When Merleau-Ponty Encounters Fazang: Comparing Merleau-Pontian Body-Network with Fazang’s Interpretation of Indra’s Net for a Critical Techno-Ethics

Abstract

This paper explores the implicit thought of the “body-network” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, drawing from both his earlier and later works. It demonstrates that, for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal body is inherently interconnected with the world through motor intentionality. Meanwhile, in his later concept of “flesh,” this interconnectedness deepens into a relationship of mutual reflection and chiasmic intertwining, where bodies and the world continuously mirror and permeate each other. The paper then introduces the Huayan Buddhist metaphor of Indra’s Net, along with Fazang’s interpretation of it. A detailed comparative analysis is conducted between Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s understanding of Indra’s Net. The paper argues for a profound resonance between the primordial characteristics of the Merleau-Pontian body-network—namely, relationality and reflectivity—and Fazang’s key concepts, such as “mutual identity” (相即), “mutual inclusion” (相入), and the contemplative idea that “the images of many bodies are reflected in one mirror” (多身入一鏡像觀). Despite their distinct cultural and philosophical vocabularies, both thinkers construct a relational ontology aimed at deconstructing entrenched dualisms. Through this in-depth comparative study using the Internet of Bodies (IoB) as a case study, this paper demonstrates that the IoB technology exhibits only superficial resemblances to the Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net. To address the ethical challenges posed by the IoB, it is imperative to integrate the shared philosophical insights of Merleau-Ponty and Fazang in constructing a critical techno-ethics capable of interrogating the ontological reduction and power asymmetries inherent in contemporary technological networks. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reversible flesh inspires an ethics of contextual sensitivity and user agency, resisting the reduction of lived experience to data points. Meanwhile, Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism, with its principles of mutual identity and mutual inclusion, reveals the relational nature of data, challenging its treatment as neutral or absolute. Together, these philosophies advocate for a decentralized, reciprocal techno-ethics that prioritizes embodied meaning over surveillance and control.

1. Introduction

1.1. Husserlian Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy

As one of the most renowned and enduring philosophical movements since the 20th century, the phenomenological tradition initiated by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl has inherently carried profound implications for comparative philosophy from its very inception. Particularly, the comparative study between the phenomenological tradition and Buddhist philosophy has evolved into a significant scholarly discourse since Husserl’s foundational work, establishing itself as a vital subject within the field of cross-cultural philosophical inquiry.

The comparative study between Husserlian phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy is of significant importance and necessity, as it opens a unique philosophical dialogue that challenges entrenched Eurocentric perspectives and enriches our understanding of consciousness, rationality, and the aims of philosophy itself. Husserl (2017), in his manuscript Socrates-Buddha, initially framed this encounter by contrasting Indian and European thought as two forms of transcendentalism, valuing the latter’s theoretical science over the former’s practical world-renunciation. While his Eurocentric conclusion has been rightly critiqued, the philosophical significance of his eidetic comparison remains. This tension in Husserl’s thought is further explored by Lau (2016), who notes his surprising praise for Buddhist philosophy as a “transcendental” path akin to the phenomenological epoché and a potential resource for cultural renewal, which he nonetheless ultimately rejected for lacking systematic form. This ambivalence is central to Ni’s (2011) analysis. Ni argues that Husserl, despite his limited knowledge of Buddhist philosophy, approached it with exceptional respect. Ni identified profound parallels in their shared transcendental character and emphasis on autonomy, while contending that their fundamental divergence lay in Buddhism’s practical soteriological aim, as opposed to phenomenology’s theoretical pursuit.

Building on this foundation, scholars have delved into specific structural and methodological resonances. Gutland and Liu (2025), reconstructing Ni’s work, highlight the striking parallels between Husserlian phenomenology and Yogācāra Buddhism, such as their layered models of consciousness and transcendental orientation, alongside key divergences concerning rationality and the theory-practice relationship. Similarly, Larrabee (1981) compares the Yogācāra concept of the ālayavijñāna with Husserl’s inner time-consciousness, proposing that Husserl’s dialectical structure of the “living present” can resolve the paradoxical unity and plurality of the storehouse consciousness. From another angle, Divino (2025) argues that the Pali Abhidhamma shares significant methodological ground with Husserlian phenomenology in its analytical reduction of experience to fundamental constituents (dhammas and essences), its relational view of consciousness, and its critique of naïve realism.

However, this comparative endeavor is not merely about identifying parallels but also about challenging and refining philosophical assumptions. For example, Day (2024) contends that Husserl’s rigid distinction between pure theory and pure praxis led him to misunderstand the Buddha’s path, which in fact integrates theoretical insight with embodied practice, presenting a way of life that challenges Husserl’s dichotomy. This critical engagement demonstrates the necessity of the dialogue: it pushes phenomenology beyond its own limitations.

Ultimately, as the collective work of these scholars suggests, the encounter between Husserl’s project and Buddhist philosophy not only illuminates historical points of contact but also advocates for an experience-based integration of introspective methods, offering a profound resource for renewing contemporary consciousness studies and addressing the ongoing crisis of humanity.

1.2. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of the Body and Buddhist Philosophy

Unlike comparative studies between Husserlian phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy, the comparative research on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Buddhist philosophy primarily focuses on the dimension of bodily perception and sensation, as well as how such perceptual sensibility relates to specific Buddhist contemplative practices. Scholars in this field argue that a comparative study between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Buddhist philosophy can contribute to dismantling the tradition of mind-body dualism in Western philosophy. In this regard, these researchers often explore the similarities and differences between the later Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh and the Buddhist ontology. Most scholars contend that both Merleau-Ponty and Buddhist philosophy establish an ontological framework in which selves and others, humans and non-humans are interdependent and intricately intertwined.

To elaborate, the dialogue between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy reveals profound intersections, particularly regarding the role of embodied perception in spiritual practice and the ontological implications of their respective non-dual frameworks. Jung (2006) demonstrates how Merleau-Ponty’s integrated body-mind aligns with Buddhist non-duality, using Korean Seonmudo to show that embodied practice, which involves purifying body, speech, and mind, serves as a direct path to awakening, where truth emerges from bodily experience itself. This emphasis on the perceiving body as the site of transformation is echoed in Morley’s (2008) comparison of Merleau-Ponty’s “lived body” with Tantric Yoga’s somatic spirituality, where the human body is seen as a microcosm of the cosmos, and immersive, embodied experience takes precedence over transcendental abstraction. Olson (1986) further solidifies this link by placing Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject in dialogue with Dogen’s Zen, arguing that for both, the body-mind is the essential vehicle for realization—whether through zazen or everyday embodied being—bridging phenomenological investigation with soteriological practice.

At the level of perceptual epistemology, in detail, Coseru (2009) contends that Buddhist epistemology in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition, much like Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, understands perception as non-conceptual, embodied, and causally efficacious—not as accessing an independent “Given” but as enacting direct, intentional engagement with the world. D. Jones (2020) extends this by advocating an aesthetic turn grounded in embodied perception and direct experience, integrating Buddhist interdependent arising and non-self to reveal the self as “interbeing” within a relational world. Mazis (2009) and H.-H. Kim (2009) argue that both Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism reject Kantian deontology, locating ethics instead in a pre-reflective responsiveness arising from perceptual openness, which can be realized either through the “flesh” or through the wisdom (prajñā) of interdependence. In Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeal resonance and Buddhist compassion (karuṇā) emerging from clear perception, ethics becomes inseparable from how we perceive.

Ontologically, Merleau-Ponty’s later concept of the “flesh” finds deep resonance with Buddhist metaphysics. Mazis (2009) and H.-H. Kim (2009) describe the flesh as a reversible medium of “wild being” comparable to Buddhist “suchness” (tathatā), both characterized by a lack of independent existence. H.-H. Kim specifically equates the body’s chiasmic entanglement with the world to dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), while Y.-J. Kim (2016) draws structural parallels between Merleau-Ponty’s “intentional arc” and the cyclical conditioning of dependent origination, even likening the non-hierarchical relationality of the flesh to Huayan Buddhism’s Indra’s Net. Berman (2004; 2014) and Michaels (2023) advance this ontological dialogue by comparing Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reversibility with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of dependent origination. They highlight the shared deconstructive approaches found in Merleau-Ponty’s Gestalt reversibility and Nāgārjuna’s tetralemma, both of which work to undermine essences and reveal a primordial relationality. Michaels adds that both frameworks reveal the self as empty and interdependent, grounding morality not in rationalist ethics but in spontaneous compassion arising from embodied intersubjectivity.

The contemporary application of this dialogue continues to yield rich insights. Johnson (2023) uses Merleau-Ponty’s “anonymous body-subject” to reconcile Buddhist no-self (anātman) with a “pattern theory” of subjectivity, while Vörös (2021) critiques decontextualized mindfulness by redefining it through Merleau-Ponty’s “phenomenal field” as a situated, engaged “radical reflection.” Most recently, Akincano (2025) reinterprets the Pali terms for internality and externality through the Merleau-Pontian chiasm, illustrating how the body is both perceiver and perceived, thereby offering a fresh philosophical grounding for mindfulness practice.

Together, these scholars demonstrate that the confluence of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy not only illuminates the perceptual and ontological dimensions of embodiment but also revitalizes ethical and contemplative practices by foregrounding the body as the locus of perception, relationality, and transformation.

However, existing comparative studies between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Buddhist philosophy have predominantly emphasized textual and conceptual parallels, as well as the phenomenological implications of Buddhist contemplative practices. There remains a relative neglect of situating the significance of such comparative work within the broader context of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), thus limiting its full phenomenological relevance. This gap becomes particularly salient in our current technological era, where Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things, and Internet of Bodies are profoundly reshaping our lived experience and modes of being. Rather than fostering greater solidarity and interdependence, the pervasive infiltration of digital networks into the lifeworld has often led to increased social fragmentation and atomization.

Guided by this problematique, this paper adopts the lens of the “network” to re-examine the dialogue between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. It conducts an in-depth comparison between the Huayan Buddhist metaphor of Indra’s Net, especially through the interpretation by the school’s patriarch Fazang (法藏), and the implicit thought of a body-network discernible throughout Merleau-Ponty’s earlier and later phenomenology. Through this detailed comparative approach, this paper aims to phenomenologically uncover the primordial characteristics of what constitutes a “network.”

I further contend that Merleau-Pontytian body-network reveals two primordial characteristics: relationality and reflectivity. These features resonate profoundly with Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net, which illustrates such ideas as mutual identity and inclusion (相即相入), and “the contemplation of the images of many bodies in one mirror” (多身入一鏡像觀). The structural and ontological affinities between Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net thus offer a fertile ground for intercultural philosophical engagement. Building on this comparative analysis, the paper further seeks to illuminate the contemporary relevance of such a dialogue in the era of the Internet of Everything, and to explore the potential critical ethical insights it may offer to the field of technology ethics.

2. Merleau-Ponty and His Implicit Thought of “Body-Network”

2.1. The Phenomenal Body and Its Networking Effect

Existing research on the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and digital networks has predominantly focused on the embodiment issue of online experiences. For example, in On the Internet, Hubert Dreyfus (2008) leverages Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body to mount a central critique against the dream of disembodied existence online. He argues that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodied cognition, in which intelligence, meaning, and risk are rooted in our physical engagement with the world, reveals the profound poverty of virtual experiences in education, social interaction, and the pursuit of expertise. For Dreyfus, the Internet’s promise to transcend the body is not liberation but a loss of the very context that gives human life its significance, a point powerfully substantiated through a Merleau-Pontian lens.

Distinct from ethical critiques of technology grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Hoel and Carusi (2016) advance a unique interpretation by conceptualizing the Merleau-Pontian “perceiving body” as a distributed, interrogating system. This system intrinsically intertwines bodies, technologies, and environments, leading them to redefine it as a “measuring body.” Through its perceptual agency, this measuring body surveys and engages with the world, thereby granting tools and symbolisms a constitutive role within its operations. Ultimately, it forms an integrated network that encompasses the selves, technologies, and the world.

Based on the above argument, I argue that the body in Merleau-Ponty’s sense possesses an innate networking capacity that we always ignore. Through the body’s perceptual intentionality, it integrates both humans and non-humans, thereby forming an interdependent body-network. Although Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body does not explicitly highlight this networking effect, his early and later thoughts profoundly imply it. This perspective is even crucial for understanding Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, yet it has been overlooked in previous research.

To justify the thesis of the Merleau-Pontian body-network, we must first emphasize that Merleau-Ponty’s approach employs phenomenological reduction to bracket the natural attitude and philosophical prejudices toward the body.1 This methodological move suspends taken-for-granted assumptions that treat the body merely as a biological or mechanical object, and instead returns us to the body as we pre-reflectively experience and live it: as the perceptive, expressive, and relational ground of all meaning and world-disclosure (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. xiv).

Indeed, as early as Husserl’s phenomenology, a distinction was already made between the concepts of Körper (the physical body) and Leib (the lived body). The former refers to the physiological body as an objective entity, while the latter denotes the subjective, living body of perceptual and affective experience. Husserl argues that the Körper, as something directly given in perception, is an object of physiological inquiry. Only through a method of “pairing association” (Parrung), coupled with the inherent perceptual experience of one’s own body, can the other’s Körper be apprehended as a Leib—that is, as another living, experiencing subject like oneself (Husserl 1960, p. 112). In this way, both the other’s body and one’s own are recognized not merely as objects, but as embodied subjects of perception.

Merleau-Ponty further develops Husserl’s line of thought, describing the body as a “being of two leaves” that encompasses both objectivity (as Körper) and subjectivity (as Leib) (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 137). Because of this dual structure, the body inherently possesses a pre-reflective capacity to “grasp” the world. It does not require conscious calculation of the position and distance of its own hands and feet, nor of their spatial relationship to the external world, in order to move them fluidly and intentionally.

Similarly, external objects, when “grasped” by the body, often become integrated into its motor intentionality—effectively extending the body’s perceptual and operative reach. In this way, external entities are incorporated into the body’s own perceptual schema.

In this sense, the perceptual capacity of the body not only constitutes the intersubjective relationship between selves and others but also establishes an embodied relationship between selves and objects, grounded in situated perception. Harney (2020) illustrates that in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account, perception is fundamentally an embodied, reciprocal, and affective relationship of intertwining between the perceiver and the perceived. That is to say, the self, the other, and objects are perceptually “connected,” forming a mutually interwoven and entangled network. As Merleau-Ponty puts out: “[p]erception is like a net whose knots progressively appear more clearly.” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 12).

Specifically, Merleau-Ponty employs the concept of the “body schema” to characterize the body’s capacity to perceptually engage with and connect to the world. The notion of the body schema does not stand alone but is intrinsically linked to the body’s “intentional arc” and “motor intentionality,” collectively forming a conceptual framework for understanding the lived “phenomenal body.” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, pp. 100–5).

To elucidate these concepts, Merleau-Ponty introduces the case study of Schneider, a war veteran suffering from cerebellar ataxia. Schneider’s primary symptom was an inability to perform specific body movements upon verbal command; he could only respond to concrete situational stimuli—such as scratching exactly where a mosquito had bitten him. Merleau-Ponty argues that Schneider’s condition stems neither from a mere motor deficit nor a cognitive impairment, but rather from a disruption between motor capacity and cognitive intention, i.e., a breakdown of motor intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 137). He further identifies this motor intentionality with what he terms the “intentional arc” of the body. As Merleau-Ponty writes:

“… the life of consciousness—epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life—is underpinned by an ‘intentional arc’ that projects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships. This intentional arc creates the unity of the senses, the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity. And this is what ‘goes limp’ in the disorder.”

(Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 137)

Here, bodily perception not only connects selves with others but also couples selves with objects in the world. It is precisely through this perceptual capacity that the body is able to project a world outward and engage with it, thereby weaving together selves, others, and things into an interconnected whole. It is in this sense that the body per se constitutes a primordial perceptual network, I would like to call it the “body-network.” The primary function of this body-network lies in its capacity for projective engagement with the world through motor intentionality (i.e., intentional arc), enabling the body to continuously couple with its surroundings and establish perceptual connections with both others and objects.

Therefore, if we understand the phenomenal body in Merleau-Ponty’s terms as this foundational perceptual network, then such a body becomes the ontological precondition of all networks. In other words, contemporary technological formations—be it the Internet, the Internet of Things, or the Internet of Bodies—can be seen as merely concrete instantiations or externalized extensions of this primordial, bodily network of perception. As Merleau-Ponty states, “Every technique is a ‘technique of the body,’ illustrating and amplifying the metaphysical structure of our flesh.” (Merleau-Ponty 1993, p. 129)

2.2. Relationality as the Primordial Characteristic of the Body-Network

Based on the above discussion, if the phenomenal body can couple selves with others and objects through the projective capacity of motor intentionality, then relationality can be regarded as the primordial characteristic of the Merleau-Pontian body-network. As De Vos (2017) argues that Merleau-Ponty actually establishes the primary, pre-reflective connectedness between bodies. De Vos then defines “bodily connectedness in motion” as the sharing of material and affective bodies in a state of perpetual dynamic tension between individuality and collectivity. It is precisely due to this “bodily connectedness in motion” (i.e., motor intentionality in Merleau-Ponty’s term) that the body is able to weave a relational network encompassing selves, others, and objects through its projective capacity. This network of being-in-the-world possesses not only a temporal breadth but also a spatial depth.

Thus, the cause of Schneider’s condition cannot be attributed solely to physiological cerebellar ataxia; it must also be understood as a loosening or breakdown of motor intentionality in phenomenological terms. This implies that Schneider was effectively excluded from the relational fabric of the body-network. He lost the depth of the body-network: temporally, he could no longer fully connect with his past or future; spatially, he became disconnected from possible and abstract situations. Thus, motor intentionality constitutes the foundation of human freedom in the world, ensuring both spatial and temporal dimensions of agential capacity. In cases where this intentionality is weakened, such as that of Schneider, the individual is reduced to reacting passively and fragmentarily to immediate stimuli. What is fundamentally compromised in such a condition is the open, projective structure of freedom—the capacity to meaningfully inhabit time and space, and to actively engage with possibilities beyond the immediate present. As Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 137) argues, “Schneider is ‘bound’ to the actual, and he ‘lacks freedom,’ he lacks the concrete freedom that consists in the general power of placing oneself in a situation.”

From the above discussion, we can outline the relationality characteristic inherent in the Merleau-Pontian body-network. Through the body’s perceptual and motor capacities, specifically its motor intentionality, selves, others, and objects are woven into a relational network. Yet, the body-network of relationality, as conceived from this phenomenological standpoint, still faces the challenge of solipsism: the relationality of the phenomenological body always originates from my body’s projective capacity. How, then, can I justify that other bodies possess the same projective ability? How can I affirm that others, through their own bodily intentionality, also constitute relational networks centered around themselves?

In response to this unresolved solipsistic dilemma within the philosophy of the lived body, Merleau-Ponty’s later thought turned toward an ontology that regards “flesh” (la chair) as both an elemental dimension and an archetype of Being. The “flesh” is not merely the sum of individual bodies; rather, it is the very style and element of existence that enables the dynamic intertwining (chiasm) between bodies, and between bodies and things. Merleau-Ponty writes:

“The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old term ‘element,’ in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an ‘element’ of Being.”

(Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 139)

For Merleau-Ponty, “flesh” as an “element” of Being reveals the most primordial sense of existence. Since flesh constitutes the meaning of things in general, it is not only the fundamental element of my own body but also that of other bodies and all worldly things. Thus, a universal relationality grounded in flesh emerges among selves, others, and objects.

In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the concept of flesh first serves to address the relationship between selves and others. If flesh signifies a universal interweaving, that is, an elemental dimension of all existence, then the connection between selves and others is established through this very element, which forms a circular circuit of perception. The pre-reflective self (i.e., the pre-personal, natural self) reflexively becomes aware of the other’s existence through the exchange of gazes and tactile intertwinings, while simultaneously recognizing itself in the other. Hence, the relationship between selves and others is essentially a primordial carnal bond; at this pre-reflective level, selves and others are mutually intertwined and encroaching.

The primordial property of flesh, therefore, lies in this “universal seeing” or “anonymous visibility” shared by both selves and others. This visibility is “anonymous” precisely because it belongs to a pre-reflective, originary form of vision, which expresses the ambiguous reciprocity between seeing/being seen and touching/being touched. As such, this pre-reflective “seeing” carries universal significance. It is through this primordial property of flesh that selves and others can share a common perceptual experience, making possible their fundamental intertwinement and mutual permeability.2

If the possibility of perceptual circulation within the body and between bodies is grounded in “flesh” as an elemental dimension of Being, then the state of mutual intertwining between the body and external things is likewise achieved through this universal medium. Therefore, the second focal point of the concept of “flesh” lies in addressing the relationship between the body and the external world.

The flesh, as the fundamental ontological element, is precisely what directly connects the body and the thing. This connection endows the thing, like the body, with a mode of existence characterized by “depth.” As Merleau-Ponty writes:

“The body unites us directly with the things through its own ontogenesis, … It is the body and it alone, because it is a two-dimensional being, that can bring us to the things themselves, which are themselves not flat beings but beings in depth, inaccessible to a subject that would survey them from above, open to him alone that, if it be possible, would coexist with them in the same world.”

(Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 136)

Thus, the “flesh” brings both bodies and things into being, establishing between them a state of mutual intertwining akin to that between bodies themselves. In this way, the thing becomes a being endowed with a certain qualitative depth similar to that of the body, resulting in a dynamic, reciprocal relationship of encroachment and engagement between the body and the world.

In summary, through the introduction of the concept of “flesh” in his later thought, Merleau-Ponty addresses two fundamental issues: on the one hand, it explains the possibility of “intercorporeality” between selves and others—enabling a reversible circuit of perception through the chiasm of the flesh; on the other hand, it grounds the connection between the body and the thing, allowing the thing to be drawn into existence through the body and thus forming a coupled relationship between them. Consequently, Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of “flesh” establishes a fundamental “reversibility” that operates between selves and others, as well as between humans and non-humans. This reversibility manifests in the body’s dual capacity as both touching and being touched, generating a reciprocal dynamic that permeates intersubjective relations and human-object engagements. Some scholars elucidate that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “flesh” and “reversibility” disclose a relational ontology, foregrounding the dynamic, interdependent, and contextually embedded character of existence (see, for example, Bannon 2011; Berman 2004; Küpers 2015).

In this manner, Merleau-Ponty employs the notion of “flesh” to overcome the solipsistic limitations of his earlier phenomenology, revealing a primordial, pre-reflective layer of carnal relationality among selves, others, and things. Thus, the relational ontology of flesh indicates that the individual does not precede relations but emerges from them, being is fundamentally “more-than-one” and is best understood as a process of perpetual, metastable becoming within associated milieus (Venn 2020). Through its capacity for mutual intertwining, the flesh weaves a network of the world, integrating selves, others, and objects into a universal existential body-network—what Merleau-Ponty evocatively termed “the flesh of the world.”

2.3. Reflectivity as Another Primordial Characteristic of the Body-Network

When Merleau-Ponty connects selves, others, and things through the concept of “flesh,” what emerges is effectively a network of Being presented before us. Through this ontological network of flesh, subjects and objects, selves and others, humans and non-humans enter into a relationship of mutual intertwining (chiasm).

Even more suggestively, Merleau-Ponty compares flesh to a “mirror”—emphasizing its reflective capacity. Just as a mirror reflects the self as an objectified image, so too does flesh allow the self and the other to reflect and permeate one another, achieving a state of mutual recognition and fusion. Much like the left and right hands, which form a diptych that consists of two complementary and reversible parts of one bodily whole, the self and the other also constitute a diptychal existence (Stawarska 2002).

Therefore, if flesh is indeed the universal element of Being, and if it originally constitutes the intercorporeal bond between selves and others, humans and non-humans, then the relationship between selves and others can be understood as a kind of folding and intertwining, akin to the relation between myself and my mirror image. This does not mean that the self and the other resemble each other in appearance, but rather that they share a common perceptual experience: the self comes to know itself through the other, and interaction becomes possible through this reversible structure of visibility and affect.

In Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty employs the “magical instrument” of the mirror to elucidate this reflective or reciprocal relationship between selves and others. The mirrored body is not merely a copy of one’s own body; it also presents the body of the other. Before the mirror, the self externalizes itself for the first time, encountering an image of itself as “other,” and in doing so, the other emerges precisely through this representation of the self. Thus, the body of the other can be understood as an externalization of my own body. As Rochat and Zahavi (2011) argue that Merleau-Ponty’s perspective reveals the profoundly alienating nature of mirror experience: recognizing oneself in the mirror involves not merely self-identification, but adopting an other’s perspective on oneself, realizing that one exists in an intersubjective space and has a public appearance visible to others. In this sense, the root of otherness is embedded within the self. Just as the mirroring of the self inevitably gives rise to a “self” as other. Through mutual reflection, the self and the other contemplate and come to know themselves. As Moran (2013) elucidates, reflexivity stands as a pivotal feature in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. The mutual touch of my left and right hands exemplifies the phenomenon of “double sensation,” where I am simultaneously the touching and the touched. Thus, from the reversibility between touch and being touched arises a form of reflexivity capable of objectifying itself, thereby blurring the distinction between subject and object. Just as the “double sensation” occurs between my two hands, so too does such reflexivity operate between selves and others, making each person a mirror to the other. This reflexivity, therefore, extends beyond rational introspection to encompass a perceptual and sensuous form of self-awareness.

Then, the significance of the mirror does not lie primarily in its invention as a technological artifact, but in the fact that the body itself can function as a mirror. Just as my left hand serves as a mirror to my right hand—each perceiving and confirming the other—the primordial nature of the “mirror” lies in its carnality. It is this inherent fleshly capacity that enables the mutual intertwining and reflectivity between selves and others. As Merleau-Ponty argues that “man is a mirror for man. Mirrors are instruments of a universal magic that converts things into spectacle, spectacle into things, myself into another, and another into myself.” (Merleau-Ponty 1993, p. 130)

Therefore, the second primordial characteristic of the Merleau-Pontian body-network can be understood as the reflectivity. Through this reflective capacity, selves and others, humans and things, enter into a relation of mutual reference and folding (diptych). It is within this structure of reciprocity that selves, others, and the world achieve their fundamental intertwining, forming a carnally constituted network woven through mutual reflection.

In summary, drawing upon both the early and later phases of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, and through the method of phenomenological reduction, we can identify the primordial form of the network as the body-network itself, whose primordial characteristics are relationality and reflectivity. By means of these two properties, the self, the other, and the world become interwoven, composing a carnally saturated networked reality.

Yet it is crucial to recognize that the body-network has always existed—though its modes of presence have varied widely. It has appeared sometimes in visible form (as in internet infrastructure), sometimes invisibly (as in the body’s own motor intentionality), and at other times through material artifacts, or particular forms of religious insight. Its existence precedes its digital expression, and its logic underlies even the most ancient forms of human world-making.

3. The Net of Indra and Fazang’s Interpretation

As previously discussed, it can be seen that the body-network in Merleau-Ponty’s sense can be regarded as the primordial form of all networks. Its primordial characteristics lie in relationality and reflectivity. Thus, the body-network encompasses selves, others, and things within an embodied existential network. Not only does it construct the coupling relationship between myself, others, and the world through the projective capacity of my body’s motor intentionality, but it also enables mutual reflection among them through “flesh”—a universal existential “element” and a “mirror phenomenon.”

Thus, we can envision a world picture in which existence is structured as a network woven from the elemental “flesh.” Within this body-network, each phenomenal body can be regarded as a node. On the one hand, these bodies connect with one another through their perceptual and projective capacities, continually integrating external entities into the body-network and extending its reach indefinitely. On the other hand, each phenomenal body also acts as a mirror, reflecting the others, thereby forming a boundless, interconnected, and mutually reflective world.

Strikingly, centuries earlier and continents away, the Chinese Huayan Buddhism—one of the most philosophically sophisticated schools of Mahayana thought—had already articulated a profound vision of universal interdependence through the potent metaphor of the Net of Indra. This metaphor depicts the cosmos as an immense network in which all phenomena are interwoven through mutual connection and reflection, forming an interdependent and infinitely reflective web of existence, which constitutes a boundless reality of endless interpenetration. In this section, I will begin by examining the metaphor of the Net of Indra and Fazang’s interpretation of it. This analysis will establish the groundwork for revealing the profound commonalities between Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net.

3.1. The Net of Indra: A Short Introduction

The Net of Indra (Sanskrit: Indrajāla) is a profound and elegant metaphor originating from the Chinese Huayan school (華嚴宗) of Mahayana Buddhism. It illustrates the core Huayan doctrine of mutual identity and inclusion (相即相入) and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda, 緣起) in its most radical and holistic form. The net symbolizes the structure of the entire cosmos, representing a cosmic web of interconnectedness where every part contains and reflects every other part.

The primary source for the Net of Indra is the Avataṃsaka Sūtra (Huayan jing, 華嚴經), which is the foundational text for the Huayan school. Francis H. Cook describes this metaphor and explains the significant philosophical implications of it. As Cook writes that:

“Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net which has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each ‘eye’ of the net, and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring.”

(Cook 1977, p. 2)

In Cook’s view, the interdependence and interconnectedness of all things in Indra’s Net stem from the mutual reflectivity of the jewels; each jewel reflects every other, which in turn establishes their fundamental interpenetration. For this reason, each jewel is identical to every other jewel. And each jewel supports and is supported by all others. Nothing exists independently; everything exists only in relation to everything else. As Cook argues that: “The Hua-yen universe is essentially a universe of identity and total intercausality; what affects one item in the vast inventory of the cosmos affects every other individual therein.” (Cook 1977, p. 4)

Furthermore, Cook employs the human body as an exemplar to elucidate the relationship between the whole and its parts within the Huayan cosmological framework. Just as organs and parts such as the nose, eyes, and elbows collectively constitute the integrated entity of the human body, isolating individual organs or parts from the whole renders them meaningless. Thus, “what we call the whole is nothing apart from the individuals which make up that whole.” (Cook 1977, p. 9) Cook further contends that when examining the relationship between a specific organ or part and the body as a whole, one is essentially investigating the intrinsic connections between that part and all other constituent parts of the body. Similarly, in Huayan’s cosmology, understanding the networked cosmos as a holistic entity necessitates an exploration of the internal relationships between individual jewels (as metaphorical particulars) and all other jewels within the net. In this sense, parts within the whole are mutually equal and interdependent, reflecting what Huayan Buddhism terms dependent origination. More significantly, within the whole, a part can represent the entirety—much as pointing to one’s nose to introduce oneself signifies the whole person through a constituent part. “The part and the whole in this sense are one and the same thing, for what we identify as a part is merely an abstraction from a unitary whole.” (Cook 1977, p. 10) As Y.-J. Kim (2016, p. 65) quotes from the sutra, “each and every jewels manifests the images of all other pearls. All the images of the jewels reflect each other” (“每一珠咸顯其餘一切珠影. 一切珠影交相輝映”). This is the precise philosophical function of Indra’s Net, because it illustrates the mutual identity (相即) and mutual inclusion (相入) of all phenomena.3

3.2. Fazang’s Interpretation of the Net of Indra

In interpreting the metaphor of Indra’s Net, the most representative and authoritative analysis comes from Fazang (法藏, 643–712 CE), the founder of the Huayan school. According to Nicholaos Jones in his recent work, Metaphors for Interdependence: Fazang’s Buddhist Metaphysics, Fazang employed Indra’s Net to elucidate the Huayan philosophy of interdependence. Thus, for Fazang, Indra’s Net serves as the finest metaphor for explaining the Huayan concepts of “mutual identity” and “mutual inclusion” (N. Jones 2025, p. 111).

In my view, among Fazang’s numerous works interpreting the metaphor of Indra’s Net, his Treatise on the Golden Lion (華嚴金師子章) stands out for offering the most vivid and profound explanation. When expounding the tenets of the Huayan Sutra to Empress Wu Zetian (武則天, 624–705 CE), the reigning sovereign of the time, Fazang specifically used the golden lion statue at the palace entrance as a metaphor to illustrate the Huayan concepts of “mutual identity” and “mutual inclusion,” as well as the state of perfect and unobstructed interpenetration among the one and the many. Fazang illustrates that:

“The gold and the lion are mutually inclusive, thus establishing their existence. This exemplifies the mutual identity and mutual inclusion between the one and the many, which are therefore non-obstructive. Yet, within this harmony, principle (li, 理) and phenomena (shi, 事) remain distinct—the one and the many are different. Each abides in its own position. This is called the Gate of the Non-Obstructive Compatibility of the One and the Many.”

(Fazang 2016a, p. 47)

(“金與師子, 相容成立, 一多無礙; 於中理事各各不同, 或一或多, 各住自位, 名一多相容不同門.”)

Fazang expounds that the gold, as the material basis of the lion (representing the “One” as noumenon), and the various manifestations of the lion (representing the “Many” as phenomena) are mutually inclusive yet non-contradictory. Thus, the “One” encompasses the “Many,” while the “Many” manifests the “One”; although distinct in principle, they mutually contain one another. So, for Fazang, the gold and the lion are, on one hand, in a relationship of mutual identity. The gold is the noumenon of the lion, while the lion is the phenomenon of the gold. They are like two sides of the same coin, coexisting and interdependent—this is what is termed “mutual identity.” On the other hand, the relationship between the gold and the lion also demonstrates the non-obstructive harmony between the one and the many, where unity and multiplicity interpenetrate freely. The noumenon of gold, through the crafting of a goldsmith, can manifest not only in the form of a lion but also in various other forms (such as a golden monkey or a golden dragon). This illustrates “mutual inclusion,” much like the way beams of light from a thousand lamps in a single room overlap and interpenetrate without obstruction.

Fazang further employs this principle of “unobstructed interpenetration” to illustrate the “mutual containment of the One and the Many (一多互攝),” thereby constituting a world network of “endless infinitude (重重無盡).” As Fazang argues:

“In each and every part of the lion—its eyes, ears, limbs, and joints, and in every single hair—there resides a golden lion. All these lions in every single hair simultaneously and instantly enter into one single hair. Within each single hair, there are boundless lions; and each single hair, bearing these boundless lions, re-enters into yet another single hair. This continues in endless layers, akin to the jewels in Indra’s net, thus termed the Gate of the Realm of Indra’s Net.”

(Fazang 2016a, p. 48)

(“師子眼耳支節, 一一毛處, 各有金師子; 一一毛處師子, 同時頓入一毛中. 一一毛中, 皆有無邊師子; 又複一一毛, 帶此無邊師子, 還入一毛中. 如是重重無盡, 猶天帝網珠, 名因陀羅網境界門.”)

Fazang illustrates that in the eyes, ears, limbs, joints, and even every single hair of the golden lion, the entirety of the golden lion is reflected. Within each hair resides an infinite multiplicity of golden lions, and each of these lions, in turn, contains countless other golden lions within their own hair. This endless, mutual reflection forms a vast, interconnected network of the world. By using the golden lion as a metaphor for the truth of Mahayana Buddhism. Fazang aims to demonstrate the doctrine of dependent origination: every phenomenon contains all other phenomena, and all other phenomena are likewise contained within each individual phenomenon.

Fazang employs the golden lion as an analogy for Indra’s Net to elucidate that all phenomena (dharmas) arise dependent on causes and conditions.4 Phenomena mutually affirm and interpenetrate one another without obstruction. Moreover, the individual and the whole are mutually integrated and mutually contained, namely that the “One” is the “Many,” and the “Many” is the “One.”

Fazang further elucidates in his work Cultivation of Contemplation of the Inner Meaning of the Huayan: The Ending of Delusion and Return to the Source (修華嚴奧旨妄盡還源觀), using the metaphor of the mutual reflection among jewels in Indra’s Net to illustrate the Buddhist principle of the mutual containment of the One and the Many, their infinite layering, and the non-obstruction among all phenomena (事事無礙)—as applies to the jewels, to all dharmas, and even to all bodies. He states the following:

“… the contemplation of the net of Indra, where principal and satellites reflect one another. This means that with self as principal, one looks to others as satellites or companions; or else one thing or principle is taken as principal and all things or principles become satellites or companions; or one body is taken as principal and all bodies become satellites. Whatever single thing is brought up, immediately principal and satellite are equally contained, multiplying infinitely—this represents the nature of things manifesting reflections multiplied and remultiplied in all phenomena, all infinitely. This is also the infinite doubling and redoubling of compassion and wisdom. … This represents the multiple levels of the cosmos of reality, like the net of Indra, principal and satellites reflecting each other. This is also the contemplation of noninterference among all phenomena.”

(Cleary 1983, p. 168)

(“主伴互顯帝網觀. 謂以自為主, 望他為伴; 或以一法為主, 一切法為伴; 或以一身為主, 一切身為伴. 隨舉一法即主伴齊收, 重重無盡. 此表法性重重影現. 一切事中皆悉無盡, 亦是悲智重重無盡也. …… 故雲主伴互現帝網觀, 亦是事事無礙觀也.”)

For Fazang, any phenomenon in the cosmos can assume the role of the principal (zhu, 主), with all other phenomena simultaneously serving as its satellites (ban, 伴). This relationship is dynamic and relative; whichever entity is chosen as the focal point becomes the principal, seamlessly incorporating all others as its contextual partners. Just as each jewel in Indra’s Net perfectly reflects and contains the images of every other jewel in an infinitely repeating pattern, so too does any single entity—when regarded as the principal—encompass the entire cosmos within its own existence. This illustrates the fundamental Huayan principles of the “mutual containment of the One and the Many” and “noninterference among all phenomena”, demonstrating that ultimate reality (dharmadhatu, 法界) manifests immanently and completely within each particular, and that compassionate wisdom arises from this profound vision of total, endless, and mutual interdependence.

For Fazang, the principles of mutual identity and mutual inclusion express the very relationality of Indra’s Net. Through them, principle and phenomena, as well as phenomena among themselves, achieve a perfect and unobstructed interpenetration, wherein the One is the Many and the Many is the One. Furthermore, by elucidating how each jewel in the net reflects all others, a state which refers to the mutual containment between the One and the Many, Fazang demonstrates the net’s intrinsic reflectivity. This mutual reflection constitutes the Huayan truth of a perfectly harmonious Dharma realm (法界圓融) and the non-obstruction of all phenomena, thereby revealing the infinitely layered nature of the Huayan cosmos.

4. When Merleau-Ponty Meets Fazang: A Comparative Study

In Section 2, through an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s earlier and later thought, I elucidate two primordial characteristics of the network in his phenomenological framework: relationality and reflectivity. Relationality refers to the interdependent coupling of selves, others, and the world, constituted by the perceptual and projective capacity of the phenomenal body. Reflectivity, grounded in the notion of the flesh as a mirror phenomenon, describes the mutual reflection and chiasmic interweaving among selves, others, and the world.

Moreover, in Section 3, I introduce Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net, articulated through such conceptual pairs as “mutual identity and inclusion”, “the mutual containment of the One and the Many”, and “the non-obstruction among all phenomena”. To my understanding, these Buddhist philosophical concepts similarly point to the fundamental network characteristics of relationality and reflectivity. This remarkable convergence in understanding the networked nature of reality between Eastern and Western intellectual traditions lays a solid foundation for an in-depth comparative study of their respective philosophies.

For a general sense, both Merleau-Ponty and Fazang reject a dualistic and isolationist model that treats the self and the other, or one phenomenon and another, as separate entities. Instead, they advocate for a monistic ontology, positing that the self and the other, as well as phenomena among themselves, are intrinsically interconnected and mutually dependent. This monistic ontology finds expression in Merleau-Ponty’s relational ontology of the flesh and Fazang’s framework of mutual identification and inclusion within Indra’s Net, respectively.

However, for a substantive comparative study, it is necessary to delve into the internal conceptual frameworks of both Merleau-Ponty and Fazang to uncover deeper philosophical resonances. First, I would argue that the notion of reversibility persists throughout Merleau-Ponty’s earlier and later thought, making it a pivotal concept for understanding his phenomenology of the body. Through reversibility, the lived body mediates and constitutes the reciprocal relations between subject and object, self and other, and human and world, thereby giving rise to their chiasmic intertwining. This conceptual structure closely corresponds to Fazang’s Huayan Buddhist idea of mutual identity and inclusion.

4.1. Merleau-Pontian Reversibility Thesis and Fazang’s Mutual Identity

Given the centrality of the reversibility of the body, Daly (2016, p. 65) contends that Merleau-Ponty effectively advances a “reversibility thesis,” which posits that the self, the other, and the world are intrinsically interrelated and ontologically interdependent. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of my left and right hands touching each other to illustrate that touching and being touched cannot be simultaneously felt—instead, there exists an alternating rhythm between the two.5 Thus, the “double sensation” in bodily touch precisely demonstrates that my body can continuously shift between touching and being touched. Furthermore, this capacity enables my body to transition back and forth between subject and object, thereby constituting itself as a “being of two leaves” endowed with an ambiguous structure that moves fluidly between subjectivity and objectivity.

Building on this logic, just as my body possesses reversibility between subject and object, a similar perceptual commonality exists between the self and the other. This makes it possible to achieve a form of reversibility between oneself and others. As Daly (2016, p. 232) argues, empathy functions as a kind of “affective reversibility,” precisely because it reveals how the self and the other can establish a shared emotional foundation through common perceptual experiences. In this process, identity based on the “self” gradually extends into a collective identity of “we.”

It is through this relational and reversible structure that the self inevitably bears responsibility toward the other and embodies the capacity for response-ability—the ability to respond to the other (Hamrick 2002, p. 302).

Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bodily reversibility, which articulates the dynamic interplay between touching and being touched, subject and object, self and other, resonates profoundly with Fazang’s notion of “mutual identity” (相即). In my view, the primary dimension of reversibility lies precisely in this mutual identity. Mutual identity implies interdependence and co-existence: the existence of one always presupposes the other, such that entities are always already situated within relationality and cannot exist independently. It is for this reason that phenomena, in their very nature, are characterized by emptiness.6

Just as my left and right hands are “folded into” one another, existing in mutual identity, so too does the double sensation of touching and being touched between them arise in mutual identity. My left hand cannot be separated from its relation to the right hand, nor from its integration within the whole body, and it exist on its own. From this, we may further deduce that subjects and objects, selves and others, humans and non-humans, are likewise concepts grounded in mutual identity, which means they are fundamentally interdependent. Through this interdependent mutual identity, a world of relational networks is constituted.

However, when Fazang speaks of the “emptiness” in all phenomena, it does not imply that the self and the other lose their individuality and dissolve into an undifferentiated whole. As discussed in Section 3, Fazang in fact uses the relationship between the principal and the accompanying jewels in Indra’s Net to illustrate the issues of subjectivity and intersubjectivity: “Taking the self as principal, others are regarded as companions… or one body is taken as principal, and all bodies become companions.” (“以自為主, 望他為伴……或以一身為主, 一切身為伴”) In this sense, as Y.-J. Kim (2016) argues, the phenomenal body in Merleau-Ponty’s sense can also be seen as a jewel in Indra’s Net. When my body acts as the principal, it means that through its motor intentionality, it incorporates others and objects into the scope of my perceptual experience. Similarly, when the other becomes the principal, the self in turn becomes part of the other’s perceptual field. In this way, the self and the other exist in “mutual identity”; they are not independent entities existing outside of relationality.

Building upon the preceding discussion, we can observe that Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis can be effectively interpreted through Fazang’s concept of “mutual identity.” This quality of mutual identity among all phenomena grants the self and the other, the humans and the non-humans, an ontologically equal status. In this way, both Fazang and Merleau-Ponty construct an ontology of relationality.

Therefore, the concept of mutual identity aptly elucidates the primordial character of relationality within the body-network. Furthermore, Fazang’s exposition on the principal-and-accompanying dynamic among jewels, which is itself grounded in mutual identity, succeeds in avoiding the solipsistic pitfalls associated with Merleau-Ponty’s earlier philosophy, while also providing a robust framework for addressing the problem of intersubjectivity.

Here, it is necessary to acknowledge potential objections that may arise regarding the conceptual compatibility between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Fazang’s Huayan Buddhist philosophy, given their distinct philosophical traditions and methodological frameworks. Critics may raise three objections against interpreting Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility through Fazang’s mutual identity. First, mutual identity fails to explain the concrete mechanisms of intersubjective understanding, particularly how we directly access others’ consciousness. Second, the “principal-companion” structure risks retaining a covert ego-centrism despite claiming equality. Third, Fazang’s static ontological mutuality cannot adequately account for the temporal asymmetry in bodily experience where touching and being touched never coincide.

I argue that these criticisms overlook the complementary strengths of integrating both frameworks. Fazang’s mutual identity provides the ontological foundation for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological observations—the reason why bodily reversibility is possible lies in the fundamental interdependence of all phenomena. The principal-companion relationship doesn’t imply hierarchy but contextual prominence within an egalitarian network, much like how in Indra’s Net, any jewel can temporarily serve as the focal point without undermining the system’s radical equality. Furthermore, mutual identity doesn’t deny experiential asymmetry but explains its metaphysical basis: the non-coincidence in “double sensation” precisely manifests the dynamic play between provisional distinction and essential unity.

4.2. Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm and Fazang’s Mutual Inclusion

As discussed in Section 2, in his later philosophy, Merleau-Ponty introduced the concept of the “flesh” (la chair) to overcome the solipsistic tendencies that remained in his earlier work. As an “element of Being,” the flesh marks Merleau-Ponty’s turn toward an ontology of relationality. It is on the basis of this shared flesh that the self, the other, and things enter into a relation of mutual chiasm or intertwining. As Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 160) writes: “Like the natural man, we situate ourselves in ourselves and in the things, in ourselves and in the other, at the point where, by a sort of chiasm, we become the others and we become world.”

In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysical metaphor of the flesh is ontologically successful and crucial, as it bridges the gap between the human body and the material world (Dufourcq 2022). Here, Dufourcq is explicitly critiquing the view of Renaud Barbaras, who regarded the “flesh” as a “failed metaphor” due to what he saw as an unbridgeable gap between sentient human flesh and insentient worldly matter (Barbaras 2011). In contrast, Dufourcq argues that the relationship between human flesh and the world’s flesh should be understood not as a substantial identity, but rather as a dynamic, circular process of co-institution and mutual resonance.

Therefore, we can draw an analogy between Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm and Fazang’s concept of “mutual inclusion” (相入). I argue that mutual inclusion precisely illustrates that both humans and non-humans are interpenetrative. Mutual inclusion means that the functions of all phenomena, which are interdependent through conditioned arising, can permeate one another.

In his Treatise on the Five Teachings of Huayan (華嚴五教章), Fazang clarifies:

“First, the principle of emptiness and existence pertains to a thing’s own noumenon; second, the principle of power and powerless pertains to its function. From the first meaning arises mutual identity; from the latter arises mutual inclusion. … The functions and powers fully interpenetrate, thus giving rise to mutual inclusion.”

(Fazang 2016b, p. 232)

(一, 空有義, 此望自體; 二, 力無力義, 此望力用. 由初義故得相即, 由後義故得相入. ……力用交彻, 故成相入.)

Here, Fazang delineates “mutual identity” from “mutual inclusion”: whereas the former concerns a thing’s noumenal state (as empty or existent), the latter concerns the dynamism of its function (as powerful or powerless).

For instance, in a room, candlelight and lamplight mutually include each other. The candlelight is relatively impotent compared to the potent lamplight; thus, the lamplight encompasses the candlelight. Yet, when the lamp is turned off, the candlelight becomes potent. Hence, the concept of mutual inclusion is fundamentally concerned with functional dynamics, explaining how the actions of things interpenetrate.

In this sense, whether between one’s own body and that of another, between human and animal bodies, or between the human bodies and the natural environment, there always exists a functional interpenetration, that is, a relationship of mutual inclusion. This perspective dissolves modern dichotomies such as mind and matter, humans and non-humans, revealing them not as separate, but as interwoven in what Merleau-Ponty terms a chiasmic relationship.

Here, critics might raise several objections to the proposed analogy. First, they could argue that Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh” represents a primordial unity of being, whereas Fazang’s “mutual inclusion” is fundamentally grounded in the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination and emptiness—creating an ontological mismatch. Second, the interpretation of “mutual inclusion” as ordinary functional interaction risks diluting its profound meaning as a realization of complete non-obstructive interpenetration in the ultimate reality. Third, while both philosophies aim to overcome dualities, Merleau-Ponty’s world remains perception-centered, whereas Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism grants autonomous ontological status to non-sentient beings through its concept of “suchness thus constituting.”

These objections, while thoughtful, underestimate the philosophical value of cross-traditional dialogue. The analogy doesn’t require identical metaphysical foundations but rather seeks complementary insights; Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology provides experiential grounding for Fazang’s metaphysical claims, while Fazang and the Huayan school offer a systematic framework for understanding the implications of chiasmic relationships. Regarding “mutual inclusion,” its manifestation in ordinary experience (like candlelight) serves as an accessible entry point to comprehend its profounder dimensions, following Fazang’s teaching approach. Finally, the perception-centered nature of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy doesn’t undermine the comparison but rather highlights how Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism radicalizes this insight toward full ontological equality.

In summary, Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis of the body and his concept of the chiasm resonate profoundly with Fazang’s notions of mutual identity and mutual inclusion. Through their respective conceptual frameworks, both Merleau-Ponty and Fazang delineate what can be understood as a relational ontology.

More significantly, in elaborating the ideas of chiasm and mutual identity and inclusion, both thinkers employ the metaphor of mirroring: Merleau-Ponty uses it to illustrate the reflective nature of the flesh, while Fazang points to the mutual reflection among jewels in Indra’s Net. This mirroring quality constitutes what I have previously described as the second primordial characteristic of the body-network: reflectivity.

4.3. Merleau-Ponty’s “Flesh as a Mirror Phenomenon” and Fazang’s Doctrine of “The Contemplation of the Images of Many Bodies in One Mirror” (多身入一鏡像觀)

As previously noted, the flesh, as an elemental constituent of being, structures the chiasmic relationship between humans and the world. In this sense, the flesh emerges as a mirror phenomenon: “The flesh is a mirror phenomenon and the mirror is an extension of my relation with my body.” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 255) Merleau-Ponty suggests that when the flesh acts as a mirror, I can externalize my body as the other, thereby creating the condition for rediscovering the self. Thus, the origin of otherness is already implicit within the self.

Through the flesh as a mirror, subjects and objects, selves and others, humans and non-humans become mutually reflective and reversible. In this way, the flesh, functioning as a mirror, opens the reflective pathway of bodily reversibility.

Similarly, in Fazang’s interpretation, Huayan Buddhism envisions the cosmos as Indra’s net, an infinite relational matrix where each jewel reflects all others and is itself reflected in them, embodying the principle that the one (a single entity) and the many (the totality) interpermeate without obstruction. As Fazang argues:

“… the contemplation of the images of many bodies in one mirror—the reality-realm of noninterference among each and every phenomenon. This means that the ten bodies of Vairocana act together without interference or obstruction. … Of these ten bodies, whichever one is brought up contains the other nine. Therefore, it is called the contemplation of the reflections of many bodies entering one mirror.”

(Cleary 1983, p. 167)

(“多身入一鏡像觀, 即事事無礙法界也. 謂毘盧遮那, 十身互用, 無有障礙也. ……如是十身.隨舉一身, 攝餘九身, 故曰多身入一鏡像觀.”)

The preceding text outlines the “mutual containment of the One and the Many” (一多互攝). It means that Vairocana, the universal Buddha from whom all phenomena arise, fully embodies ten interconnected identities: a Buddha’s body, a wisdom body, the absolute Dharma body, a Bodhisattva body, a solitary realizer, a voice-hearer, an ordinary being, a karmic reward body, a land or nation, and the body of empty space. The core principle is that any single one of these ten bodies, such as the body of an ordinary person, already encompasses all the other nine, just as a single mirror can hold infinite reflections.

It is fascinating that both Merleau-Ponty and Fazang depict the world or the cosmos as a mirror. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is a “mirror phenomenon” of the flesh, in which the flesh of the world signifies a chiasmic intertwining between human flesh and world flesh, forming a wild and primordial nature woven through mutual relations. For Fazang, the cosmos is a boundless Indra’s net, which is a great mirror in itself, where each jewel acts as a smaller mirror, infinitely reflecting all others in an inexhaustible interplay. This embodies the principle that “the One is the Many, the Many is the One.” Just as one body mirrors and is mirrored by other bodies, each body signifies and contains every other. This is what Fazang termed “the contemplation of the images of many bodies in one mirror.”

Here again, critics may also raise three significant objections to this mirror analogy. First, Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh as mirror” remains within immanent perceptual experience while Fazang’s “mirror contemplation” presupposes a transcendent Buddhist framework. Second, the former describes a self-other reversibility originating from the embodied self, whereas the latter presents an ontological fact of mutual inclusion without such reversible directionality. Third, Merleau-Ponty’s mirror operates primarily as a philosophical metaphor, whereas Fazang’s mirror contemplation constitutes a verifiable meditative reality within Buddhist practice.

From my point of view, these objections, while valid in highlighting differences, overlook the fundamental insight shared by both thinkers: that relationality and reflectivity precede and constitute individuality. The mirror analogy proves fruitful precisely because it demonstrates how both phenomenological and Buddhist traditions arrive at similar conclusions about ontological interdependence through different methodologies. Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual approach provides empirical grounding for what Fazang describes metaphysically, while Fazang’s transcendent framework offers systematic elaboration of the implications hinted at in Merleau-Ponty’s later work. Their differences in approach and terminology actually enrich rather than undermine the cross-traditional dialogue.

Notwithstanding their distinct philosophical foundations and systematic frameworks, a detailed comparative analysis reveals that both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Fazang’s Huayan Buddhist philosophy conceptualize reality through the common lens of an interconnected network. Whether conceptualized as the flesh of the world or the Net of Indra, this network demonstrates relationality and reflectivity as its primordial characteristics.

In a nutshell, Merleau-Ponty articulates relationality through the body’s motor intentionality and the reversibility of the body, while grounding reflectivity in his ontology of the flesh as a mirroring phenomenon. Correspondingly, Fazang conceptualizes relationality through the notions of mutual identity and mutual inclusion within Indra’s Net, while explicating reflectivity through “the contemplation of the images of many bodies in one mirror.”

5. Toward a Critical Techno-Ethics Inspired by Merleau-Pontian Body-Network and Fazang’s Indra’s Net

5.1. Superficial Affinities: Internet of Bodies, Merleau-Pontian Body-Network, and Fazang’s Indra’s Net

By conducting a comparative study of Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net, we gain insight into the primordial characteristics of the network: relationality and reflectivity. This insight holds significant theoretical value for reflecting on our contemporary era of the ubiquitous Internet of Everything. As Veidlinger (2018, p. 137) notes, Buddhist thought, particularly the Huayan metaphor of Indra’s Net, bears remarkable resonance with the development of the contemporary Internet society. Indeed, the interconnectivity of the web appears to mirror the infinite mutual reflection of jewels in Indra’s Net, while the fluidity of online identities—avatars, profiles, and digital traces—parallels the Buddhist denial of a fixed, essential self (Veidlinger 2018, p. 197).

In fact, our bodies have already become nodes within the Internet. Treating the body as a digital node means integrating it into the Internet, enabling people to relate to others and the world through their connected selves. This technological integration of the body is what we now call the Internet of Bodies (IoB), which is an evolution and deepening of the Internet of Things (IoT), and arguably the most impactful manifestation of the Internet of Everything in contemporary societies. Today, a wide variety of IoB devices are increasingly entering our households, reshaping our lifestyles and daily behaviors. In this sense, the body-network envisioned by Merleau-Ponty and the metaphor of Indra’s Net in Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism have transformed from theoretical possibilities into reality. Through devices such as smartphones, wearable smartwatches, and internet-connected pacemakers, our real-time biometric features are translated into body data. The relationship between the human bodies and their numerous data avatars thus manifests what Fazang described as “the One is the Many, the Many is the One.” In this sense, the flesh of the world correspondingly becomes the datafied flesh of the world. The jewels in Indra’s Net are the data nodes across the Internet, reflecting our every move and utterance, while predicting our possible future behaviors through algorithms. Relationships between humans and between humans and non-humans can thus be understood in terms of connections among data nodes within the network.

5.2. Ontological Divergences: Datafication, Lived Experience, and Emptiness

Despite the above surface resonances, a deeper analysis reveals fundamental conflicts between the technological logic of the IoB and the philosophical frameworks of Merleau-Ponty and Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism.

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology emphasizes the body as the primary medium of lived experience (le corps vécu). The body can engage with the world through motor intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 113). Crucially, the body’s meaning arises from its irreducibility to quantitative measures; pain, for example, is not merely a physiological event but a qualitative experience embedded in a lifeworld. The IoT and IoB, however, operate by reducing the body to a collection of measurable data points, such as heart rate, step counts, and sleep patterns, all of which can be monitored, analyzed, and commodified (Sadowski 2019; van Dijck 2014). This datafication disregards the phenomenological depth of embodiment by treating the body as an object to be optimized rather than a subject of experience (Liu 2023). As Veidlinger (2018, p. 7) acknowledges, technologies shape the development of ideas in society; in this case, the IoT and IoB threaten to compress the rich, ambiguous reality of the lived body into a narrow set of quantifiable parameters.

Moreover, Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism insists that the interpenetration of all phenomena is possible only because of emptiness—the lack of inherent existence in all things. Indra’s Net is luminous and reflective precisely because each jewel is empty; it has no fixed nature that would prevent it from mirroring others. In contrast, the IoT and IoB tend to reify data, namely by treating biometric information as objective, self-existent facts. For example, a sleep score generated by a wearable device is often presented as an authoritative measure of health, ignoring the cultural, contextual, and individual factors that shape sleep (e.g., the value of afternoon naps in Mediterranean cultures7). This reification contradicts the Huayan understanding of emptiness and dependent origination, where all phenomena are contingent and context-dependent. By imposing rigid, universal standards, the IoT and IoB risk enacting what might be called technological substantialism, a digital colonialism that marginalizes alternative ways of knowing and being.

5.3. Ethical and Power Asymmetries: Reciprocity vs. Extraction

In the Huayan metaphor of Indra’s Net, every jewel is both reflector and reflected, creating a relation of perfect reciprocity. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm describes a reversible relationship where the toucher is also touched, the seer is also seen. The IoT and IoB, however, are characterized by asymmetrical power relations. Data flows primarily from users to corporations and institutions, which then analyze, monetize, and control that data. Users are rarely granted full agency to interpret, contest, or benefit from the algorithms that shape their lives (Pauwels and Denton 2018). For instance, health insurance companies may use data to adjust premiums without transparency or consent, creating a form of bio-surveillance (Zuboff 2019). This lack of reciprocity contradicts both Fazang’s mutual identity and mutual inclusion and Merleau-Ponty’s reversible flesh.

Veidlinger (2018, p. 157) cites optimistic views that the Internet “frees people from the shackles of race, gender, socioeconomic status,” but he also acknowledges the digital divide and other barriers to access (Connelly 2021). The IoT and IoB may exacerbate these inequalities: those without access to advanced devices or digital literacy are excluded from the purported benefits, while privileged groups enjoy enhanced control over their health and productivity. This reinforces existing social hierarchies rather than dissolving them. From this perspective, the IoT and IoB not only fail to eliminate social hierarchies but tend to reinforce them. This contradicts Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism, which emphasizes the unimpeded interpenetration and fundamental equality of all phenomena, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s concept of empathy as “affective reversibility” between individuals.

5.4. Toward a Critical Techno-Ethics: Lessons from Merleau-Ponty and Fazang

Through the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that the apparent parallels between IoT/IoB and Merleau-Pontian body-network, as well as Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net, remain largely superficial. Consequently, a comparative examination of Merleau-Ponty and Fazang’s philosophies, drawing inspiration from their respective insights, provides a foundation for constructing a critical techno-ethics. Such a framework would offer nuanced responses to the ethical challenges posed by the IoT and IoB, while also reflecting on the deeper philosophical tensions between technological networks and embodied existence.

On the one hand, the IoT and IoB should incorporate reversibility by allowing users to question, interpret, and influence how their data is used. For example, health algorithms could expose their reasoning chains and permit users to correct errors or add contextual notes. This would align with Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the body as a meaning-generating subject rather than a passive object. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “flesh” opens up a midway between subject and object, selves and others, as well as humans and non-humans; it emphasizes the interweaving of existence, the wisdom of the body, and the openness of perception. This reversible nature of flesh invites us to critique the pitfalls of reducing the body to biometric data. It allows us to harness the benefits of such data through democratically accountable evaluations while remaining vigilant about its limitations.

On the other hand, the Huayan Buddhist philosophy of Fazang, with its core principles of mutual identity and mutual inclusion, fundamentally refutes the notion of data as a neutral or absolute entity. It reveals that data is always relational, deriving its meaning and ethical valence from its context and connections; and it is non-autonomous, its very existence and nature being co-determined by the entire network of conditions in which it is embedded. It is in this sense that the IoT and IoB should be understood not as neutral collections of facts, but as vast, interdependent systems of meaning and power. For instance, a biometric datum from an IoB device, such as a heart rate reading, is not an absolute indicator of “fitness.” Its meaning is mutually determined by, and interpenetrates with, the algorithms that interpret it, the corporate goals of the platform that owns it, and the cultural norms that equate certain physiological states with social worth. Similarly, the identity of a “user” is not independent from but is co-established by the network of data points that profile them. Therefore, recognizing the radical relationality of data is paramount for building a techno-ethics that can evaluate not just data collection, but the entire interdependent network of meanings and consequences these technologies create.

In conclusion, while the IoT and IoB superficially echo the interconnected visions of Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net, a deeper examination reveals fundamental ontological and ethical divergences. The IoT and IoB’s tendency to reduce lived experience to quantifiable data, their reification of biometric information, and their asymmetrical power structures stand in direct tension with the phenomenological depth of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh and the reciprocal, empty nature of Fazang’s interpenetration. Rather than rejecting technological progress, however, this critical analysis points toward the urgent need to reimagine the IoT and IoB through a philosophically informed techno-ethics—one that prioritizes reversibility, contextual sensitivity, and decentralized reciprocity. By integrating these principles, we may steer the IoT and IoB away from becoming an instrument of surveillance and data reductionism, and toward realizing its potential as a genuine network of embodied liberation and mutual care.

6. Concluding Remarks

This comparative study has journeyed through the distinct yet profoundly resonant philosophical landscapes of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism, specifically contrasting the former’s implicit thought of the “body-network” with the latter’s interpretation of Indra’s Net. My initial exploration revealed a remarkable, deep-seated affinity between these two relational ontologies, which transcends their disparate cultural and historical origins. Both thinkers deconstruct entrenched dualisms, such as those between subjects and objects, selves and others, and the one and the many, by positing primordial relationality and reflectivity as the fundamental conditions of existence. For Merleau-Ponty, this is articulated through the body’s motor intentionality and the chiasmic, reversible intertwining of the flesh, where perception is always a “double sensation” phenomenon. For Fazang, it is masterfully illustrated through the metaphor of Indra’s Net, where each jewel perfectly reflects and is reflected by all others, embodying the principles of mutual identity and mutual inclusion. This foundational comparison established that both systems conceive of reality not as a collection of isolated substances but as a dynamic, reflective, and intrinsically relational web.

The true value of this philosophical juxtaposition, however, was fully unlocked when we turned our gaze to the contemporary technology of the Internet of Bodies (IoB), for example. Here, the apparent similarity, namely the shared rhetoric of “interconnection” and “networks,” proved to be merely superficial. My comparative analysis served as a powerful critical lens, exposing a fundamental ontological and ethical rift. The IoB’s operational logic, which reduces the lived body to quantifiable data points and reifies biometric information into absolute facts, stands in direct tension with the phenomenological depth of Merleau-Pontian body-network and the empty, reciprocal nature of Fazang’s interpenetration of Indra’s Net. Where the philosophers see meaning-generating subjects engaged in a world of ambiguous, contextual experience, the IoB sees optimizable objects for monitoring and control. This critical discernment is the primary contribution of our comparative approach: it moves beyond facile analogies to reveal the specific ways in which a dominant technology can misrepresent and instrumentalize the very nature of embodied existence.

Consequently, this study culminates not in a mere comparison but in a constructive proposal for a philosophically informed critical techno-ethics. The dialogue between Merleau-Ponty and Fazang provides the essential pillars for this framework. From Merleau-Ponty, we derive the imperative of reversibility and contextual sensitivity, demanding that the IoB be designed to grant users the agency to interpret and contest the data and algorithms that shape their lives, thus resisting the reduction of lived experience. From Fazang, we learn the principles of decentralized reciprocity and radical relationality, challenging the asymmetrical, extractive data flows of the current IoB and advocating for architectures and governance models that reflect the non-hierarchical, mutually constitutive reality of Indra’s Net. Synthesized, these insights advocate for a techno-ethics that steadfastly prioritizes embodied meaning, user agency, and reciprocal care over the impulses of surveillance and control. By steering the development of the IoB with these principles, we can aspire to realize its potential not as an instrument of digital substantialism, but as a genuine network of embodied liberation, that is, a technological reality worthy of the profound interconnections articulated by both Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s Net of Indra.