Next Article in Journal
Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Previous Article in Journal / Special Issue
Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory

1
Research Center for Ethi-Culture Studies, RINRI Institute, Tokyo 102-0094, Japan
2
Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, Tokyo 141-8602, Japan
3
Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
4
F-Power Inc., Tokyo 106-6119, Japan
5
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010011
Received: 4 December 2018 / Revised: 15 February 2019 / Accepted: 15 February 2019 / Published: 21 February 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Evolution of Cooperation in Game Theory and Social Simulation)
  |  
PDF [1395 KB, uploaded 27 February 2019]
  |  

Abstract

Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; social dilemma; punishment; evolutionary games; prospect theory; nonlinear utility evolution of cooperation; social dilemma; punishment; evolutionary games; prospect theory; nonlinear utility
Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

Supplementary materials

SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Uchida, S.; Yamamoto, H.; Okada, I.; Sasaki, T. Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory. Games 2019, 10, 11.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top