Examining the Anthropological–Philosophical Implicit Content in Carl Menger’s Value Theory Through Three Philosophers

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Referee report on “Understanding Carl Menger’s theory of value through three philosophers”
Report intended for the journal Philosophies
The paper is about the economic thought of Carl Menger examined in its philosophical basis, focusing 
on theory of value. The paper compares this theory with anthropological views by three philosophers / 
literary writers: Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold Gehlen and José Ortega y Gasset (Nota: the referee indicates
being only slightly acquainted with the works by Ortega y Gasset. Incidentally: this writer’s first name 
should appear the first time he is quoted). The goal is to help understand better what the author sees as 
the implicit contents of Menger’s views, as well as spot shortcomings in Menger’s views on value. The 
structure is simple: one section per author examined. Comparison runs through, much is descriptive here.
Section 1. In the Introduction, the choice of such diverse three authors, albeit naturally free (any paper 
author chooses his/her topic of study) and as such legitimate, the reader cannot but wonder: why these
(and not such other)? The selection should be justified and an argument of the style “there is an 
anthropological side to it…” (see the abstract and introduction, for instance: “We hypothesize that these 
authors will help us broaden our understanding of Menger’s theoretical framework and allow us to think 
beyond it.”, passim as well) is not enough. Surely readers grant freedom of choice, but still they wonder
and the author should explain. It is all the more so as the methodology consists here purely in comparing
notions (therefore it is indeed philosophical) and displays no quest for “influence” (a labile concept 
anyway). It is not said whether Menger read Feuerbach or if later authors like Ortega y Gasset actually 
read Menger, because the paper is not such a quest. Then pure comparison may be illuminating, but it 
may also appear gratuitous and thus the author needs to explain more his choice and motivate selecting.
The paper really starts (section 2) with a section on Menger’s work and his theory of value. It is qualified 
here as “projective” because “the value given to objects is the second act of a process, whose first act 
consists in the valuation of the satisfaction of one’s own needs, and it is this first estimation that is 
projected onto objects, thus giving them value”: this description is correct, even if one wonders if there 
is a serious need to call “projective” this theory. The tendency to label (e.g. calling the theory 
“projective”) may actually serve an author in distinguishing what one thinker said from what others did,
but it is reducing the scale and the philosophical questioning. The paper goes forth by differentiating 
notions rather than assimilating them, which is fine, but more study of conditions and caveats by thinkers 
(and Menger was prolix on them) should appear to proceed convincingly and not only deliver 
stimulating insights, but provide actual rich original knowledge.
Albeit the description of Menger’s theory of value is quite correct as it is summed up in a graph by the 
author, it is very short: it is summed up in a graph, as if this could be enough, while the conditions of 
possibility of writing the graph itself are not examined. What about notions that become conditions, like 
time (and delays if forming the projection, in realizing how the object relates), ignorance (incomplete 
information- one thinks of a disciple like Friedrich Hayek, or beliefs about fictive goods - one thinks of 
Menger’s son Karl Menger, or of Ludwig von Mises etc.)
About section 3 and L. Feuerbach. Here again the description seems correct, albeit simplified. For 
instance, one does not grasp well why “A” and “- A” are that important in Feuerbach’s representing the 
structure of needs if one does not have in mind the structure of the Ich and the Anstoss principle in the 
philosophy J.G. Fichte. Feuerbach received all of German Idealism before putting it upside down. In 
this paper it is impossible to grasp that. Conversely, the notion of “sensing” (Sinnlichkeit) and the
thresholds (Reizschwelle, where Reiz is better adapted to what the author seems to wish to say than Sinn)
involved in the process relate to Menger within Menger’s times context, that is experimental psychology 
and the Weber-Fechner psychophysiologisches Grundgesetz much more than through Feuerbach. Since 
expert on Menger G. Campagnolo is cited in the literature, it would be useful to consult the volume Carl 
Menger. Neu erörtert unter Einbeziehung nachgelassener Texte / Discussed on the Basis of New 
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Findings, Frankfurt/Main & Wien, Peter Lang, 2008, « Was the Austrian School a “Psychological” 
School in the realm of Economics in Carl Menger’s view? », pp. 165-186, to see how Menger rejected 
a psycho-anthropological take on his understanding of the role of the senses, but not sensation as a 
signaling process that starts reflexive liberation process from needs, within economic analysis. Menger’s 
notion of Bedürfnisbefriedigung could (should) appear here, especially since the author throws in 
Glückseligkeitstrieb. Referring to instincts and the like should bring readers to Menger’s debate against 
experimental psychology of his times more efficiently than the contraposition with Feuerbach’s views, 
all the more as, finally, Feuerbach belonged to the circle of heirs to German Idealism (albeit critically) 
and not to the Austrian brand of contesting the legitimacy of German-inspired views. In a nutshell: what 
is said about Feuerbach seems acceptable and stimulating, albeit short, but out of place to refer to Menger. 
The comparison could alternatively be more detailed, for instance by characterizing side by side 
Bedürfnisbefriedigung and Glückseligkeitstrieb and detailing where Menger would fall short. The last 
sentence by the author is interesting in this way: “in the very experience of wanting we should find a 
teleological direction: the desire to cease to be a need to become a satisfaction”. Is this not already in
Menger? The referee would support it is explicitly as the analysis of Bedürfnisbefriedigung would show.
And where it is to be found in Feuerbach, which are the aspects that a detailed comparison would offer?
The term “dialectical” nature surfaces here and is put forth by the author: this makes sense with 
Feuerbach heir to German Idealism, but it does not produce any argument contra Menger (rather pro
but this would require a detailed explanation. The author of the paper remains too concise - or short?).
Section 4 bears on Gehlen. Again noteworthy remarks are made. But why start the section with “even…” 
as if there was a concession to be made? The notion of “need” inaugurates many German philosophical 
(economic, psychological and anthropological) works at the time. Indeed the author could also illustrate 
the views put forth with something as general as vocable references: for instance, the German language 
offers advantages for philosophy often inscribed right away in vocabulary. Example: where man is 
“irreducible to animality”, the German language has fressen (eat) for animals and essen for humans. 
This is anecdotic, but one should not receive an impression that Menger would tend to reduce the human 
nature. On the contrary, the full process of choice underlying the notion of value makes sense as humans 
make choices, while systematic optimization in the economic standard understanding could be seen even 
as basic as a tendency of nature itself. This is true for vegetals, minerals and so on: actually true of the 
frame within which humankind explains the world to itself - here we would be back to discussing the
conditions of pure theoretical reason upon the basis of Kant’s Critique of pure reason. This does not 
appear in the paper (and does not have to, it would lead too far astray), but Menger annotated Kant in 
detail on this point (again, see for instance G. Campagnolo « Carl Menger, réformateur de l’économie 
politique, devant Aristote et Kant », Cahiers philosophiques, 179/4, pp.101-120). Anyhow when this 
section gets back to psychological concerns, the remarks made in the previous Section 3 apply.
Section 5 is on Ortega y Gasset and the referee would rather not comment, but say the pleasure to learn 
from the contexts of works his knowledge of is too superficial to allow refereeing. The only point is that 
insisting on the incompleteness of the human being (physiologically and psychologically as well) looks 
more like a common field Menger and the authors discussed share than one upon which to compare 
them to try to display shortcuts in Menger’s work. Rather the analysis would tend to stress how much 
Menger and the three philosophers “side together”, so to speak, and as the author says using the latter 
helps showing “the implicit content of human need” in the former. Yes, as well as to distinguish them 
from the indeed reduced views that on the contrary dominate in more standard economics. 
All in all, if one may grant that the goal is partly reached: it is not that there would be more in the 
philosophers examined here, but that one may learn more about Menger’s notion by comparing it with 
the latter, which the author of the paper tries to do. It should then be said that Menger’s view is here less 
“broadened” than “better displayed”. Indeed items in the conclusion all belong to Menger’s notion 
(perhaps except #12 in the conclusion “Herein lies the "Promethean” character of the human being.”
That would call for discussion).
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Also the last sentence of the paper (“In this sense, our needs are the condition 440 of possibility of our 
openness to a more-than-natural life.”) belongs to the comment on Ortega y Gasset. It may be correct 
and it may also apply to Menger. However, Menger was always very careful in not taking side on the 
ontology, so it would be excessive to confer his notion of value this view that published texts would fail 
to support. Menger’s frame is already open enough not to call for transcendence, at least at the level of 
economic analysis, where Menger’s philosophical analysis aims at maintaining its discourse.
Now, this depth in the notion of value would show in views coming from the history of the school that 
followed Menger’s works. The Viennese professor started the Austrian school of economics. So it is 
correct to see in Menger’s works more a philosophical understanding of notions (of need, of value)
applied to economics than economics in a restricted sense. Hence Menger has more in common with 
philosophers than with standard economists (especially as we may see them today). The author s right 
in this and it connects with his starting point in a book in Spanish by O. Vara wherefrom he quotes in 
the introduction: “economists cannot get rid, at the moment of doing their work, of certain 
preconceptions of reality that they carry with them.” Vara is of course not alone in this (the author 
justifies in footnote 1). But the results in the conclusion show well that Menger is not isolated/“out of 
the blue” and there should be more context. Here, the author writes as if Menger had not originated any 
school, whereas disciples refer to him often. Leaving no room in the paper to mention the Austrian
school is clearly a lacuna - or should be made explicit and justified from the start presenting good reasons.
The paper is in English. Not being a native speaker, I will not pronounce on the quality of the writing, 
which seems to me fine and in all cases is clear and easily understandable. Given some references given 
in Spanish, it is quite possible that the author is a native Spanish-speaker. And it is not coincidental if 
Section 5 on Ortega y Gasset is the longest and most developed. As such, and even if the paper is in 
English, why not at least provide references in Spanish in the bibliography for major titles? For instance 
if the author does not read German, then Menger’s Principles is available in the following editions: 
Principios de economia politica, Madrid, Unión Editorial, coll. « Clásicos de la libertad », 1977; -
Principios de economia politica, Barcelona, Ediciones Orbis, coll. « Biblioteca de Economia », 1985.
A note about the system of references : using one figure only (instead of name of author and title of 
book, or name and date of publication of the book) and thus having to relate to the list of quoted texts 
serves to shorten the length of the paper, but is not so much convenient for a reader.
General appraisal: The paper is interesting, stimulating but made of considerations (as the author entitles 
its sections) that fall short to provide a thorough comparison, often (but not only) for lack of context. 
The paper is too short generally speaking for its purpose. Is this being short a constraint made by the 
journal? If not, then the advice would be to let the author justify by developing in many aspects the 
paper: the author should contextualize, justify and complete the nature of choices, the characterization
of notions and more than a few statements that appear in the present version

Author Response

Dear referee, in the document attached you will find our responses. Thank you for your work!

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Very original work. 

Author Response

Thank you

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article under review presents a highly engaging topic, not only because it addresses a central concept in contemporary debates across economics, philosophy, and even specialized fields such as anthropology and biology, but also because it does so from theoretical premises that, as the author demonstrates, are both distinct and complementary. The analysis begins with an exploration of the implicit content of human need as the foundation of Menger’s theory of value, and proceeds to offer an anthropological perspective by drawing on what the author terms three anthropological considerations: Feuerbach, Gehlen, and Ortega y Gasset. Each of these thinkers not only provides a meaningful lens through which to understand the theory of value from the standpoint of human need, but also helps broaden the scope of the discussion,extending it to domains as diverse as the human condition, the animal realm, and even technology.

In this regard, I find the article to be very well written, with clear argumentative coherence and an important contribution to the debate at hand. It sheds new light on the issue of values, which remains a core concern in contemporary philosophy.

Author Response

thank you

Reviewer 4 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I am grateful for the opportunity to read this interesting paper on the concept of need in Menger, Gehlen, Feuerbach, and Ortega y Gasset. I was not very familiar with the thought of the last three authors, so I have learned about them through this work. In contrast, Instead, I have studied Menger’s work more thoroughly, and consequently, I believe the paper correctly describes his theory of need, though it lacks reference to Menger distinction between objective and subjective needs and to social needs (in the second edition of the Principles: cf. Becchio 2015).

The abstract states that the authors “hypothesize that, despite belonging to heterogeneous philosophical traditions, the authors above can help us fully understand the concept of need in Menger, a topic that he did not develop in depth.”

I believe this hypothesis is flawed. As the authors themselves acknowledge, Gehlen, Feuerbach, and Ortega y Gasset belong to philosophical traditions that differ significantly from Menger’s. I agree with several scholars who have argued that Menger’s theory of need and value has Aristotelian roots (see, for example, Gilles Campagnolo 2004, pp. 2002-2010). In this sense, Feuerbach’s sensitive theory of needs, Gehlen’s biological view of the human being, and Ortega’s psychological approach are foreign to Menger’s framework, which has its own value. These perspectives do not contribute to a better understanding of Menger’s notion of need. (On Menger’s non-psychological approach, see also Campagnolo 2008.)

While the theories of need proposed by Gehlen, Feuerbach, and Ortega y Gasset might offer interesting elements to enrich a general theory of need, they are not particularly relevant to understanding Menger’s position. My suggestion would be to reformulate the paper as a broader theoretical proposal that incorporates these different perspectives—after a deeper examination of the philosophical foundations of Menger’s concept of need. However, this would be a different paper.

References:

Becchio, G. (2015). “Social needs, social goods, and human associations in the second edition of Carl Menger’s Principles”, History of Political Economy 46(2), pp. 247–264.

Campagnolo, G. (2004). Critique de l’économie politique classique, PUF, Paris.

Campagnolo, G. (2008). « Was the Austrian School a “Psychological” School in the realm of Economics in Carlos Menger’s view?”, in G. Campagnolo (ed.), Carl Menger. Discussed on the Basis of New Findings, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, pp. 165-186.

 

Author Response

Dear referee,

thank you for your work. In the document attached, we provide some response to your reviews.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The author has taken into account remarks that were made upon the former version. The topic is just as interesting as before and the legitimization of the approach has been somewhat increased. The Introduction and Part I on Menger has been modified and bettered. The parts on Feuerbach and Gehlen less so: I could recommend working those some more; The impression that seeing revisions provides is that they diminish as the reading goes on, and this suggests that more time could have been employed.

About the selection of authors discussed in relationship to Menger, naturally the author of a paper is free to choose his/her topic of inquiry - that is a certain thing that warrants freedom of scholarship. The chosen approach may remain doubtful to the reader, but if it is justified and clarified, it helps much. Here it is now the case, but this could also be improved some more and I would advise to do so. In other words: as the reviewer, I am still not fully convinced by present choices by the paper's author, but some work has been done by the author to assert his/her choices and this is positive.

Consequently, additions to parts where I am most competent improved and nourished the text in my view. A few remarks are still in order: for instance, beware that Menger studied (or at least screened well) the works by W. Wundt, the "pope" of experimental psychology in his days, yet only to reject it strongly if such psychology intended to provide a basis to a pure theory of economics. Since the paper's author aims to deal with the anthropological aspects of Mengerian theory, it seems natural to stress such elements that support the stress Menger always put on a "pure theory of economics" ("eine reine theoretische Wirtschaftslehre", the title he wanted to give to a re-edition of his 1871 Principles, which he himself never provided).

As specified in my lengthy previous report, I only discussed points I am familiar enough with - and therefore unfortunately not on the section about Ortega y Gasset.

The English language is clear and easily understandable. The fact that corrections by revisions (probably on Word) all appear on the PDF file makes the reading a little difficult (for instance "Menger'sian" appears when probably "Menger's" got corrected into "Mengerian"). Beware when polishing the final version.

Author Response

Dear Referee,

please find attached a rebuttal letter explaining the changes we introduced in our paper. 

Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Reviewer 4 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I agree with the new version of the paper. 

Author Response

Thank you