Search Results (106)

With the integration of high-penetration renewable energy, existing uniform marginal pricing mechanisms face critical challenges, including difficulty in recovering flexibility resource capacity costs and free-riding phenomena caused by renewable energy’s variability. To address these issues, this paper proposes a differentiated pricing mechanism for renewable energy based on analytical uncertainty representation to avoid marginal price distortion and promote the rational allocation of ancillary service costs. Firstly, a joint clearing model for energy and reserve ancillary service is developed, incorporating a distributional robust chance constraint based on moment information to model the uncertainty of renewable energy. Then, the composition structure of the nodal marginal price for ancillary service demand is redefined, offering clearer and more explicit price signals compared with traditional uniform marginal pricing. After that, quantification of the impact of energy storage on renewable energy forecast errors and ancillary service pricing is conducted, with a systematic analysis of its role in reducing ancillary service costs and optimizing generation revenue. Simulation results on the modified IEEE 30-bus system demonstrate significant advantages over traditional uniform pricing: the proposed mechanism ensures fair cost allocation, effectively mitigates free-riding problems, and provides clear economic signals. With energy storage units regulating renewable power output, it could lead to a 12.9% reduction in ancillary service costs while increasing total generation revenue by 6.73%. Full article

The dramatic increase in global construction and demolition waste (CDW) is a considerable environmental challenge, but recycled building materials face serious marketing bottlenecks. Although existing studies have focused on the technological path and policy regulation of CDW management, they have not yet considered the impact of sales effort level under the dual-channel sales model. Considering the coexistence of price competition and bidirectional free-riding behavior, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model, which includes a construction waste remanufacturer with both online and offline sales channels and a building materials retailer, to reveal the pricing decision-making mechanism under bidirectional free-riding behavior. The results of the study show that (1) in the decentralized decision-making model, offline free-riding has a negative effect on the online channel, and when the effort cost coefficient is high, it increases the retail price of recycled building materials in the offline channel; at the same time, under high cross-price sensitivity, both the manufacturer and the retailer are negatively affected by online free-riding behaviors; (2) in contrast to decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making motivates the supply chain as a whole to significantly increase sales effort investment and develop a better pricing strategy under the condition of satisfying the threshold cross-price sensitivity, which ultimately improves the overall efficiency of the supply chain. The findings provide an important theoretical basis and management insights for the coordination of dual-channel supply chains, the governance of free-riding behavior, and the promotion of recycled building materials in the recycling economy. Full article

Classical epidemic models treat vaccine uptake as an exogenous parameter, yet real-world coverage emerges from strategic choices made by individuals facing uncertain risks. During the last two decades, vaccination games, which combine epidemic dynamics with game theory, behavioural economics, and network science, have become a very important tool for analysing this problem. Here, we synthesise more than 80 theoretical, computational, and empirical studies to clarify how population structure, psychological perception, pathogen complexity, and policy incentives interact to determine vaccination equilibria and epidemic outcomes. Papers are organised along five methodological axes: (i) population topology (well-mixed, static and evolving networks, multilayer systems); (ii) decision heuristics (risk assessment, imitation, prospect theory, memory); (iii) additional processes (information diffusion, non-pharmacological interventions, treatment, quarantine); (iv) policy levers (subsidies, penalties, mandates, communication); and (v) pathogen complexity (multi-strain, zoonotic reservoirs). Common findings across these studies are that voluntary vaccination is almost always sub-optimal; feedback between incidence and behaviour can generate oscillatory outbreaks; local network correlations amplify free-riding but enable cost-effective targeted mandates; psychological distortions such as probability weighting and omission bias materially shift equilibria; and mixed interventions (e.g., quarantine + vaccination) create dual dilemmas that may offset one another. Moreover, empirical work surveys, laboratory games, and field data confirm peer influence and prosocial motives, yet comprehensive model validation remains rare. Bridging the gap between stylised theory and operational policy will require data-driven calibration, scalable multilayer solvers, and explicit modelling of economic and psychological heterogeneity. This review offers a structured roadmap for future research on adaptive vaccination strategies in an increasingly connected and information-rich world. Full article

Trade-in programs have become a vital mechanism for promoting sustainable consumption and reducing negative impacts on the environment, gaining substantial support from branders, e-platforms, and consumers in recent years. Concurrently, the emergence of professional recyclers has provided firms with viable alternatives for the outsourcing of recycling processes. To investigate the optimal leadership and recycling model with respect to trade-in operations, this study examines the strategy selection in a platform-based supply chain under a resale model. A two-period game-theoretic framework is developed, encompassing four models: self-recycling and outsourcing models under the leadership of the brander or platform. The main findings are as follows: (1) In markets characterized by a low consumer price sensitivity, both branders and platforms tend to choose the self-recycling model to capture the closed-loop value. In contrast, in highly price-sensitive markets, both parties exhibit a preference for “free-riding” strategies. (2) Once the recycling leader is determined, adopting a self-recycling model can lead to a relative win–win outcome in high price sensitivity contexts. (3) With a short product iteration cycle, both the brander and platform should strategically lower their prices in the first period, sacrificing short-term profits to enhance trade-in incentives and maximize long-term gains. (4) When the brander leads the recycling process, they should consider reusing the resources derived from old products; however, in platform-led models, the brander can only consider reusing the recycled resources in a low price sensitivity market. This study provides strategic insights for the sustainable development of the supply chain through the analysis of a game between a brander and an e-commerce platform, enriching the literature on CLSCs through integrating trade-in leadership selection and the choice to outsource, offering theoretical support for dynamic pricing strategies over multi-period product lifecycles. Full article

Under the “Dual Carbon” strategy, collaborative governance of port atmospheric pollutants and carbon emissions is critical for low-carbon transformation. Focusing on Ningbo-Zhoushan Port (48% regional ship emissions), this study examines government, port enterprises, and public interactions. A tripartite evolutionary game model with numerical simulation reveals dynamic patterns and key factors. The results show the following: (1) A substitution effect exists between government incentive costs and penalty intensity—increased environmental governance budgets reduce the probability of government incentives, whereas higher public reporting rewards accelerate corporate emission reduction convergence. (2) Public supervision exhibits cyclical fluctuations due to conflicts between individual rationality and collective interests, with excessive reporting rewards potentially triggering free-rider behavior. (3) The system exhibits two stable equilibria: a low-efficiency equilibrium (0,0,0) and a high-efficiency equilibrium (1,1,1). The latter requires policy cost compensation, corporate emission reduction gains exceeding investments, and a supervision benefit–cost ratio greater than 1. Accordingly, the study proposes a three-dimensional “Incentive–Constraint–Collaboration” governance strategy, recommending floating penalty mechanisms, green financial instrument innovation, and community supervision network optimization to balance environmental benefits with fiscal sustainability. This research provides a dynamic decision-making framework for multi-agent collaborative emission reduction in ports, offering both methodological innovation and practical guidance value. Full article

The diffusion of green energy technological innovation based on international green energy cooperation is a critical pathway to achieving global low-carbon emission reductions. However, few studies have considered the innovation diffusion pathways of green energy technologies under bilateral policy uncertainties. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for the diffusion of green energy technological innovation in a complex network environment, with a focus on analyzing the impacts of key parameters such as policy spillover effects, technological heterogeneity, technical leakage risks, and free-riding risks on the equilibrium outcomes of evolutionary strategies. The results of the study are as follows: (1) Technological synergy and technological heterogeneity have a significant role in promoting the diffusion of green energy technological innovation, but when technological heterogeneity is too high, it is difficult for the two parties to find more common interests and areas of technological interaction, and the cooperative innovation will be turned into an empty shell that has a name but no reality. (2) Policy uncertainty has a significant impact on the diffusion of green energy technology innovation, and the specific impact depends on the type of policy, policy intensity, policy spillover effects, and other key parameters. (3) The risk of technological obsolescence has prompted countries to deeply participate in green energy international cooperation to realize the “curved road overtaking” of green energy technology based on technological locking and latecomer advantages; due to the existence of the phenomenon of “free-riding”, the logic of value creation based on win–win cooperation is replaced by the opportunism of “enjoying the benefits”, and cooperative innovation may be turned into a one-time “handshake agreement”. The existence of the risk of technology leakage can turn collaborative innovation into a “witch hunt” by the underdog against the overdog, and the diffusion process of green energy technology innovation is led in the wrong direction. Full article

The synergistic dilemma of upstream actors in the agro-ecological product supply chain restricts the transformation of ecological value, and traditional research focuses on the “production-supply” dichotomy, neglecting the driving role of the innovation service system. This study innovatively proposes a theoretical framework of “industry-supply-innovation tri-system synergy”, constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model with “free-riding” behavior, quantifies the effects of synergistic cost sharing coefficients (θ), benefit distribution ratios (γ), and policy regulation variables on the evolution of the main body’s strategy, and reveals the key laws through Matlab simulation. The results show that: (1) the participation of an innovation service system can significantly improve the speed of cooperation convergence; (2) the initial willingness to cooperate and the fairness of benefit distribution dominate the evolution path, and the probability of the system converging to “active cooperation” increases significantly when θ > 0.5; (3) the policy needs to be complemented with the market, and the government optimizes the distribution of the benefits of innovation services to improve the efficiency of the supply chain. The government can optimize the distribution of benefits from innovation services to promote the efficiency of the supply chain. Accordingly, we propose a “market-policy” dual-wheel control strategy to promote the deep integration of multiple supply chain actors with the innovation service system as a link. Full article

We experimentally study how leadership selection mechanisms affect public goods provision. Introducing leadership does not raise contribution. Voluntary leadership performs the worst, primarily because the absence of leadership signals uncooperative play, and candidates free-ride on other leaders. Voluntary leadership from a randomly selected candidate is a promising endogenous leadership selection mechanism, primarily because assuming leadership by revealed preference signals cooperative play, the absence of leadership leaves the possibility of unlucky cooperative candidates, and sole leadership removes the leader’s free-riding incentives. Full article

With global economic growth and intensifying market competition, Chinese manufacturing firms are under pressure to enhance product competitiveness and adapt to changing consumer demands, requiring continuous product innovation and upgrading. This study introduces a tripartite evolutionary game model involving manufacturing firms, service providers and consumers to analyze the strategic stability and the impact of various factors on decision-making within this system. The results indicate that the decisions of these actors are interdependent, with a fair distribution of innovation benefits and costs being key to stimulating innovation enthusiasm and participation. The presence of free-riding behavior affects strategic choices, and a robust system of rewards and penalties can mitigate this problem. The cost of obtaining market information also influences service providers’ participation in innovation, with high costs potentially suppressing their involvement. This research provides insights to guide collaborative innovation efforts during industrial transformation, highlighting the direct impact of service providers and consumers on the success of manufacturing upgrades. Full article

Living organisms expend energy to sustain survival, a process which is reliant on consuming resources—termed here as the “cost of survival”. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a classic model of social interaction, individual payoffs depend on choices to either provide benefits to others at a personal cost (cooperate) or exploit others to maximize personal gain (defect). We demonstrate that in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), a simple “Always Cooperate” (ALLC) strategy evolves and remains evolutionarily stable when the cost of survival is sufficiently high, meaning exploited cooperators have a low probability of survival. We derive a rule for the evolutionary stability of cooperation, x/z >T/R, where x represents the duration of mutual cooperation, z the duration of exploitation, T the defector’s free-riding payoff, and R the payoff for mutual cooperation. This finding suggests that higher survival costs can enhance social welfare by selecting for cooperative strategies. Full article

This paper analyzes the possibility of creating worker cooperatives in which members are paid not through wages but through dividends calculated on the organization’s residual income, as stipulated by the economic theory of the labor-managed firm. It is shown how dividends paid to members can be linked to the value of their financial participation in the capital of the cooperative. In the presence of a financial market, cooperative shares would be issued and allocated to both members and non-member outside investors, thus addressing the problem of the under-capitalization of worker cooperatives. It is hypothesized that the strong financial incentives of this type of capital structure, together with involvement in the democratic governance of the cooperative, peer pressure, and other horizontal monitoring mechanisms, would support members’ intrinsic motivation to work and help overcome the problem of free-riding in the labor process. Flexible economic and financial structure in the absence of fixed wages would promote job stability, as already observed in existing worker cooperatives. Full article

Digital intelligent supply chains strengthen industrial resilience and optimize economic efficiency in the timber industry. Information asymmetry and low collaboration efficiency remain key challenges across the timber supply chain. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model examining digital collaboration between timber production and processing enterprises, finished product distribution and retail enterprises, and third-party service providers, introducing third-party service providers alongside traditional production and distribution enterprises. The model incorporates novel parameters including information sharing degree, value-added reliability gains, and free-riding coefficients to reflect real-world circumstances. Through equilibrium simulation and analysis, we identify four possible evolutionary states. The results demonstrate that successful digital collaboration in timber supply chains relies on three conditions: a high level of initial stakeholder involvement accelerates the formation of supply chain digital intelligent collaborative mechanisms, equitable benefit distribution maintains long-term cooperation, and integrated third-party services reduce implementation costs while improving information reliability. These findings provide a new perspective and reference for timber enterprises to implement digital transformation strategies. Full article

Against the backdrop of an increasingly sound supply chain system and thriving e-commerce, it is becoming increasingly common for retailers to introduce their own brands of products and for manufacturers to open up direct online sales channels. The existence of these two supply chain decisions is complex and involves interactions. Moreover, the introduction of online direct sales channels will bring about differences in prices and service quality between channels, resulting in a free-riding effect on the internet. However, existing related research rarely considers the role of network free-riding effect in this supply chain system. This article integrates the network free-riding effect into the supply chain model by setting the network free-riding rate. According to whether retailers introduce their own brand products and manufacturers open up online direct sales channels, four supply chain scenarios are formed, and the reverse recursion method is used to obtain the profit functions for each of these four scenarios. Then, a Stackelberg game model is established to determine the response strategies of manufacturers and retailers based on the changes in profits of manufacturers caused by retailer decisions and the changes in profits of retailers caused by manufacturer decisions. Through analysis, it was discovered that a key factor affecting decision-making within the supply chain system is the retailer’s channel advantage. When the channel advantage of retailers is strong, manufacturers will open up online direct sales channels to weaken the channel advantage of retailers. Retailers will not introduce their own brand products but are more inclined to cooperate with manufacturers. When the channel advantage of retailers is weak, retailers will attract consumers and consolidate their channel advantage by introducing high-quality, low-priced private label products, while manufacturers will maintain cooperation with retailers and adopt a strategy of not opening up online direct sales channels. We also analyzed the Nash equilibrium state under different channel advantages of retailers. Full article

The collaborative promotion of agricultural green technology innovation and adoption (AGTIA) is essential for achieving green agriculture. However, there remains a need to raise both innovation and adoption levels, necessitating explorations of the effects of government subsidies and collaborative mechanisms. To this end, this paper builds an evolutionary game model to analyze the collaborative promotion of AGTIA. By introducing relevant parameters, such as government subsidies for AGTIA, dividends and liquidated damages within industrial technology innovation alliances (ITISAs), and cost reduction coefficients, this paper explores the impacts of the technology spillover effect, price premium of green agricultural products, and government subsidies on the strategic choices of related participants. The main findings are as follows: (1) The key factors influencing AGTIA are different and the government can implement different combinations of dynamic and static subsidy mechanisms at distinct stages of agricultural green development. Government subsidies play a major role at the initial stage, while ITISAs should take fuller advantage of AGTIA as green agriculture matures. (2) Increasing subsidies can promote AGTIA at the initial stage. However, an optimal range of subsidies exists, and when subsidies are higher than a certain threshold, government subsidy willingness fluctuations may lead to decreased stability. (3) There is a threshold of liquidated damages within ITISAs. Only when liquidated damages exceed the threshold can they facilitate the development of durable ITISAs and discourage free-rider behavior. The above findings can provide theoretical support for relevant government sectors when issuing policies to promote AGTIA and agricultural green development. Full article

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be utilized as airborne base stations to deliver wireless communication and federated learning (FL) training services for ground vehicles. However, most existing studies assume that vehicles (clients) and UAVs (model owners) offer services voluntarily. In reality, participants (FL clients and model owners) are selfish and will not engage in training without compensation. Meanwhile, due to the heterogeneity of participants and the presence of free-riders and Byzantine behaviors, the quality of vehicles’ model updates can vary significantly. To incentivize participants to engage in model training and ensure reliable outcomes, this paper designs a reliable incentive mechanism (FedBeam) based on game theory. Specifically, we model the cooperation problem between model owners and clients as a two-layer Stackelberg game and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). For the cooperation among model owners, we formulate the problem as a coalition game and based on this, analyze and design a coalition formation algorithm to derive the Pareto optimal social utility. Additionally, to achieve reliable FL model updates, we design a weighted-beta (Wbeta) reputation update mechanism to incentivize FL clients to provide high-quality model updates. The experimental results show that compared to the baselines, the proposed incentive mechanism improves social welfare by 17.6% and test accuracy by 5.5% on simulated and real datasets, respectively. Full article