Evolution of Cooperation and Evolutionary Game Theory

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Learning and Evolution in Games".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 December 2025 | Viewed by 3955

Special Issue Editors

Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
Interests: evolution of cooperation; evolutionary game theory; network science; multiagent learning

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Co-Guest Editor
Departamento de Matematicás, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
Interests: behavioral experiments; evolutionary game theory; dynamics on complex networks; cooperation and social norms
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Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Human societies have always relies on collective cooperation for survival and prosperity. When the recent global pandemic emerged, some individuals and societies responded by offering their cooperation, such as volunteering as frontline workers, donating protective materials and supplies, and adhering to strict quarantine policies, which made the containment of the pandemic possible. This is just one of numerous examples that prove that collective cooperation indeed benefits the long-term development of the entire system; however, it can also inhibit the maximization of one’s short-term interests. Theoretically, this means that individuals’ motivations to increase their own benefits could lead to the collapse of cooperation. Understanding the spread and maintenance of cooperation, and human decision making when faced with conflict between one’s own interests and those of the group, is now widely recognized as an important and practical problem with tangible benefits, as we tackle global problems in public health, resource management, and climate change.

The evolution of cooperation has received significant attention from researchers in the field of mathematics, physics, biology, sociology, economics, and computer science. This Special Issue aims to collect papers that provide insights into cooperation, human decision making, social behaviors, and social norms, using a wide range of tools including computer simulation, mathematical analysis, data analysis, and experiments with human subjects.

Dr. Qi Su
Dr. Alberto Antonioni
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

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Keywords

  • evolution of cooperation
  • evolutionary game theory
  • evolutionary dynamics
  • game theory
  • social dilemmas
  • social norms
  • social behaviors
  • human decision making
  • laboratory experiments
  • online experiments

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Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

12 pages, 759 KiB  
Article
High Cost of Survival Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation
by Oleg Smirnov
Games 2025, 16(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16010004 - 9 Jan 2025
Viewed by 1963
Abstract
Living organisms expend energy to sustain survival, a process which is reliant on consuming resources—termed here as the “cost of survival”. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a classic model of social interaction, individual payoffs depend on choices to either provide benefits to others [...] Read more.
Living organisms expend energy to sustain survival, a process which is reliant on consuming resources—termed here as the “cost of survival”. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a classic model of social interaction, individual payoffs depend on choices to either provide benefits to others at a personal cost (cooperate) or exploit others to maximize personal gain (defect). We demonstrate that in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), a simple “Always Cooperate” (ALLC) strategy evolves and remains evolutionarily stable when the cost of survival is sufficiently high, meaning exploited cooperators have a low probability of survival. We derive a rule for the evolutionary stability of cooperation, x/z >T/R, where x represents the duration of mutual cooperation, z the duration of exploitation, T the defector’s free-riding payoff, and R the payoff for mutual cooperation. This finding suggests that higher survival costs can enhance social welfare by selecting for cooperative strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolution of Cooperation and Evolutionary Game Theory)
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7 pages, 183 KiB  
Article
Computing Stackelberg Equilibrium for Cancer Treatment
by Sam Ganzfried
Games 2024, 15(6), 45; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060045 - 23 Dec 2024
Viewed by 934
Abstract
Recent work by Kleshnina et al. has presented a Stackelberg evolutionary game model in which the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leading player corresponds to the optimal cancer treatment. We present an approach that is able to quickly and accurately solve the model [...] Read more.
Recent work by Kleshnina et al. has presented a Stackelberg evolutionary game model in which the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leading player corresponds to the optimal cancer treatment. We present an approach that is able to quickly and accurately solve the model presented in that work. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolution of Cooperation and Evolutionary Game Theory)
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