Search Results (129)

The rapid growth of distributed renewable generation and electric vehicles has increased the demand for flexible peak-shaving resources. Battery swapping stations (BSSs), which centrally manage standardized batteries under the battery-as-a-service model, can provide station-to-grid (S2G) services when aggregated by virtual power plants (VPPs). However, S2G adoption is influenced by contract design, market returns, subsidies, battery degradation, and heterogeneous consumer attitudes. This study develops a complex-network evolutionary diffusion model for VPP–BSS cooperation. The framework integrates a VPP profit-accounting module, a segmented Hotelling demand model, and an evolutionary game on a Newman–Watts small-world network. BSS strategies are updated through a partial asynchronous Fermi rule to reflect bounded rationality and investment inertia. Numerical simulations examine contract parameters, subsidy policies, consumer structures, exogenous variables, and network characteristics. The results show that S2G adoption follows an S-shaped trajectory but does not automatically reach full penetration. Successful diffusion requires a feasible combination of electricity prices, revenue sharing, settlement mechanisms, subsidies, consumer acceptance, and available battery capacity. The findings also reveal a trade-off between promoting BSS participation and maintaining VPP profitability, while robustness tests confirm the stability of the main conclusions. Full article

Digital and intelligent fresh-product supply chains increasingly rely on third-party logistics providers (TPLs) to record and disclose transport-process information. However, the TPL bears data-collection and digital-governance costs while capturing only part of the market value created by credible disclosure. This study develops a supplier-led Stackelberg game for a supplier–TPL–retailer supply chain. Contractual terms are negotiated before operation. Conditional on the negotiated contract, the supplier sets the wholesale price, the TPL selects the disclosure level, and the retailer determines the retail price. We derive decentralized equilibria under blockchain and non-blockchain regimes and compare cost-sharing and joint cost-sharing/revenue-sharing contracts. The results show that cost-sharing increases the TPL’s optimal disclosure level, but disclosure upgrades occur through discrete threshold jumps. Blockchain adoption depends jointly on fixed implementation costs and reliability improvements, and cost-sharing alone may not ensure both adoption and high-level disclosure. Introducing revenue-sharing allows the TPL to internalize part of the demand-side value generated by credible disclosure, leading to a Pareto-improving coordination interval for all supply-chain members. The findings provide a mathematical basis for designing incentive-compatible contracts for blockchain-enabled disclosure in digital fresh product supply chains. Full article

In the burgeoning live stream landscape, manufacturers face critical dilemmas regarding strategic channel governance and how intermediaries’ bargaining ability dictates sustainable cooperation under Stackelberg leadership change. Addressing these issues is vital, as misaligned governance risks severe profit losses, yet standard heuristics fail to capture how leadership shifts disrupt channel coordination and model selection. To fill this gap, we model a manufacturer’s self-operated (Model SO) live stream channel and an intermediary-operated (Model IO) live stream channel to evaluate trade-offs among bargaining ability, operational costs, and spillover effects. Key findings show that in Model SO, spillover and price adjustments transform the live stream channel into a traffic-channeling gateway in which rising operational costs paradoxically boost total profits. In Model IO, bargaining ability serves as a key determinant, as high pit fees weaponize this ability for predatory commission-squeezing, while low pit fees redirect it toward volume expansion, transforming the intermediary into a synergistic partner. Furthermore, bargaining ability shifts pricing from intermediary-introduction to profit-recapture strategies while exerting cost-magnification and revenue-magnification effects under varying pit fees. Crucially, we uncover two Pareto-optimal cooperation zones alongside a non-cooperation zone caused by incentive incompatibility under mid-tier bargaining ability. Extensions show that intensified price competition turns dominant intermediaries into welfare killers and high service sensitivity induces an over-service trap, though popularity cost-sharing contracts restore coordination. Overall, this study fills a crucial analytical gap by establishing precise theoretical boundaries for channel governance, bargaining ability dynamics, and cost-driven functional transformations in live stream supply chains. Full article

The authorization and operation of the public data supply chain is an important pathway for unlocking the value of public data and cultivating the data element market. However, in practice, it faces challenges such as insufficient data supply and insufficient stakeholder incentives. This paper focuses on the differentiated subsidy policies of the fiscal department, constructing a differential game model involving multiple participants, including data providers, data managers, and data operators. The paper systematically compares the optimal effort decisions of each stakeholder, the evolution trajectory of public data product value, and the trajectory of overall system profits under two subsidy models: cost subsidies and transaction subsidies. It further analyzes the regulatory role of revenue distribution ratios and cost-sharing contracts in shaping the effectiveness of these subsidy mechanisms. The study finds that: (1) cost subsidies provide more balanced and stable incentives for all stakeholders and contribute more to the final value trajectory of public data products; transaction subsidies are more effective in improving overall system profits but offer weaker incentives for the supply and management sides, requiring flexible use in conjunction with cost-sharing contracts; (2) cost-sharing contracts play a regulatory role under different subsidy models and effectively reduce the data provider’s dependence on fiscal subsidies under the transaction subsidy mechanism; (3) the revenue distribution ratio only positively affects the effort decisions of the supply and management sides under the transaction subsidy model, and the optimal subsidy ratio of the fiscal department is closely related to the revenue distribution ratio. Therefore, differentiated subsidy strategies should be implemented based on specific decision-making contexts and internal revenue distribution ratios. This paper reveals the synergistic incentive mechanism between differentiated subsidy models and cost-sharing contracts, providing a theoretical basis for the design of subsidy policies for public data authorization and operation. Full article

Large online marketplaces increasingly rely on multi-stage ranking pipelines where a learned relevance model is complemented by business-aware constraints such as contractual pacing, exposure caps and commercial alignment objectives. This paper develops a second-stage, contract-aware re-ranking layer for real-estate recommendation that explicitly balances user–item relevance with plan fulfillment, lead value and operational guardrails. The proposed multi-objective re-ranker (PMOR) combines a calibrated base relevance score with multiplicative business adjustments and subtractive penalties for approaching contractual caps and for within-slate similarity. The method supports heterogeneous settlement models, including pay-per-action and fixed-fee contracts, via contract-specific weights. Because the scoring function is deterministic and structured, it admits exact component-wise contribution analysis and counterfactual ablations without relying on surrogate explainability methods. Offline evaluation on production logs from an anonymized marketplace covers 4219 recommendation requests and 184,147 candidate items, joined with daily business snapshots using an as-of strategy to prevent look-ahead bias. Under a profit proxy based on effective lead value, position discounting and billability, PMOR achieves an indexed expected-revenue proxy of 487.4 (baseline = 100), corresponding to a lift of 387.4% over a model-only baseline and 48.4% over a legacy production re-ranker (LPR). The gain is primarily associated with improved billable exposure, increasing the share of billable positions in TOP-3 to 78.22% compared with 37.85% for LPR. We discuss parameter sensitivity, operational considerations and limitations of offline proxy objectives for deployment. Full article

The Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC) general contracting model has emerged as the dominant delivery method for large-scale infrastructure and industrial projects in China. However, contemporary EPC project cost control remains plagued by critical industry challenges, including fragmented cross-stage coordination, pervasive data silos, and the shallow integration of digital technologies into core management processes. This study considers three key stakeholders—government regulators, project owners, and EPC general contractors—and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic interactions underlying intelligent cost control in EPC projects. We examine the evolutionary stability of each stakeholder’s strategy selection, explore how various factors influence tripartite strategic choices, and further investigate the stability of equilibrium points in the game system. The key findings are summarized as follows: (1) Strengthening government incentives and penalties simultaneously promotes owners’ investment in intelligent cost control systems and general contractors’ active collaborative cost management. However, excessive incentive intensity undermines the government’s regulatory effectiveness. (2) Establishing a revenue-sharing mechanism for excess cost savings fully stimulates the spontaneous cooperation willingness of owners and general contractors, serving as the cornerstone for market-oriented operation of intelligent cost control. (3) Reducing owners’ intelligent construction investment costs and general contractors’ collaborative control costs effectively addresses practical implementation barriers and accelerates the digital upgrading of engineering cost management. Finally, numerical simulations are performed using MATLAB R2020b to validate theoretical findings. Full article

Background/Objectives: The COVID-19 pandemic intensified concerns regarding the resilience and financing architecture of mental health services, yet it remains unclear whether crisis-induced adjustments fundamentally altered hospital case-mix complexity or merely exposed pre-existing structural configurations. This study examines the relationship between financing regimes and case-mix complexity in psychiatric hospitals in Romania, a Central and Eastern European health system characterized by mixed financing arrangements and pronounced interregional heterogeneity. Methods: Using administrative data comprising 752 hospital section–year observations (2019–2024), we identify structural financing–organization regimes through a two-step clustering procedure (hierarchical Ward method followed by K-means refinement) based on revenue composition, expenditure allocation, workforce structure, and operational pressure indicators. Results: Three distinct regimes emerge, reflecting persistent institutional configurations rather than temporary crisis-induced groupings. Chi-square tests confirm that regime membership is statistically independent of pandemic timing. A multivariate regression model controlling for financing composition and expenditure structure shows that structural variables (particularly the share of contract-based revenues and the allocation of expenditures) exert systematic and economically meaningful effects on the case-mix index (CMI). Pandemic and post-pandemic indicators do not retain robust explanatory power once structural determinants are accounted for. Regional robustness analyses further demonstrate that financing architecture consistently outweighs temporal shock effects in explaining territorial variation in clinical complexity. Conclusions: The findings suggest that psychiatric hospital case-mix dynamics are structurally embedded within differentiated financing regimes whose influence persists beyond crisis periods. By integrating regime identification with outcome modeling in a Central and Eastern European context, this study contributes to the international literature on health system resilience and highlights the primacy of institutional financing architecture over episodic shock effects in shaping hospital complexity. Full article

To promote the sustainable development of power battery recycling, this study investigates the strategic interplay between altruistic preferences and channel structure. Addressing divergent interests and the dynamic evolution of recycling scale and brand reputation, a differential game model with two state variables is constructed to analyze four decision modes: resale/agency under selfish/altruistic scenarios. The results reveal that altruistic preferences induce Pareto improvements, reconciling the recycler’s utility with the partner’s profit growth. Notably, altruism acts as a moderating mechanism that reshapes channel advantages, enabling the Resale–Altruistic (RA) mode to surpass the agency mode as the system-wide optimal state. Furthermore, a substitutive compensation effect between altruistic preference and revenue-sharing contracts is identified. This research provides a quantitative framework for optimizing behavioral contract design and governance in battery recycling ecosystems. Full article

Against the background of carbon neutrality, the government’s carbon regulations have had a profound impact on the distributed energy sharing behavior of industrial parks. To deeply explore the interactive relationship between distributed energy sharing in industrial parks and government regulation, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model composed of the government, core enterprises and supporting enterprises; endogenizes government behavior; and integrates inter-enterprise contractual mechanisms into the evolutionary framework. By establishing a revenue payment matrix and a replication dynamic equation, the stability conditions and system evolution paths of the strategy choices of each subject are analyzed, and numerical simulations are conducted. The results show that there are multiple evolutionary stable equilibria in the system, among which the equilibrium where core enterprises actively share, supporting enterprises actively share, and the government actively regulates carbon is the ideal state. Cost-sharing contracts and cooperative penalty contracts play a significant role in promoting the participation of supporting enterprises in sharing and curbing “free-riding” behavior, respectively. The changes in government subsidy rates and carbon tax rates have a crucial impact on the evolution of corporate strategies. Quantitatively, the carbon tax rate exhibits a threshold effect; enterprises shift to positive energy sharing when the tax rate exceeds 0.8, while a subsidy rate above 0.4 leads the government to withdraw from regulation. This indicates that a reasonable design of carbon regulations can help achieve coordinated energy emission reduction between the government and enterprises. The findings provide theoretical support for optimizing carbon regulations and designing cooperation strategies. Full article

Addressing the high investment costs and market revenue uncertainties faced by hydrogen energy storage projects, this study examines the economic implications of green bond financing on their participation in electricity market transactions. A two-level optimization decision model is constructed: the upper level aims to minimize the total cost over the project’s lifetime by optimizing the proportion of green bond financing, while the lower level aims to minimize daily operational costs by optimizing the hydrogen storage system’s charging and discharging strategy. The model comprehensively accounts for factors including medium-to-long-term contracted electricity volumes, tiered carbon pricing, and forecasting errors for wind and solar generation, utilizing the CPLEX solver for optimization. Case study analysis demonstrates that green bonds can substantially reduce financing costs, achieving optimal net present value within a financing share range of 60–80% and a storage capacity range of 1000–2000 MWh. This enhances the full lifecycle economics of hydrogen storage projects, providing theoretical support for integrated ‘financing–investment–operation’ decision-making. Full article

Agri-food supply chains are highly exposed to freshness deterioration, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. In practice, upstream suppliers may strategically misreport freshness-related information to influence downstream procurement decisions, which can amplify inefficiency and increase food loss and waste. This study develops an analytical framework that integrates (i) strategic freshness misreporting by an informed supplier, (ii) endogenous investment in blockchain-enabled traceability that improves information credibility at a cost, and (iii) contract design for supply chain coordination. We consider a two-echelon agri-food supply chain with stochastic demand and freshness-dependent valuation, and characterize equilibrium operational decisions under centralized and decentralized settings. The results reveal how misreporting reshapes optimal order quantities, wholesale prices, and profit allocation, and identify conditions under which misreporting increases expected waste and undermines sustainability performance. We then examine how traceability investment changes the incentives of both parties, leading to adoption thresholds and potential incentive misalignment under decentralization. Finally, we design revenue-sharing, cost-sharing, and combined contracts and derive parameter regions that coordinate the blockchain-enabled agri-food supply chain and generate Pareto improvements for both the supplier and the retailer. Numerical experiments illustrate the comparative statics and quantify the trade-offs among profitability, transparency, and waste reduction. Relative to existing blockchain-enabled agri-food supply chain models, the framework jointly endogenizes supplier misreporting of freshness, blockchain-based traceability investment, and contract parameters, thereby uncovering new adoption thresholds and coordination regions that tightly link transparency decisions to food loss and waste. The findings provide actionable guidance for using digital traceability and contract mechanisms to curb opportunism, enhance coordination, and support sustainable agri-food supply chains. Full article

Balancing efficiency and equity within agricultural supply chains is crucial for rural revitalization and sustainable development. This study focuses on the three-tiered chain of ‘farmers–cooperatives–retailers’, constructing a joint decision-making model linking pricing, sales effort, and order volume. It compares the performance differences between decentralized and centralized decision-making structures. Methodologically, we introduce four corrective factors—risk-bearing capacity, cooperation level, capital investment, and information access—to the traditional Shapley value. By employing TOPSIS (Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) to calculate proximity, we derive an enhanced Shapley–TOPSIS allocation coefficient. Furthermore, we design a secondary distribution rule of ‘effort-based value-added distribution according to labor contribution,’ tightly binding the marginal returns of sales effort to input intensity, thereby reconciling structural fairness with incentive compatibility. Empirical findings indicate that, compared with decentralized approaches, centralized decision-making significantly enhances overall system revenue and reduces retail prices. The refined distribution scheme outperforms the baseline Shapley value in fairness and stability, effectively mitigating the misalignment where effort contributors receive disproportionately low returns. The optimal sales effort level is approximately 0.35. Under the ‘distribution according to labor’ approach, retailers (the primary effort providers) see a marked increase in their value-added share, whereas farmers and cooperatives also gain positive benefits, enhancing alliance stability. Unlike existing studies that rely mainly on revenue-sharing contracts or a single Shapley allocation, this study, on the one hand, explicitly endogenizes sales effort into demand and profit functions and systematically characterizes the joint mechanism between effort and profit allocation under both centralized and decentralized structures. On the other hand, an improved Shapley–TOPSIS modeling procedure and an ‘effort added-value allocation according to contribution’ rule are proposed. By adjusting demand parameters and the weights of the adjustment factors, the proposed framework can be readily extended to other agricultural products and green supply chain settings, providing a replicable tool and managerial implications for designing sustainable profit allocation schemes. Full article

Recent frequent food safety incidents have heightened consumer concern about agricultural product traceability, driving companies to build more robust supply chain traceability systems. However, enhancing traceability level is not only driven by consumer preferences but is also profoundly shaped by supply chain power structures and coordination mechanisms. In this study, we investigate how consumer preferences, power structures, and contractual mechanisms jointly shape traceability investment and coordination in agricultural supply chains. Using a two-tier supplier–retailer game-theoretic model, we compare traceability levels, pricing, and profit allocation under three governance structures: vertical Nash, supplier-led, and retailer-led. We also evaluate the effectiveness of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts. The results reveal several key insights. First, consumer preference for traceable products serves as a critical market-driven force that enhances traceability investment across supply chain tiers. Second, power structures fundamentally determine traceability outcomes through threshold-dependent mechanisms: when consumer preference is weak, vertical Nash structures yield superior traceability via balanced cost-sharing; however, once preference intensity surpasses critical thresholds, retailer-led structures dominate in responsiveness, profit distribution, and capability building. In contrast, supplier-led structures deliver the weakest outcomes, as concentrated cost burdens suppress investment incentives, particularly in supply chains composed of small and medium-sized suppliers. Third, coordination contracts exhibit structure-specific efficacy. Cost-sharing contracts achieve full optimization in vertical Nash contexts and yield Pareto improvements in supplier-led chains, whereas traditional contracts exert minimal influence in retailer-led settings. These findings enrich our theoretical understanding of traceability governance and provide practical guidance for differentiated traceability design and contract formulation. Full article

When a technology provider (entrant) enters an emerging end market, he may outsource critical components from a competing conventional manufacturer (incumbent) or insource critical components. Under the outsourcing strategy, brand reputation spills over from the incumbent to the entrant—a phenomenon termed brand spillover. This paper investigates the sourcing strategy (insourcing or outsourcing) and contract choice (wholesale price contract or revenue share contract) in markets subject to brand spillover. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one entrant with a new technology and one incumbent who sells the traditional product in the end market and the critical component to the entrant. We find that the entrant adopts the insourcing strategy only if his optimal quantity, including original market power and brand spillover, is intermediate. Otherwise, the outsourcing strategy with wholesale price contract is selected when his optimal quantity is low, while revenue-sharing contracts dominate at high quantity. Interestingly, when brand spillover intensity exceeds a threshold, both parties benefit from a higher level of brand spillover under the wholesale price contract. Full article

This study examines a three-tier e-commerce platform supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, an e-commerce platform, and a logistics provider, where three members invest in artificial intelligence. Market demand is modeled as a function of retail price and the AI investment efforts of three members. To coordinate the supply chain, all possible coalition forms and the cost-sharing contract are investigated. Game models under different scenarios are established and solved. The results show that: (1) Compared with the centralized structure, each member’s AI investment effort will decrease under decentralized structures; (2) The cost-sharing contract is always effective for the AI investment efforts of the manufacturer and platform, but it is effective for the logistics provider’s AI investment effort under certain conditions; (3) The cost-sharing contract effectively coordinates the e-commerce platform supply chain compared to the revenue-sharing contract. Market demand and supply chain profit are larger under the cost-sharing contract than under the fully decentralized structure. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the design of AI investment strategies, product pricing, and coordination mechanisms for supply chain members of the e-commerce supply chain. Full article