Sectarian Diplomacy and the Transformation of Ottoman Statecraft: Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s Embassy to Qajar Iran (1810–1813)

Abstract

At the beginning of the 19th century, Ottoman–Iranian relations entered a new diplomatic phase shaped by Russia’s expansion in the Caucasus and Britain’s growing influence in the Persian Gulf. This shared perception of external threats led to the establishment of a more structured and representative diplomatic framework between the two empires. This study examines the embassy of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi, who was appointed as Ottoman ambassador to Iran between 1810 and 1813, in the context of a shifting diplomatic mindset. Yâsincizâde’s mission is analyzed not merely as a temporary diplomatic engagement, but as a form of ideological, sectarian, and cultural representation by a figure from the ulema class. Based on archival sources, the study reveals that his diplomatic reports and observations provided critical input to the central administration, contributing to the development of more institutionalized and long-term strategies in Ottoman policy toward Iran. By focusing on the transitional character of his embassy, the paper reassesses the evolving role of religious scholars in Ottoman foreign relations and situates this case between the classical sefaretnâme tradition and emerging modern diplomatic practices.

1. Introduction

Diplomacy, whose historical roots can be traced back to ancient civilizations, remains one of the oldest and most essential political instruments ensuring the continuity of interstate relations. In early civilizations such as Sumer, Assyria, Phoenicia, China, Egypt, India, Greece, and Rome, various forms of political representation emerged, most of which were shaped around task-specific and temporary embassies (Liverani 2001, pp. 177–86). By the nineteenth century, however, following the Industrial Revolution, the intensified colonial activities of the Western powers enabled them to establish a more permanent presence within imperial territories such as those of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran; consequently, diplomatic practice was reshaped on the basis of permanent missions and institutionalized relations (Savaş 2007, p. 13).

This transformation was not only political but also deeply connected with economic and technological change. The Industrial Revolution, by generating new forms of military capacity, industrial production, and transportation infrastructure, directly affected diplomatic communication and the tempo of political negotiation. The Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, confronted with these dynamics, were compelled to adapt their diplomatic strategies in order to prevent isolation and maintain sovereignty. In this context, the growing involvement of specific European powers—namely Britain, France, and Russia—forced both empires to reconsider how permanent missions and sustained embassies could function as protective mechanisms rather than mere instruments of representation.

In the early periods of the Ottoman Empire, diplomatic relations were conducted within a framework of legitimacy derived from military victories and under a unilateral hierarchical understanding of power. Relations with both the East and the West largely developed through warfare and post-conflict negotiation; diplomacy was often a byproduct of conquest rather than an autonomous practice. Until the late seventeenth century, Ottoman diplomacy was built upon a centralist and superiority-based paradigm that did not recognize its counterparts as equals (İnalcık 2000). From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, however, military defeats, the erosion of central authority, and structural transformations in Europe compelled the Ottomans to adopt a model based on mutual recognition and permanent diplomacy (Savaş 2007, p. 13). This evolution marked a crucial shift from temporary envoy missions to continuous diplomatic presence—a change also mirrored in Ottoman–Qajar relations.

The inclusion of Qajar Iran (established in 1796 after the fall of the Zand dynasty) into the sphere of Ottoman diplomacy represented a new phase in the long history of Ottoman–Iranian encounters. Diplomatic representation no longer served only for conflict resolution but also became a key tool for intelligence-gathering, balance-of-power politics, and the defense of imperial interests through sustained dialogue.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in an environment where Europe and Russia dictated most political and diplomatic norms, the Ottoman Empire sought to organize its diplomatic apparatus more systematically. Ambassadors dispatched to various countries recorded their political, economic, religious, and social observations in the form of sefaretnâmes (embassy reports). One of these was authored by Seyyid Mehmed Refi Efendi, who served as ambassador in Tehran in 1807–1808, and another by Bozoklu Osman Şâkir Efendi, who accompanied Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi between 1810 and 1813. Osman Şâkir compiled his observations in the Musavver İran Sefâretnâmesi, later rendered into modern Turkish by Gülnur Kavak (Kavak 2016). Within this framework, the embassy of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi to Qajar Iran between 1810 and 1813 not only formed a crucial component of the evolving relations between the two empires but also served as an example of how Ottoman diplomacy adapted to a multipolar geopolitical context.

In this study, the term “Ottoman delegation” refers specifically to the embassy headed by Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi, with Bozoklu Osman Şâkir Efendi serving as the Persian interpreter and (as recorded in contemporary sources) Hayret Efendi among the entourage; the mission departed from Istanbul on 20 Ramazan 1225 (19 October 1810) and proceeded toward Tehran (Osman Şâkir Efendi 2018, p. 21).

On the Istanbul side, foreign correspondence in this period was handled by the Reisülküttâb (Chief of Scribes) and the Amedi Kalemi (Amedci) attached to the Imperial Council, which received, registered, and relayed ambassadorial dispatches. These bureaucratic offices functioned as proto-ministries of foreign affairs until 1836, when they were reorganized under the Umur-ı Hariciye Nezâreti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (BOA, HAT, 795/36895, 27 June 1809).

The historical background of Ottoman–Iranian relations produced conflicts that were not only geopolitical but also sectarian and ideological. With the establishment of the Safavid state under Shah Ismāʿil in 1501, Iran—under Safavid, and later Qajar rule—ceased to be a mere neighbor on the eastern frontier and became an ideological rival challenging Ottoman Sunni identity (Keven 2015, p. 14). Shah Ismāʿil’s adoption of Twelver Shiʿism as the state religion carried Ottoman–Safavid relations into a religious breaking point and provided fertile ground for political and military conflicts (Ocak 2000, pp. 148–50). The 1514 Çaldıran Campaign marked the first major military manifestation of this tension, serving as a turning point that revealed how sectarian rivalry crystallized on both theological and geopolitical levels (Bitlisî 2001, p. 180).

From the sixteenth century onwards, the deepening Ottoman–Safavid rivalry acquired continuity in ideological, economic, and theological dimensions. Both sides issued fatwas delegitimizing each other in an effort to shape public opinion; while on the Ottoman side the caliphate and Sunni orthodoxy were constructed as the foundation of legitimacy, on the Safavid side, the doctrine of the Imamate became the ideological basis of sovereignty (Tan 2024, pp. 2065–66). Despite this contentious context, Ottoman diplomacy at times displayed pragmatic tendencies. For example, in the mid-seventeenth century, even the idea of a temporary Ottoman–Safavid alliance against external Sunni powers was discussed (Saçmalı 2024a, pp. 392–414). The fact that in 1656 an Ottoman Shaykh al-Islām proposed such an alliance demonstrates that sectarian conflicts could be mitigated by realpolitik considerations (Saçmalı 2024a, p. 407).

By the late eighteenth century, following the fall of the Safavids and the short-lived Zand rule, the emergence of the Qajar dynasty (1796) brought a new diplomatic pattern. During this era, sectarian tensions subsided, and relations centered more on issues of border demarcation, security, and the growing Russian threat (Uzunçarşılı 1988, p. 459; Karadeniz 2012, p. 300). The 1804–1813 Iran–Russia War fostered a shared sense of vulnerability between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, encouraging more frequent exchanges of envoys. Within this geopolitical setting, Yâsincizâde’s mission to Tehran can be seen as both a response to Russian expansionism and an effort to institutionalize Ottoman diplomacy toward its eastern neighbor.

This study, therefore, aims to contextualize Ottoman diplomatic modernization and sectarian diplomacy through the Iranian embassy of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi (1810–1813), demonstrating how his mission reflected both the pragmatism and the ideological limits of Ottoman foreign policy in the early nineteenth century.

2. Method

This study employs a qualitative research design based on the document analysis technique, aiming to interpret diplomatic sources through both contextual and textual perspectives. The research materials are grouped into two main categories: primary and secondary sources.

The primary sources consist of sefaretnâmes, archival documents, and original manuscripts that directly reflect Ottoman–Qajar diplomatic relations between 1810 and 1813. In particular, Bozoklu Osman Şâkir’s Musavver İran Sefâretnâmesi and Seyyid Mehmed Refi Efendi’s embassy report from Tehran (1807–1808) were comparatively examined within the context of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s mission (Kavak 2016). Archival materials were obtained from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), the Topkapı Palace Archives (TSMK), and the Millet Manuscript Library, with the catalog numbers of relevant documents indicated in footnotes where appropriate.

The secondary sources include scholarly studies on Ottoman diplomacy and on the sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical dimensions of Ottoman–Iranian relations. Research by İnalcık (2000), Savaş (2007), Karadeniz (2012), Liverani (2001), Ocak (2000), Uzunçarşılı (1988), Keven (2015), Tan (2024), and Saçmalı (2024a, 2024b) shaped both the methodological and conceptual framework. These works were not treated as descriptive references but were critically assessed in order to situate the primary sources within the broader historiography of Ottoman diplomacy and to test existing interpretations. Accordingly, the sefaretnâmes were analyzed not merely as narratives of events but also as textual instruments revealing diplomatic discourse, modes of representation, and ideological positioning.

The archival and textual documents were examined through a combination of critical reading and comparative contextualization. Information extracted from the texts was evaluated not only for its factual content but also with attention to its authorship, purpose of composition, and rhetorical framing. In this regard, specific attention was paid to Yâsincizâde’s use of diplomatic language, intelligence reporting style, and portrayal of sectarian issues, as well as to broader themes such as travel accounts, border negotiations, reciprocity practices, and ceremonial protocol. Wherever possible, cross-references were established between Ottoman archival records and the Persian and British diplomatic correspondences of the same period.

The collected data were categorized under thematic headings according to content and contextual analysis methods. Historical events were not addressed solely in chronological sequence; rather, causal and functional relationships among processes—such as the diplomatic dynamics of the Ottoman–Iranian–Russian triangle, Britain’s mediation initiatives, and the temporary transcendence of sectarian rivalry through realpolitik considerations—were also considered. This approach was designed to reveal how diplomatic texts both reflected and shaped the evolution of Ottoman foreign policy mechanisms.

At every stage of the research, the principles of scholarly transparency, source criticism, and intertextual verification were applied. The conclusions were drawn directly from both primary and secondary sources, with interpretive statements supported by document-based evidence. Thus, the methodological structure of this study aligns not only with the established practices of Ottoman historiography but also with contemporary standards of qualitative research, ensuring that the analysis remains both academically rigorous and empirically verifiable.

3. Ottoman–Iranian Relations in the Early Nineteenth Century

The dynastic transformation that occurred in Iran at the end of the eighteenth century was far more than a mere change of rulership; it fundamentally altered the structure of domestic authority and the direction of foreign policy. With the decline of the Zand dynasty, the newly established Qajar rule sought to rebuild a fragmented polity by restoring internal order and redefining external alignments (Avery 1379, p. 59). Following the assassination of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar in 1797, his nephew Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834) ascended the throne. The early years of his reign were spent suppressing tribal revolts and reasserting central control (Markham [1364] 1985, pp. 33–35), yet this consolidation soon allowed for a more active and calculated diplomacy (Amanat 1997, p. 4).

This diplomatic reorientation unfolded within a highly volatile regional environment. The Ottoman Empire, facing both internal decentralization and external military pressures, found itself drawn into an increasingly complex triangle involving Qajar Iran, Russia, and Britain. The ideological and sectarian dimensions of Ottoman–Iranian relations—rooted in the legacy of Safavid–Ottoman rivalry—remained present but were now reframed through pragmatic cooperation.

The year 1801 marked a critical rupture. On the day of Ghadir Khumm, a date of deep symbolic importance for Shiʿis, the shrine of Imam Ḥusayn in Karbala, nominally under Ottoman jurisdiction, was attacked by a Wahhabi force of roughly ten thousand men led by ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. Muḥammad b. Saud. The dome was destroyed, the treasury looted, and approximately two thousand Shiʿis massacred. Contemporary observers—including both Ottoman and Iranian chroniclers—interpreted the event not only as a local security failure but as a theological affront with regional consequences. Tehran claimed that the attackers had come from Ottoman territory and demanded their punishment through diplomatic channels (Algar 2002, pp. 24–25). Acting on Fath Ali Shah’s orders, a mission was dispatched to Baghdad, while the Ottoman side announced plans to rebuild the shrine and reinforce its fortifications (Karadeniz 2012, p. 300).

Karbala, though formally within the Ottoman provincial system, effectively stood between imperial authority and tribal autonomy. Local Kurdish and Arab notables often controlled access and security, complicating the enforcement of central directives. For context, Abdurrahman Pasha Baban (d. 1813) was emir of the Baban principality centered in Sulaymaniyah, while Ibrahim Pasha Baban (d. 1806)—credited with founding the city—had preceded him. In Baghdad, the late Mamluk governor “Küçük” Süleyman Pasha (in office 1807–1810) oversaw the Ottoman frontier administration. These figures collectively defined the political geography within which Ottoman–Qajar diplomacy unfolded.

Although most sources place the Karbala attack in 1801, some record it as 21 April 1802; this study follows the former chronology in accordance with Algar (2002).

Soon thereafter, a deeper crisis erupted. Upon Ibrahim Pasha’s death in 1806, his post was granted to Halit Pasha Baban, provoking the rebellion of Abdurrahman Pasha, who fled to Iran after defeat. This episode evolved into a frontier dispute: the Baghdad governor Ali Pasha requested his extradition under treaty terms (BOA, HAT, 161/6703, 9 March 1807), but—acting without approval from Istanbul—he launched a military incursion into Iranian territory, sparking hostilities. Ottoman forces suffered heavy losses at Merivan, and Istanbul thereafter instructed Baghdad to act with greater restraint (Bayburdî [1349] 1930, pp. 52–53; Karadeniz 2012, pp. 301–2).

This tense frontier environment was overshadowed by a larger geopolitical reality: the rise of Russia as a shared adversary. The Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia (1806–1812), while Iran fought its own campaigns (1804–1813) in the Caucasus (Axworthy 2008, pp. 178–79). These parallel conflicts created the basis for pragmatic convergence, and with Britain’s mediation, a triadic diplomatic configuration emerged. British policymakers, concerned with maintaining access to India, actively encouraged an Ottoman–Iranian alignment to counter Russian expansion (Piri 2011, p. 118).

Within this context, Crown Prince Abbās Mīrzā’s reformist policies gained prominence. By 1810, under British pressure, Iran formally proposed an alliance, which the Ottoman side received favorably. The two states concluded an agreement envisioning coordinated operations against Russia (Şânîzâde 2008, p. 96). According to the protocol, joint military action in the Caucasus was to be supported by British financial and technical assistance (Teymurova 2016, pp. 45–59).

Meanwhile, Fath Ali Shah also sought contact with France. In 1806, he appealed to Napoleon Bonaparte for support, leading to the dispatch of a French military mission under General Gardane (Yılmaz 2014, pp. 65–96). This multipolar diplomatic landscape required the Ottoman Empire to recalibrate its Iranian policy, culminating in the appointment of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi as ambassador to Iran (Osman Şâkir Efendi 2018, p. 49). This mission aimed both to resolve bilateral disputes and to create the diplomatic infrastructure for an anti-Russian alliance.

Reciprocal initiatives followed. Iran dispatched Asker Khan and later Ibrahim Efendi, the mufti of Khoy, to the Ottoman court (Unat 1987, p. 206). The Ottoman reply was significant: Sultan Mahmud II’s decision to send Yâsincizâde Seyyid Abdülvehhâb Efendi in early 1810 signaled not only a ceremonial exchange but an intention to institutionalize permanent diplomacy.

In a Hatt-ı Hümâyûn dated 4 February 1810 (29 Zilhicce 1224), it was reported that a two-month truce between Iran and Russia—mediated by France—had been initiated. The Iranian emissary Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, citing the notion of cihet-i camia-i İslâmiye (“the collective cause of Islam”), formally invited the Ottoman Empire to join an anti-Russian alliance (BOA, HAT, 795/36895). This invocation of Islamic unity illustrates how sectarian identity was temporarily transcended through political pragmatism.

The same document reveals that symbolism accompanied policy: Yâsincizâde was elevated to the rank of mevleviyet and presented with a robe of investiture (hilʿat), emphasizing both his personal distinction and the diplomatic gravity of his mission. Such ceremonial gestures functioned as instruments of political communication, projecting the prestige of the Ottoman court and affirming Yâsincizâde’s authority before his Qajar counterparts.

Taken together, the developments of early 1810 signify not merely a transient rapprochement but a deliberate redefinition of Ottoman–Iranian relations on institutional and ideological grounds. The appointment of Yâsincizâde—timed amid intersecting Russian, British, and French pressures—marked the emergence of a more self-aware and bureaucratized Ottoman diplomacy.

To understand this transformation, it is necessary to consider the intellectual and administrative background of the envoy himself, for the credibility and symbolic weight of his mission were directly linked to his personal standing. Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s scholarly authority and judicial experience made him uniquely suited to personify the synthesis of religious legitimacy and administrative expertise that the late Ottoman diplomatic tradition sought to project.

4. The Life of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi

Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi, the son of Seyyid Osman Efendi, descended from Seyyid Bilal of Sinop, a figure renowned for his spiritual influence in Anatolia. The family’s epithet “Yâsincizâde” derived from his grandfather Seyyid Mustafa Efendi, who served as a yasînhan (reciter of the Sura Yā Sīn) in the Hagia Sophia Mosque (İmamoğlu and Karataş 2016, p. 23). His father, Yâsincizâde Osman Efendi, counted among the eminent scholars of Sultan Mustafa III’s reign and occupied a distinguished position within the ilmiyye (learned hierarchy). Since Abdülvehhâb Efendi was recognized as a descendant of Hasan, the grandson of the Prophet, the honorifics “Es-Seyyid” or “Seyyid” preceded his name.

The exact year of his birth remains unknown; therefore, this study explicitly states that his date of birth cannot be identified with certainty.

At an early age, Abdülvehhâb Efendi entered the Imperial Palace School (Enderûn-ı Hümâyûn), where he received training in both the rational and traditional sciences under two prominent scholars: Gelenbevî İsmail Efendi and Palabıyık Mehmed Efendi (Süreyya 1996, p. 131; Kavak 2016, p. 5). On 13 January 1786, he obtained his müderrislik rûûsu (license to teach), thus formally commencing his scholarly career. On 21 February 1802, he was appointed as lecturer at the Yeni Saray Library (BOA, C.MF, 170/8474). In subsequent years, he taught in various madrasas, distinguishing himself as a versatile and erudite scholar. On 19 December 1809, he was appointed judge (kadı) of Thessaloniki, and in 1810 he rose to the rank of bilâd-ı erbaa, the upper tier of the judicial hierarchy. He gained further recognition through his lectures at the Bâyezid and Yeni Cami madrasas (Kavak 2016, pp. 5–6).

In 1810, accompanied by Chief Secretary Hayret Efendi and interpreter Bozoklu Osman Şâkir, Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi was appointed ambassador to Iran, a mission that required exceptional political and theological acumen. Contemporary accounts emphasize his composure, diplomatic prudence, and mastery of both Arabic and Persian. His successful handling of the embassy earned him Sultan Mahmud II’s personal commendation, and upon his return in April 1811, he was appointed judge of Edirne, later promoted to judge of Mecca and Istanbul (Şânîzâde 2008, pp. 399–400).

It should be noted that some of these titles, such as the “judge of Mecca,” were largely honorary and symbolic, while others—such as the positions in Edirne and Istanbul—entailed active judicial and administrative responsibilities. Thus, the word “also” appearing in references to his subsequent offices does not imply concurrent accumulation but rather a sequence of successive appointments reflecting a steady career progression (İpşirlî 1988, pp. 285–86).

Beyond his diplomatic distinction, Yâsincizâde held several high-ranking posts within the Ottoman administrative and religious hierarchy: he was appointed Kazasker of Anatolia in 1816, Nakîbüleşraf (Chief of the Prophet’s Descendants) in 1818, and later Kazasker of Rumelia, the highest judicial rank beneath the Şeyhülislâm (İpşirlî 1988, pp. 285–86).

In the final stage of his career, he twice ascended to the office of Şeyhülislâm, first between 1821–1822, and again from 1828 to 1833, thereby reaching the pinnacle of the ilmiyye order. He passed away on 7 February 1834 (27 Ramadan 1249)—coinciding with the Night of Power (Laylat al-Qadr)—at his mansion in Anadolu Hisarı, Üsküdar, and was interred beside his father outside the Topkapı walls (Müstakimzâde 1978, pp. 126–27; Kavak 2016, p. 7).

Among the many milestones of his distinguished career, his appointment as ambassador to Iran in 1810 stands as the defining moment. This mission was not merely a reflection of his personal merit but a strategic move aligning the Ottoman scholarly elite with the evolving needs of modern diplomacy. His ability to embody both intellectual authority and political pragmatism rendered him a unique bridge between the theological foundations of the Ottoman establishment and the practical demands of international relations. In this sense, Yâsincizâde’s embassy represents the synthesis of religious legitimacy and bureaucratic modernization that characterized early nineteenth-century Ottoman diplomacy.

5. Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s Embassy to Iran

The dispatch of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi as ambassador to Iran in 1810 constituted not merely a diplomatic appointment but a symbolic watershed in the evolution from classical ambassadorship to institutionalized representation in Ottoman foreign policy. Behind the transition from temporary embassies to permanent missions lay the Empire’s increasing need for intelligence, information exchange, and exposure to European diplomatic models within the broader context of Nizâm-ı Cedîd reforms (Yalçınkaya 2010, p. 593). Diplomacy, now integral to state survival and territorial integrity, became a tool not only for negotiation but also for information-gathering and reputation management (Davison 2015, p. 291). Within this framework, the appointment of a figure of both scholarly and spiritual prestige to Iran—a polity defined by deep sectarian consciousness—acquired ideological as well as political significance (Azap 2023, p. 328).

The imperial rescript (Hatt-ı Hümâyûn) of 4 February 1810 (29 Zilhicce 1224) confirms that this mission was conceived as a restructuring of Ottoman representation in Iran rather than a routine dispatch. The description of Yâsincizâde as one of the müderrisîn-i kirâm reveals the conscious selection of a scholar–diplomat whose religious authority could balance Shiʿi sensitivities at the Qajar court. The rescript further instructed that new directives might be issued “during the mission,” granting the envoy a rare level of field discretion. This nuance demonstrates the trust invested in Yâsincizâde and the Empire’s willingness to delegate diplomatic initiative to him—a notable departure from earlier centralized control (BOA, HAT, 804/37132). The same document stipulated travel expenses, ceremonial gifts, and correspondence protocols, highlighting the prestige and political weight of the embassy.

Sultan Mahmud II’s personal involvement in the appointment underscores the degree to which diplomacy had become intertwined with royal representation. In an era of administrative centralization, sending an ambassador of ulema origin symbolized the Sultan’s assertion of both temporal and religious legitimacy. This duality—statecraft fortified by sacred authority—would later characterize the Ottoman approach to Islamic diplomacy.

Precedents for this new model of engagement can be traced to Seyyid Mehmed Refi Efendi’s mission to Tehran in 1807, which aimed to block a Franco-Iranian rapprochement. Far from serving as a passive envoy, Refi Efendi directly participated in negotiations and established channels with ʿAbbās Mīrzā’s reformist circle, fostering dialogue between Sunni and Shiʿi elites (Sarıkçıoğlu and Güngör 2020, pp. 933–37). His approach—melding practical diplomacy with theological reasoning—prepared the conceptual ground for Yâsincizâde’s later embassy.

The Iranian court reciprocated these gestures: Fath Ali Shah Qajar, acting through Asker Khan and the mufti of Khoy, Hacı Muhammed Han, sent emissaries accompanied by letters, gifts, and statements of goodwill to Istanbul (Osman Şâkir Efendi 2018, p. 42). Their arrival, carefully recorded in Osman Şâkir’s Musavver Sefâretnâme-i İran, marks the prelude to Yâsincizâde’s appointment. The document also reproduces the Sultan’s reply and the formal commissioning of Bozoklu Osman Şâkir as Persian interpreter:

“fazîletlü Yâsincizâde Seyyid Abdülvehhâb Efendi bu abd-i Şâkir’i Fârisî tercümânlığı hidmeti ile maʿiyyet-i efendiye meʾmûr eylediler”.

(Musavver Sefâretnâme-i İran, fol. 2b)

Chronology of the mission: The delegation departed Istanbul on 19 October 1810 (20 Ramazan 1225), reached Tabriz in mid-1811, proceeded to Tehran, and engaged in negotiations that continued through 1812–1813. By late 1813, amid renewed Russo–Iranian hostilities, Yâsincizâde’s correspondence (BOA, HAT, 784/36635, 23 December 1813) reported the breakdown of alliance talks and assessed the shifting balance of power along the Georgia–Karabakh frontier.

Unlike his predecessors, Yâsincizâde’s mission combined diplomatic, sectarian, and intelligence functions. His dispatches conveyed the views of Iranian clerics and officials regarding Russia’s expansion, identifying opportunities for an Ottoman–Iranian rapprochement under the shared banner of cihet-i camia-i İslâmiye (“the collective cause of Islam”). This framing, far from rhetorical, reflected a deliberate Ottoman attempt to construct a trans-sectarian diplomacy grounded in religious solidarity.

Yâsincizâde’s activities extended beyond Tehran to Tabriz, Ardabil, Khoy, and Maragha, where he met governors, scholars, and military officers. His correspondence functioned as a real-time intelligence network, reporting troop movements, local alliances, and reform efforts spearheaded by Abbas Mirza. The Sublime Porte relied heavily on these reports, as indicated in the correspondence of Kapıcıbaşı Hüseyin Ağa (December 1813), which distinguished Yâsincizâde’s dispatches as “authoritative and firsthand accounts” (BOA, HAT, 804/37122).

Yâsincizâde was thus more than an envoy: he operated as an intelligence conduit, crisis mediator, and symbolic representative of the Ottoman scholarly class. He played an active role in resolving local conflicts, notably after Muhammad Ali Mirza’s incursions into Ottoman territory, when Yâsincizâde personally met Fath Ali Shah to de-escalate tensions (BOA, C.AS, 809/34357, 21 March 1814). This act of shuttle diplomacy demonstrated his ability to merge scholarly authority with political negotiation—a synthesis that became a model for later Ottoman practice.

His influence also manifested culturally and intellectually. At Negarestan Palace, Iranian artists painted portraits of Yâsincizâde and his retinue, visualizing Ottoman diplomatic presence (Bilim 2002, p. 265). His dialogues with leading Shiʿi scholars not only earned him respect but also facilitated a shared vocabulary of legitimacy, an early precursor to the nineteenth-century idea of “Islamic unity” (ittihad-ı İslam).

In terms of legacy, Yâsincizâde’s mission established the template for later Ottoman embassies, notably Haydar Efendi’s 1851 mission to Tehran, whose sefaretnâme rearticulated the same inter-sectarian, reform-minded language (Sarıkçıoğlu and Güngör 2022, pp. 83–87). The Treaties of Erzurum (1823 and 1847) later institutionalized this diplomatic logic, embedding the field-based, document-heavy method pioneered by Yâsincizâde into formal border policy.

In conclusion, Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s embassy epitomized a hybrid model of diplomacy—simultaneously political, cultural, and intellectual. Through his sefaretnâme reports, he constructed an image of the Ottoman envoy as scholar, mediator, and intelligence officer—a figure capable of negotiating not only with rulers but with ideas. His mission marked a turning point in the professionalization of Ottoman diplomacy, offering a prototype that integrated religious legitimacy with administrative modernity and left a durable imprint on the Empire’s diplomatic tradition.

6. Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s Embassy in the Context of Ottoman–Iranian Diplomatic Relations

Following Napoleon’s failure and the subsequent Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia in 1807, the Ottoman Empire concluded the Treaty of Kale-i Sultaniye with Britain in 1809, signaling a new orientation in its foreign policy (Şânîzâde 2008, p. 239). From this moment onward, both the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran found themselves under growing pressure to define their positions vis-à-vis the rapidly shifting European balance of power. Britain, now determined to isolate France diplomatically, sought to strengthen ties with both states. This convergence generated an unprecedented intensity in Ottoman–Iranian diplomatic traffic, which materialized concretely with the dispatch of Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi to Iran in 1810—an appointment intended to institutionalize the search for a new balance (BOA, HAT, 795/36895, 4 February 1810).

In correspondence exchanged between Abbas Mirza, the Iranian crown prince, and the Sublime Porte, repeated emphasis was placed on “the necessity of strengthening friendship because of the bond of religion between the two countries” (Tekdemir 2009, p. 80). This phrasing was not merely diplomatic courtesy but part of a deliberate rhetorical construction appealing to a shared Islamic identity—what Ottoman documents call cihet-i camia-i İslâmiye. Yâsincizâde’s ulema background gave this notion both credibility and resonance: he personified the idea that religious legitimacy could serve as the foundation of inter-sectarian rapprochement, translating theology into diplomacy (BOA, HAT, 804/37132, 4 February 1810).

However, Iran’s persistent territorial claims and Fath Ali Shah’s insistence on border revisions prevented a stable understanding. The Treaty of Bucharest between the Ottomans and Russia in 1812, which granted Russia decisive advantages in the Balkans and the Caucasus, further deepened Iranian distrust (Muahedat Mecmuası 2008, IV, pp. 48–58). During this delicate phase, Yâsincizâde’s detailed field reports enabled the Ottoman administration to follow Iranian military and diplomatic maneuvers almost in real time. His dispatches, unlike earlier fragmentary sources, provided first-hand intelligence on troop movements, sectarian dynamics, and British and French activities in Tehran (BOA, HAT, 804/37122, 23 December 1813). This marks the institutionalization of on-site diplomatic reporting in Ottoman practice.

One persistent obstacle to alliance-building was Iran’s interference in Ottoman Iraq, where local uprisings and tribal unrest often intersected with Qajar ambitions (Uluerler 2012, p. 311). Yâsincizâde’s mediating role became central here: observing frontier tensions firsthand, he reported on Abdurrahman Pasha’s rebellion, Iranian-backed tribal movements, and the complex loyalties of Baghdad’s elites, providing the Sublime Porte with unprecedented insight into the region (Cevdet Paşa 1309, pp. 51–52).

When British mediation efforts collapsed, and Iran failed to reach a settlement with the Ottomans, Fath Ali Shah ordered an assault on Baghdad, resulting in its plunder. The Ottoman response was restrained by concurrent Russian offensives in the Caucasus. While Russia annexed Dagestan and Georgia, Iran launched counteroffensives under Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, whose European-trained army initially achieved limited success but ultimately suffered defeat at Erivan (1812–1813). These developments formed the military and psychological backdrop of Yâsincizâde’s mission (Dunbuli [1389] 1969, pp. 200–1; Pâkrevan [1376] 1997, p. 69). In his reports, he conveyed Iran’s preparations, morale, and reactions to Russian expansion, providing the Ottoman center with strategic intelligence it had previously lacked (BOA, HAT, 784/36635, 23 December 1813).

The outbreak of these conflicts transformed Yâsincizâde’s embassy into a dual mission—both representational and observatory. Through his dispatches, the Sublime Porte learned not only of battlefield outcomes but also of the emerging British influence in Tehran. His analyses anticipated that the vacuum left by France’s retreat from the region would soon be filled by Britain, a prediction confirmed when the Treaty of Tehran (1814) was signed. Under this treaty, Iran pledged to prevent any hostile advance toward India through its territory, while Britain promised financial and military assistance, particularly in training the Qajar army (Gafuri [1389] 2010, p. 415). Yâsincizâde’s embassy directly witnessed the consolidation of this Anglo-Iranian alliance and reported it to the Ottoman center as a strategic warning (Uluerler 2012, p. 152).

By observing these shifts, Yâsincizâde helped the Ottoman administration understand that the “Eastern Question” was no longer confined to Europe but now extended to the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. The sefaretnâme form thus evolved from a travel narrative into a geopolitical report documenting the first phase of Western imperial involvement in the Middle East. His writings reflect the emergence of a multipolar context, where Britain, France, and Russia all sought leverage over the Ottoman–Iranian borderlands (Uçarol 1995, p. 155).

In one spy report transmitted from Iran, the Ottomans learned that Russia was constructing new fortresses in occupied territories while internal unrest spread in Khorasan and Shiraz—evidence that Ottoman fears of encirclement were well-founded (BOA, HAT, 807/37194, H.29.12.1229). In response, the Empire dispatched Celaleddin Efendi as ambassador to Tehran in 1813 (BOA, HAT, 803/37119, H.22.08.1228), an appointment that consciously built upon the intelligence-gathering model established by Yâsincizâde.

Yâsincizâde’s mission therefore stands at the intersection of diplomacy, intelligence, and ideology. It revealed the pragmatic limits of Islamic solidarity, the complexities of sectarian politics, and the emergence of intelligence-based diplomacy in Ottoman statecraft. While his conciliatory discourse of cihet-i camia-i İslâmiye promoted inter-sectarian unity, his field observations exposed how geopolitical realities constrained that ideal. Through his experience, the Ottoman Empire learned to balance faith-based rhetoric with the strategic realism required by an age of global imperial competition.

7. Conclusions

Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s embassy revealed the sectarian and ideological depth of Ottoman–Iranian relations, transforming religious discourse into an operative tool of diplomacy. In the aftermath of the Karbala incident and amid the rise of the Wahhabi movement, questions of legitimacy and orthodoxy acquired new urgency for both empires. By virtue of his ulema identity, Yâsincizâde functioned as both mediator and theologian, interpreting political conflicts through a moral and religious lens. In his reports, he repeatedly invoked the principle of cihet-i camia-i İslâmiye—“the collective cause of Islam”—urging the Ottoman state to act as a unifying authority transcending sectarian boundaries. This notion was not a rhetorical ornament but a diplomatic paradigm that redefined legitimacy and representation in inter-Islamic relations. Through his engagement with Iranian scholars and his recognition of their doctrinal concerns, Yâsincizâde promoted a trans-sectarian discourse that located Islam, rather than dynastic rivalry, at the center of statecraft.

Traditionally, Ottoman diplomacy had been episodic and militarily driven. In the classical age, embassies were temporary missions, dispatched for enthronements, treaty ratifications, or crisis negotiations, and were dissolved thereafter. The absence of permanent representation was partly political, but it also stemmed from juridical reservations about maintaining envoys in non-Muslim territories (dār al-ḥarb). Yâsincizâde’s embassy, however, signaled a functional shift: diplomacy was no longer conceived solely as an extension of military power but as a form of informed governance, dependent on observation, reporting, and interpretation. His mission thus bridges the ideological world of the ulema and the procedural rationality that would later characterize nineteenth-century diplomacy.

From the late eighteenth century onward, defeats against Russia and increasing exposure to Europe compelled the Ottomans to reconceptualize foreign representation. The establishment of permanent embassies in London (1793), Paris (1797), and Vienna, and eventually the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836, reflected this institutional transformation. The later opening of a permanent mission to Iran in 1848 can be seen as a direct continuation of the experimental model inaugurated by Yâsincizâde’s temporary but information-oriented mission.

In this historical continuum, Yâsincizâde’s 1810–1813 embassy stands as a critical hinge between two diplomatic paradigms: the moral–religious diplomacy of the early modern era and the bureaucratic–informational diplomacy of the modern state. His reports addressed Shiʿi unrest following the Wahhabi raids, the Babanzâde Abdurrahman Pasha affair, and border tensions around Shahrizor and Merivan, offering granular analyses that shaped later Ottoman responses. He demonstrated initiative, balance, and a sophisticated awareness of the interplay between local, imperial, and global dynamics.

The methodological contribution of Yâsincizâde’s mission lies in its fusion of epistemology and practice. By framing observation as a scholarly duty and negotiation as a form of knowledge production, he blurred the line between the scholar and the diplomat. His approach anticipated the bureaucratic ethos that would define Ottoman foreign affairs after 1836, where empirical reporting replaced ceremonial representation.

In sum, Yâsincizâde Abdülvehhâb Efendi’s embassy represents both a culmination and a beginning—the culmination of the classical Ottoman tradition of learned diplomacy and the beginning of an empirically grounded, ideologically reflexive diplomatic practice. It resolved short-term crises, preserved sectarian equilibrium, and offered the intellectual infrastructure for institutionalized diplomacy. More than an episode of frontier management, it exemplifies how sectarianism, frontier security, and European imperial rivalry intersected in shaping a new Ottoman diplomatic mentality. Through his mission, diplomacy became not merely a means of negotiation but a mode of knowledge—one that redefined the Ottoman Empire’s place in a rapidly globalizing world.