Being Church Together? Exploring the Logic of Intercultural Theology and Ministry

Abstract

The shift away from mission studies to intercultural theology within a number of universities coincides with the emergence of postmodernism. This article explores the extent to which a postmodern outlook pervades intercultural theology and explores whether or not an alternative epistemological orientation, particularism, might be better suited to the task of bringing diverse cultures and languages into dialogue and, moreover, uniting Christian congregations.

1. Introduction

The paradigm shift from mission studies to intercultural theology in the late twentieth century coincides with the emergence of postmodernism. This essay explores the extent to which a postmodern outlook reverberates throughout intercultural theology. It then evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of this approach as a theoretical framework for bringing different cultures into dialogue. Following this, it suggests an alternative approach to intercultural theology (and ministry) by exploring how a particularist epistemological orientation enables different cultures and languages to be church together.

2. The Emergence of Intercultural Theology

Intercultural theology developed out of mission studies during the latter part of the twentieth century (Wrogemann 2021, p. 1; Ustorf 2011, p. 19). Pioneered by the Swiss/German missiologists Walter J. Hollenweger, Richard Friedli and Hans Jochen Margull, the concept has often been seen as an alternative to what might be interpreted as the ethnocentrism inherent within Christian missiology. Margull’s History of Christian Missions in Africa is a classic example of this paradigm shift. Margull (1969, p. 15) challenged imperialistic conceptions of mission and called for dialogue between the Christians and the plethora of different cultures in Africa.1 Essentially, his analysis of the historic entanglement of Christian mission with European imperialism led him to believe that “mission” was no longer tenable (Margull 1971, p. 50). While Hollenweger (1984, p. 3) continued to use the word, he also critiqued the dominance of Western Christianity and associated its claims to normativity with colonialism.2 In the same vein, in a World Council of Churches publication, Friedli advocated for a paradigm shift, away from “mission,” toward the terms “intercultural theology.” This, he believed would prevent the imposition of European forms of Christianity and highlight the diverse and dialogical nature of theology (Friedli 1985, p. 5). In summary, these writers began to suspect missiology of harbouring an implicit ‘metatheology’ and challenged the illusion that Christianity can be reduced to the contents of any one particular culture (Ustorf 2011, p. 19; Bevans et al. 2019, p. 104).

The resistance of these thinkers to “metatheology” and to the transmission of a universally valid Christian gospel has not fallen out of the sky (Ustorf 2011, p. 2019). Indeed, the reluctance of these writers to use the term mission echoes a more general societal shift away from metanarratives. This is reflected in the fact that several universities with faculties of missiology—including Hamburg, Basel, Heidelberg, Roehampton, Fuller, and others—have renamed these departments “Intercultural Theology” (Wrogemann 2016, p. 23; Ustorf 2011, p. 15).3 It must be acknowledged here that, at a practical (business) level, this rebranding has probably been advantageous given that, unlike the term mission, intercultural is not yet burdened with colonial conceptions. Moreover, it is likely that these terms offer a broader umbrella for a wider number of subjects including the exploration of diverse theological traditions from around the world, mutual engagement between a variety of different Christians groups and even the relationship between Christians and other religions (Wrogemann 2016, p. 23). Nevertheless, at an epistemological level, resistance toward the term “mission” reflects a wider shift within western society and resonates with what has been described as the postmodern rejection of meta-narratives (Lyotard 1984).

3. The Postmodern Condition

Over the last few decades, several philosophers have called into question humanity’s ability to know objective truth. For example, in his later writings, Ludwig Wittgenstein rejected the notion that human language corresponds to concrete reality and argued instead that truth and meaning are determined within particular “language games” (Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 49–50, 138). Similar arguments are put forward by Jean-Francois Lyotard in his work The Postmodern Condition (Lyotard 1984). Diagnosing this “postmodern condition” is challenging in that a powerful current within this way of thinking is the rejection of objective meaning. Indeed, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact meaning of the term postmodernism since this epistemological orientation resists systematic or comprehensive understandings of reality. Nevertheless, it can be said that the jumble of writers often associated with postmodernism typically manifest an aversion toward metaphysics (Sheehan 2004, p. 20). Indeed, thinkers from a wide variety of backgrounds including Wittgenstein (1958, pp. 5, 11), Quine (1953, pp. 42–43), Rorty (1979; 1989, p. xvi), Baudrillard (1983, p. 10; 1988, p. 170), Lyotard (1984, pp. 31–37), Derrida (1976, p. 4) and many more besides assume, perhaps as a first principle, the impossibility of metaphysics.

Lyotard’s work offers a paradigmatic example of this anti-metaphysical tendency. He employs Wittgenstein’s work in order to argue that meaning and truth cannot be determined through reference to an extra-linguistic reality and thus we must move away from grand, universal, metanarratives and fall back upon micro-narratives. Thus, like Wittgenstein, he concludes that meaning and truth are to be found within limited contexts where ‘language games’ form clear, if not clearly defined, rules for meaning and behaviour (Lyotard 1984, p. 10). In a similar vein, Quine writes:

The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs … is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field… But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.” Quine (1953, pp. 42–43).

Therefore, while their arguments differ in emphasis, a central feature of their rejection of metaphysics is the disconnection between our language, our conceptual schemes, and things in the world. This separates our theories about the way things are from reality. Put simply, these writers are sceptical about our ability to connect words and things, thus there is no way to demonstrate a relationship between the way things are in the world and how we describe them.

Another central feature within postmodern discourse is the rejection of universal conceptions of reason. For example, echoing the thought of the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (Wray 2021, pp. 72–73), Lyotard stresses the incommensurability between different language games (micro-narratives) in that there are no objective criteria for deciding between the truths generated in different micro-narratives given that different cultural groups can offer very different accounts of the same reality (Kuklick 2003, pp. 269–71). Thus, Quine infamously declared that, at an epistemological level, there is no difference between the gods of Homer and scientific explanations of reality.4 To be clear, Quine did not believe Greek mythology and scientific enquiry to be on a par. Nevertheless, his essential point was that there are no objective rules for choosing between conceptual schemes. On this way of viewing reality, decisions about truth and meaning are decided from within the language game (micro-narrative). There are no independent objective criteria that can enable us to determine whether a particular proposition or action is valid. Every culture has its own language-game, its own particular grammar, and its truths and ethical standards can only be decided by those situated within the culture (Lyotard 1984, pp. 7–8; Pratt Morris-Chapman 2025a).

A further difficulty raised by these thinkers is the indeterminacy of language (Derrida 1976; Quine 1960). Put simply, if one believes that conceptual schemes/language games are not demonstrably related to “any given set of data”, then more than one conceptual scheme/language games/translation can account for the data as well as any other (Kemp 2006, p. 55). For example, Quine illustrates how the disconnect between words and things renders translation between different languages (conceptual schemes) indeterminate. This is not to say that sentences cannot be translated between one language and another (Kemp 2006, p. 35). However, Quine maintains that, since the cultural insider has a different conception of the world to the outsider then, what might appear to be a straightforward translation may be considerably at variance with the insiders meaning.5

The speaker of a language unknown to a visiting anthropologist might say “gʉ̀ŋ” when an Owl flies past (Wepngong Ndi 2007, p. 64). The question is, can the anthropologist be certain that “gʉ̀ŋ” is Owl? Quine answers no. The speaker of the language (Limbum) may be talking about a particular part of an Owl or may even be talking about what they want for dinner. Moreover, Quine argues that the person speaking the language will have a different conception of the world to the anthropologist. Thus, if it is believed that people can transform into Owls, then it is quite possible that gʉ̀ŋ refers not expressly to Owls but to the activity of wizards who have the power to control the supernatural sphere and transform themselves into Owls (Wepngong Ndi 2007, p. 64; Mbunwe-Samba 2012).6 Thus, on this worldview the noun “gʉ̀ŋ” could logically mean that “Owls are men incarnate” (Quine 1960, p. 69). Hence, the external translator’s attempt is nothing more than a projection—the imposition of a conceptual scheme onto a set of data which could equally well be explained very differently. As Quine puts it, “if matching of stimulus meanings … is the only objective test for translation” then postmodernism entails “the indetereminacy of translation” (Kemp 2006, p. 56). Thus, different anthropologists with different world views will come up with entirely different translations (Davidson 1984, p. 27). There is thus no way to be sure whether or not “gʉ̀ŋ” refers to owls, parts of owls or wizards.

In summary, the postmodern condition often entails (1) a rejection of metanarratives because there is no way to demonstrate that our descriptions of reality are actually connected to the way things are. For this reason, they often maintain that (2) each language (game) or conceptual scheme offers its best attempt to explain the way things are. Nevertheless, they maintain that these different conceptual schemes are incommensurate in that one cannot use one to judge another, (3) and moreover that this makes accurate translation between different conceptual schemes impossible. Having illustrated some aspects of the postmodern condition, it is helpful to examine how these features render the proposals of intercultural theologians shaped by postmodernism unworkable.

4. Uncovering the Logic of Intercultural Theology

The emphasis postmodern thinkers place upon the plurality of different language games resonates with Margull’s emphasis on the way in which different contexts produce very different theologies (Ustorf 2011, p. 23).7 Indeed, the postmodern outlook outlined above reverberates throughout intercultural theology. Thus, for example, Margull’s critique of the concept of mission, as the transmission of a globally valid gospel, anticipates Lyotard’s critique of meta-narratives. Indeed, several intercultural theologians explicitly state their outright opposition to what they refer to as “meta-theology” (Sundermeier 1996; Küster 2011, p. 110). However, while these thinkers reject “meta-theology”, they insist, nevertheless, on struggling to identify a means by which they may engage in meaningful dialogue with alternative cultural manifestations of Christianity (Gruber 2017b, pp. 10–11).8 A paradigmatic example of this tendency is Robert Schreiter. For example, while adopting a postmodern outlook, which presupposes an incommensurability between different micro-narratives, Schreiter (1997b, p. 45) nevertheless asserts that “to hold that cultures are utterly incommensurate” is something untenable for Christians. Thus, Schreiter implies that “all cultures, however diverse and different, are finally commensurable” (Pieterse 2015, 2017, p. 146) and tries to commensurate the various contextual theologies under a conception of catholicity (Schreiter 1997b, pp. 131–32). Unfortunately, while the worldwide presence of Christian communities is a reality, his attempt to commensurate these very different Christian communities under a catholic conception of orthodoxy is not only ecumenically suspicious but philosophically muddled. Essentially, he attempts to outline criteria for orthodoxy by arguing that in order for it to be ‘truly Christian’ it will cohere with the beliefs, practice and worship of ‘the’ (catholic?) tradition (Schreiter 1997a, pp. 117–21). Thus, Schreiter tries to locate a common measure for the various different micronarratives of Christianity—conceptualising these various manifestations as an internal part of what might be described as a grand Christian narrative (Pratt Morris-Chapman 2023, 2025a). However, the Wittgensteinian framework underpinning his analysis rejects this grand narrative as having contested boundaries, given that each Christian micro-narrative contains opinions, practices and rules that are contrary to other manifestations. In short, Schreiter is effectively trying to evaluate one cultural manifestation of Christianity according to the standards and criteria of another (Pratt Morris-Chapman 2024, 2025b). Another example of this tendency is Henning Wrogemann.

In an insightful essay upon “Intercultural Theology as In-Between Theology” Henning Wrogemann describes intercultural theology as an “in-between theology” which reflects the “boundary-crossing” nature of Christianity (Wrogemann 2021, p. 1). His conception of the intrinsic nature of this theological subdiscipline is centred upon the preposition “inter.” Not only does this presuppose engagement with at least two cultural manifestations of Christianity, it entails what he describes as a comparison of these entities through an analysis of the “interplay between their respective cultural, religious, societal” features. In addition, he envisages the central task of this theology as “continually negotiating” between the particular and the universal (2021, pp. 3–4). While he does not explicitly state his adhesion to a postmodern theoretical framework, this can be inferred from his description of Intercultural theology as being “Opposed to Metatheologies” and, moreover, his aversion to any definition which would entail the comprehension of “all manner of cultural-contextual expressions of Christianity.” Essentially, he considers it unhelpful, in light of the wide variety of local forms of Christianity, to attempt any kind of abstract commensuration (2021, p. 3). Wrogemann’s reluctance to view intercultural theology as meta-theology resonates with the anti-metaphysical feature of the postmodernism described above. However, if this is so, his contention that a central task of intercultural theology is to compare different forms of Christianity and bring them into dialogue is problematic. Even if it is concluded that he does not adopt a postmodern outlook, he fails to offer a theoretical framework which can enable the intercultural theologian to compare and contrast different forms of Christianity so as to enable meaningful dialogue between them.

Similar problems are found in his three-volume work on intercultural theology (Wrogemann 2016, 2018, 2019), arguably one of the most comprehensive reflections on the subject to date (Hill 2022). Here the same tension remains unresolved between the demands of the universal and the particular within intercultural theology. As will be seen below, this of course is typical of the encounter between Christian theology and postmodernism in that the former seeks to retain some sort of “sky hook” attempting to anchor theological knowledge in something beyond human cultures and languages (Rorty 1991, p. 23). However, while he is opposed to meta-theology, emphasises the plurality of Christian theologies and stresses that theological claims are shaped by culture and language he refuses to accept that theological claims are culturally contingent. Thus, while he acknowledges the wide variety of interpretations available, Wrogemann (2016, p. 392) believes “the Bible itself remains as a normative source of faith”. Therefore, while he resists the postmodern suggestion that central Christian beliefs are contingent to a particular time and place, he does not offer a theoretical framework that would allow him to provide intercultural theology with a method for achieving a balance between truth claims deemed central to the Christian tradition and the culturally situated nature of knowledge. In sum, rather than engaging with the Anglo-analytic philosophical tradition which could assist him in this task, he draws heavily upon scholarship from within the continental tradition (Alston 1996, p. 45).9

5. Intercultural Theology, Epistemological Particularism and Epistemic Fit

At this juncture it is useful to explore how an alternative epistemological position might resolve the incommensurability inherent within the postmodern framework utilised by many intercultural theologians. The approach in question is an epistemological particularist approach helpfully illustrated by Ernest Sosa:

Which should come first: a method or set of criteria for determining when we have a bit of knowledge, or particular examples of knowledge, in terms of which we can determine criteria? Those who give pre-eminence to method of criteria may be called methodists [proceduralists], and those who give pre-eminence to particular examples (e.g., my knowledge that I have two hands) may be called particularists.

(Sosa 1991, p. 158)

This epistemological orientation begins with the assumption that people possess genuine claims to knowledge, prior to their having epistemological criteria (procedures) outlining what constitutes valid knowledge. This position advanced by Roderick Chisolm essentially holds that epistemology commences with knowledge—with what we think we know. It is from this starting point, a presupposition of knowledge antecedent to epistemological criteria that the particularist evaluates what they think they know and explores how such knowledge claims might be justified in such a way that commonsense beliefs are not jettisoned as the result of the imposition of rigid criteria.10 Put simply the particularist approach reverses how we think about epistemology, instead of beginning with criteria determining authentic or inauthentic belief, a particularist orientation begins with knowledge and then evaluates how these knowledge claims might be justified.

The above may, at first glance, appear to be cooking the books in advance. The same exact criticism however can be made of those who begin epistemology with rules (criteria) determining the parameters of knowledge. Chisolm’s analysis of this the traditional proceduralist approach to epistemology is illuminating at this point:

To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle.

(Chisholm 1973, p. 3)

Chislom’s point is essentially this; philosophers who begin epistemology with a procedure (criteria) outlining true and false beliefs are unable to know whether such criteria are effective unless they already know what constitutes true belief and are caught in an infinite regress. However, rather than succumbing to a postmodern sceptical condition we recognise that we do actually have knowledge prior to our having criteria for knowledge, thus we can be confident that we have two arms and legs, even if we do not have epistemological criteria to justify these beliefs. Thus, a particularist orientation enables us to presuppose the knowledge claims already in our possession and to then formulate criteria evaluating these spontaneous beliefs retrospectively in a manner appropriate to the case in hand.

In identifying appropriate criteria for the retrospective evaluation of these claims, Chisolm highlights Aristotle’s contention that each area of knowledge has its own levels of precision (1973, p. 3). This principle, what Chisolm refers to as Aristotelian Epistemic Fit, is found in the Nicomachean Ethics:

For it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

(Aristotle 2008, 1094b.24ff)

According to this principle, “we should fit our epistemic evaluations in an appropriate way” to the antecedent knowledge claims already in our possession (Abraham and Aquino 2017, p. 1). Put simply if I know I have two hands I should not attempt to justify this belief retrospectively using criteria that would forbid me from believing this.11

This Epistemological orientation is well suited to the demands raised by intercultural theologians. Whereas postmodernism’s strength is that it recognises the plurality of different worldviews (micronarratives/language games), the weakness of this position is that it prevents different conceptions of the world from communicating with one another indeed it assumes diverse cultures to be incommensurate and in the end renders communication between them impossible. Conversely, a particularist approach to intercultural theology (and ministry) does not presuppose incommensurability between alternative conceptual schemes. Neither does it assume the indeterminacy of translation between different languages. On the contrary, a particularist orientation enables us to (x1) recognise the knowledge claims emerging within different cultures, (x2) assume that communication between these cultures happens all the time and (x3) have reflective dialogue between the cultures concerning their different ways of viewing the world in order that differences between them might be resolved appropriately. With regard to this last point, it is essential that the parties involved resolve their differences in a manner appropriate to the particular claims emerging within the particular cultures and groups involved (Abraham 2006, p. 29). Having outlined the contours of this epistemological orientation and how it might relate to intercultural theology, I want to explore how this might work in practice.

6. Case Study: The Italian Job

An intercultural model of Church operative in Italy helps to illustrate the value of a particularist approach to knowledge. In 2015, my wife and I were asked to serve two Methodist12 congregations in Italy. Since the late nineteen eighties, Italian congregations had been particularly blessed by the arrival of Christians from many different parts of the world. This is reflected in official church statements which stress the importance of “Essere Chiesa Insieme”—being church together in worship, leadership and mission (Chiesa Evangelica Valdese 2003, 2014). The following extract from the 2004 synod report captures the essence of the church’s intercultural vision (Chiesa Evangelica Valdese 2004):

The Synod thanks the Lord for the richness and opportunities resulting from the presence in our churches of brothers and sisters from other countries [the] opportunity to witness to an enriching coexistence with migrant brothers and sisters …Communion with migrant evangelical believers is a fundamental and central part of our “being church” …Therefore, we need a unity of purpose on the path of “being church together,” one that belongs to the entire church and moves at the right pace—neither falling behind nor ahead of its time, and avoiding even unintentional paternalistic attitudes. This journey requires a willingness to listen, particularly to the diverse local situations, and reflection on the theme of “identity and desirable cross-fertilization.” The Synod, therefore, recommends that churches seek equitable representation of the various components in their decision-making bodies; invites churches to take into account “being church together” in their work with children and young people, and to develop some concrete initiatives, even small ones, of coexistence in their ways of working and praying, which bear the mark and contribution of these sisters and brothers of ours

(Chiesa Evangelica Valdese 2004)

The above illustrates how the intercultural vision (Chiesa Evangelica Valdese 2013) emerging within this particular context encourages congregations to have united worship services, to make structural changes to ensure leadership bodies reflect the presence of diversity present within congregations and the sharing of wisdom with one another (Chiesa Evangelica Valdese 2004).13 How might a particularist approach, rather than a postmodern (or postcolonial) epistemological orientation, practically facilitate this?

At the outset it is apparent that the vision of “Essere Chiesa Insieme” outlined above acknowledges the intrinsic value of the various different cultures found within the church. At the level of implementation, it is of paramount importance that ecclesial structures reflect this—ensuring that the principle of equality translates into equal membership of the leadership bodies (local, district and national) within the church. Thus, at a practical level, it is first necessary to make structural changes which ensure the leadership reflects the cultural diversity present. Then, and only then can the intercultural vision, “Essere Chiesa Insieme” become manifest. Thus, it is necessary to presuppose the value of the wisdom and knowledge claims contained within these cultures from the outset. However, it is also necessary, if culturally diverse congregations are to remain together, to have a mechanism for resolving disagreements and differences. This is where the utility of a particularist epistemological orientation becomes apparent. While a postmodern outlook may concede that all cultures and languages are on a similar epistemological footing, it also presupposes an incommensurability between them which renders the practical task of adjudicating between different groups (epistemologically) impossible. Put simply, if Italians and Ghanaians within a congregation have different opinions concerning worship styles and prayer, a particularist approach allows for both (x1) the recognition of different approaches and (x3) a collective retrospective evaluation of the best way to move forward together. Another challenge contained with this particular intercultural vision is that of worshipping together at the same time, with people from diverse language groups. This requires, contrary to postmodernism, the assumption that different languages are capable of translation. Fortunately, a particularist epistemological position allows to assume (x2) that communication between different cultures is possible—even if misunderstanding is commonplace.

7. Conclusions

This essay highlights the difficulty facing intercultural theologians utilising a postmodern theoretical framework. While intercultural theology entails (x1) meaningful engagement, (x2) communication, and (x3) negotiation between different cultures (Wrogemann 2021), the incommensurability (incomparability) and indeterminacy (ambiguity) of translation advanced by postmodern thinkers render these tasks (x1–x3) theoretically impossible. Moreover, the attempt by figures such as Schreiter and Wrogemann to retain a norm (whether church or Bible) for adjudicating between different forms of Christianity is fundamentally at odds with postmodernism. However, while highlighting the unsuitability of postmodernism for the aims of intercultural theology, this essay highlights the way in which an epistemological particularist orientation enables all of the above (x1–x3).

At a practical level, a particularist approach allows the intercultural theologian to presuppose (x1) all the beliefs, traditions and cultures, indeed all the knowledge claims advanced in the cultures present. This means that all the cultures present are recognised and valued, placed on an equal footing from the beginning. Thus, in a congregation in which, for example, there are Methodist Italians and Ghanaians, a particularist approach enables the intercultural practitioner/minister to place all the theological and cultural beliefs of these different treasured components of the body of Christ on a par. Indeed, this orientation enables those present to bring their cultures, traditions, styles of worship, beliefs, conceptions of reality (etc.) to the table. Secondly, (x2) a particularist approach assumes communication between the different cultural groups to be possible. This enables discussion and indeed comparisons between the different contributions on offer. Moreover, the presupposition of meaningful communication between different cultural groups allows those present to discuss what they believe to be the positive and negative aspects of each other’s traditions. Thirdly, (x3) the reflective evaluative feature contained within this epistemological orientation enables those present to corporately negotiate together toward a consensus about what they wish to preserve and what they seek to leave behind. Finally, this approach enables the presupposition of a (x1) theological tradition. Thus, on this approach it is possible for the discussions between the cultural groups present to also be in dialogue with a particular tradition, such as Methodism. This allows the intercultural practitioner to bring doctrines peculiar to this tradition into the discussion where helpful—particularly when the dialogue between them reaches an impasse.

In conclusion, if intercultural theology is to be an “in-between theology” whose central task is to compare different forms of Christianity and bring them into dialogue (Wrogemann 2021, p. 1), then it needs a theoretical framework capable of supporting this role. While it is true that a postmodern outlook enables an equitable view of different cultures and ways of worshipping, it is fundamentally sceptical about the capacity of these different communities to really communicate. In contrast, a particularist approach enables us to (x1) presuppose the epistemological claims within each culture (x2) assume communication is possible and (x3) retrospectively resolve differences in a manner appropriate to the claims in hand.