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Sustainability
  • Article
  • Open Access

21 May 2021

Sustainable Earnings: How Can Herd Behavior in Financial Accumulation Feed into a Resilient Economic System?

and
1
Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK
2
Centre for the Analysis of Social Policy, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK
3
Department of Social & Policy Sciences, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
This article belongs to the Special Issue System-wide Disruption of Organisations for Sustainability

Abstract

The paper applies a methodological tool able to frame national policies with sustainable financial flows between social groups. In effect, exchange entitlement mapping (E-mapping) shows the interdependency of capital and labor earnings across social groups, which is then accounted for in the policy planning of future financial flows for the green transition. First, the paper highlights the extent to which herd behavior feeds into capital and labor earnings by social, occupational, demographic, and regional groups for the United Kingdom, France, and Italy over the past 40 years. Second, learning from these past trends, the paper proposes a policy framing of “sustainable earning trends” to hamper or facilitate financial flows towards sectors, occupations, and regions prone to herd behavior. The paper concludes that for an economic system to be resilient, it should be able to recycle external shocks on group earnings into economic opportunities for the green transition.

1. Introduction

Since the COP21 agreement in 2015, too little has been done to implement sustainable pathways for environmental policies to meet the target that global warming should not increase by more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels [1]. Top-down approaches to policy implementation make use of the hierarchy of power relationships in decision-making, with the assumption that the decisions taken by political institutions at the national and global levels necessarily lead to a positive impact on the environment [2]. The argument put forward here is that relying on such vertical relationships of power may trigger rent-seeking behavior in terms of financial accumulation, as seen during the Great Recession [3,4], and may then feed into greenwashing practices. In effect, one dominant feature of excessive capitalism has been the growing hegemony of shareholder value as a mode of governance over human and natural resources [5,6,7]. At a time of urgent action for financing climate adaptation, such a phenomenon would compromise the intended outcome of an ethical distribution process of financial resources towards a sustainable goal, as understood by Raworth [6], to meet the human needs for all within the planetary boundaries.
In the COP21 era, when global financial flows need to be channeled towards the green transition, there is an urgent need to move our understanding in economic theory and policy from individualism to groupism, in the way that resources are exchanged across economies and societies over time. In this paper, we show that financial accumulation at the individual level in the past was based on group rather than individual behavior. Then, the proposition made here to avoid the negative effects of herd behavior on financial accumulation is that economic policies must be grounded in methodological groupism rather than individualism, which will, in turn, allow future financial flows to be more resilient to external shocks by quickly reaching all parts of society. The main research question raised here is, therefore, “Can private earnings feed into the financial needs of the green transition without feeding into herd behavior that negatively affects the global ecosystem?”
Just as nature thrives on diversity, this paper argues that a resilient economic system based on financial flows free from negative herd behavior in financial accumulation is able to recycle external shocks into economic opportunities within the planetary boundaries [6]. In order to address the main research question, the paper comprises the following two steps. The paper is structured as follows: we start by mapping out group behavior of past capital and labor earnings for the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. In the second part of this paper, we propose the definition of “sustainable earnings trends”, whereby financial flows are broken down horizontally by demographic group, and past, present, and potential future scenarios, to serve the purpose of providing transparency on the extent to which financial accumulation by social groups can hamper or facilitate financial flows towards sectors, occupations, and regions prone to herd behavior. We then provide an example of how such a concept can be applied at the national level, using the T21 framework as an example of a policy tool, before providing a few policy recommendations.

2. Financial Accumulation: Individual or Group Phenomenon?

In most economics textbooks for Year 1 students, economics departments worldwide teach that individual income is a function of a variety of human capital factors, such as marginal productivity, educational background, skills, and so on [8]. Such methodological individualism means that the discriminatory elements of socialization attached to gender, race, class, or ethnicity are embedded across those individual characteristics and are, as such, not fully accounted for in economic exchange. However, such discriminatory elements describing the power relationships between social groups in a particular context become central to the ways by which income is generated and wealth is accumulated over time.
In behavioral economics, the literature distinguishes between group and individual behavior [9,10,11], whereby norms of behavior by a social group tend to have an impact on individual decision-making. Similarly, in stratification economics, various authors show how race and ethnic group disparities in market outcomes can be sustained and exacerbated over time [12,13,14,15]. In effect, the relative economic value socially assigned to groups of individuals is mostly historically determined and culturally embedded. Social norms convey the rules of legitimacy for the access to resources between social groups, where group membership is sustained according to certain ideal criteria of behavior that sustain group membership. An individual belongs to multiple identities that are shaped by social interactions, and each identity socially entitles him or her to a socially acceptable level of resources [16,17]. Social identities are endogenous to an individual’s personal identity since they tend to evolve dynamically over time and thus, questions the use of methodological individualism to capture the dynamics of inequality between social groups [16]. In effect, there is a deterministic element of social life that shapes the way individuals access resources—a perceived legitimacy in social exchanges, which depends on the position of the individual’s identities on the spectrum of context-based social stratification [16,17,18].
When economic exchange takes place, social norms serve as rules for reproducing the advantages of certain social groups at the expense of others. For instance, in the context of the United States, [4] have shown how occupational, race, and gender characteristics are reinforced by the exacerbation of earning differentials between demographic groups during the financialization period of 1980 to 2010. Another example at the intersection of context and educational elites is the evidence from England and Wales that shows that a large number of employers offering the top-paid jobs in the country target an average of only 19 universities (out of 130) in the United Kingdom for those jobs [19]. These examples go beyond the issue of statistical discrimination since group productivity is not responsible for income inequality across all occupations [20]. Rather, the problem lies in the combined effect of identities on inequality since the sum of identities can lead to worse discriminating outcomes than when considering identities separately, as argued by the intersectionality literature [21,22,23]. Compared with implicit discrimination [24] or with Becker’s taste discrimination, the concept of intersectionality departs from methodological individualism by questioning the boundaries that can be drawn between groups and by defining individuals by a unique combination of diverse groups. As such, it allows us to assess the multiple layers of discrimination over time.
The methodology used to map out group earnings is also known as “exchange entitlement mapping”, or “E-mapping” in the literature (see [25,26] on E-mapping theory and its applications in different contexts of analysis in [3,4,27,28]). Such a method allows us to show how social norms are the channels through which the economic environment of individuals affects their opportunities and freedoms to choose different states of well-being [26]. The main concept that is operationalized, similarly to [3,4,26,27,28], is that income flows between group identities rather than individuals. Such a theoretical standpoint requires that individual income data be aggregated at the group level, from which cointegration analysis can be performed, including unit root testing or Vector Autoregression, to understand the long-term dynamics of income flows towards some groups at the expense of others [3,4,27]. The number of data points from the dataset used below [29], however, did not allow us to perform a full cointegration analysis. Simple Vector Autoregressions by pairs of group earnings were therefore performed as follows [30].
Starting from Charles and Vujic [27], we assumed a society with two demographic groups, i and j, both belonging to the same occupational group k. Therefore, individuals are composed of groups i and k or of group identities j and k. A socially dominant group is represented by j and receives a premium for group membership, while the non-dominant group is represented by i, whose earnings are discriminated against due to group membership. Hence, we assumed a ranking of groups of j > i, dependent upon the context specificity in which this ranking has been socially and historically determined.
At the societal level, the sum of earnings from capital and labor z = ( r + w ) is then distributed between all groups, such that Z = k = 0 n ( z i + z j ) . The point of the model is to show the nature of the short-run relationships of labor and capital earnings between i and j, whether the relationship is statistically significant (positively or negatively), or non-significant. In other words, the model describes the share of the capital and labor earnings going towards i and j in Z. In the short run, at one end of the individualist spectrum, the first scenario is that capital earnings per group i and j at the occupational level k will depend on the group’s productivity and on its earnings in the previous period, calculated as follows:
{ r j ( t ) = α + β 1 r j ( t 1 ) + ε t r i ( t ) = α + β 3 r i ( t 1 ) + ε t
where capital earnings per demographic group at time t depends on a constant, on its previous value at time t − 1, and a white noise term, while labor earnings will be calculated as follows:
{ w j ( t ) = α + β 1 w j ( t 1 ) + ε t w i ( t ) = α + β 3 w i ( t 1 ) + ε t
where labor earnings per demographic group at time t depends on a constant, on its previous value at time t − 1, and a white noise term. Equations (1) and (2) work simultaneously in Z.
To test whether past earning trends have experienced elements of group behavior with a premium attached to group j, the following Vector Autoregression analysis is conducted with the following earning relationships:
{ r j ( t ) = α + β 1 r j ( t 1 ) + β 2 r i ( t 1 ) + ε t r i ( t ) = α + β 3 r i ( t 1 ) + β 4 r j ( t 1 ) + ε t
where capital earnings per demographic group at time t depends on a constant, on its previous value at time t − 1, on the value of the other group’s earnings at time t − 1, and a white noise term; while labor earnings will be:
{ w j ( t ) = α + β 1 w j ( t 1 ) + β 2 w i ( t 1 ) + ε t w i ( t ) = α + β 3 w i ( t 1 ) + β 4 w j ( t 1 ) + ε t
where labor earnings per demographic group at time t depends on a constant, on its previous value at time t − 1, on the value of the other group’s earnings at time t − 1, and a white noise term.
At the other end of the spectrum, a second scenario is that, if group membership influences the dynamics of earnings between groups, then Equations (3) and (4) in Z will apply. Here, the nature of the earning relationships between i and j will depend on the sign and statistical significance of β1 and β2 for (3), and β3 and β4 for (4). From this perspective, group membership is socially assigned by a dominant convention rather than chosen individually, consciously, or unconsciously, and reproduced over time. While the constant α represents the labor earning gaps between i and j in (4) and the capital earning gaps between i and j in (3), the analysis is more concerned with the short-run dynamics of group biases. The results in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 presented in the next section are therefore concerned with the sign and statistical significance of β1 and β2 for (3), and β3 and β4 for (4), while the α gaps are displayed in the Appendix. Furthermore, as described above, context matters for the ways by which income is generated and wealth is accumulated by a social group over time. Therefore, groups i and j and occupation k will differ across countries. Hence, the empirical testing of Equations (1)–(4) was applied to the United Kingdom, Italy, and France depending on country-dependent classifications.
Table 1. Significant relationships of labor and capital earnings between demographic groups in the United Kingdom (1969–2016).
Table 2. Significant relationships of labor and capital earnings between demographic groups in France (1978–2010).
Table 3. Significant relationships of labor and capital earnings between demographic groups in Italy (1986–2016).

5. Conclusions

The paper shows that there is ample evidence of the interdependency of earnings between social groups, whether it is in the United Kingdom, France, or Italy, with varying degrees of interdependency across groups and countries. Such discrepancies are not based on individual productivity but on the social perception that one group is socially and, therefore, economically more valuable than another. Over time, such discrepancies are economically unsustainable, feeding into herd behavior that exacerbates group status and eventually creates production, consumption, and financially speculative bubbles that sustain that group’s status. Another perspective on income accumulation is therefore needed for a sustainable economic system.
National and international agencies that have developed rationales and policy plans to address the climate emergency are based on methodological individualism. Trillions of dollars have been released to “green” the economy. However, this paper shows that these efforts need to account for herd behavior in financial flows. Income and wealth inequalities represent power relationships among social groups, which then set social entitlement rules in economic exchange. Building planning tools at the national and international levels with a group mapping perspective can inform future policies of the potential cognitive biases at the individual level that aggregate at the macro-level. Adopting such a lens could create sustainable earning trends whereby financial flows are broken down horizontally by demographic group to provide transparency on the extent to which capital and labor earnings by social group can hamper or facilitate financial flows towards sectors, occupations, and regions prone to herd behavior.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, A.C.; investigation, A.C.; data curation, D.S.; formal analysis, D.S.; methodology, A.C.; supervision, A.C.; writing—original draft, A.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. Available online: http://www.lisdatacenter.org (accessed on 22 March 2021).

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. VARs of capital and labor earnings by occupation, gender, and ethnicity in the United Kingdom (12 Waves 1969–2016). Author’s calculation from LIS data (2020).
Table A1. VARs of capital and labor earnings by occupation, gender, and ethnicity in the United Kingdom (12 Waves 1969–2016). Author’s calculation from LIS data (2020).
Variables NamesOc1: Managers and Professionals (ISCO 1 & 2)
Oc2: Other Skilled Workers (ISCO 3-8, 10)
Oc3: Laborers/Elementary (ISCO 9)
lab: Average Labor Income
cap: Average Capital Income
m: Male Population
f: Female Population
eth1: White Ethnic Group
eth2: Mixed Race/Multiple Ethnic Groups
eth3: ASIAN/ASIAN BRITISH ETHNIC GROUP
eth4: BLACK/AFRICAN/CARIBBEAN/BLACK BRITISH ETHNIC GROUP
** Significance ≤ 0.05
* Significance between 0.10 and 0.05
VariablesVARs
oc1_mlab
oc1_flab
Oc1_mlab = 6802.64 * + 0.91 oc1_mlab (t − 1) − 0.01 oc1_flab (t − 1)
Oc1_flab = 2763.66 ** + 0.75 oc1_mlab (t − 1) − 0.12 oc1_flab (t − 1)
oc1_mcap
oc1_fcap
Oc1_mcap = 836.92 * + 1.36 oc1_mcap (t − 1) – 1.01 oc1_fcap (t − 1)
Oc1_fcap = 762.79 * +0.70 oc1_mcap (t − 1) − 0.40 oc1_oc1_fcap (t − 1)
oc1_eth1lab
oc1_eth2lab
Oc1_eth1lab = 60071.24 * − 0.77 * oc1_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.25 * oc1_eth2lab (t − 1)
Oc1_eth2lab = 45526.60 − 0.52 oc1_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.36 oc1_eth2lab (t − 1)
oc1_eth1cap
oc1_eth2cap
Oc1_eth1cap = 2930.56 * − 0.60 * oc1_eth1cap (t − 1) − 0.17 oc1_eth2cap (t − 1)
Oc1_eth2cap = −691.47 * + 0.85 * oc1_eth1 cap (t − 1) − 0.01 oc1_eth2cap (t − 1)
oc1_eth1lab
oc1_eth3lab
Oc1_eth1lab = 18249.62 * + 0.53 * oc1_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.04 oc1_eth3lab (t − 1)
Oc1_eth3lab = −12984.76 + 0.79 oc1_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.55 ** oc1_eth3lab (t − 1)
oc1_eth1cap
oc1_eth3cap
Oc1_eth1cap = 1758.42 * − 0.10 oc1_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.16 oc1_eth3cap (t − 1)
Oc1_eth3cap = 494.53 − 0.37 oc1_eth1cap (t − 1) + 1.44 oc1_eth3cap (t − 1)
oc1_eth1lab
oc1_eth4lab
Oc1_eth1lab = 18040.16 * + 0.54 * oc1_eth1lab (t − 1) +0.02 oc1_eth4lab (t − 1)
Oc4_eth4lab = − 21267.1 + 1.71 * oc1_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.24 oc1_eth4lab (t − 1)
oc1_eth1cap
oc1_eth4cap
Oc1_eth1cap = 1749.47 * − 0.02 oc1_eth1cap (t − 1) − 0.04 oc1_eth4cap (t − 1)
Oc1_eth4cap = −621.16 +0.67 oc1_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.01 oc1_eth4cap (t − 1)
oc2_mlab
oc2_flab
Oc2_mlab = 3155.20 * + 1.25 * oc2_mlab (t − 1) − 0.49 oc2_flab (t − 1)
Oc2_flab = 1113.26 * + 0.72 * oc2_mlab (t − 1) − 0.11 oc2_flab (t − 1)
oc2_mcap
oc2_fcap
Oc2_mcap = 223.20 * − 4.11 * oc2_mcap (t − 1) + 4.29 * oc2_fcap (t − 1)
Oc2_fcap = 241.35 * 2212 3.47 * oc2_mcap (t − 1) + 3.83 * oc2_fcap (t − 1)
oc2_eth1lab
oc2_eth2lab
Oc2_eth1lab = −3702.57 * +1.50 * oc2_eth1lab (t − 1) – 0.27 * oc2_eth2lab (t − 1)
oc2_eth2lab = −18432.94 + 2.75 ** oc2_eth1lab (t − 1) – 0.80 oc2_eth2lab (t − 1)
oc2_eth1cap
oc2_eth2cap
Oc2_eth1cap = 1160.31 * − 0.48 * oc2_eth1cap (t − 1) – 0.01 oc2_eth2cap (t − 1)
Oc2_eth2cap = 2745.67 * − 3.43 * oc2_eth1cap (t − 1) +0.50 * oc2_eth2cap (t − 1)
oc2_eth1lab
oc2_eth3lab
Oc2_eth1lab = 7065.82 * + 0.68 * oc2_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.01 oc2_eth3lab (t − 1)
Oc2_eth3lab = −2555.72 + 0.77 oc2_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.25 oc2_eth3lab (t − 1)
oc2_eth1cap
oc2_eth3cap
Oc2_eth1cap = 362.58 + 0.32 oc2_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.27 oc2_eth3cap (t − 1)
Oc2_eth3cap = −209.81 + 0.76 oc2_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.85 oc2_eth3cap (t − 1)
oc2_eth1lab
oc2_eth4lab
Oc2_eth1lab = 6707.39 * + 0.76 * oc2_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.05 oc2_eth4lab (t − 1)
Oc2_eth4lab = 3224.54 + 0.84 ** oc2_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.01 oc2_eth4lab (t − 1)
oc2_eth1cap
oc2_eth4cap
Oc2_eth1cap = 617.83 * + 0.24 oc2_eth1cap (t − 1) − 0.25 oc2_eth4cap (t − 1)
Oc2_eth4cap = 185.54 + 0.09 oc2_eth1cap (t − 1) − 0.45 oc2_eth4cap (t − 1)
oc3_mlab
oc3_flab
Oc3_mlab = 1958.92 * + 1.30 * oc3_mlab (t − 1) − 0.73 ** oc3_flab (t − 1)
Oc3_flab = 414.75 + 0.41 * oc3_mlab (t − 1) + 0.22 oc3_flab (t − 1)
oc3_mcap
oc3_fcap
Oc3_mcap = 261.07 * + 0.60 oc3_mcap (t − 1) − 0.47 oc3_fcap (t − 1)
Oc3_fcap = 171.71 * + 0.36 oc3_mcap (t − 1)– 0.10 oc3_fcap (t − 1)
oc3_eth1lab
oc3_eth2lab
Oc3_eth1lab = 6944.97 * + 0.47 * oc3_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.02 oc3_eth2lab (t − 1)
Oc3_eth2lab = −7280.15 + 2.17 * oc3_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.71 * oc3_eth2lab (t − 1)
oc3_eth1cap
oc3_eth2cap
Oc3_eth1cap = −333.46 * + 1.88 * oc3_eth1cap (t − 1) − 0.03 oc3_eth2cap (t − 1)
Oc3_eth2cap = −742.18 * + 2.42 * oc3_eth1cap (t − 1) − 0.25 ** oc3_eth2cap (t − 1)
oc3_eth1lab
oc3_eth3lab
Oc3_eth1lab = 4546.80 * + 0.64 * oc3_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.03 oc3_eth3lab (t − 1)
Oc3_eth3lab = −1565.27 + 1.24 oc3_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.12 oc3_eth3lab (t − 1)
oc3_eth1cap
oc3_eth3cap
Oc3_eth1cap = 80.42 + 0.53 oc3_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.14 * oc3_eth3cap (t − 1)
Oc3_eth3cap = 1657.60 ** − 4.40 oc3_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.51 oc3_eth3cap (t − 1)
oc3_eth1lab
oc3_eth4lab
Oc3_eth1lab = 4729.1 * + 0.35 ** oc3_eth1lab (t − 1) + 0.27 oc3_eth4lab (t − 1)
Oc3_eth4lab = 5102.60 * + 0.87 ** oc3_eth1lab (t − 1) − 0.19 oc3_eth4lab (t − 1)
oc3_eth1cap
oc3_eth4cap
Oc3_eth1cap = −82.38 + 1.07 * oc3_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.43 * oc3_eth4cap (t − 1)
Oc3_eth4cap = 272.02 − 0.74 oc3_eth1cap (t − 1) + 0.56 ** oc3_eth4cap (t − 1)
Table A2. VARs of capital and labor earnings by occupation, gender, and citizenship in France (7 Waves 1978–2010). Author’s calculation from LIS data (2020).
Table A2. VARs of capital and labor earnings by occupation, gender, and citizenship in France (7 Waves 1978–2010). Author’s calculation from LIS data (2020).
Variables NamesOc1: Managers and Professionals (ISCO 1 & 2)
Oc2: Other Skilled Workers (ISCO 3-8, 10)
Oc3: Laborers/Elementary (ISCO 9)
lab: Average Labor Income
lap: Average Capital Income
m: Male Population
f: Female Population
cit1: French Citizenship
cit2: French Naturalized Citizens
cit3: Non-Citizen Status
cit4: African Citizenship Holder
cit5: Norther African Citizenship Holder
cit6 Europe Citizenship Holder
** Significance ≤ 0.05
* Significance between 0.10 and 0.05
VariablesVARs
oc1_mlab
oc1_flab
Oc1_mlab = 10957.93 * − 0.23 oc1_mlab (t − 1) + 1.57 * oc1_flab (t − 1)
Oc1_flab = 4123.91 * − 0.08 oc1_mlab (t − 1) + 1.12 * oc1_flab (t − 1)
oc1_mcap
oc1_fcap
Oc1_mcap = 1058.91 * − 1.15 oc1_mcap (t − 1) + 1.92 * oc1_fcap (t − 1)
Oc1_fcap = 949.85 * − 1.00 oc1_mcap (t − 1) + 1.68 ** oc1_fcap (t − 1)
oc1_cit1lab
oc1_cit2lab
Oc1_cit1lab = −8355.29 * + 2.38 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 1.12 * oc1_cit2lab (t − 1)
Oc1_cit2lab = −12208.73 * + 2.54 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 1.30 * oc1_cit2lab (t − 1)
oc1_cit1cap
oc1_cit2cap
Oc1_cit1cap = 6732.47 * − 1.97 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) +0.49 * oc1_cit2cap (t − 1)
Oc1_cit2cap = 12414.87 * − 2.78 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) − 1.85 * oc1_cit2cap (t − 1)
oc1_cit1lab
oc1_cit3lab
Oc1_cit1lab= 7407.12 * +0.96 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.08 * oc1_cit3lab (t − 1)
Oc1_cit3lab = 28943.92 * − 0.05 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.43 * oc1_cit3lab (t − 1)
oc1_cit1cap
oc1_cit3cap
insufficient observations
oc1_cit1lab
oc1_cit4lab
Oc1_cit1lab = 5027.05 * + 0.91 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.11 * oc1_cit4lab (t − 1)
Oc1_cit4lab = −6861.91 + 0.95 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.59 * oc1_cit4lab (t − 1)
oc1_cit1cap
oc1_cit4cap
Oc1_cit1cap = 1084.98 * + 0.42 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.76 * oc1_cit4cap (t − 1)
Oc1_cit4cap = 1451.97 * − 0.30 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.54 * oc1_cit4cap (t − 1)
oc1_cit1lab
oc1_cit5lab
Oc1_cit1lab = 6963.37 * + 0.88 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.01 oc1_cit5lab (t − 1)
Oc1_cit5lab = −825.88 +0.59 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.13 oc1_cit5lab (t − 1)
oc1_cit1cap
oc1_cit5cap
Oc1_cit1cap = 4648.04 * − 0.48 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) − 7.97 * oc1_cit5cap (t − 1)
Oc1_cit5cap = −2122.89 * + 7.96 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) +10.12 * oc1_cit5cap (t − 1)
oc1_cit1lab
oc1_cit6lab
Oc1_cit1lab = 7543.65 * + 0.82 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.07 oc1_cit6lab (t − 1)
Oc1_cit6lab = −7046.77 +1.10 * oc1_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.19 oc1_cit6lab (t − 1)
oc1_cit1cap
oc1_cit6cap
Oc1_cit1cap =763.78 * +0.92 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.41 * oc1_cit6cap (t − 1)
Oc1_cit6cap = −284.33 +0.90 * oc1_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.24 oc1_cit6cap (t − 1)
oc2_mlab
oc2_flab
Oc2_mlab = 4463.35 * + 0.41 oc2_mlab (t − 1) + 0.58 oc2_flab (t − 1)
Oc2_flab = 2649.01 * + 0.55 ** oc2_mlab (t − 1) +0.18 oc2_flab (t − 1)
oc2_mcap
oc2_fcap
Oc2_mcap = 233.10 * − 2.21 ** oc2_mcap (t − 1) +2.60 * oc2_fcap (t − 1)
Oc2_fcap = 301.11 * − 2.64 oc2_mcap (t − 1) +3.02 ** oc2_fcap (t − 1)
oc2_cit1lab
oc2_cit2lab
Oc2_cit1lab = −2299.50 * − 4.46 * oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) + 6.31 * oc2_cit2lab (t − 1)
Oc2_cit2lab = 2662.28 * − 0.23 * oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) + 1.16 * oc2_cit2lab (t − 1)
oc2_cit1cap
oc2_cit2cap
Oc2_cit1cap= 4507.12 * − 2.89 * oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.86 * oc2_cit2cap (t − 1)
Oc2_cit2cap = 223.28 * + 0.22 * oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.24 * oc2_cit2cap (t − 1)
oc2_cit1lab
oc2_cit3lab
Oc2_cit1lab = 5314.08 * + 0.65 * oc2_cit1ab (t − 1) + 0.16 * oc2_cit3lab (t − 1)
Oc2_cit3lab = −1203.08 * + 1.47 * oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.69 * oc2_cit3lab (t − 1)
oc2_cit1cap
oc2_cit3cap
note: oc2_cit3cap dropped because of collinearity
oc2_cit1lab
oc2_cit4lab
Oc2_cit1lab = 2513.95 + 0.96 * oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.03 oc2_cit4lab (t − 1)
Oc2_cit4lab = 8809.76 + 0.17 oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.14 oc2_cit4lab (t − 1)
oc2_cit1cap
oc2_cit4cap
Oc2_cit1cap = 1509.01 * − 0.63 * oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.42 * oc2_cit4cap (t − 1)
Oc2_cit4cap = 2000.28 * − 1.73 * oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.47 * oc2_cit4cap (t − 1)
oc2_cit1lab
oc2_cit5lab
Oc2_cit1lab = 4838.81 * + 0.78 * oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.01 oc2_cit5lab (t − 1)
Oc2_cit5lab = 5555.39 + 0.50 oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.20 oc2_cit5lab (t − 1)
oc2_cit1cap
oc2_cit5cap
Oc2_cit1cap = 285.74 ** + 0.59 * oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.50 oc2_cit5cap (t − 1)
Oc2_cit5cap = 118.19 + 0.20 oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.31 oc2_cit5cap (t − 1)
oc2_cit1lab
oc2_cit6lab
Oc2_cit1lab = 4951.24 * + 0.71 * oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.07 oc2_cit6lab (t − 1)
Oc2_cit6lab = 2088.77 + 0.79 oc2_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.04 oc2_cit6lab (t − 1)
oc2_cit1cap
oc2_cit6cap
Oc2_cit1cap = 292.98 ** + 1.08 ** oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.41 oc2_cit6cap (t − 1)
Oc2_cit6cap =255.55 + 1.80 * oc2_cit1cap (t − 1) − 1.34 * oc2_cit6cap (t − 1)
oc3_mlab
oc3_flab
Oc3_mlab = 6636.90 * − 0.50 oc3_mlab (t − 1) +1.20 oc3_flab (t − 1)
Oc3_flab = 4424.80 * − 0.39 oc3_mlab (t − 1) + 1.06 oc3_flab (t − 1)
oc3_mcap
oc3_fcap
Oc3_mcap = 169.64 ** − 2.54 oc3_mcap (t − 1) + 3.19 ** oc3_fcap (t − 1)
Oc3_fcap = 172.83 * − 2.00 oc3_mcap (t − 1) +2.68 ** oc3_fcap (t − 1)
oc3_cit1lab
oc3_cit2lab
Oc3_cit1lab = −1601.95 * +0.08 * oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 1.20 * oc3_cit2lab (t − 1)
Oc3_cit2lab = 1014.03 * + 0.09 * oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.93 oc3_cit2lab (t − 1)
oc3_cit1cap
oc3_cit2cap
Oc3_cit1cap = 940.38 * − 2.37 * oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) +2.55 * oc3_cit2cap (t − 1)
Oc3_cit2cap = 896.50 * − 2.48 oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) + 2.22 * oc3_cit2cap (t − 1)
oc3_cit1lab
oc3_cit3lab
Oc3_cit1lab = 4745.62 * + 0.84 * oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.12 oc3_cit3lab (t − 1)
Oc3_cit3lab = −300.11 * + 1.49 * oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.47 oc3_cit3lab (t − 1)
oc3_cit1cap
oc3_cit3cap
insufficient observations
oc3_cit1lab
oc3_cit4lab
Oc3_cit1lab = 6848.13 + 0.30 oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.13 oc3_cit4lab (t − 1)
Oc3_cit4lab = 9601.59 − 0.27 oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.11 oc3_cit4lab (t − 1)
oc3_cit1cap
oc3_cit4cap
Oc3_cit1cap= 69.84 * + 0.75 * oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.82 * oc3_cit4cap (t − 1)
Oc3_cit4cap = 870.77 * − 1.13 * oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) − 0.96 * oc3_cit4cap (t − 1)
oc3_cit1lab
oc3_cit5lab
Oc3_cit1lab = 6123.54 * + 0.44 ** oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.04 oc3_cit5lab (t − 1)
Oc3_cit5lab= 6025.53 + 0.01 oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.41 oc3_cit5lab (t − 1)
oc3_cit1cap
oc3_cit5cap
Oc3_cit1cap = 18839.33 * − 24.06 * oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) − 97.78 * oc3_cit5cap (t − 1)
Oc3_cit5cap = −5869.07 * + 8.20* oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) + 29.99 * oc3_cit5cap (t − 1)
oc3_cit1lab
oc3_cit6lab
Oc3_cit1lab = 6256.10 * + 0.07 oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) + 0.43 oc3_cit6lab (t − 1)
Oc3_cit6lab = 5796.51 * + 0.58 oc3_cit1lab (t − 1) − 0.14 oc3_cit6lab (t − 1)
oc3_cit1cap
oc3_cit6cap
Oc3_cit1cap = 134.18 + 0.81 oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.02 oc3_cit6cap (t − 1)
Oc3_cit6cap = 429.75 * − 0.70 oc3_cit1cap (t − 1) + 0.58 oc3_cit6cap (t − 1)
Table A3. VARs of capital and labor earnings by occupation, gender, and birth in Italy (13 Waves 1986–2016). Author’s calculation from LIS data (2020).
Table A3. VARs of capital and labor earnings by occupation, gender, and birth in Italy (13 Waves 1986–2016). Author’s calculation from LIS data (2020).
Variables NamesOc1: Blue-Collar
Oc2: Office Worker and Schoolteacher
Oc3: Junior/Middle Manager and Professional Occupations
Oc4: Senior Managers and White-Collar Workers
m: Male
f: Female
lab: Labor Income
cap: Capital Income
in: Born in the Country
out: Born out the Country
** Significance ≤0.05
* Significance between 0.10 and 0.05
VariablesVARs
Oc1_mlab
oc1_flab
oc1_mlab =2672.60 * + 0.95 * oc1_mlab (t − 1) 0.87 oc1_flab (t − 1)
oc1_flab = 2440.10 * + 0.40 ** oc1_mlab (t − 1) + 0.29 oc1_flab (t − 1)
Oc1_mcap
oc1_fcap
Oc1_mcap = 134.97 + 0.32 *oc1_mcap (t − 1) + 0.30 oc1_fcap (t − 1)
Oc1_fcap = 52.60+ 0.32 * oc1_mcap (t − 1) + 0.57 * oc1_fcap (t − 1)
oc1_inlab
oc1_outlab
oc1_inlab = −225.61 + 0.18 oc1_inlab (t − 1) + 1.01 oc1_outlab (t − 1)
oc1_outlab = 1928.71 + 0.34 oc1_inlab (t − 1) + 0.55 oc1_outlab (t − 1)
oc1_incap
oc1_outcap
oc1_incap = 221.67 + 0.09 oc1_incap (t − 1) + 0.71 oc1_outcap (t − 1)
oc1_outcap = 36.21 + 0.34 oc1_incap (t − 1) + 0.27 oc1_outcap (t − 1)
oc2_mlab
oc2_flab
oc2_mlab = 4097.44 ** + 0.08 oc1_mlab (t − 1) + 0.80 oc2_flab (t − 1)
oc2_flab = 2384.25 − 0.21 oc2_mlab (t − 1) + 1.16 **oc2_flab (t − 1)
oc2_mcap
oc2_fcap
oc2_mcap = 401.63 − 0.54 oc2_mcap (t − 1) + 1.06 ** oc2_fcap (t − 1)
oc2_fcap = 677.23 * − 1.17 ** oc2_mcap (t − 1) + 1.52 * oc2_fcap (t − 1)
oc2_inlab
oc2_outlab
oc2_inlab = 824.04 + 0.27 oc2_inlab (t − 1) + 0.78 oc2_outlab (t − 1)
oc2_outlab = 751.78 + 0.28 oc2_inlab (t − 1) + 0.76 oc2_outlab (t − 1)
oc2_incap
oc2_outcap
oc2_incap = 471.22 + 0.48 oc2_incap (t − 1) + 0.14 oc2_outcap (t − 1)
oc2_outcap = 664.14 + 0.53 oc2_incap (t − 1) + 0.22 oc2_outcap (t − 1)
oc3_mlab
oc3_flab
oc3_mlab = 3146.20 + 0.92 * oc3_mlab (t − 1) + 0.15 oc3_flab (t − 1)
oc3_flab = 8114.84 * + 0.54 * oc3_mlab (t − 1) + 0.03 oc3_flab (t − 1)
oc3_mcap
oc3_fcap
oc3_mcap = 969.30 ** + 1.19 * oc3_mcap (t − 1) − 0.62 oc3_fcap (t − 1)
oc3_fcap = 966.40 + 1.02 oc3_mcap (t − 1) − 0.40 oc3_fcap (t − 1)
oc3_inlab
oc3_outlab
oc3_inlab = 3201.03 + 0.94 * oc3_inlab (t − 1) + 0.77 oc3_outlab (t − 1)
oc3_outlab = 20.52 + 1.48 * oc3_inlab (t − 1) − 0.64 oc3_outlab (t − 1)
oc3_incap
oc3_outcap
oc3_incap = 1208.80 ** + 0.16 oc3_incap (t − 1) + 0.33 oc3_outcap (t − 1)
oc3_outcap = 1701.65 ** − 0.67 oc3_incap (t − 1) + 0.73 **oc3_outcap (t − 1)
oc4_mlab
oc4_flab
oc4_mlab = 9787.48 + 0.25 oc4_mlab (t − 1) + 0.91 oc4_flab (t − 1)
oc4_flab = 2378 + 0.34 oc4_mlab (t − 1) + 0.53 oc4_flab (t − 1)
oc4_mcap
oc4_fcap
oc4_mcap = 3853.93 * + 0.19 oc4_mcap (t − 1) − 0.28 oc4_fcap (t − 1)
oc4_fcap = 2873.76 * + 0.39 oc4_mcap (t − 1) − 0.27 oc4_fcap (t − 1)
oc4_inlab
oc4_outlab
oc4_inlab = − 279.29 + 1.60 * oc4_inlab (t − 1) − 0.43 oc4_outlab (t − 1)
oc4_outlab = − 22010.67 + 3.04 * oc4_inlab (t − 1) − 1.19 ** oc4_outlab (t − 1)
oc4_incap
oc4_outcap
oc4_incap = 4887.26 * − 0.13 oc4_incap (t − 1) − 0.89 * oc4_outcap (t − 1)
oc4_outcap = 8252.62 + 0.34 oc4_incap (t − 1) − 0.29 oc4_outcap (t − 1)

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