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Article

Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure

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COMO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
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MLG, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe–CP 212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
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CENTRIA, Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
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ATP-group, CMAF, Complexo Interdisciplinar, Av. Prof. Gama Pinto, 21649-003 Lisboa, Portugal
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Departamento de Matemática e Aplicações, Universidade do Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
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GADGET, Apartado 1329, 1009-001, Lisboa, Portugal
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2010, 1(3), 317-337; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030317
Received: 15 July 2010 / Revised: 30 August 2010 / Accepted: 9 September 2010 / Published: 17 September 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
Human social networks reshape continuously, as individuals forge new contacts while abandoning existing ones. Simultaneously, individuals adapt their behavior, leading to an intricate interplay been network evolution and behavior evolution. Here, we review a framework, called Active Linking, which allows an analytical treatment of such a co-evolutionary dynamics. Using this framework we showed that an increase in the number of ways of responding to adverse interactions leads an overall increase of cooperation, which is here extended to all two-player social dilemmas. In addition, we discuss the role of the selection pressure in these results. View Full-Text
Keywords: social dilemmas; cooperation; evolutionary game theory; dynamical networks; coevolution; selection pressure social dilemmas; cooperation; evolutionary game theory; dynamical networks; coevolution; selection pressure
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MDPI and ACS Style

Van Segbroeck, S.; Santos, F.C.; Pacheco, J.M.; Lenaerts, T. Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure. Games 2010, 1, 317-337. https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030317

AMA Style

Van Segbroeck S, Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T. Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure. Games. 2010; 1(3):317-337. https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030317

Chicago/Turabian Style

Van Segbroeck, Sven, Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco, and Tom Lenaerts. 2010. "Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure" Games 1, no. 3: 317-337. https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030317

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