Political Justice: Levinas Contra Aristotle
AbstractIn this paper, I argue that two radically different conceptions of political justice can be derived from the work of Aristotle and Emmanuel Levinas—notions of justice that are indeed directly opposed. Aristotle defines justice in terms of considerations of moderation, prudence, and measure, where the virtuous actor is supposed to demonstrate aspects of character and perform acts that are neither deficient nor excessive; yet the ethics of Levinas, as instantiated in justice, is a demand that responding to the needs of others not be limited by moderate considerations, but can precisely be realized as an exorbitant and anarchic assumption of responsibility. It thus becomes of decisive importance for both a thinking of the political, and political praxis, in determining which conception of justice is found to be more compelling. I illustrate the stakes of this difference with reference to the politics of asylum, and in particular, a discussion of the historical case of the Kindertransport. View Full-Text
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Bell, N. Political Justice: Levinas Contra Aristotle. Religions 2019, 10, 126.
Bell N. Political Justice: Levinas Contra Aristotle. Religions. 2019; 10(2):126.Chicago/Turabian Style
Bell, Nathan. 2019. "Political Justice: Levinas Contra Aristotle." Religions 10, no. 2: 126.
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