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Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

1
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 5-3-1 Kojimachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0083, Japan
2
Department of Sociology, Kansai University, 3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka 564-8680, Japan
3
Department of Behavioral Science, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, N.10, W.7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060-0810, Japan
4
Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences, Hokkaido University, N.10, W.7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060-0810, Japan
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010010
Received: 29 November 2018 / Revised: 25 January 2019 / Accepted: 10 February 2019 / Published: 21 February 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Evolution of Cooperation in Game Theory and Social Simulation)
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Abstract

Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such “linkage” has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem. View Full-Text
Keywords: linked game; social dilemma; public goods game; indirect reciprocity; agent-based simulation linked game; social dilemma; public goods game; indirect reciprocity; agent-based simulation
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Inaba, M.; Takahashi, N. Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. Games 2019, 10, 10.

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