Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
2.1. Expectations of Land Transfer and Contract Renewal Intention
2.2. Farmer Trust and Contract Renewal Behavior
2.3. The Moderating Role of Farmer Trust
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample Selection
3.2. Model Selection
3.3. Variable Selection
4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Benchmark Result Analysis
4.2. Further Analysis
4.2.1. Moderating Effects
4.2.2. Heterogeneity Analysis
5. Research Findings and Policy Implications
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable Categories | Variable Name | Variable Definition and Values | Mean | Std. |
---|---|---|---|---|
Dependent Variables | Contract signing (CS) | 1 = Written contract; 0 = Verbal contract | 0.530 | 0.015 |
Contract renewal (CR) | 1 = Renewing the contract; 0 = Not renewing the contract | 0.851 | 0.011 | |
Explanatory Variables | Circulation expectations | 1 = Land transfer meets expectations; 0 = Land transfer does not meet | 0.750 | 0.013 |
Farmer Trust | Rating towards the transfer partner | 3.593 | 0.034 | |
Control Variables | Age | Measured in years | 58.007 | 0.371 |
Healthy | 1 = Very unhealthy; 3 = Fair; 5 = Very healthy | 3.764 | 0.025 | |
Agricultural training | Measured in units (people) | 0.232 | 0.025 | |
Number of women | Measured in units (people) | 2.017 | 0.034 | |
Number of workers | Measured in units (people) | 1.084 | 0.036 | |
Economic level | Economic level of the household in the local village | 3.024 | 0.024 | |
Certificate of Title Confirmation | Ownership Certificate | 0.574 | 0.015 | |
Land belongs to | 1 = Individual; 2 = Village collective; 3 = State | 2.281 | 0.026 | |
Crop yield | Unit: Kilograms | 2361.620 | 170.759 |
Variable | CS | CR | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
VIF | 1/VIF | VIF | 1/VIF | |
Contract signing | 1.090 | 0.916 | 1.090 | 0.916 |
Contract renewal | 1.070 | 0.935 | 1.070 | 0.935 |
Circulation expectations | 1.010 | 0.986 | 1.010 | 0.986 |
Farmer Trust | 1.020 | 0.977 | 1.020 | 0.977 |
Age | 1.030 | 0.976 | 1.030 | 0.976 |
healthy | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
Agricultural training | 1.100 | 0.912 | 1.100 | 0.912 |
Number of women | 1.090 | 0.917 | 1.090 | 0.917 |
Number of workers | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
Economic level | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
Certificate of Title Confirmation | 1.100 | 0.912 | 1.100 | 0.912 |
Land belongs to | 1.090 | 0.917 | 1.090 | 0.917 |
Crop yield | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
Mean VIF | 1.060 |
Variable | Ⅰ | Ⅱ | Ⅲ | Ⅳ | Ⅴ | Ⅵ | Ⅶ | Ⅷ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CS | CR | CS | CR | CS | CR | CS | CR | |
Circulation expectations | −0.213 ** | 0.806 *** | −0.199 ** | 0.815 *** | −0.218 ** | 0.828 *** | −0.176 * | 0.836 *** |
(0.099) | (0.104) | (0.100) | (0.105) | (0.100) | (0.106) | (0.101) | (0.110) | |
Farmer Trust | −0.576 *** | 0.263 *** | −0.594 *** | 0.265 *** | −0.594 *** | 0.265 *** | −0.586 *** | 0.275 *** |
(0.044) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.045) | |
Age | −0.007 * | −0.008 * | −0.008 ** | −0.006 | −0.008 ** | −0.005 | ||
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |||
Healthy | −0.116 ** | −0.029 | −0.108 ** | −0.040 | −0.111 ** | −0.055 | ||
(0.052) | (0.061) | (0.052) | (0.061) | (0.053) | (0.063) | |||
Agricultural training | 0.215 *** | −0.092 | 0.214 *** | −0.095 * | 0.206 *** | −0.093 | ||
(0.058) | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.060) | (0.059) | |||
Number of women | −0.016 | 0.118 ** | −0.020 | 0.135 ** | ||||
(0.037) | (0.052) | (0.037) | (0.054) | |||||
Number of workers | −0.082 ** | 0.021 | −0.094 * | 0.030 | ||||
(0.035) | (0.043) | (0.036) | (0.044) | |||||
Economic level | −0.074 | 0.106 * | −0.083 | 0.099 | ||||
(0.054) | (0.065) | (0.054) | (0.067) | |||||
Certificate of Title Confirmation | 0.249 ** | 0.414 *** | ||||||
(0.089) | (0.110) | |||||||
Land belongs | −0.173 *** | 0.182 ** | ||||||
(0.051) | (0.061) | |||||||
Crop yield | −0.022 | −0.010 | ||||||
(0.014) | (0.017) | |||||||
Constant | 2.360 *** | −0.385 ** | 3.190 *** | 0.180 | 3.592 *** | −0.447 | 3.974 *** | −1.074 * |
(0.176) | (0.151) | (0.365) | (0.396) | (0.417) | (0.473) | (0.443) | (0.517) | |
P | 0.000 | 0.002 |
Variables | CS | CR |
---|---|---|
Circulation expectations | −2.066 *** | 1.971 *** |
(0.484) | (0.325) | |
Farmer Trust | −1.011 *** | 0.502 *** |
(0.120) | (0.077) | |
Circulation expectations × Farmer Trust | 0.526 *** | −0.354 *** |
(0.129) | (0.096) | |
Control variable | control | control |
Constant | 5.473 *** | −1.833 *** |
(0.599) | (0.562) | |
Number of obs | 1101 | 1101 |
Wald chi2(24) | 361.84 | |
Prob > chi2 | 0.000 |
Variable | Gender | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Woman | Man | |||
Circulation expectations | −0.073 | 0.7515 | −0.357 ** | 0.869 *** |
(0.067) | (0.603) | (0.123) | (0.131) | |
Farmer Trust | −0.595 | 0.3425 | −0.578 *** | 0.219 *** |
(0.058) | (0.273) | (0.054) | (0.053) | |
Constan | 2.1445 *** | −0.741 | 2.506 *** | −0.191 |
(0.288) | (0.601) | (0.224) | (0.188) | |
Number of obs | 393 | 708 | ||
Wald chi2(4) | 106.82 | 191.45 | ||
Prob > chi2 | 0.000 |
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Wenjun, Z. Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior. Land 2023, 12, 1588. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12081588
Wenjun Z. Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior. Land. 2023; 12(8):1588. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12081588
Chicago/Turabian StyleWenjun, Zhuo. 2023. "Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior" Land 12, no. 8: 1588. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12081588
APA StyleWenjun, Z. (2023). Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior. Land, 12(8), 1588. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12081588