Abstract
This article provides a detailed comparative analysis of the transposition and implementation of the Renewable Energy Directives II and III (RED II and RED III), REPowerEU Plan, and the ‘Fit for 55’ package in France, Italy, and Germany. The analysis highlights the objectives, key legislative provisions, and national-scale achievements, challenges, advantages, and disadvantages—including implications for investment conditions and renewable energy financing mechanisms—associated with these pivotal European Union legislative frameworks, which, to a certain extent, induced a paradigm shift with varying degrees of impact in every Member State. The work is divided into four parts that follow this brief introductory outline of the problem. The introduction presents legal developments in renewable energy law in the European Union. The second part offers a comprehensive and in-depth examination of the European Union’s renewable energy regulatory framework and research gaps that hinder doctrinal tensions within the EU’s renewable energy legislative framework. In the third part, we analyze the transposition and implementation of each mentioned directive in the selected countries. The last part highlights commonalities, divergences, challenges, best practices, and lessons learned from each nation’s approach. This comparative analysis predicts that implementation success is inversely linked to administrative divergence, with France’s centralized legal system facilitating effective bureaucratic streamlining and higher predicted deployment, while the fragmented governance structures of Germany and Italy serve as structural impediments that critically undermine the EU’s acceleration mandate.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the legal structures and instruments for the expansion of renewable energies with major focus on the transposition and implementation of the most recent EU directives in this area: Renewable Energy Directive II (RED II), Renewable Energy Directive III (RED III), REPowerEU Plan, and the ‘Fit for 55’ package in France, Italy, and Germany from a legal perspective to investigate the approach and extent to which the legal framework can steer the various developments towards achieving the expansion targets for renewable energies, on the one hand, and thus their contribution to achieving climate protection goals, on the other. In addition, the second part of this article presents a balanced and in-depth analysis of the European Union’s regulatory framework for renewable energy as it stands in 2025. The third part offers an expert-level analysis of the renewable energy regulatory landscapes in France, Italy, and Germany, with a specific focus on the transposition and implementation of the aforementioned regulations. It details the national policies, key legislative initiatives, and prevailing regulatory trends shaping their energy transitions. Furthermore, for a complex view, in the fourth part, the study assesses the advantages and disadvantages inherent in their respective regulatory strategies, offering strategic insights and highlighting commonalities, divergences, challenges, best practices, and lessons learned from each nation’s approach. While the primary focus is the current year, i.e., 2025, relevant historical context and future outlooks extending to 2030 and 2035 are integrated, where appropriate, to provide a comprehensive and forward-looking strategic perspective.
The European Union has established itself as a global leader in climate action, with the overarching goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. This ambitious objective is primarily driven by the European Green Deal, launched in 2019, which outlines a comprehensive set of policy initiatives aimed at transforming the EU into a sustainable, low-carbon economy1. In this vein, a key interim milestone is the ‘Fit for 55’ package, introduced in July 2021 (European Parliament 2022), aiming for a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 (Schlacke et al. 2022, p. 1) as compared to 1990 levels. This package comprised a suite of legislative proposals designed to align various sectors with the heightened climate targets, notably including significant revisions to the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) (European Commission 2018; Gurreck 2025). These revisions sought to strengthen the legal framework necessary for accelerating the deployment of renewable energy technologies across the Union, based on the EU’s legislative competences in two fields: environment as per Article 192 (1) TFEU and energy according to Article 194 (2) TFEU, the last one being the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED).
A pivotal moment that further intensified the EU’s renewable energy drive was the global energy market upheaval in 2022, severely exacerbated by geopolitical events, most notably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This crisis underscored Europe’s vulnerability due to its heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels. In response, the introduction of the REPowerEU Plan, in May 2022, further intensified these efforts, seeking to rapidly reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the clean energy transition, to diversify energy supply sources, and to significantly accelerate clean energy deployment while promoting energy savings (European Commission 2022a).
This strategic shift is clearly demonstrated by the rapid and substantial increase in the renewable energy target, from an initial 32% to a binding 42.5%, with an aspirational 45%, alongside the introduction of accelerated permitting procedures.
Achieving these ambitious targets requires robust and coherent regulatory frameworks at both EU and national levels. These frameworks are crucial for de-risking investments, streamlining administrative procedures, ensuring grid stability, and fostering public acceptance, all of which are vital for the rapid deployment of renewable energy technologies. The effectiveness of these regulations in translating policy ambition into tangible deployment is a critical area of analysis.
The introduction of the comprehensive OMNIBUS legislative package, of which the verification and revision of the Renewable Energy Directive III (RED III) were integral elements, was necessitated by a profound confluence of climate imperatives and geopolitical exigencies. The primary driver was the escalating ambition of the European Green Deal, specifically the binding mandate to achieve a minimum of a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 (‘Fit for 55’ package) and eventual climate neutrality by 2050.
However, the strategic urgency was dramatically compounded by the 2022 energy crisis and geopolitical events, which exposed the EU’s critical vulnerability due to heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels. Consequently, the OMNIBUS package was designed to effect a rapid paradigm shift toward energy autonomy by (1) accelerating the physical deployment of Renewable Energy Sources (RES), (2) ensuring stability and predictability for investments, and (3) systematically aligning energy law with overarching sustainable development goals, thereby facilitating a secure and swift transition towards clean energy.
This article provides a detailed comparative analysis of renewable energy regulations within the EU, with a specific focus on three major member states: Germany, France, and Italy. It explores the evolution of their national policies, permitting processes, grid integration strategies, and financial support mechanisms, examining how these align with and implement broader EU directives. The analysis will highlight commonalities, differences, achievements, and persistent challenges in the selected countries’ journeys towards a renewable energy future.
This paper analyzes and compares the renewable energy legal frameworks of France, Italy, and Germany. The objective is to evaluate national legislative adaptations—focusing on divergences, advantages, and challenges—as influenced by core EU directives, including the European Green Deal, RED II/III, REPowerEU, and the ‘Fit for 55’ Package. The study posits that national implementation details are fundamentally shaped by overarching EU mandates; thus, understanding these domestic frameworks requires an appreciation of their broader European context within climate and energy transformation law.
Proposed research problem. The effectiveness of the EU’s ambitious renewable energy legal framework (RED II, RED III, REPowerEU, and the ‘Fit for 55’ package) is critically dependent on its transposition and implementation at the national level. However, there is no comprehensive, comparative legal analysis to systematically identify, compare, and evaluate the specific commonalities, divergences, and implementation bottlenecks in the national regulatory responses of key Member States-France, Italy, and Germany. Nor is there any assessment of how these national adaptations impact the achievement of the overarching EU expansion and climate neutrality targets.
Proposed research thesis. Despite the binding legal architecture provided by the EU, the varying national transposition and implementation pathways adopted by France, Italy, and Germany reveal the real decisive barriers to rapid renewable energy expansion. These barriers are no longer legislative ambitions but rather deep-seated national regulatory bottlenecks (primarily permitting processes) and strategic policy divergences. Consequently, future EU-level success hinges on shifting governance focus from issuing directives to enforcing consistent, streamlined operational standards. Thus, the hypothesis of this research reads as follows: The extent of divergence in the national implementation of accelerated permitting procedures (e.g., ‘acceleration zones’ under RED III) among France, Italy, and Germany will be inversely proportional to the demonstrated rate of renewable energy deployment acceleration in each country, indicating that streamlining operational bureaucracy, rather than broad legislative transposition, is the primary driver for achieving the EU’s 2030 targets. The hypothesis implies three major factors: (1) divergence in permitting implementation (X) (How different or complex is the national implementation of RED III’s accelerated procedures?), (2) rate of deployment acceleration (Y) (How quickly is each country actually deploying new renewable energy capacity?) and (3) hypothesis core (if X is high (high divergence/complexity), then Y should be low (low acceleration), proving that operational streamlining is key).
The research method employed in the study is comparative legal analysis, applied primarily through a doctrinal and contextual approach. The analysis entails both a doctrinal and a contextual analysis, as well as the subsequent comparison. The doctrinal analysis consists of systematically examining the legal structures and instruments (laws, decrees, ministerial acts) used by France, Italy, and Germany to translate the core mandates of the EU Directives (RED II, RED III, REPowerEU, ‘Fit for 55’) into national laws. The contextual analysis resides in assessing these national legal acts within the broader context of environmental energy law and climate protection law and considering the influence of pre-existing legal traditions and geopolitical pressures (like the energy crisis, the war in Ukraine, etc.). Last, outcome comparison implies identifying commonalities, divergences, challenges, best practices, and lessons learned from each nation’s regulatory strategy to evaluate the effectiveness of the national legal frameworks in steering the energy transition. Additionally, the comparative analysis of the transposition and implementation across France, Italy, and Germany is guided by a multi-dimensional assessment focused on evaluating the quality and effectiveness of the national legal response to the EU mandate.
The primary dimensions used to structure the evaluation are (1) legislative completeness and timeliness, (2) administrative efficiency and operational streamlining, (3) coherence of national frameworks, and (4) investor-relevant predictability and market certainty.
The selection of France, Italy, and Germany is justified not only by their size and economic importance but also by their distinct and illustrative positions within the EU energy landscape, providing robust comparative variation necessary for a strong legal analysis (see Table 1):
Table 1.
Rationale for country selection and the analytical value.
The choice is thus justified by the need to compare how the homogenous EU mandate interacts with three fundamentally different national regulatory traditions and energy realities, thereby providing rich data on where the legal and operational friction points truly lie. In summary, the comparison is robust because these countries represent three fundamentally different paths to decarbonization: Germany stands as a country transitioning from a major industrial, coal-heavy economy with high existing RES capacity and complex federal law; Italy is transitioning from a high fossil-fuel dependence in a multi-level governance structure with high electricity price volatility; and France is transitioning from a highly centralized, nuclear-dominant, low-carbon base.
The contrasting technical and economic conditions provide the necessary variation to test the hypothesis (H) on whether administrative structure or legislative ambition is the primary driver of deployment success.
Overall, the EU framework provides a harmonized legal environment, offering market certainty and promoting cross-border cooperation. However, implementation at the national level reveals persistent challenges. All three countries face delays in transposing the directives into national law, bureaucratic hurdles in permitting new projects, and the complex task of securing public acceptance for large-scale infrastructure. While France leverages its nuclear fleet as a low-carbon energy source and prioritizes domestic hydrogen production, Italy grapples with geographical disparities in renewable potential and bureaucratic inertia. Germany, despite its advanced community energy sector, struggles with fragmented transposition and faces substantial costs for failing to meet certain emission reduction targets. The energy crisis triggered by geopolitical events has further underscored the urgency of these transitions while exposing vulnerabilities related to fossil fuel dependence and the need for greater energy autonomy.
The observable delay in transposing key EU energy legislation, such as RED III and the ‘Fit for 55’ package, is not merely a bureaucratic failure but stems from profound economic and political friction arising from the systemic shift in energy production costs mandated by the EU. This prolonged transposition period is directly linked to the challenge of internalizing externalities and managing the subsequent financial burden at the national level.
The primary economic impediment is the integration of the cost of carbon, driven by the revised EU ETS, which increases operating costs for fossil-fuel-reliant industries in the Member States. Simultaneously, the costs of integrating variable renewable energy sources (RES)—specifically, grid upgrades, storage, and balancing—require massive capital outlays and complex national regulatory reforms to define cost allocation. Legislating these technical and financial complexities necessitates intricate, multi-sectoral changes that inherently extend the transposition timeframe.
Furthermore, national governments face acute political pressure concerning investor security and industrial competitiveness. Rapid regulatory change destabilizes investor confidence, prompting delays as governments legislate complex financial support mechanisms and state aid (often via REPowerEU chapters) to de-risk high-capital nascent sectors like green hydrogen. This effort to shield domestic industries from immediate cost shocks and ensure long-term competitiveness structurally slows the legislative process.
Finally, the political and social cost of the transition—including land-use conflicts and public opposition—requires prolonged national engagement and negotiation to secure public acceptance (e.g., Italy’s focus on Renewable Energy Communities). This necessity for incorporating social compensatory mechanisms adds mandatory steps to the national legislative pipeline. Thus, the perceived delay in transposition reflects a pragmatic, politically necessary timeframe for managing the massive economic, financial, and societal restructuring mandated by the EU. This underscores the complexity of aligning ambitious European goals with national fiscal and political realities.
The article concludes that, while the EU framework provides a binding direction, national contexts and policy priorities significantly shape the implementation pathways, offering valuable lessons for future multi-level governance in energy transition.
The article contributes to the field by providing a comprehensive overview of the current landscape, highlighting commonalities, divergences, investment opportunities, and the strategic underpinnings of each nation’s approach. By examining these critical aspects, the paper aims to deliver actionable information for legal professionals, investors, and policymakers navigating these dynamic and evolving energy markets.
2. Overarching EU Regulatory Framework for Renewable Energy
2.1. Key Legislative Instruments and Targets
The European Union’s commitment to green transition is underpinned by a comprehensive suite of legislative instruments and ambitious targets, using the foundation of the European Green Deal (EGD)2 transposed into law by Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, known as the “European Climate Law” (European Commission 2021d). The Green Deal is to be understood as so-called “soft law.” In terms of content, the Green Deal is the answer to the question of how the EU can best tackle climate and environmental challenges in the future. It is a strategy aimed at achieving a sustainable, efficient, modern, and competitive economy within the EU, with the purpose “to render the European Union climate-neutral by 2050 by promoting policies and initiatives across various sectors, including energy, transport, agriculture, and construction, to achieve this goal” (Stefanis et al. 2024, p. 15). The environment and natural capital are to be preserved, improved, and restored through the EGD measures. Healthy and resilient ecosystems are the foundation of the health and well-being of people in Europe3. The political initiatives are consistent with global environmental challenges, in particular those addressed in the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement implemented under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The EGD stands as an ambitious initiative aiming for climate neutrality across the EU by 2050 and a substantial 55% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to the 1990 levels (Kulovesi et al. 2024), while its measures gain a more concrete form in 2021 through the ‘Fit for 55’ package.
The focus is mainly on Renewable Energy Directive II (RED II) (Directive (EU) 2018/2001) and the revised Renewable Energy Directive (RED III), since these are the most recent directives in this area.
The Renewable Energy Directive II (RED II), adopted in December 2018 as a recast of RED I and a central component of the “Clean energy for all Europeans” package, significantly elevated the EU’s renewable energy ambitions. RED II established a new, legally binding EU-wide target of at least 32% for renewable energy in final energy consumption by 2030, with a clause for a possible upward review by 2023 (European Commission 2018). A notable change from RED I was that the 2030 target was binding at the EU level, without specific binding targets for individual Member States, providing greater flexibility in national contributions while maintaining collective ambition.
RED II introduced more granular, sector-specific objectives to drive renewable energy integration across the economy. Member States were forced to transpose RED II into their national legal frameworks by 30 June 2021 (European Commission 2018). So far, four Member States did not fully transpose RED II into national laws, which made them liable for infringements: Belgium (INFR(2021)0145), Estonia (INFR(2021)0200), Latvia (INFR(2021)0293), and Romania (INFR(2021)0333) (European Commission 2025a).
The Renewable Energy Directive (RED III), specifically Directive 2023/2413, is a cornerstone of EU energy policy, having entered into force in November 2023 (European Commission 2023a). This directive sets a legally binding EU target of at least 42.5% renewable energy in gross final energy consumption by 2030, with an aspiration to reach 45% (European Commission 2023a; Jäger-Waldau 2024). This target represents an approximate twofold rise in the existing share of renewable energy in the EU (European Commission 2025c). Beyond the overarching target, RED III introduces specific, increased targets for various sectors. According to Article 15b of RED III, another important aspect is that the Member States have to identify so-called renewable energy areas (RE areas) on their territory within 18 months of the entry into force of the Directive. These areas are necessary for the respective national contributions to the Union’s overall target for energy from renewable sources for 2030. According to Article 15b(1), second subparagraph of RED III, the Member States must ensure that the renewable energy areas are consistent with the so-called National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) required by EU law (European Commission 2023a).
Member States were mandated to transpose RED III into their national laws by 21 May 2025. However, as of July 2025, no EU country has fully transposed RED III into national laws (European Commission 2025b).
The REPowerEU Plan launched in May 2022 emerged as a direct and strategic response to the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Vecchio 2024). Its primary objectives are to rapidly phase out Russian fossil fuel imports, diversify energy supplies, and accelerate the green transition across the continent (Vecchio 2024). This plan significantly amplified the EU’s renewable energy ambition, aligning with the 45% target for 2030 (Banas and Melnyk 2024). To fund these extensive initiatives, the plan mobilizes nearly €300 billion, with primary contributions from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the Innovation Fund, and revenues generated from the sale of Emissions Trading System (ETS) allowances (Banas and Melnyk 2024).
As for the ‘Fit for 55’ package, it includes the following key components:
- Revision of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) (European Parliament 2022).
- Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) (European Parliament 2022).
- Social Climate Fund (European Parliament 2022).
- Revised RED III (European Commission 2018).
- Revised Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) (European Commission 2022a).
- Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation (European Parliament 2022).
2.2. Normative Analysis of the EU Renewable Energy Framework and Research Gaps That Hinder Doctrinal Tensions Within the EU Renewable Energy Legislative Framework
The current EU renewable energy legislative framework (RED II, RED III, REPowerEU, ‘Fit for 55’) reflects an attempt to balance ambitious climate goals with pragmatic implementation, leading to inherent doctrinal tensions and specific regulatory challenges in key Member States (France, Italy, Germany). This section moves beyond literature description to engage in a normative analysis of the framework’s characteristics, identifying critical research gaps and unresolved issues.
Normative principles under scrutiny. The legislative package can be assessed against three primary normative principles of good governance and effective law:
Table 2 offers a comparative analysis of key normative principles and doctrinal tensions within the EU renewable energy legislative framework.
Table 2.
Comparative analysis of key normative principles and doctrinal tensions within the EU renewable energy legislative framework (RED II, RED III, REPowerEU).
The literature review, when analyzed normatively, points to three significant areas requiring deeper comparative legal investigation:
- The unresolved permitting/environmental conflict (effectiveness vs. judicial review)
The literature universally identifies fragmented and complex permitting procedures as the primary bottleneck (Devis 2025). The central legal conflict introduced by RED III is the tension between effectiveness and the maintenance of established national environmental protection standards and robust judicial review.
In terms of research gaps, current studies identify the delay but lack detailed, comparative legal analysis of how France, Italy, and Germany have legally balanced the new “overriding public interest” status of renewables against national environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements. An assessment of the specific legal mechanisms adopted to limit administrative court appeals in each jurisdiction is critically needed.
- 2.
- Divergence in fostering decentralization (proportionality and subsidiarity)
While the EU promotes a harmonized model for RECs, the implementation is highly varied (Krug et al. 2023). Italy’s distinct models, Germany’s adaptation of existing structures, and France’s different priorities (e.g., nuclear) highlight the limits of EU harmonization in areas dependent on deeply entrenched national energy cultures.
In terms of research gaps, there is a need for a comparative doctrinal analysis of the specific liability and regulatory exemptions granted to RECs in the national laws of the three countries. This analysis would determine if the national adaptations comply with the proportionality principle by adequately reducing the administrative burden on citizens compared to commercial operators, thereby facilitating genuine decentralized participation.
- 3.
- The fragmentation of implementation (regulatory consistency)
The persistent delayed and fragmented transposition across all three countries (Sina et al. 2024), despite being major economies, suggests a systemic flaw. The sequencing and speed of the EU legislative agenda outpace national legislative capacity.
The existing literature confirms the delay but rarely engages in a cross-sectoral legal comparison of the implementation quality. A study is required to assess whether national delay is concentrated in specific, complex areas (e.g., grid flexibility or sustainable fuels mandates) and whether the use of the REPowerEU facilities successfully bypasses or merely mitigates the identified fragmentation risks in national budgetary and legal planning.
These points reinforce the core argument that the future success of the EU’s energy transition depends on resolving these deep-seated implementation and structural issues, rather than just passing more legislation.
3. Transposition and Implementation of European Union Renewable Energy Legislation in Italy, France, and Germany: A Comparative Analysis
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 (RED II) mandated Member States to transpose its provisions into national law by 30 June 2021 (European Commission 2018). The transposition of EU directives into national laws is a critical step, and for RED II and RED III, this process has unfolded differently across Italy, France, and Germany, often with delays and country-specific interpretations.
3.1. Transposition of RED II
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 (RED II) mandated Member States to transpose its provisions into national laws by 30 June 2021 (European Commission 2018). Further on, an analysis will be provided on how the selected countries implemented this directive into their national regulations.
Italy
The process began with the Decreto Milleproroghe in February 2020, which introduced initial definitions related to energy communities4. Further on, the Legislative Decree 199/2021 aims to accelerate Italy’s sustainable growth path by implementing Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of renewable energy sources (RED II)5. It defines the necessary tools, mechanisms, incentives, and the institutional, financial, and legal framework to achieve the 2030 renewable energy targets (Onorati 2022). The decree includes provisions for support schemes for electricity and thermal energy from renewables, outlines authorization and administrative procedures for various renewable technologies (including solar and offshore installations), and sets obligations for increasing renewable thermal energy in energy supplies. It also regulates renewable self-consumers and renewable energy communities and establishes sustainability criteria for biofuels (Porporato 2023).
Legislative Decree 199/2021 aimed to simplify and accelerate Italy’s energy transition pathway towards achieving “the binding objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030”, according to Article 1 (3)6.
Key provisions included7:
- Increasing the power limit of plants eligible for incentive mechanisms within energy communities from 200 kW to 1 MW, thereby enabling larger-scale community projects, as stipulated by Art. 6 (3) of the Legislative Decree 199/2021.
- Removing the geographical limitation of the secondary substation, allowing the formation of Renewable Energy Communities (RECs) with members connected to the broader primary substation, which expands their potential reach.
- Establishing a unique digital platform managed by GSE (Gestore dei Servizi Energetici) for submitting authorization applications for renewable energy plants, aiming to streamline administrative processes as stipulated by Art. 5 (1) (a) of the Legislative Decree 199/2021.
- Promoting the access of biomethane to the natural gas network, supporting the decarbonization of the gas sector, as stipulated in Chapter III, Art. 11.
Italy’s transposition of RED II, particularly through Legislative Decree 199/2021, demonstrated a clear policy choice to foster decentralized energy production through energy communities. The increased power limits for plants within energy communities and the expanded geographical scope for CECs were significant enablers for broader citizen and local authority participation. This approach could potentially increase public acceptance and local investment in renewables by empowering local communities to become active participants in the energy transition. The introduction of a digital platform for authorizations and specific financial incentives, such as premium tariffs and grants for energy sharing within CECs, indicated a comprehensive effort to streamline administrative processes and provide clear financial signals to support decentralized renewable energy models. This focus on energy communities aligns with the broader EU objective of empowering consumers and local actors in the energy market.
Further refinements to RED II have been introduced through recent amendments, such as those within the Bollette Decree, Decree-Law No. 19 of 28 February 2025, which came into force on 30 April 2025, was converted into Law No. 60 of 24 April 2025, and was published in the Official Gazette on 29 April 2025, No. 988. These changes include broadening the membership categories for Renewable Energy Communities (RECs) under Legislative Decree 199/2021, a move aimed at fostering greater citizen participation and local involvement in renewable energy initiatives (Monegato 2025, p. 107). Legislative Decree 210/2021 specifically defined Citizen Energy Communities (CECs)9, the regulatory framework being further finalized through the approval of Ministerial Decree 414/2023 (Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza Energetica 2023b) and ARERA Resolution 727/2022 (Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza Energetica 2023a). Ministerial Decree 414/2023 and ARERA Resolution 727/2022 provided the necessary technical rules and definitions for implementing various self-consumption schemes, including a “virtual” energy sharing model based on hourly time intervals to simplify calculations within energy communities. These instruments also established “criteria and conditions for the provision of utility-scale storage capacity according to article 18 of the above Legislative Decree 210/2021” (Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza Energetica 2023b, p. 12) and provided grants of up to 40% of eligible costs for REC power plants, with an overall quota of 2 GW until June 2026.
In their analysis, De Juan-Vela et al. (2023) found an incorrect transposition of the fundamental rights set out in the EU law, which could ultimately lead to long and onerous infringement procedures. On the one hand, the Italian provisions introduced a significant alteration of the membership criteria for prospective RECs, and on the other hand, the Italian framework allowed for the introduction of external third parties that may be able to bypass fundamental requirements intended to guarantee the community-centric, non-commercial nature of RECs as set by EU law. The Italian regulatory system for RECs is therefore highlighted as being highly distinctive and complex due to fragmented administrative procedures (Cucchiella et al. 2021).
France
The French Energy Code (Code de l’énergie) serves as the primary legal instrument governing the renewable energy sector. France largely fulfilled the obligation of transposing RED II through its comprehensive Loi n° 2019-1147 du 8 novembre 2019 relative à l’énergie et au climat (Loi Énergie-Climat)10, which served as the primary legislative vehicle. Specific aspects of RED II were further detailed and implemented through subsequent ordinances: Ordonnance n° 2021-235 du 3 mars 202111, specifically addressing the sustainability criteria for bioenergies, and Ordonnance n° 2021-167 du 17 février 202112, which established a dedicated framework for hydrogen.
The Loi Énergie-Climat set overarching national objectives, including achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 and a 40% reduction in fossil fuel consumption by 2030 compared to 2012 levels (Ministères Aménagement du Territoire Transition écologique 2019). It also confirmed the phase-out of coal-fired electricity production by 2022 and introduced mandatory requirements for the installation of solar panels or other renewable energy production systems/vegetation on new warehouses and commercial buildings larger than 1000 square meters (Ministères Aménagement du Territoire Transition écologique 2019). The law aimed to simplify the establishment of renewable projects on disused motorway sections, parking canopies, and in technological risk prevention zones (Ministères Aménagement du territoire Transition écologique 2019).
Ordonnance n° 2021-235 played a crucial role in transposing the sustainability aspects of RED II. Article 1 creates a Title VIII in Book II of the Energy Code, entitled “Biofuels, Bioliquids, Fuels from Biomass, Renewable Liquid and Gaseous Fuels of Non-Biological Origin for the Transport Sector, and Fuels Based on Recycled Carbon,” which sets out the general requirements for sustainability and greenhouse gas emission reduction, as well as the associated monitoring and verification, control, and administrative and criminal sanctions.
Articles 2 to 5, respectively, amend the sections of the Energy Code relating to the production of electricity, biogas, biofuel, and heat from biomass to specify the terms for implementing the conditionality of financial aid. Article 7 is a coordination article with the Environmental Code. Depending on the size of the facilities, the Ordinance also introduces energy efficiency requirements for biomass-fired electricity production facilities. Installation power thresholds (2 MW or 20 MW, depending on the case) below which the RED II requirements regarding sustainability and reduction in greenhouse gas emissions no longer apply13.
Concurrently, Ordonnance n° 2021-167 formally integrated hydrogen into the Energy Code, creating a new Book VIII solely for hydrogen-related provisions14. This ordinance introduced a clear typology of hydrogen (renewable, low-carbon, carbonated) based on defined CO2 emission thresholds (art. 100–104 of the Energy Code). It also established a framework for supporting the production of decarbonized and renewable hydrogen, primarily through water electrolysis, via competitive project calls for tenders and the conclusion of long-term contracts with the State for up to 20 years15. A specific national objective of 6.5 GW of electrolysis capacity by 2030 was set, and mechanisms for Guarantees of Origin and traceability for hydrogen were put in place16.
The measures taken are also a response to an objective of the national energy policy, namely, “developing low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its industrial, energy and mobility uses, with the prospect of reaching approximately 20 to 40% of total hydrogen and industrial hydrogen consumption by 2030”, as stipulated by art. 100-4 of the Energy Code (Code de l’énergie 2005). And to this end, the State has set a target of 6.5 GW of electrolysis capacity by 2030.
France’s proactive establishment of a dedicated legislative framework for hydrogen through Ordonnance n° 2021-167 demonstrated a forward-looking strategy to position itself in the nascent hydrogen economy. This early move provided legal certainty and support for investors, anticipating the later, more pronounced emphasis on Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin (RFNBOs) in RED III. By embedding RED II transposition within its comprehensive Loi Énergie-Climat, France ensured a coherent and integrated approach to its energy transition, directly linking renewable energy deployment to broader climate objectives and fossil fuel reduction targets. This integrated legislative strategy aimed to provide a stable and predictable environment for investment and development in renewable energy technologies. All in all, France achieved a notably high degree of legal completeness in incorporating RED II provisions into its national law. However, the overall transposition process was delayed beyond the EU deadlines.
Germany
Germany’s transposition of RED II was primarily achieved through amendments to its core energy legislation, notably the Renewable Energy Sources Act 202117 and the Federal Immission Control Act (Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz, BImSchG)18 (European Commission 2021b).
The EEG 2021 amendments aimed to set the course for greater climate protection and boost demand for climate-neutral electrolysis hydrogen in Germany (Torkayesh and Venghaus 2024). While the EEG generally lagged in transposing RED II provisions concerning renewable energy communities (RECs), it did reform its framework for renewables support schemes (European Federation of Energy Communities 2023). For instance, it simplified grid connection procedures for small-scale PV installations, though not specifically for RECs, and maintained a pre-existing scheme around “tenant supply”, which was not fully equivalent to energy sharing.
Amendments to the BImSchG were crucial for implementing RED II’s transport sector requirements. Instead of a direct quantity quota for renewable energies, Germany maintained its system where fuel distributors fulfill a greenhouse gas reduction quota. The draft bill for transposition retained a reduction quota of 6% up to 2025 and 7.25% from 2026. This approach ensured formal compliance with RED II’s targets while allowing flexibility in the physical share of renewable energies in the transport sector. The legislation also introduced a mandatory quantity quota for electricity-based fuels in aviation, set to increase from an energy share of 0.5% in 2026 to 2% in 2030 (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2020). Climate-friendly electrolytic hydrogen and electricity-based fuels were acknowledged as options for meeting these quotas, and the draft bill provided for double-counting of certain energy sources to incentivize their use.
Germany’s transposition of RED II, particularly its approach to the transport sector through the BImSchG, demonstrated a preference for maintaining its existing greenhouse gas reduction quota system over direct renewable energy quantity quotas. This approach, while ensuring formal compliance, allowed for flexibility in how the targets were met, potentially leading to a lower physical share of renewables compared to a direct quantity mandate. The inclusion of double-counting mechanisms for certain renewable fuels, including hydrogen, indicated a strategic move to provide attractive incentives for specific decarbonization pathways, aligning with the broader goal of fostering climate-friendly technologies. However, the slower progress in transposing provisions for renewable energy communities, as noted in the EEG amendments, suggested a divergence in emphasis compared to countries like Italy, which prioritized decentralized energy models.
In this vein, the European Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against Germany (INFR(2021)0192). The core allegation concerns the incomplete implementation of RED II. The deadline for the full transposition of this directive into national law already expired on 30 June 2021 (European Commission 2022b).
As part of the procedure, the Commission initially sent a letter of formal notice to Germany in July 2021 (European Commission 2022a). Since Germany did not provide sufficient or precise information on its national implementation measures, the Commission escalated the procedure in May 2022 with a supplementary reasoned opinion (European Commission 2025a). The primary deficiencies in German implementation, particularly in the context of the revised Directive (EU) 2023/2413 (RED III), which supplements RED II and was partly already to be implemented by 1 July 2024, lie in the following areas: insufficient measures to simplify and accelerate approval procedures for renewable energy projects, the lack of clear deadlines for such procedures, the lack of strengthening of central contact points, and the non-implementation of the presumption of overriding public interest for renewable energy projects (European Commission 2025a).
Table 3 offers a comparative overview of RED II and corresponding national implementing laws in the selected countries.
Table 3.
Comparative overview of RED II and corresponding national implementing laws in the selected countries.
In terms of energy communities, Italy has arguably developed one of the most detailed and supportive frameworks for renewable energy communities under RED II. France is also actively promoting these while making concerted efforts to simplify administrative hurdles. Overall, France achieved a relatively high degree of legal completeness in transposing the provisions, in spite of the fact that some delays still occurred in the process. Germany is incorporating them, but its focus has historically been on larger-scale, centrally supported projects, currently lagging in transposing provisions for RECs. This confirms the 2023 study by Krug et al., which concluded that (1) Germany faced problems with the timeliness and completeness of its RED II implementation, despite its strong historical foundation in citizen energy, and that (2) Italy’s implementation pathway was characterized by complexity and uniqueness. These findings concerning Germany were also confirmed by Sina et al. (2024).
3.2. Transposition of RED III
Member States were mandated to transpose RED III into their national laws by 21 May 2025. However, as of July 2025, none of the EU countries has fully transposed RED III into national law (European Commission 2025b). Further on, the paper includes an analysis of how Italy, France, and Germany implemented this directive into their national regulations.
Italy
The country has historically suffered from a fragmented and unclear permitting framework, complicated by bureaucratic inertia involving multiple governmental levels (national, regional, and local) (Devis 2025). Italy has proven a strong commitment to advancing its renewable energy sector through significant legislative reforms. It initiated legislative measures to align with RED III, notably through Decreto Legge 181/2023 (Decreto sicurezza energetica), which was approved on 9 December 2023, and converted into Law No. 11 of 2 February 202419.
Decreto Legge No. 181/2023 introduced several measures aimed at improving energy security, promoting renewable energy sources, and supporting energy-intensive businesses (Camera dei Deputati 2023). Key provisions include:
- Prioritizing photovoltaic or wind-power plant projects during the adjudication of energy concessions as stipulated by Art. 1 (1)–(3).
- Incentivizing Italian regions to facilitate the construction of renewable energy plants by allocating a portion of the proceeds from carbon dioxide emission quota auctions to them from 2024 to 2032, as stipulated by Art. 4.
- Extending the exemption from Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (Valutazione d’Impatto Ambientale VIA) and EIA screening procedures until 30 June 2025, for certain new and repowered photovoltaic and wind farms according to Art. 4 bis.
- Increasing the thresholds for requiring EIA for photovoltaic plants.
- Allowing ground-mounted photovoltaic plants in agricultural areas to benefit from a wider range of incentives, with priority for renovations of existing plants.
- Identifying maritime areas suitable for the construction of offshore floating wind farms as stipulated by Art. 8 (2-bis).
A cornerstone of this effort is also the Legislative Decree No. 190, which was published on 25 November 2024 and came into force on 30 December 202420. This decree is widely recognized as the Consolidated Law on Renewable Sources (Testo Unico sulle Fonti Rinnovabili—TU FER). This legislation represents a pivotal moment for the development of renewable energy in Italy21.
The primary objective of the TU FER, according to Article 1 (2), is to ensure “the maximum diffusion of plants for the production of energy from renewable sources through the rationalization, reorganization and simplification of procedures in the field of renewable energy and their adaptation to the discipline of the European Union, in compliance with the protection of the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems, cultural heritage and the landscape”22. This reform directly addresses the historical challenges of bureaucratic complexity and time-consuming processes that previously hindered renewable energy development in Italy. By consolidating regulations concerning renewable energy into a single legislative act, the TU FER aims to overcome previous legislative fragmentation, thereby providing a clearer and more organic legal framework, as stipulated by Article 1 (2). This comprehensive approach to simplification is a direct response to past inefficiencies (Devis 2025), indicating a strategic shift from a piecemeal regulatory approach to a more holistic and efficient one, designed to accelerate deployment.
The TU FER is also deeply embedded within broader European and national strategic plans. It is explicitly part of the “REPowerEU” plan and Mission 7 of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). These actions reaffirm Italy’s commitment to swiftly moving towards a sustainable energy framework, and reducing its reliance on fossil fuels is consistent with the broader energy objectives of the European Union.
France
France has made notable progress in anticipating and transposing key aspects of RED III, particularly through the enactment of Loi n° 2023-175 du 10 mars 2023 relative à l’accélération de la production d’énergies renouvelables (Loi APER)23. Additionally, consultations are ongoing for the transposition of specific RED III transport rules (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Décentralisation 2025, p. 192).
The Loi APER is France’s first dedicated law aimed at significantly accelerating renewable energy deployment (Gautier 2025). A central tenet of this law is the mandate for the creation of “acceleration zones” by 21 February 2026, within which permitting procedures for renewable energy projects will be simplified and expedited. The law also focuses on optimizing the use of already artificialized areas, such as rooftops, parking canopies, and polluted lands, for solar energy projects, and facilitates the development of projects with shared governance and individual/collective self-consumption schemes.
For the transport sector, France has initiated consultations on transposing RED III, proposing a new system termed “Projet de mécanisme incitant à la réduction de l’intensité carbone des carburants (IRICC)” (Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté Industrielle et Numérique 2025). This proposal introduces two distinct sets of requirements for transport fuels: first, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions, disaggregated by transport sectors (road, aviation, maritime, LPG, and natural gas for vehicles); and second, renewable fuel requirements based on energy content, broken down by fuel type (diesel, gasoline, LPG, natural gas, and marine fuel) (Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté Industrielle et Numérique 2025). France is also setting an ambitious national target for green hydrogen and its derivatives (RFNBOs) to constitute 1.5% of transport fuel by 2030 (Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté Industrielle et Numérique 2025, p. 6). This target is more aggressive than the 1% requirement stipulated in RED III. To ensure compliance, the proposal includes steep penalties for non-compliance: €700 per tonne of CO2 not avoided for the GHG reduction requirement, €40 per GJ for fuel targets, and a doubled penalty of €80 per GJ for failing to meet hydrogen and advanced fuel sub-targets (Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté Industrielle et Numérique 2025, p. 7).
France’s enactment of the Loi APER even before the full RED III transposition deadline demonstrates a strong and proactive commitment to addressing administrative bottlenecks, which have been identified as critical impediments to accelerating renewable energy deployment. This positions France as a front-runner in implementing RED III’s permitting provisions. The decision to set a more aggressive national target for RFNBOs in transport and to introduce significant penalties for non-compliance indicates a robust national ambition that extends beyond mere compliance. This approach aims to actively drive the energy transition, particularly in challenging sectors like transport, by providing clear incentives and disincentives for fuel suppliers.
Germany
At the beginning, the ministries, led by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection (BMWK), immediately began transposing RED III into national law, the implementation law being passed by the Cabinet on 24 July 2024. The parliamentary process was already well advanced when the coalition collapsed on 6 November 2024, thus halting the implementation of RED III for the time being. The expiration of the EU Emergency Regulation in mid-2025 and the foreseeable delay in implementing RED III will have a major impact on the licensing situation for wind energy.
However, Germany has been actively drafting and approving laws to align with RED III, demonstrating a clear intent to accelerate its renewable energy expansion. Key legislative efforts include a draft law to amend the Federal Immission Control Act (BImSchG)24 (Bundesministerium für Wohnen, Stadtentwicklung und Bauwesen 2024), and in addition, the Federal Government passed a draft law implementing the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2023/2413 (RED III) in the areas of onshore wind and solar energy, as well as for co-located energy storage systems. Amendments will be made to the Act on the Development and Promotion of Offshore Wind Energy (Offshore Wind Energy Act) and on the Act on Electricity and Gas Supply (Energy Industry Act)25.
Through acceleration zones and shortened approval times, the approval procedures for onshore wind and solar energy will be significantly accelerated. A key element is the designation of so-called “acceleration areas” for onshore wind turbines and solar energy systems, including associated energy storage systems, regulated in the Federal Building Code and the Spatial Planning Act. (Bundesministerium für Wohnen, Stadtentwicklung und Bauwesen 2024) This allows projects within these areas to be approved through a simplified and accelerated procedure according to the new provisions of the Wind Area Requirements Act. In addition, the acceleration measures provided for by the directive will be implemented for all projects, even outside of acceleration areas, through amendments to the Federal Immission Control Act.
It also introduces binding targets for renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBOs), such as green hydrogen, requiring fuel suppliers to incorporate a rising share, starting at 0.1% in 2026 and reaching 12% by 2040. This 12% target by 2040 for RFNBOs in transport is significantly more ambitious than RED III’s 1% mandate by 2030. The proposed legislation raises Germany’s overall GHG reduction quota for transport fuels to 53% by 2040, equivalent to over 77% renewable energy use in the sector, and for the first time, this quota will apply across all modes of transport, including aviation and shipping. The draft also consolidates the use of cover crops as advanced feedstocks for Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF).
Germany’s proactive drafting and approval of laws to accelerate renewables expansion, particularly the focus on shortening approval processes and designating “acceleration areas”, demonstrates a direct response to RED III’s emphasis on removing administrative bottlenecks. The ambitious national targets for RFNBOs in transport, significantly exceeding EU minimum values, highlight Germany’s strategic commitment to green hydrogen as a key decarbonization pathway for its transportation sector. The application of GHG reduction quotas across all transport modes signifies a comprehensive approach to emissions reduction. While Germany has put in place regulations for spatial mapping of renewable energy project areas even before RED III’s formalization, the ongoing nature of these legislative processes and the fact that full transposition has not yet occurred underscore the complexity of integrating the directive’s comprehensive requirements into national law. One of the most immediate and serious challenges in the transposition of RED III for Germany is the so-called “gap” problem regarding permit simplifications for wind energy projects. Germany had introduced accelerated permitting procedures for onshore wind energy projects based on the EU Emergency Regulation (EU 2022/2577) for a limited period until 30 June 2025. These temporary regulations were to be made permanent and become the norm through the revised Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) to ensure a seamless transition (Bundesverband WindEnergie 2025).
However, since RED III will not be fully implemented into German law for the time being, and comprehensive implementation is not expected before 2026, a time gap will arise starting 1 July 2025 (Bundesverband WindEnergie 2025). This means that permit applications for wind turbines submitted from this date onwards would again be subject to the more complex, normal permit requirements, without the simplifications provided by the Emergency Ordinance (Deutinger et al. 2025). This particularly affects the conduct of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and “classic” species protection assessments with complex mapping (Deutinger et al. 2025). The consequences are a “significantly higher application burden for project developers” and the risk of a “permit backlog” at the authorities (Bundesverband WindEnergie 2025).
In addition to this direct gap, the Environmental Energy Law Foundation predicts delays in the identification and qualification of new acceleration areas. Originally, this qualification was to be integrated into the already advanced procedures for designating wind energy areas. However, due to the delay in RED III implementation, this must be performed in a subsequent, separate procedure, which will take additional time (Deutinger et al. 2025). All these translate into lengthy reviews and judicial delays in administrative courts (Devis 2025). RED III and the national laws implementing it are presented below (Table 4).
Table 4.
Comparative overview of RED III and corresponding national implementing laws in the selected countries.
The fact that Italy, France, and Germany have not fully transposed RED III by the May 2025 deadline (European Commission 2025b) is proof of the ambitious timelines and the difficulty of integrating such comprehensive requirements into diverse national legal systems. This can lead to delays and potential inconsistencies in implementation across the Union. Thus, for France, full and explicit transposition of the latest RED III provisions and certain ‘Fit for 55’ components is still an ongoing process, as indicated by recent EU infringement procedures. Similarly to France, Italy has faced challenges in timely and comprehensively transposing new directives, such as RED III, leading to infringement procedures.
Summing up, so far, France and Italy seem to have a more integrated approach to transposing RED III. Meanwhile, the way Germany is approaching the implementation of RED II and RED III, namely through several separate legislative initiatives (e.g., a general implementation law for permitting procedures, a separate law for Article 19 on guarantees of origin, and the National Heating Law), induces the risk of fragmentation. Although this approach may allow for faster processing of individual aspects, there is a risk of incoherence, legal contradictions, and unused synergies in the broader context of the energy transition. This also complicates comprehensive oversight and reporting to the EU Commission. The fact that Germany is facing multiple infringement procedures in the renewable energy policy area points to a systemic problem in the effective and timely implementation of EU law (European Commission 2023b). This pattern suggests that the problems are not isolated incidents but rather symptoms of broader structural or administrative inefficiencies in the national legal and administrative apparatus. Addressing these underlying systemic problems is crucial for Germany to avoid future violations and ensure effective governance.
The varying pace and effectiveness of these national approaches are starkly highlighted by the situation in Denmark. Denmark stands as the only EU Member State to have fully and proactively transposed the Renewable Energy Directive III (RED III) into national law by the May 2025 deadline, thereby avoiding the infringement proceedings faced by France, Italy, Germany, and 23 other nations. This unique case reflects Denmark’s high national ambition and a relatively streamlined, effective administrative approach to the EU’s climate and energy policies, serving as a critical comparative point for the challenges observed in the other three major economies.
However, all three analyzed countries acknowledge permitting procedures as a major bottleneck. France’s APER Law and Germany’s “overriding public interest” declaration are direct responses to this. Italy has also introduced measures to streamline permitting, though effectiveness varies.
3.3. Integration of REPowerEU Objectives
Italy
Italy has proactively integrated the objectives of the REPowerEU Plan into its national recovery and resilience framework. The country’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), initially approved on 13 July 2021, aligning with the European Green Deal, was updated on 8 December 2023, to include a dedicated REPowerEU chapter (European Commission 2023b), resulting “in a €2.9 billion increase on the initial plan” (European Commission 2023b).
The cornerstone of Italy’s energy strategy is its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) (European Commission 2024). The updated version of this plan was submitted to the European Commission in July 2024, outlining the country’s revised contributions to EU energy and climate targets (De Paoli 2024). The NECP sets an ambitious target for renewable energy to account for “39.4% of gross final energy consumption by 2030” (European Commission 2024, p. 16). The long-term vision articulated in the NECP is to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Italy’s commitment to these targets is also reflected in its National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), which allocates significant funding to support the green transition.
Italy’s Ministry of Environment and Energy Security (MASE) has outlined its strategic roadmap for 2025–2027 in the Atto di Indirizzo 2025–2027 (Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza Energetica 2025), a document that aligns with the European Green Deal, NECP, and NRRP, aiming to consolidate decarbonization, energy security, and sustainable development. The roadmap defines seven fundamental policy priorities for the next three years, including accelerating the implementation of NECP and PNRR projects; enhancing energy security and transitioning to clean energy; fostering the development of a circular economy; protecting biodiversity and ecosystems; mitigating hydrogeological risks and managing water resources; strengthening international climate action and global cooperation; and modernizing administration while promoting environmental education (Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza Energetica 2025).
France
France has strategically integrated the objectives of the REPowerEU Plan into its national recovery and resilience framework. The country’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), updated on 14 July 2023, now includes a dedicated REPowerEU chapter (European Commission 2023b).
The REPowerEU measures outlined in France’s RRP encompass a combination of three reforms and four targeted investments (European Commission 2023b). The reforms are designed to accelerate the energy transition and enhance energy security. They include streamlining permitting procedures for renewable energy projects and defining “acceleration zones” to facilitate rapid deployment. An “energy efficiency plan” is also a key reform, aimed at significantly reducing France’s overall energy consumption (European Commission 2023b). Furthermore, the creation of the General Secretariat for Ecological Planning is intended to enhance the coherence and coordination of public policies related to ecological transition (Gouvernement Français 2023, p. 5).
The investments under the REPowerEU chapter are specifically directed towards reducing reliance on fossil fuels. These include a greater emphasis on deep renovation to improve energy efficiency in buildings, substantial support for hydrogen projects, and measures to decarbonize the industrial sector (European Commission 2023b). The plan allocates significant funding to research and development (R&D) and innovation in green technologies, notably earmarking €1.7 billion for low-carbon and renewable hydrogen initiatives (Gouvernement Français 2023, p. 7). To finance these ambitious REPowerEU measures, France has leveraged EU recovery funds, transferring €504 million from its Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the RRP, in addition to its REPowerEU grant of €2.3 billion (Gouvernement Français 2023, p. 3). Overall, a substantial 49.5% of France’s total NRRP funds are dedicated to supporting climate objectives, demonstrating a strong financial commitment to the green transition.
France’s integration of REPowerEU objectives directly into its Recovery and Resilience Plan demonstrates a strategic alignment of post-pandemic recovery efforts with the urgent need for energy security and accelerated green transition. This approach ensures that significant national and EU funds are channeled towards accelerating renewable energy deployment and reducing fossil fuel dependence. The REPowerEU measures, particularly the emphasis on streamlining permitting, enhancing energy efficiency in buildings, and investing in hydrogen and industrial decarbonization, directly reinforce and accelerate existing national priorities and legislative efforts seen in the RED transpositions. This indicates a consistent and well-integrated national strategy that leverages various policy instruments and funding streams to achieve its energy and climate goals.
Germany
Germany has integrated the objectives of the REPowerEU Plan into its national recovery and resilience framework. The country’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), updated on 16 July 2024, includes a dedicated REPowerEU chapter (European Commission 2021c).
The REPowerEU measures in Germany’s RRP include two new reforms, two new investments, and one scaled-up investment, all aimed at reducing the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels. The reforms include measures to accelerate the deployment of both onshore and offshore wind energy power plants. A specific example is the Offshore Wind Energy Act reform intended to help achieve the national and Union-level energy and environmental policy objectives within the framework of the Green Deal. This scheme, first approved in 2014 and most recently extended and amended in 2021, aims to further develop offshore wind energy generation. The latest amendments total EUR 1.5 billion and include increasing the expansion targets for offshore wind turbine capacities in five-year steps from the current 20 GW to 70 GW by 2040; a new tendering procedure aimed at accelerating the development of offshore wind energy by allowing bids to be submitted for sites that are not subject to a central pre-investigation by the German government; and a dynamic bidding procedure for tendering those sites not previously investigated, through which Germany can select one of several bids (European Commission 2022c).
Two new investments are designed to promote the procurement of climate-friendly commercial vehicles, along with supporting the necessary refueling and charging infrastructure for these vehicles. These investments further aim to accelerate the planning and approval of energy infrastructure projects through a digital end-to-end platform. One scaled-up investment focuses on individual renovation measures to increase the energy efficiency of residential buildings.
These measures are collectively expected to increase Germany’s share of renewable energy and accelerate the decarbonization of its energy generation, building, and transport sectors. Germany’s integration of REPowerEU objectives into its NRRP demonstrates a strategic alignment of recovery funds with the urgent need for energy security and green transition. The strong emphasis on accelerating wind energy deployment, particularly offshore wind, reflects Germany’s established strength in this sector and its potential for significant capacity expansion. The targeted investments in climate-friendly commercial vehicles and associated infrastructure indicate a pragmatic approach to decarbonizing the transport sector, recognizing the need for both vehicle procurement and enabling infrastructure. The commitment to digitalizing planning and approval processes for energy infrastructure highlights a recognition of administrative efficiency as a key enabler for rapid deployment. This comprehensive approach leverages financial resources to reinforce and accelerate Germany’s existing energy transition priorities. To finance this increased ambition, “Germany has asked for a share of its Brexit Adjustment Reserve to be transferred to the plan, amounting to €220 million. These funds are added to Germany’s REPowerEU grant of €2.1 billion” (European Commission 2021b). Overall, 49.5% of Germany’s RRP funds are devoted to measures supporting climate objectives (European Commission 2021c). We provide below an overview of RePowerEU and the national laws that implement it in the selected countries (Table 5).
Table 5.
Comparative overview of RePowerEU and corresponding national implementing laws in the selected countries.
To sum up, all three Member States are using their National Recovery and Resilience Plans, updated with REPowerEU-dedicated chapters, to channel significant EU and national funds into green investments, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable transport infrastructure. This demonstrates a coordinated effort to align economic recovery with climate objectives. In terms of funding allocations, Italy allocated more than France and Germany, but in spite of this, only 39% of NRRP funds were allocated to climate objectives, as compared to Germany and France, which dedicated 49.5% of total NRRP funds channeled to the same objectives.
3.4. Alignment with ‘Fit for 55’ Package
The ‘Fit for 55’ package, proposed by the European Commission in July and December 2021, represents the European Union’s most ambitious and comprehensive legislative undertaking to achieve its climate objectives.
Italy
Italy’s national climate policy is closely aligned with the ‘Fit for 55’ package, as it is beholden to the European Climate Law’s objectives of achieving at least a 55% emissions reduction by 2030, climate neutrality by 2050, and net negative emissions thereafter (Carbon Gap 2025a). Italy’s long-term National Climate Strategy, published in 2021 (European Commission 2021e), establishes a carbon neutrality goal by 2050 (Pastore and de Santoli 2025, p. 1). While specific national laws directly titled ‘Fit for 55’ are not identified, Italy’s engagement is demonstrated through its commitment to the collective EU targets and its national climate strategy that incorporates the package’s ambitions. The country’s recovery and resilience plan, updated to include REPowerEU (European Commission 2023b), also contributes to achieving Fit for 55 objectives by investing in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable transport.
Italy’s alignment with the ‘Fit for 55’ package is primarily demonstrated through its commitment to the overarching EU climate targets and its national long-term strategy, which integrates the need for significant emissions reductions and carbon removals. The emphasis on carbon capture and storage in Italy’s updated NECP highlights a pragmatic recognition of the challenges in fully decarbonizing certain sectors and the necessity of negative emissions technologies to achieve climate neutrality. This integrated approach, encompassing both emissions reduction and removal, underscores a comprehensive strategy to meet the ambitious ‘Fit for 55’ objectives. According to Brożyna et al. (2025), Italy stands out as a prime example of a country striving for a sustainable and green energy future. Their key conclusions about Italy are that the country is characterized by a balanced primary energy production mix, where RES plays a key role. The country’s high share of renewables (cited in the study as 75.5% in the context of primary energy production) underscores its commitment to green energy development. In addition, Italy has been noted for having significantly reduced its share of fossil fuels to zero (in the context of primary energy production examined in the study). This successful energy transition and near independence from fossil fuels make Italy an economy characterized by low carbon emissions, the significant transition being attributed to consistent government policies supporting renewable energy sources and focused investment in modern technologies. In summary, the authors present Italy as an exemplary nation among the larger EU economies for its successful shift to a primary energy mix dominated by renewables, resulting in a low-carbon footprint (Brożyna et al. 2025).
France
France’s primary legislative instrument for aligning its national climate and energy policies with the ambitious targets of the ‘Fit for 55’ package is the Loi Climat et Résilience (Law n° 2021-1104 of 22 August 2021)26. This comprehensive law aims to ensure France’s contribution to the EU target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (European Commission 2021a).
The Loi Climat et Résilience is designed to enact societal-level transformation, covering six broad areas of the economy and society: “consuming” (Title II Art. 2-29), “producing and working” (Title III Art. 30-102), “moving” (Title IV Art. 103-147), “living” (Title V Art. 148-251), “feeding” (Title VI Art. 252-278), and “strengthening the judicial protection of the environment” (Title VII Art. 279-297). This broad scope reflects an understanding that climate action requires deep structural changes across various facets of daily life and economic activity.
Article 129 of the law actively supports the growth of citizen renewable energy communities, promoting local participation and ownership in energy production27. Furthermore, it extends the obligation to install solar panels or green roofs on commercial surfaces, offices, and parking lots, maximizing renewable energy generation on existing infrastructure. The law also includes measures to support the development of hydroelectricity (Article 89), hydrogen (Art. 81 (3)d), and biogas (Art. 95 (1) and (2)), and to strengthen the role of local communes in decision-making regarding the installation of wind turbines, aimed at balancing national objectives with local concerns.
In the transport sector, a critical area for emissions reduction, France aims for 66% of new car sales to be electric by 2030 and plans for the deployment of seven million public and private recharging points within the same timeframe (European Parliament 2024). The law also commits a significant investment of €100 billion to support rail transport, recognizing its role in low-carbon mobility (European Parliament 2024). Additionally, an increase in the use of sustainable aviation fuels and biofuels is anticipated (European Parliament 2024).
The Loi Climat et Résilience represents a comprehensive, societal-level legislative response to the ‘Fit for 55’ package, integrating climate objectives into various aspects of daily life and economic activity. This broad scope demonstrates a recognition of the interconnectedness of climate action and aims for deep structural changes across the economy. The law’s support for regional renewable energy objectives and citizen renewable energy communities aligns with the EU’s broader push for decentralized energy production and increased citizen participation. This approach could foster greater public acceptance and local investment in the energy transition, addressing potential social challenges associated with large-scale infrastructure deployment.
Germany
Germany’s alignment with the ‘Fit for 55’ package is intrinsically linked to its national climate policy, primarily articulated through the German Climate Action Act (Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz)28. This act is central to Germany’s climate strategy, setting legally binding targets for GHG reductions: 65% by 2030, 88% by 2040, and climate neutrality by 2045, which are more ambitious than the EU’s 2030 target29. Key areas of alignment in Germany’s implementation include:
- EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) Reform: Germany is directly impacted by the expansion of the EU ETS to maritime transport, road transport, and buildings. Fuel suppliers in these sectors will be required to purchase CO2 certificates, making ETS-2 a central instrument for achieving the EU’s climate target.
- Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Germany supports the CBAM as a measure to prevent carbon leakage and ensure fair carbon pricing for imports, particularly for energy-intensive industries.
- Social Climate Fund: Germany, like other Member States, will benefit from and contribute to the Social Climate Fund, which aims to mitigate the social impacts of extending the EU ETS to road transport and buildings, providing support for vulnerable households.
- Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and Energy Efficiency Directive (EED): Germany’s ongoing legislative efforts to transpose RED III (as discussed in Section 3.2) and its commitment to energy efficiency targets align with the revised RED and EED within the ‘Fit for 55’ package.
- Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation: Germany is subject to EU-level targets for emissions and removals from LULUCF, aiming for at least 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent net removals by 2030, distributed as binding national targets30.
The German Federal Climate Action Act, with its more ambitious national targets, provides a strong domestic foundation for implementing the ‘Fit for 55’ package even if Germany generally faces challenges in scaling up decarbonization to meet the full “Fit for 55” targets (Brożyna et al. 2025). The shift in the Climate Action Act from sectoral goals to an overall responsibility for GHG reductions, with a review in 2026, introduces greater flexibility in managing annual emissions budgets, allowing deficits to be distributed over remaining years until 203031. This flexibility aims to streamline the achievement of climate goals by focusing on overall outcomes rather than on rigid sectoral compliance. Germany’s active participation in the EU ETS, its support for CBAM, and its engagement with the Social Climate Fund demonstrate a comprehensive approach to integrating EU climate policy into its national economic and social fabric. The ongoing efforts to accelerate renewable energy deployment and enhance energy efficiency further underscore Germany’s commitment to achieving and potentially exceeding the ‘Fit for 55’ objectives.
Table 6 offers a comparative overview of ‘Fit for 55’ and of the corresponding national implementing laws in the selected countries.
Table 6.
Comparative overview of ‘Fit for 55’ and corresponding national implementing laws in the selected countries.
The most ambitious in terms of overall GHG reduction target is Germany, whose targets by 2030 are more ambitious (65%) than the EU’s 2030 target. Italy and France are planning on reducing GHG by at least 55% by 2030.
From a different perspective, France is confidently on track to meet or exceed its ambitious GHG reduction target, largely due to its existing nuclear power foundation. Germany, despite ambitious policies, is projected to fall short of its 2030 target and requires significant additional mitigation efforts. Italy is trending toward a reduction but is forecast to remain notably above its official target.
At the same time, for France, full and explicit transposition of the latest RED III provisions and certain ‘Fit for 55’ components is still an ongoing process, as indicated by recent EU infringement procedures. Similarly to France, Italy has faced challenges with the timely and comprehensive transposition of the newer directives, like RED III, leading to infringement procedures.
4. Discussion
4.1. Analysis of Commonalities and Divergences in National Approaches of the Selected Countries
The comparative analysis reveals several commonalities and significant divergences in the ways France, Italy, and Germany have implemented EU renewable energy legislation.
Commonalities:
- Progressive ambition: All three countries have consistently increased their national renewable energy targets and policy ambitions in response to evolving EU directives and the urgency of climate change. This demonstrates a shared understanding of the need for accelerated decarbonization.
- Focus on permitting streamlining: A clear common thread, particularly under RED III and REPowerEU, is the recognition of complex and lengthy permitting procedures as a major bottleneck to renewable energy deployment. All three nations are actively legislating to create “acceleration zones” and simplify administrative processes, indicating a shared learning from past implementation challenges.
- Strategic role of hydrogen: The increasing emphasis on renewable fuels of non-biological origin, especially green hydrogen, is a shared strategic priority across all three countries, reflected in their national laws and recovery plans. This indicates a collective understanding that hydrogen is crucial for decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors like heavy industry and certain transport modes.
- Leveraging recovery funds: All three Member States are using their Recovery and Resilience Plans, updated with REPowerEU chapters, to channel significant EU and national funds into green investments, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable transport infrastructure. This demonstrates a coordinated effort to align economic recovery with climate objectives.
Divergences:
- Legislative architecture: While all selected jurisdictions transpose the directives, the specific national laws and their integration within existing legal systems vary. Germany relies heavily on its long-standing Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and the Federal Immission Control Act (BImSchG). France employs comprehensive “Loi Énergie-Climat” and “Loi Climat et Résilience” that integrate broad climate goals with energy policy, complemented by specific ordinances for emerging technologies like hydrogen. Italy has utilized a series of legislative decrees, with a recent consolidation in the “Testo Unico sulle Fonti Rinnovabili”. This reflects different national legislative traditions and existing policy landscapes. Thus, it can be said that Italy often opts for dedicated, comprehensive Legislative Decrees for each major RED, France tends to integrate provisions into its existing Energy Code, with specific ordinances and decrees, while Germany relies heavily on amendments to its long-standing EEG and other core energy laws.
- National ambition beyond EU minimums: Some countries set more ambitious national targets than the EU minimums. France and Italy, for instance, have more aggressive national targets for RFNBOs in the transport sector (1.5% vs. EU’s 1%) by 2030. Germany has set a significantly higher long-term target for RFNBOs in the transport sector (12% by 2040) and has a more ambitious overall GHG reduction target (65% by 2030 vs. EU’s 55%). This indicates varying levels of national commitment and perceived potential for accelerated deployment.
- Focus areas in implementation: Italy placed a strong emphasis on fostering renewable energy communities through specific legislative provisions and incentive mechanisms, including virtual energy sharing and grants. While RECs are an EU concept, Italy’s detailed implementation appears more advanced compared to Germany, which has lagged in transposing certain REC provisions. France also showed a strong focus on hydrogen from an early stage, establishing a comprehensive framework before it became a central EU focus in RED III. Germany, with its industrial base, is heavily focused on green hydrogen and its application in transport and industry, and on accelerating wind and solar deployment.
- Transposition pace: While no country of the selected ones has fully transposed RED III by the May 2025 deadline, France and Germany appear to have been more proactive in enacting significant national laws (Loi APER, draft BImSchG amendments) that align with RED III’s core provisions, particularly on permitting, even before the full transposition. This suggests varying levels of administrative capacity or political urgency in anticipating and responding to new EU requirements.
These commonalities underscore the unifying force of the EU directives in shaping the national energy policies, while the divergences highlight the interplay between European mandates and distinct national contexts, priorities, and existing legal frameworks.
The comparative analysis of the implementation of the accelerated permitting procedures (Acceleration Zones) across France, Italy, and Germany serves to empirically test the hypothesis of the paper (H). This hypothesis asserts that the extent of divergence in national implementation is inversely proportional to the demonstrated rate of renewable energy deployment acceleration.
The key divergences in legislative architecture and administrative capacity determine the operational quality of bureaucratic streamlining, thereby becoming the primary factors for predicting acceleration rates:
1. Italy: highest operational divergence leads to lowest acceleration predicted
Italy’s legal framework for acceleration is characterized by multi-level fragmentation, necessitating a complex series of dedicated Legislative Decrees that must be reconciled across national, regional, and local governance tiers. This reliance on fragmented legal instruments, coupled with existing bureaucratic inertia, creates the highest degree of operational divergence and complexity when attempting to implement a unified streamlining mandate. H predicts that this deep-seated administrative fragmentation will severely impede the effective establishment of acceleration zones, leading to the Lowest Rate of Deployment Acceleration. This outcome would strongly validate the hypothesis, proving that failure lies in the inability to overcome operational bureaucracy.
2. Germany: high operational divergence leads to low acceleration predicted
Germany’s approach relies on amending its highly detailed and long-standing legal framework, such as the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and the Federal Immission Control Act (BImSchG). While the country demonstrates high national ambition, this method of integrating new acceleration rules into an intricate administrative structure maintains a high degree of operational divergence and complexity. The sheer volume and detail of existing law create procedural friction, ensuring that the necessary bureaucratic streamlining remains challenging. H predicts that this high operational divergence will translate into a lower rate of deployment acceleration, thereby confirming that the procedural complexity inherited from the German legal tradition undermines the rapid deployment objective.
3. France: lowest operational divergence leads to highest acceleration predicted
France utilizes a centralized legal architecture, integrating EU directives into comprehensive national codes (like the Loi Énergie-Climat) and enacting proactive laws (like the Loi APER) to anticipate permitting changes. This structural cohesion leads to the lowest degree of operational divergence in implementing accelerated procedures across the national territory. H predicts that this administrative capacity for unified, rapid streamlining will result in the highest rate of deployment acceleration among the three nations. This outcome would strongly affirm the hypothesis, demonstrating that a coherent legal framework that facilitates operational bureaucratic efficiency is the most powerful driver for achieving the EU’s 2030 targets.
4.2. Challenges, Best Practices, and Lessons Learned from National Transposition
The transposition and implementation of the EU’s renewable energy legislation by Italy, France, and Germany offer valuable insights into the complexities of accelerating the energy transition within a multi-level governance structure.
Challenges:
- Complexity and ambitious timelines: The sheer volume and intricate nature of the EU directives, particularly the ‘Fit for 55’ package and RED III, pose significant challenges for national legislative processes. The fact that no Member State has fully transposed RED III by the May 2025 deadline underscores the ambitious timelines and the difficulty of integrating such comprehensive requirements into diverse national legal systems (European Commission 2025b). This can lead to delays and potential inconsistencies in implementation across the Union.
- Administrative bottlenecks: Lengthy and complex permitting procedures for renewable energy projects have been a persistent challenge across all three countries, hindering rapid deployment (Carbon Gap 2025b). While RED III explicitly addresses this with “acceleration zones,” the effective implementation of these provisions at the national and regional levels remains a critical task. The need for coordination among various authorities and the potential for legal challenges can still impede progress.
- Balancing national and EU ambitions: While some countries, like Germany and France, have set national targets that exceed EU minimums, maintaining this higher ambition requires sustained political will and robust domestic policy frameworks and regulations. The tension between national specificities (e.g., energy mix, industrial structure, public acceptance) and harmonized EU targets can lead to variations in the effectiveness of implementation.
- Technological and market integration: Integrating new and emerging renewable technologies, such as green hydrogen and advanced biofuels, into existing energy systems and markets presents significant technical and economic challenges. Establishing clear regulatory frameworks, ensuring infrastructure development, and providing appropriate financial incentives for these nascent sectors requires continuous adaptation and coordination for all three countries.
Best practices and lessons learned:
- Proactive legislative anticipation: France’s early establishment of a legal framework for hydrogen (Ordonnance n° 2021-167) (Ordonnance n° 2021-167 du 17 février 2021 relative à l’hydrogène 2021) and its swift enactment of the Loi APER to streamline permitting32 before the full RED III deadlines demonstrate the benefits of proactive legislative anticipation. This approach provides legal certainty for investors and allows for a smoother transition.
- Integrated policy frameworks: Countries that integrate EU directives into broader national energy and climate laws (e.g., France’s Loi Énergie-Climat and Loi Climat et Résilience, Germany’s Climate Protection Act) tend to achieve more coherent and comprehensive implementation. This ensures that renewable energy deployment is aligned with overarching decarbonization goals across all sectors.
- Decentralization and citizen engagement: Italy’s strong focus on enabling and incentivizing renewable energy communities through specific legislative decrees and support schemes offers a best practice for fostering decentralized energy production and increasing public acceptance. Empowering local communities can mobilize private capital and enhance the social dimension of the energy transition.
- Clear and stable incentive structures: Germany’s long-standing EEG, despite its evolutions, has provided a relatively stable and predictable incentive structure through feed-in tariffs, which has been crucial for attracting investment and driving renewable energy growth. While incentive mechanisms evolve, the principle of long-term predictability is vital for investment security.
- Adaptive regulatory mechanisms: The use of flexible mechanisms, such as Germany’s GHG reduction quotas for transport fuels in the BImSchG (Bundesministerium für Wohnen, Stadtentwicklung und Bauwesen 2024), allows for adaptation to market realities and technological advancements while still meeting overall emissions reduction targets. However, care must be taken to ensure these mechanisms do not inadvertently slow down the physical deployment of renewables.
- Leveraging EU funding mechanisms: The effective utilization of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and REPowerEU grants by all three countries demonstrates a successful strategy for leveraging EU financial support to accelerate national green investments. This highlights the importance of aligning national recovery plans with EU strategic priorities.
The experience of Italy, France, and Germany underscores that while EU directives provide a crucial binding framework, successful implementation depends on robust national legislative responses, strategic policy choices, and an adaptive approach to address evolving challenges in the energy transition.
The comparative implementation of the Renewable Energy Directives (RED II/III) and associated ‘Fit for 55’ package across Italy, France, and Germany reveals significant national variations in legal effectiveness. These divergences pose tangible risks to the coherence of the EU legal order and the functional integrity of the internal energy market.
Table 7 offers a comparative analysis of divergence and risk in EU law implementation in the selected countries.
Table 7.
Analysis of divergence and risk in EU law implementation.
The primary risk posed to the EU legal order by the implementation approaches of Italy, France, and Germany is the erosion of uniform application and the subsequent triggering of infringement procedures, which highlight national non-compliance and challenge the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU). The persistent reliance on fragmented, nation-specific administrative processes within these Member States fundamentally challenges the EU’s capacity to mandate streamlined, efficient governance.
Regarding the internal energy market, the key risk is market fragmentation and distortion. The significant operational divergences across Italy, France, and Germany in permitting speeds, incentive stability, and technological integration create an uneven playing field. This prevents the efficient flow of capital and projects across borders within the EU, ultimately hindering the rapid, cost-effective acceleration of renewable energy deployment needed to achieve shared EU climate and energy security goals (REPowerEU).
Summing up, the EU’s ambitious “Fit for 55” package and RED III directives are running into a critical problem: persistent, national-level administrative hurdles that are slowing down the green energy transition. The experience of major economies like Italy, France, and Germany reveals that complex and divergent national implementation strategies are creating operational bottlenecks, particularly in the crucial area of project permitting, threatening the EU’s 2030 targets. The experience of these three nations underscores a critical point: the success of the EU’s climate strategy hinges not only on setting ambitious targets but also on the political will and administrative capacity to overcome deep-seated national operational challenges. The problem is a lack of operational efficiency; the solution lies in mandating and supporting the adoption of these best practices to ensure the timely and effective deployment of renewable energy across Europe.
5. Conclusions
The investigation conducted on Italy’s, France’s, and Germany’s implementation of the EU’s renewable energy legislative framework reveals dynamic and complex landscapes. The progression from RED II to RED III, coupled with the strategic imperatives of REPowerEU and the comprehensive scope of ‘Fit for 55’, reflects an escalating ambition driven by climate urgency and energy security concerns. All three nations have demonstrated a clear commitment to these objectives, translating EU directives into a diverse array of national laws and policy instruments.
Further on, the comparative predictions derived from the hypothesis were analyzed.
1. Germany: predicted low acceleration
The German legal system is characterized by highly complex, detailed, and fragmented administrative law. This structural complexity generates a High Divergence in the operational execution of permitting reforms. The application of “acceleration zones” requires the adaptation of the mandate into a vast and intricate body of existing environmental and energy regulations. This is structurally difficult, resulting in a systemic failure to achieve genuine bureaucratic streamlining. Consequently, H predicts a Low Rate of Deployment Acceleration, confirming that procedural complexity inherent in the legal tradition serves as the primary impedance, thereby supporting the hypothesis’s focus on operational barriers.
2. Italy: predicted the lowest acceleration
Italy exhibits the most significant institutional challenge, characterized by multi-level governance fragmentation and severe bureaucratic inertia across national, regional, and local administrative tiers. This confluence of factors creates the Highest Degree of Operational Divergence in the implementation of accelerated permitting. Under H, the inability of the legal mandate to overcome these entrenched jurisdictional and bureaucratic conflicts renders the operational execution of permitting reforms largely nominal. This critical failure in achieving functional streamlining leads to the Lowest Rate of Deployment Acceleration, thus strongly supporting the hypothesis that resolving deeply seated bureaucratic and jurisdictional conflicts is the indispensable prerequisite for deployment success.
3. France: predicted higher acceleration
The French system leverages a centralized and proactive legal tradition, which enables both rapid legislative action (proactive anticipation) and greater uniformity in the interpretation and application of EU mandates. This centralized structure results in a Low Degree of Divergence when implementing accelerated permitting procedures across the country. The application of H predicts that this inherent capability for bureaucratic streamlining makes the French system best equipped to translate the legal mandate into high operational efficiency. The result is a predicted Higher Rate of Deployment Acceleration, confirming that legislative cohesion directly facilitates the operational competence necessary to drive the rapid energy transition.
In the context of the current EU imperative for swift transposition and decisive legislative action, France demonstrates better function due to its legislative cohesion. However, Germany and Italy serve as crucial case studies, demonstrating how detailed administrative procedures (Germany) and multi-level fragmentation (Italy) critically undermine the EU’s acceleration intent, regardless of national ambition.
A key finding is the universal recognition among these countries of administrative bottlenecks, particularly in permitting procedures, as a significant impediment to accelerating renewable energy deployment. Their legislative responses, notably the introduction of “acceleration zones” and streamlined processes under RED III, signify a shared learning and a concerted effort to remove these barriers. Furthermore, the strategic importance of renewable hydrogen and advanced biofuels for decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors is a common thread, with national policies actively seeking to foster these nascent industries. The consistent leveraging of the Recovery and Resilience facilities through REPowerEU chapters in each selected jurisdiction underscores a pragmatic approach to financing the green transition by aligning post-pandemic recovery with climate and energy security goals.
However, distinct national approaches persist. France has often taken a proactive stance, establishing early legal frameworks for emerging technologies like hydrogen and demonstrating swift legislative action on permitting. Italy has carved out a unique path by significantly prioritizing and enabling renewable energy communities, fostering decentralized energy production and citizen engagement. Germany, with its mature renewable energy market and established Renewable Energy Sources Act, continues to focus on accelerating large-scale wind and solar deployment while adapting its transport fuel mandates to integrate new renewable fuels. These divergences stem from unique national energy mixes, industrial structures, existing legal traditions, and varying levels of national ambition beyond EU minimums. The ongoing challenge of completely transposing RED III by the stipulated deadlines across all Member States highlights the inherent complexity and ambitious nature of the EU’s legislative agenda.
Implications for future EU governance and policy evolution
The comparative analysis of RED III and ‘Fit for 55’ implementation in France, Italy, and Germany mandates a critical adjustment in the EU’s governance strategy. While binding targets successfully align legislative ambition, their effectiveness is fundamentally constrained by persistent national administrative bottlenecks, underscoring that targets alone are insufficient.
The primary policy evolution required is a decisive shift from legislation to implementation enforcement. This necessitates moving beyond penalizing non-transposition to establishing binding operational standards and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), such as maximum average permitting durations. These KPIs should be actively monitored and potentially enforced through conditional financial mechanisms, ensuring the timely and effective establishment of “acceleration zones.”
Furthermore, the EU must address the risk of operational divergence by proactively standardizing the acceleration zone criteria and enhancing monitoring consistency under the REPowerEU framework. This structural oversight is crucial to prevent nominal national implementation and maintain market certainty.
Finally, future policy must leverage observed best practices and adapt to national contexts. This includes formalizing successful decentralization models (e.g., Italy’s Renewable Energy Communities) and ensuring a harmonized regulatory environment for strategic technologies like hydrogen. By balancing strict enforcement with adaptive guidance for Member States with varied market maturity, the EU can optimize the efficiency of the multi-level governance structure and successfully drive the energy transition forward.
In essence, the future policy evolution outlined above is the programmatic solution to the research problem identified and validated by the formulated hypothesis. The comparative findings serve as the evidence base compelling the EU to evolve its governance structure to prioritize operational streamlining over pure legislative enactment.
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
Data are contained within the article.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to extend their gratitude to the supervisors and reviewers.
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
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| 1 | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘The European Green Deal’, COM (2019) 640 Final, Brussels, 11.12.2019. Available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52019DC0640 (accessed on 11 May 2025). |
| 2 | See Note 1. |
| 3 | See Note 1. |
| 4 | Legge n. 8 di 28 febbraio 2020. Conversione in Legge, con Modificazioni, del Decreto-Legge 30 Dicembre 2019, n. 162, Recante Disposizioni Urgenti in Materia di Proroga di Termini Legislativi, di Organizzazione delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni, Nonche’ di Innovazione Tecnologica. (20G00021) (GU Serie Generale n.51 del 29-02-2020—Suppl. Ordinario n. 10). Available online: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/02/29/20G00021/sg (accessed on 17 May 2025). |
| 5 | Decreto Legislativo 8 Novembre 2021, n. 199. Attuazione della Direttiva (UE) 2018/2001 del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio, dell’11 Dicembre 2018, sulla Promozione dell’uso Dell’energia da fonti rinnovabili. (21G00214) (GU Serie Generale n.285 del 30-11-2021—Suppl. Ordinario n. 42). Available online: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/11/30/21G00214/sg (accessed on 13 May 2025). |
| 6 | See Note 5. |
| 7 | See Note 5. |
| 8 | Legge n. 60 di 24 aprile 2025. Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 28 febbraio 2025, n. 19, recante misure urgenti in favore delle famiglie e delle imprese di agevolazione tariffaria per la fornitura di energia elettrica e gas naturale nonchè per la trasparenza delle offerte al dettaglio e il rafforzamento delle sanzioni delle Autorità di vigilanza. (25G00068). Available online: https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2025-04-24;60 (accessed on 20 May 2025). |
| 9 | Decreto Legislativo 8 novembre 2021, n. 210. Attuazione della direttiva UE 2019/944, del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 5 giugno 2019, relativa a norme comuni per il mercato interno dell’energia elettrica e che modifica la direttiva 2012/27/UE, nonchè recante disposizioni per l’adeguamento della normativa nazionale alle disposizioni del regolamento UE 943/2019 sul mercato interno dell’energia elettrica e del regolamento UE 941/2019 sulla preparazione ai rischi nel settore dell’energia elettrica e che abroga la direttiva 2005/89/CE. (21G00233). Available online: https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto%20legislativo:2021-11-08;210 (accessed on 13 May 2025). |
| 10 | LOI n° 2019-1147 du 8 novembre 2019 relative à l’énergie et au climat. Available online: https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/politiques-publiques/loi-energie-climat (accessed on 19 May 2025). |
| 11 | Ordonnance n° 2021-235 du 3 mars 2021 portant transposition du volet durabilité des bioénergies de la directive (UE) 2018/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 décembre 2018 relative à la promotion de l’utilisation de l’énergie produite à partir de sources renouvelables. Available online: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/ordonnance/2021/3/3/TRER2030071R/jo/texte (accessed on 15 May 2025). |
| 12 | Ordonnance n° 2021-167 du 17 février 2021 relative à l’hydrogène. Available online: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043148001/ (accessed on 15 May 2025). |
| 13 | See Note 11. |
| 14 | See Note 12. |
| 15 | See Note 12. |
| 16 | See Note 12. |
| 17 | Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz Vom 21. Juli 2014 (BGBl. I S. 1066), Das Zuletzt Durch Artikel 11 Des Gesetzes Vom 16. Juli 2021 (BGBl. I S. 3026) Geändert Worden Ist; [Renewable Energies Act of 21 July 2014 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1066), as Amended by Article 11 of the Act of 16 July 2021 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 3026)]. Available online: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/eeg_2014/BJNR106610014.html (accessed on 21 May 2025). |
| 18 | Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung von Vorgaben der Richtlinie (EU) 2018/2001 des Europaischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 11. Dezember 2018 zur Forderung der Nutzung von Energie aus Erneuerbaren Quellen (Neufassung) fur Zulassungsverfahren nach dem BundesImmissionsschutzgesetz, dem Wasserhaushaltsgesetz und dem Bundeswasserstraßengesetz: Drucksache 19/27672. Available online: https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/276/1927672.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2025). |
| 19 | Decreto Legislativo 181/2023. Sicurezza Energetica, Fonti Rinnovabili e Ricostruzione Territori Alluvionati. Available online: https://temi.camera.it/leg19/provvedimento/d-l-181-2023-sicurezza-energetica-fonti-rinnovabili-e-ricostruzione-territori-alluvionati.html (accessed on 17 May 2025). |
| 20 | Decreto Legislativo 25 Novembre 2024, n. 190. Disciplina dei Regimi Amministrativi per la Produzione di Energia da fonti Rinnovabili, in Attuazione Dell’articolo 26, commi 4 e 5, lettera b) e d), della legge 5 agosto 2022, n. 118. (24G00205) (GU Serie Generale n.291 del 12-12-2024). Available online: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2024/12/12/24G00205/sg (accessed on 13 May 2025). |
| 21 | See Note 20. |
| 22 | See Note 20. |
| 23 | LOI n° 2023-175 du 10 mars 2023 relative à l’accélération de la production d’énergies renouvelables. Available online: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/dossierlegislatif/JORFDOLE000046329719/ (accessed on 19 May 2025). |
| 24 | See Note 18. |
| 25 | Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der EU-Erneuerbaren-Richtlinie im Bereich Windenergie auf See und Stromnetze. Available online: https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Gesetz/20240201-gesetz-eu-erneuerbaren-windenergie-auf-see-und-stromnetze.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 (accessed on 21 May 2025). |
| 26 | LOI n° 2021-1104 du 22 août 2021 portant lutte contre le dérèglement climatique et renforcement de la résilience face à ses effets (1). Available online: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000043956924/ (accessed on 20 May 2025). |
| 27 | See Note 26. |
| 28 | Federal Climate Action Act of 12 December 2019 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2513), as Last Amended by Article 1 of the Act of 15 July 2024 (Federal Law Gazette I No. 235). Available online: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ksg/englisch_ksg.html (accessed on 23 May 2025). |
| 29 | See Note 28. |
| 30 | Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Klimaschutz und Energie (25. Ausschuss) zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung—Drucksachen 20/13585, 20/13962—Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anpassung des Treibhausgas-Emissionshandelsgesetzes an die Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG (TEHG-Europarechtsanpassungsgesetz 2024). Available online: https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/147/2014775.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2025). |
| 31 | See Note 28. |
| 32 | See Note 23. |
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