Governance in the Age of Disruption: Board Strategy and Oversight for Volatile Markets

Dear Colleagues,

Contemporary corporate governance finds itself at a historic inflection point. The confluence of geopolitical fragmentation, technological acceleration, climate-induced systemic risk, and macroeconomic volatility has rendered obsolete many of the governance frameworks that served adequately in more stable eras. Boards of directors—long conceived as stewards of institutional continuity and guardians of stakeholder value—now operate under conditions that demand not merely reactive oversight but proactive strategic intelligence. Indeed, as Aguilera and Ruiz Castillo (2025) have recently argued, traditional governance models are increasingly unable to effectively address the "radical uncertainty" that defines the contemporary operating environment, compelling boards to adopt innovative approaches that transcend probabilistic risk-management tools. It is within this context of compounding disruption that this Special Issue of Administrative Sciences, entitled "Governance in the Age of Disruption: Board Strategy and Oversight for Volatile Markets," is conceived.

Focus, Scope, and Purpose

Focus: The central preoccupation of this Special Issue is the evolving role of the board of directors under conditions of structural market volatility and systemic uncertainty. The traditional separation of governance from management—so carefully constructed by agency theorists and codified in corporate law across jurisdictions—is being tested by the speed and complexity of contemporary disruption. Boards can no longer confine themselves to ex-post oversight and fiduciary compliance; they must increasingly engage with strategic foresight, risk anticipation, and organisational resilience. This Issue focuses on how boards are—and ought to be—adapting their compositions, competencies, processes, and accountability mechanisms to meet these demands (Huse, 2007; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; van Ees, Gabrielsson & Huse, 2009). Evidence now suggests that the nature of board effectiveness in crisis conditions differs fundamentally from its manifestation in stable periods: in times of crisis, advice-oriented boards appear to fare better than monitoring-oriented boards, as information flows less easily within highly independent boards—a finding that challenges long-standing structural orthodoxies in governance design (Croci, 2023).

Scope: In this Special Issue, we welcome contributions from multiple theoretical traditions and methodological perspectives. We are interested in empirical studies—both qualitative and quantitative—as well as conceptual and theoretical work that advances our understanding of board behaviour and effectiveness in turbulent environments. Contributions may draw on agency theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, behavioural governance, or emerging frameworks such as dynamic capabilities and complexity theory (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zona, Zattoni & Minichilli, 2013). The scope encompasses listed and unlisted firms, family businesses, state-owned enterprises, and non-profit organisations across diverse institutional contexts, recognising that governance challenges in volatile markets are neither sector-specific nor geographically bounded (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). Recent comparative research confirms that boards in emerging markets experience a compounding effect of global and local pressures, wherein international shocks such as geopolitical tensions, trade disruption, and technological change do not replace domestic challenges but intensify them instead—a dynamic that renders cross-national governance scholarship more urgent than ever.

Thematic areas of particular interest include, but are not restricted to, the following: board strategic involvement and the boundaries of oversight; director expertise, cognitive diversity, and collective intelligence under uncertainty; board risk governance and the oversight of emerging risks—digital, climatic, and geopolitical; the dynamics of CEO–board relations in crisis conditions; governance of artificial intelligence and digital transformation at the board level; sustainability governance and ESG accountability structures; board renewal, director succession, and the challenge of institutional memory; and cross-national comparative governance in the context of regulatory divergence.

Purpose: The purpose of this Special Issue is threefold. First, it seeks to consolidate and advance an emerging scholarly conversation on the adaptive governance capacities required in volatile and uncertain environments. Second, it aims to bridge the persistent gap between governance theory and practice by generating insights of direct relevance to directors, institutional investors, regulators, and governance advisors. Third, it aspires to contribute to the ongoing reconceptualisation of board effectiveness—moving beyond structural proxies (board size, independence ratios, committee composition) toward a deeper understanding of board processes, behavioural dynamics, and strategic contributions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Macus, 2008; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005).

Relationship to Existing Research

The literature on corporate boards and governance has accumulated considerably over four decades. The foundational agency theoretic tradition (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) established the conceptual architecture within which boards are understood primarily as monitoring mechanisms—instruments for controlling managerial discretion and aligning executive incentives with shareholder interests. This paradigm, though influential and institutionally consequential, has attracted sustained criticism for its reductive conception of governance and its empirical shortcomings in explaining actual board behaviour (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).

Subsequent theoretical development—through stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), and institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)—enriched the conceptual palette available to governance scholars and drew attention to the resource-provisioning, legitimating, and collaborative functions of boards. The behavioural turn in governance research (Hambrick, von Werder & Zajac, 2008; Huse, 2005) further shifted analytical attention toward the internal dynamics of board functioning: the quality of deliberation, the role of power and politics in boardroom decision-making, and the social and psychological conditions that enable or inhibit effective governance.

Yet much of this accumulated scholarship was developed against the backdrop of relatively stable economic and institutional environments. The governance challenges now confronting organisations require theoretical and empirical frameworks capable of grappling with non-linear change, systemic interdependencies, and the governance of deep uncertainty (Miller & Sardais, 2011; Pugliese et al., 2009; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Three domains in particular have emerged in recent scholarship as urgently requiring new governance frameworks, and it is in relation to these that this Special Issue makes its most distinctive contribution.

The first is the governance of geopolitical risk. While dealing with geopolitical and political risks has a long history in international business, the fast-changing and increasingly volatile global reality has renewed interest among both practitioners and scholars, prompting calls for boards to move beyond reactive crisis management toward institutionalised geopolitical competency (Klopf, Suder & Kallmorgen, 2025). Empirical work confirms that geopolitical risk increases corporate risk-taking and that diversification strategies do not uniformly smooth out this effect (Li et al., 2024), underscoring the need for board-level frameworks that go beyond conventional enterprise risk management. A survey by The Conference Board found that company CEOs ranked geopolitical risk as their main concern for 2025, while geopolitical strategists have warned that the international system may be entering a "geopolitical risk supercycle" (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance)—a condition that places extraordinary demands on board-level foresight and scenario planning capabilities.

The second domain concerns the governance of artificial intelligence and digital transformation. The proliferation of generative AI across corporate functions has confronted boards with oversight challenges for which established governance frameworks offer limited guidance. As of 2024, only 39% of Fortune 100 companies disclosed any form of board oversight of AI—whether through a committee, a director with AI expertise, or an ethics board—while a global survey of directors found that 66% report that their boards have limited to no knowledge or experience with AI (McKinsey & Company) (McKinsey, 2025). This governance lacuna represents both a structural risk and a scholarly opportunity of considerable magnitude. Existing research on digital transformation governance (Weill & Woerner, 2018) requires substantial augmentation to address the specific deliberative, compositional, and accountability requirements that AI oversight imposes on boards.

The third domain is the evolving architecture of sustainability governance and ESG accountability. The regulatory landscape has shifted dramatically in recent years. The EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), and the IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards have collectively produced what amounts to a mandatory governance architecture for environmental and social accountability (Kim et al., 2025). Scholarship has begun to document the board-level implications of this transformation. The percentage of Fortune 100 board members possessing relevant ESG credentials has risen from 29% to 43%, with growth concentrated in environmental and governance credentials (Harvard Business Review), while the creation of dedicated sustainability committees has surged as a governance response to regulatory pressure (Tamimi & Sebastianelli, 2024). Yet significant expertise gaps persist, and the relationship between board ESG competency, sustainability committee design, and actual environmental and social performance remains insufficiently theorised (Grau Grau et al., 2025).

This Special Issue is positioned to make a distinctive contribution precisely at the intersection of these three domains and the broader governance literature. It will supplement existing scholarship not merely by extending established frameworks to new empirical contexts but by interrogating the adequacy of those frameworks themselves and advancing conceptually novel approaches to governance under disruption. In doing so, it engages productively with adjacent studies—on strategic leadership (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009), organisational resilience (Duchek, 2020), enterprise risk governance, and comparative institutional analysis—bringing governance scholarship into productive conversation with these rapidly evolving fields. The integration of these perspectives will, we anticipate, yield a Special Issue of substantive theoretical ambition and clear practical relevance.

We request that, prior to submitting a manuscript, interested authors initially submit a proposed title and an abstract of 300–500 words summarising their intended contribution. Please send it to the Guest Editor (dtipuric@efzg.hr) or to the Administrative Sciences Editorial Office (admsci@mdpi.com). Abstracts will be reviewed by the Guest Editors for the purposes of ensuring proper fit within the scope of the Special Issue. Full manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review

References

Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447–465.

Aguilera, R. V., & Ruiz Castillo, M. (2025). Toward an updated corporate governance framework: Fundamentals, disruptions, and future research. Organization & Management, advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/23409444251320399

Croci, E. (2023). Board characteristics and firm resilience: Evidence from disruptive events. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 31(2), 312–334. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12518

Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371–382.

Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47.

DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160.

Duchek, S. (2020). Organizational resilience: A capability-based conceptualization. Business Research, 13(1), 215–246.

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management Journal, 21(10–11), 1105–1121.

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325.

Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. (2009). Strategic Leadership: Theory and Research on Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards. Oxford University Press.

Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 489–505.

Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Pitman.

Grau Grau, A., et al. (2025). Board structure and ESG performance: The moderating role of country-level gender parity. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.70067

Hambrick, D. C., von Werder, A., & Zajac, E. J. (2008). New directions in corporate governance research. Organization Science, 19(3), 381–385.

Heidrick & Struggles / INSEAD Corporate Governance Centre/BCG. (2026). Governing Under High Uncertainty: Opportunities for Emerging-Market Boards. INSEAD.

Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383–396.

Huse, M. (2005). Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of Management, 16(S1), S65–S79.

Huse, M. (2007). Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side of Corporate Governance. Cambridge University Press.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.

Kim, Y., et al. (2025). Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) research: A systematic review of recent trends (2020–2024). Sustainable Development, advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.70370

Klopf, P., Suder, G., & Kallmorgen, A. (2025). Geopolitics and corporate governance: Are boards of directors prepared for an era of global uncertainty? In S. Michel (Ed.), Best Practice in Governance. International Institute for Management Development.

Krueger, P., Sautner, Z., Tang, D. Y., & Zhong, R. (2024). The effects of mandatory ESG disclosure around the world. Journal of Accounting Research, 62(5), 1795–1847.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517.

Li, X., Yan, D., & Chen, W. (2024). Do geopolitical risks increase corporate risk-taking? Based on the perspective of diversification expansion. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 32(3), 428–448. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12538

Macus, M. (2008). Board capability: An interactions perspective towards understanding board effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(4), 303–317.

McKinsey & Company. (2025). Elevating board governance through AI posture and archetypes. McKinsey Technology Insights. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-technology/our-insights/the-ai-reckoning-how-boards-can-evolve

McNulty, T., & Pettigrew, A. (1999). Strategists on the board. Organization Studies, 20(1), 47–74.

Miller, D., & Sardais, C. (2011). Angel agents: Agency theory reconsidered. Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(2), 6–13.

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper & Row.

Pugliese, A., Bezemer, P.-J., Zattoni, A., Huse, M., Van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. (2009). Boards of directors' contribution to strategy: A literature review, 1972–2007. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 292–306.

Roberts, J., McNulty, T., & Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British Journal of Management, 16(S1), S5–S26.

Stiles, P., & Taylor, B. (2001). Boards at Work: How Directors View Their Roles and Responsibilities. Oxford University Press.

Tamimi, N., & Sebastianelli, R. (2024). Board ESG expertise and sustainability committee governance. Journal of Business Ethics, advance online publication.

van Ees, H., Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2009). Toward a behavioral theory of boards and corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 307–319.

Weill, P., & Woerner, S. L. (2018). What's Your Digital Business Model? Six Questions to Help You Build the Next-Generation Enterprise. Harvard Business Review Press.

Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291–334.

Zona, F., Zattoni, A., & Minichilli, A. (2013). A contingency model of boards of directors and firm innovation: The moderating role of firm size. British Journal of Management, 24(3), 299–315.

Prof. Dr. Darko Tipurić
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 250 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for assessment.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Administrative Sciences is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

• corporate governance
• board of directors
• strategic oversight
• market volatility
• organisational resilience
• ESG accountability
• artificial intelligence governance
• geopolitical risk