In the Silence of the Heart: Wittgenstein and the “Inner”
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for Authors
Overall, I cannot recommend the paper in its present shape for publication. I do agree with the author that there is an interesting tension between the later Wittgenstein's dissolution of the inner vs. the outer distinction and his emphasis on the inner life in his remarks on religion. But I find the way the point is made incomprehensible; the manuscript is full of unmotivated excursuses, the connection between which far too often evaded my comprehension, and of bold and equally unmotivated statements about love, conscience, and repression.
For instance:
"Conscience is a painful insight about my lovelessness. Apart from sorrow, there is no pain of the soul that is equally painful. This is why this pain is the one that we are most inclined to repress. What is repressed in repression is not that I have done wrong but that I have been loveless to you." (p.6) Why? Is "conscience" the same thing others call "remorse"?
"Why would one want to give religion a privileged status? Quite obviously because it gives you a pretext for avoiding the hardest thing there is: to be open with the other." (p. 17) What's so "quite obvious" about it? Why is this particular thing the "hardest". And so forth.
I may be missing something. But as far as I can see, the paper lacks a clear structure to literally a critical extent. If it was cut down to half the size and the crucial points better explained, rather than surrounded by "further issues that deserve a mention", I can imagine it might work quite well. But in this shape, it is beyond me. But if the other reviewers are happy with it, I will not dissent; this may be down to a difference in philosophical preferences.
One disclaimer (related to the above-stated possible conflict of interest): the manuscript is NOT anonymised. I don't know what to make of it, in combination with the fact that my review is negative. But I assume there might be a problem. Perhaps it could help if the author retracted the submission and resubmitted the paper properly anonymised (whether in the present version, or a revised one), to be reviewed anew.
Comments on the Quality of English Language
No complaints with the quality of language as such, but there are minor issues such as typos. A cursory re-reading would help.
Author Response
Overall, I cannot recommend the paper in its present shape for publication. I do agree with the author that there is an interesting tension between the later Wittgenstein's dissolution of the inner vs. the outer distinction and his emphasis on the inner life in his remarks on religion. But I find the way the point is made incomprehensible; the manuscript is full of unmotivated excursuses, the connection between which far too often evaded my comprehension, and of bold and equally unmotivated statements about love, conscience, and repression.
I do not agree that the excursuses are unmotivated, but I could have made their relation to the problem clearer. For the sake of brevity I have removed some of these "excursuses" and motivated those that are left.
For instance:
"Conscience is a painful insight about my lovelessness. Apart from sorrow, there is no pain of the soul that is equally painful. This is why this pain is the one that we are most inclined to repress. What is repressed in repression is not that I have done wrong but that I have been loveless to you." (p.6) Why? Is "conscience" the same thing others call "remorse"?
No, conscience is not the same as remorse - nor the same as guilt. I give a bit more space to explaining these things, but I cannot go deep into the matter. This is a problem when writing outside the common discourse: one can never build on one's thought but would have to write the same paper over and over again...
"Why would one want to give religion a privileged status? Quite obviously because it gives you a pretext for avoiding the hardest thing there is: to be open with the other." (p. 17) What's so "quite obvious" about it? Why is this particular thing the "hardest". And so forth.
I take it as granted that openness is the hardest thing, just like I take it as granted that everyone "has" a conscience, and that heeding it is hard, and so on. If someone disagrees, I cannot show why I am right, though I could ask a number a questions such as "Why is it so hard to ask for forgiveness? ,etc., but I cannot do it here. But I try to explain remarks like these a bit more in the revised version.
I may be missing something. But as far as I can see, the paper lacks a clear structure to literally a critical extent. If it was cut down to half the size and the crucial points better explained, rather than surrounded by "further issues that deserve a mention", I can imagine it might work quite well. But in this shape, it is beyond me. But if the other reviewers are happy with it, I will not dissent; this may be down to a difference in philosophical preferences.
One disclaimer (related to the above-stated possible conflict of interest): the manuscript is NOT anonymised. I don't know what to make of it, in combination with the fact that my review is negative. But I assume there might be a problem. Perhaps it could help if the author retracted the submission and resubmitted the paper properly anonymised (whether in the present version, or a revised one), to be reviewed anew.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for Authors
- Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Notes in “Culture and Value” and Usage of Sources
What was published under the unity suggesting title Culture and Value, more aptly as Vermischte Bemerkungen in German, is, as is well known, just the result of an editorial decision— Culture and Value consists of notes from Wittgenstein’s private notebooks and manuscripts written by him between 1914 and 1951.
Thus one can only agree with the author that the remarks found in C&V do not represent anything like a systematic treatment of a particular theme. Given the repeated reminder of the "scattered" nature of the remarks on Christianity, faith, sin, atonement, salvation or self-knowledge, it is all the more surprising that passages from Culture and Value are cited (i) without any reference to their date of origin and without any consideration of what is written before and after these passages. As if Wittgenstein’s remarks in C&V ultimately could indeed be treated as context-free text/notes. The exclusive reliance on the English translation also is not helpful to settle questions of interpretations. Why, for example, does Wittgenstein (or rather: the translation) speak of “properly” or “understanding properly”? The author quotes the following note from C&V::
“Understanding oneself properly is difficult, because an action to which one might be prompted by good, generous motives is something one may also be doing out of cowardice or indifference…”. (CV: 48)“
Are we supposed to believe that Wittgenstein thought that there is also a kind of not proper understanding? And how, if, does that differ from proper understanding? Such questions require clarification.
“Generally speaking, the difficulty is understanding oneself. More particularly, the problem is that one can, according to Wittgenstein, act in a given way out of ‘genuine love’ but ‘equally well out of deceitfulness’.” (p. 3, 99-100)
I dare say that Wittgenstein would not have agreed with such a “conclusion,” as he likely would have found the insertion of “generally speaking” confusing. As a reader, I find it inappropriate. That in a Wittgenstein interpretation an expression like “properly” is simply overlooked should not be; and—unless one already knows or looks it up—one does not even know what the actual wording was. The author might assume that “properly” is an adverb, standing in relation to understanding much like “by good (or bad) motives” stands in relation to knowing about the reasons for an action. That is: the way of knowing is equivalent to the what one wants to know; which might suggest one could simply ignore the “properly” in this passage. Such an interpretation would however have to be explicitly argued for. And that is precisely not what is not done with this passage, nor with any other passage in this text. As another example.
“Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. For 'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith.” (CV: 28) (p.2, 45-48)
The text continues right after the passage above with “What Wittgenstein here says is certainly true in some sense, but in what? (Line 45) I presume this formulation is intended to sound witty (it is not good English, by the way) hinting at the opaqueness of the sentences. A remark like this—intended, perhaps, to alert readers that “there’s more going on here than it seems”—is however not a good substitute for a serious interpretive effort —for if one does not know what is being said, how can one possibly know that what is said is true? And if such statements have no clear “sense”, how could one even refer meaningfully to “what Wittgenstein says here” and ask what part of it or from which angle it is true?
Plus: What is denied here? Is the case that Christianity does not only or not essentially consists in making predictions about what will happen?” (And one would think this is precisely what distinguishes Christianity from other religions: that a Last Judgment will occur and salvation will take place). Or is it in question whether the reference to the Last Judgment is a "prediction" in the sense of a singular consequence from a hypothesis? Is it denied that Christianity is a theory? Or is Wittgenstein trying to highlight that Christianity describes the beginning and end of human history on Earth as events in the world? (We do know that he was concerned with this question, but may be not in this passage)
These are the questions one has to pursue if one wants to understand Wittgenstein’s attitude toward religious belief. If one immediately asks “What is the reality of becoming conscious of one’s sins?” (sorry again, but there is a distinction between saying “real event” and speaking of a “reality of being or becoming something” and Wittgenstein would have opposed the speak in the way of the latter) this might suggest that Christianity is not a theory lies solely in the fact that something – despair – is felt, something – salvation – is hoped for. But if so, why the contrast? Because Wittgenstein wanted to tell us that believing is not necessarily feeling or hoping or fearing? That would be not so interesting.
To return to the initial critique: Since there are related passages to the one cited above, too, let me again emphasize the importance of context. What is the context of these passages? Are there similar passages elsewhere (and the answer is Yes). Do these similar passages speak of the same thing? Etc. Plus: given the difficulty in interpreting what Wittgenstein wanted to show (us), one should either cite directly from the Nachlass—from MS and TS sources—or, if Culture and Value is to be used, at least provide precise dates for the entries. One cannot simply assume that every reader will automatically associate a given C&V note with its historical context (à la “Ah yes, C&V 28 or 48—that must be from year XYZ!”).
After all, the central thesis of the article in question is to diagnose an inconsistency between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy—presumably the phase beginning with the Philosophical Investigations—and his remarks on religion.
And, if certain entries on Christianity, sin, salvation, self-knowledge, etc., stem before the Philosophical Investigations, then the supposed inconsistency would amount merely to a discrepancy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the Tractatus. The text, however, clearly distances itself from this possibility—and argues for there being a tension within the later philosophy itself: a kind of tension between PI and the entries on religion which were written after 1940 or so.
This brings me to my next topic:
- What actually is central claim of this paper?
This is not sufficiently clear. To quote from the abstract of this paper:
“… what I take to be the main direction in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is the movement away from the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. Most clearly, this is visible in the second volume of Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein dissolves the idea of the inscrutable inner of the other. As I will show, these remarks are in tension … with his own remarks on religion in Culture and Value.” (lines 13–17)
The central claim, then, is that Wittgenstein's religious remarks, particularly those found in Culture and Value, are at odds with his later philosophy—in particular, his treatment of the concepts subjectivity and objectivity and the overcoming of the inner/outer dichotomy in the Last Writings.
Aside from the fact that the characterization of Wittgenstein’s “moving away from the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity” is definitely not a shared on in the literature on Wittgenstein, what is suggested by claiming that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion are “in tension” with the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. That he failed to follow his own insights when speaking of religious issues (Christian belief, feeling of sin, believing in salvation etc.)? That he, when it comes to religion, is still in the grip of metaphysics? Or that “a third Wittgenstein” announced itself? Let’s have a look again at the inner-outer-dichotomy (since he does nor speak of subjective-objective):
In the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein scrutinises he idea that the inner life of other persons is something that is fundamentally not knowable. The traditional picture of the minds/minds suggest that our access to another's thoughts, feelings, and pains is insofar indirect, inferential. Wittgenstein’s response is to dissolve this view and the problems with it. It is a certain picture and – as philosophers – our demand for a one-to-one correlation between “inner” states and “outer” expressions that generates skeptical worries. But the “inner” is not hidden behind behavior; it is expressed through it.
Parts of this text repeat Wittgenstein’s criticism but the text appears not to acknowledge this fundamental point. Why, otherwise, could even religious belief be under scrutiny as a potential candidate for bridging the divide between me and others? To me it also seems as if the fact that the text equates the inner-outer-relation and the relation between the subjective and the objective “ is responsible for the “tension” claimed. That however would lead to the following confusion:
Are Wittgenstein’s remarks in C&V about the minds of others, or are they about the opacity of one’s own inner life? Is is suggested in this text that in the case of religion Wittgenstein thought that everyone has her/his/their own “private language”? Or is question not how I can possibly know of your beliefs but of my beliefs or myself. And if the latter, does that mean I am speaking a private language, I do not understand? Or is it a private language that is oppressed by the terms of a public language? If the latter, the claim would be that there cannot be any self-understanding as a believer in religion because the public language “forces” upon us what we can agree upon. The text indeed introduces the notion of a language belonging to a ruling class … . In a nutshell it simply remains unclear to which “tensions” exactly the text wants to argue for.
Author Response
What was published under the unity suggesting title Culture and Value, more aptly as Vermischte Bemerkungen in German, is, as is well known, just the result of an editorial decision— Culture and Value consists of notes from Wittgenstein’s private notebooks and manuscripts written by him between 1914 and 1951.
Thus one can only agree with the author that the remarks found in C&V do not represent anything like a systematic treatment of a particular theme. Given the repeated reminder of the "scattered" nature of the remarks on Christianity, faith, sin, atonement, salvation or self-knowledge, it is all the more surprising that passages from Culture and Value are cited (i) without any reference to their date of origin and without any consideration of what is written before and after these passages. As if Wittgenstein’s remarks in C&V ultimately could indeed be treated as context-free text/notes. The exclusive reliance on the English translation also is not helpful to settle questions of interpretations. Why, for example, does Wittgenstein (or rather: the translation) speak of “properly” or “understanding properly”? The author quotes the following note from C&V::
I did in fact mention the date of the quoted remarks in TWO different places in the paper. I do not how this could have escaped the reviewer. Secondly CV is widely used as a reference, though there are many different views on the use of works of Wittgenstein. If English translations are not helpful, the reviewer should indicate what becomes obscured by using them. I have read the German original but I see no reason to change anything on that basis.
“Understanding oneself properly is difficult, because an action to which one might be prompted by good, generous motives is something one may also be doing out of cowardice or indifference…”. (CV: 48)“
Are we supposed to believe that Wittgenstein thought that there is also a kind of not proper understanding? And how, if, does that differ from proper understanding? Such questions require clarification.
I fail to understand the intention behind this comment. I discuss different sides of our difficulties with self-understanding, particularly with a view to conscience, because I think it is OBVIOUSLY important to relate "feeling sinful" to "bad conscience". I have tried to make these things clearer in the revised version.
“Generally speaking, the difficulty is understanding oneself. More particularly, the problem is that one can, according to Wittgenstein, act in a given way out of ‘genuine love’ but ‘equally well out of deceitfulness’.” (p. 3, 99-100)
I dare say that Wittgenstein would not have agreed with such a “conclusion,” as he likely would have found the insertion of “generally speaking” confusing. As a reader, I find it inappropriate. That in a Wittgenstein interpretation an expression like “properly” is simply overlooked should not be; and—unless one already knows or looks it up—one does not even know what the actual wording was. The author might assume that “properly” is an adverb, standing in relation to understanding much like “by good (or bad) motives” stands in relation to knowing about the reasons for an action. That is: the way of knowing is equivalent to the what one wants to know; which might suggest one could simply ignore the “properly” in this passage. Such an interpretation would however have to be explicitly argued for. And that is precisely not what is not done with this passage, nor with any other passage in this text. As another example.
I find this confusing. First, Wittgenstein's view of generality and particularity is too big issue to be dealt with here. But he was no more favourable to particularising issues than to generalising them. But this issue with "properly", (recht)...Wittgenstein thinks there is a difficulty with knowing whether one acts out of "genuine love" (wahrer Liebe) or deceitfulness or a "cold heart" (Kälte des Herzens). There is nothing obscure about this problem, which I discuss at length.
“Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. For 'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith.” (CV: 28) (p.2, 45-48)
The text continues right after the passage above with “What Wittgenstein here says is certainly true in some sense, but in what? (Line 45) I presume this formulation is intended to sound witty (it is not good English, by the way) hinting at the opaqueness of the sentences. A remark like this—intended, perhaps, to alert readers that “there’s more going on here than it seems”—is however not a good substitute for a serious interpretive effort —for if one does not know what is being said, how can one possibly know that what is said is true? And if such statements have no clear “sense”, how could one even refer meaningfully to “what Wittgenstein says here” and ask what part of it or from which angle it is true?
There is nothing odd at all with noting that a given remark is in some sense right, though it may remain unclear in what sense. And I do in fact state in what sense the remark is right, for there is such a thing as consciousness of one's sins, but then I make a critical analysis of what this can and cannot mean.
Plus: What is denied here? Is the case that Christianity does not only or not essentially consists in making predictions about what will happen?” (And one would think this is precisely what distinguishes Christianity from other religions: that a Last Judgment will occur and salvation will take place). Or is it in question whether the reference to the Last Judgment is a "prediction" in the sense of a singular consequence from a hypothesis? Is it denied that Christianity is a theory? Or is Wittgenstein trying to highlight that Christianity describes the beginning and end of human history on Earth as events in the world? (We do know that he was concerned with this question, but may be not in this passage)
I was not concerned with issues at all.
These are the questions one has to pursue if one wants to understand Wittgenstein’s attitude toward religious belief. If one immediately asks “What is the reality of becoming conscious of one’s sins?” (sorry again, but there is a distinction between saying “real event” and speaking of a “reality of being or becoming something” and Wittgenstein would have opposed the speak in the way of the latter) this might suggest that Christianity is not a theory lies solely in the fact that something – despair – is felt, something – salvation – is hoped for. But if so, why the contrast? Because Wittgenstein wanted to tell us that believing is not necessarily feeling or hoping or fearing? That would be not so interesting.
I am not concerned with this issue.
To return to the initial critique: Since there are related passages to the one cited above, too, let me again emphasize the importance of context. What is the context of these passages? Are there similar passages elsewhere (and the answer is Yes). Do these similar passages speak of the same thing? Etc. Plus: given the difficulty in interpreting what Wittgenstein wanted to show (us), one should either cite directly from the Nachlass—from MS and TS sources—or, if Culture and Value is to be used, at least provide precise dates for the entries. One cannot simply assume that every reader will automatically associate a given C&V note with its historical context (à la “Ah yes, C&V 28 or 48—that must be from year XYZ!”).
After all, the central thesis of the article in question is to diagnose an inconsistency between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy—presumably the phase beginning with the Philosophical Investigations—and his remarks on religion.
And, if certain entries on Christianity, sin, salvation, self-knowledge, etc., stem before the Philosophical Investigations, then the supposed inconsistency would amount merely to a discrepancy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the Tractatus. The text, however, clearly distances itself from this possibility—and argues for there being a tension within the later philosophy itself: a kind of tension between PI and the entries on religion which were written after 1940 or so.
Like I said above: I mention the date of the relevant remarks in two different places in the paper.
This brings me to my next topic:
- What actually is central claim of this paper?
This is not sufficiently clear. To quote from the abstract of this paper:
“… what I take to be the main direction in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is the movement away from the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. Most clearly, this is visible in the second volume of Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein dissolves the idea of the inscrutable inner of the other. As I will show, these remarks are in tension … with his own remarks on religion in Culture and Value.” (lines 13–17)
The central claim, then, is that Wittgenstein's religious remarks, particularly those found in Culture and Value, are at odds with his later philosophy—in particular, his treatment of the concepts subjectivity and objectivity and the overcoming of the inner/outer dichotomy in the Last Writings.
Aside from the fact that the characterization of Wittgenstein’s “moving away from the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity” is definitely not a shared on in the literature on Wittgenstein, what is suggested by claiming that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion are “in tension” with the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. That he failed to follow his own insights when speaking of religious issues (Christian belief, feeling of sin, believing in salvation etc.)? That he, when it comes to religion, is still in the grip of metaphysics? Or that “a third Wittgenstein” announced itself? Let’s have a look again at the inner-outer-dichotomy (since he does nor speak of subjective-objective):
In the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein scrutinises he idea that the inner life of other persons is something that is fundamentally not knowable. The traditional picture of the minds/minds suggest that our access to another's thoughts, feelings, and pains is insofar indirect, inferential. Wittgenstein’s response is to dissolve this view and the problems with it. It is a certain picture and – as philosophers – our demand for a one-to-one correlation between “inner” states and “outer” expressions that generates skeptical worries. But the “inner” is not hidden behind behavior; it is expressed through it.
I take this move of thought in LWPPII for granted, at the same time as I show that Wittgenstein was struggling with issue. On p. 16 (in the new version) I say: "Wittgenstein is wavering between thinking on the one hand that one cannot speak about knowing the other’s feelings, for certainty of knowledge presupposes common criteria which are here lacking and, on the other hand, thinking that one can often say that one is certain about the other’s feelings."
I cannot see how the impression could arise, that I do not acknowledge the fundamental point the reviewer refers to.
Parts of this text repeat Wittgenstein’s criticism but the text appears not to acknowledge this fundamental point. Why, otherwise, could even religious belief be under scrutiny as a potential candidate for bridging the divide between me and others? To me it also seems as if the fact that the text equates the inner-outer-relation and the relation between the subjective and the objective “ is responsible for the “tension” claimed. That however would lead to the following confusion:
Are Wittgenstein’s remarks in C&V about the minds of others, or are they about the opacity of one’s own inner life? Is is suggested in this text that in the case of religion Wittgenstein thought that everyone has her/his/their own “private language”? Or is question not how I can possibly know of your beliefs but of my beliefs or myself. And if the latter, does that mean I am speaking a private language, I do not understand? Or is it a private language that is oppressed by the terms of a public language? If the latter, the claim would be that there cannot be any self-understanding as a believer in religion because the public language “forces” upon us what we can agree upon. The text indeed introduces the notion of a language belonging to a ruling class … . In a nutshell it simply remains unclear to which “tensions” exactly the text wants to argue for.
If it is claimed that ONLY religion can access the depth of my soul, then this does raise questions about subjectivity. - I elaborate a bit more on this in the new version.
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for Authors
I still do not really follow. That is, I do follow (and agree) that Wittgenstein's dissolution of the inner/outer distinction undermines, in an illuminating way, traditional religious intuitions about the soul (as a secluded domain). But the author's framing of this problem in terms of love, I-You relationship, and repression evades me (I find it unnecessary and far too often phrased in the form of statements such as "in my view, ...", unsupported by much further argument). But I can appreciate that the author took great effort to revise the text; and I tend to interpret my dissatisfaction even with the revised version as my idiosyncratic problem in the first place. If other reviewers recommend acceptance, I do not dissent.
Author Response
My reply:
R1 says that s/he still does not follow – and agree – that Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the inner/outer undermine religious ideas about the secluded inner. Moreover, R1 does not think that my way of framing the problem in terms of love, I-you understanding and repression is pertinent. First just one observation that is worth considering: my account of ethics, conscience, love, language, departs decissively from the basic outlook that characterizes most philosophical agreements and disagreements on these matters. Whatever R1 thinks about this, it is a fact that makes it hard to agree about common standards concerning clarity. It is a notorious fact, that even philosophers that by some are considered to be of historical importance are by others dismissed as worthless obscurantists. - Given that my outlook differs significantly from what from my point of view appear as different versions of standard views, it is quite impossible for me to shorten my paper: it is already too short. Of course: if my outlook appears uninteresting, this will be felt as a waste of space. But in case there would be interest in it, it has to be given some space.
What I try to show is that the idea of the secluded inner is a result of repressing conscience. This is true as much of the religious as of the philosophical notions of the secluded inner. What we have here is not a philosophical problem the way it is usually understood - for instance as a problem about language use and grammar. In his LWPP II Wittgenstein dissolves the inner/outer dichotomy, and as I show, it is not about grammar, language use and philosophical argument but, to put it in Wittgenstein’s words, about ”work with oneself” – about moral issues. In my view, (yes: in my view) morality is about I-you understanding, love, conscience and repression. This matters because the idea of the secluded inner is a result of repressing conscience. I show this with my discussion of Winch. I also have to show the ethical-religious outlook of Winch is quite far analogous to Hegel’s dialectic between subjective conscience and objective morality, which is interesting, because Hegel, in my view, was the first one to elaborate an dialectic between subjectivity and sociality; today a dominating outlook, which also contains a view of language as a socially established discourse.
In his LWPP II, Wittgenstein goes against the grain of the above mentioned, dominating outlook while, in his remarks on religion, he does not seem to be considering the dissolution he performs in LWPP II. But then the remarks in LWPP II are written later than the remarks on religion that I am discussing. There is however no reason to think that Wittgenstein intended the remarks in LWPP II to correct his remarks on religion. But I think there is a tendsion here.
The main themes of my discussion are the idea of wretchedness, the idea of the secluded inner, and the idea of the difficulty of self-understanding together with the assumption that only God can reach the secluded interiority and give you proper self-understanding. Firstly, I show that the idea that only God could give you self-understanding is untenable. It is not possible not to know whether one acts for instance out of genuine love or deception. Nor can God ”give” you love, for love is something that precisely you open yourself to in that you open yourself to another human being.
Secondly, I show how the religious idea of the secluded; ”the silence of the heart” involves a reversal of human understanding and its relation to religion. What actually is an experience of conscience is interpreted, by Winch and Kierkegaard (and St. Augustine) as a feature of ”prayer”. Here I have to give an outline of what I understand conscience and how it differs from something that can arguably be called the standard view of conscience. The point with this is to show that the ideas of the secluded inner and of God providing with understanding are actually repressive responses to something that is your own conscience. This is relevant also for the remarks of Wittgenstein, for even if they are less specific than the elaborations of Winch and Kierkegaard, they are continuous with these (and as I shortly indicate, both with St. Augustine’s ideas and the Bible).
Thirdly, I try to show that the idea of the secluded inner is not an intellectual oversight that could be ammended by a proper understanding of the concepts of inner and outer. Instead, there is a normative, that is: collective, pressure to adopt this view, for it orignates from repressing conscience and love: not from grammatical confusions. Moreover, repressing conscience involves, unsurprisingly, a view of language too, the view namely, that language is basically a discourse. It is true, that public language is a discourse. But my talking to you is centrally about me and you understanding each other, not about understanding each other’s sentences. This understanding cannot be reduced to a discourse.
Finally, I show that Wittgenstein’s remarks in LWPP II are continuous with the view I have presented. He also notices the (for philosophers) peculiar character of one person talking to another (which I call I-you understanding), and the important sense in which the meaning of such a conversation cannot be conveyed to a third person. This all shows, that the religious idea of a secluded inner, etc. – that Wittgenstein still in the mid 1940ties held on to – are morally troublesome assumptions that one should try to dissolve. This too, is in accordance with Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as a ”work on oneself”.
Disclamer: Deep issues on morality cannot be argued for. Nor does Wittgenstein (nor Winch nor Kierkegaard) argue for the idea of a secluded domain in the soul; he simply assumes that this is the case. The same goes for Winch and Kierkegaard. If someone thinks for instance that conscience is about feeling guilt for moral trespasses – not about being loveless to another person, then there is no way of showing by way of argument that she is wrong. What I do in this paper, is that I try to show what kind of philosophical assumptions that go together with the assumption of a secluded domain of the human soul and what, by contrast, goes with ”my view” of conscience and openness. And I do think that Wittgenstein’s line of thinking in LWPP II goes in a direction where the idea of secludedness is not only questioned but dissolved. But this is so only if one acknowledges certain basic ideas about human intercourse and language. – This view of philosophical argument is, as is generally known among Wittgensteinians, in line with Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy, and should not be a problem in an issue about Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
I have added references to all philosophers mentioned.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for Authors
The author's revision, to put it bluntly, falls short of being a revision. None of the concerns I had raised have been addressed in the revised version:
(i) The quoted Wittgenstein passages are, sadly enough, still not considered worthy of any deeper analysis by the author. And the immediate sentences following the quotations may work in German (the author seems to be a native German speaker) but they come across as awkward in English. The author, however, for whatever reasons, refuses to let go of them.
(ii) The structure of the argument remains unresolved—the revised version merely adds more material. Now, simply adding more material does not clarify any paper’s structure. To do so is more a (bad) habit of students; certainly not the way scholars should react – in their own interest by the way. I assume, too, that most of the "new" material is taken from other (already published?) papers by the author.
(iii) Plus, the author still sees no need to cite Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, despite the fact that the paper is explicitly concerned with it. The author has to either provide the reader with the dates of the cited passages from “Culture and Value” or quote from the MS.
The requirements set out in point 3 must be met. Given the topic and the scholarly practices, the author must engage with and cite more appropriate sources (The Nachlass itself). Simply taking out remarks from a stack of notes (such as "Vermischte Bemerkungen", i.e. "Culture and Value") and attaching grandiose interpretations to it, without appropriate investigation, is unacceptable.
Author Response
My reply:
The reply contains a summary of the paper, that will hopefully, together with the additions I have made, clarify its structure.
First just one observation that is worth considering: my account of ethics, conscience, love, language, departs decissively from the basic outlook that characterizes most philosophical agreements and disagreements on these matters. It is a notorious fact, that even philosophers that by some are considered to be of historical importance are by others dismissed as worthless obscurantists. - Given that my outlook differs significantly from what from my point of view appear as different versions of standard views, it is quite impossible for me to shorten my paper: it is already too short. Of course: if my outlook appears uninteresting, this will be felt as a waste of space. But in case there would be interest in it, it has to be given some space.
What I try to show is that the idea of the secluded inner is a result of repressing conscience. This is true as much of the religious as of the philosophical notions of the secluded inner. What we have here is not a philosophical problem the way it is usually understood - for instance as a problem about language use and grammar. In his LWPP II Wittgenstein dissolves the inner/outer dichotomy, and as I show, it is not about grammar, language use and philosophical argument but, to put it in Wittgenstein’s words, about ”work with oneself” – about moral issues. In my view, (yes: in my view) morality is about I-you understanding, love, conscience and repression. This matters because the idea of the secluded inner is a result of repressing conscience. I show this with my discussion of Winch. I also have to show the ethical-religious outlook of Winch is quite far analogous to Hegel’s dialectic between sujective conscience and objective morality, which is interesting, because Hegel, in my view, was the first one to elaborate an dialectic between subjectivity and sociality; today a dominating outlook, which also contains a view of language as a socially established discourse.
In his LWPP II, Wittgenstein goes against the grain of the above mentioned, dominating outlook while, in his remarks on religion, he does not seem to be considering the dissolution he performs in LWPP II. But then the remarks in LWPP II are written later than the remarks on religion that I am discussing. There is however no reason to think that Wittgenstein intended the remarks in LWPP II to correct his remarks on religion. But I think there is a tendsion here.
The main themes of my discussion are the idea of wretchedness, the idea of the secluded inner, and the idea of the difficulty of self-understanding together with the assumption that only God can reach the secluded interiority and give you proper self-understanding. Firstly, I show that the idea that only God could give you self-understanding is untenable. It is not possible not to know whether one acts for instance out of genuine love or deception. Nor can God ”give” you love, for love is something that precisely you open yourself to in that you open yourself to another human being.
Secondly, I show how the religious idea of the secluded; ”the silence of the heart” involves a reversal of human understanding and its relation to religion. What actually is an experience of conscience is interpreted, by Winch and Kierkegaard (and St. Augustine) as a feature of ”prayer”. Here I have to give an outline of what I understand conscience and how it differs from something that can arguably be called the standard view of conscience. The point with this is to show that the ideas of the secluded inner and of God providing with understanding are actually repressive responses to something that is your own conscience. This is relevant also for the remarks of Wittgenstein, for even if they are less specific than the elaborations of Winch and Kierkegaard, they are continuous with these (and as I shortly indicate, both with St. Augustine’s ideas and the Bible).
Thirdly, I try to show that the idea of the secluded inner is not an intellectual oversight that could be ammended by a proper understanding of the concepts of inner and outer. Instead, there is a normative, that is: collective, pressure to adopt this view, for it orignates from repressing conscience and love: not from grammatical confusions. Moreover, repressing conscience involves, unsurprisingly, a view of language too, the view namely, that language is basically a discourse. It is true, that public language is a discourse. But my talking to you is centrally about me and you understanding each other, not about understanding each other’s sentences. This understanding cannot be reduced to a discourse.
Finally, I show that Wittgenstein’s remarks in LWPP II are continuous with the view I have presented. He also notices the (for philosophers) peculiar character of one person talking to another (which I call I-you understanding), and the important sense in which the meaning of such a conversation cannot be conveyed to a third person. This all shows, that the religious idea of a secluded inner, etc. – that Wittgenstein still in the mid 1940ties held on to – are morally troublesome assumptions that one should try to dissolve. This too, is in accordance with Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as a ”work on oneself”.
Disclamer: Deep issues on morality cannot be argued for. Nor does Wittgenstein (nor Winch nor Kierkegaard) argue for the idea of a secluded domain in the soul; he simply assumes that this is the case. The same goes for Winch and Kierkegaard. If someone thinks for instance that conscience is about feeling guilt for moral trespasses – not about being loveless to another person, then there is no way of showing by way of argument that she is wrong. What I do in this paper, is that I try to show what kind of philosophical assumptions that go together with the assumption of a secluded domain of the human soul and what, by contrast, goes with ”my view” of conscience and openness. And I do think that Wittgenstein’s line of thinking in LWPP II goes in a direction where the idea of secludedness is not only questioned but dissolved. But this is so only if one acknowledges certain basic ideas about human intercourse and language. – This view of philosophical argument is, as is generally known among Wittgensteinians, in line with Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy, and should not be a problem in an issue about Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
I have added references to all philosophers mentioned.
I do not understand what the sentences after quotations that according to R2 are awkward ”in in English”, are. What is the trouble with them? R2 should clarify this. And if the structure of the ”argument” is still unclear, it is more helpful to point out what is unclear? What are the passages that have an unclear role, or are confusing, mistaken,etc.?
