Search Results (163)

The rapid decarbonisation of urban districts is accelerating the deployment of rooftop photovoltaic (PV) systems, household battery energy storage systems (BESSs) and electric vehicles (EVs). However, the high variability of urban micro-generation creates substantial forecasting errors at the urban–grid interface, imposing high balancing costs on distribution system operators (DSOs) and local energy communities. Traditional metrics fail to assess how effectively internal peer-to-peer (P2P) flexibility offsets these forecast mismatches prior to grid settlement. To address this gap, this paper presents a novel methodological framework and a non-parametric indicator: the Community Imbalance Neutralisation Index (CINI). Formulated in a generalised, scalable matrix structure applicable to any heterogeneous urban neighbourhood (N households), CINI quantifies the relative reduction in net community-level imbalance relative to the cumulative sum of uncoordinated individual forecast errors. CINI ranges from 0 per cent (no collective mitigation) to 100 per cent (perfect internal neutralisation). Complementing this index, an adaptive day-ahead scheduling algorithm is introduced to determine the optimal community energy purchase requirement (E_forecast). The proposed framework is numerically evaluated using a high-resolution synthetic benchmark annual dataset with 15 min intervals (35,040 intervals) representing a Central European urban residential cluster equipped with diverse combinations of PV, BESS and managed EV charging infrastructure. The simulation results demonstrate that active cVPP coordination reduces annual grid-facing imbalance energy from 188.73 MWh to 143.88 MWh, increasing the annual CINI score from 57.22% to 67.39% (+10.17 percentage points) compared with the uncoordinated baseline. Notably, the framework reveals a ‘Winter Flexibility Paradox’, achieving its highest relative efficacy during the winter months (+13.88 percentage points in December). Furthermore, sensitivity analyses show that scaling flexibility up to 40 kW achieves a CINI score of 91.22%, revealing diminishing marginal returns and critical technological saturation thresholds. The proposed CINI metric and E_forecast dispatch algorithm provide city planners, municipal energy managers and DSOs with a transparent diagnostic tool to design dynamic socio-economic tariff incentives, optimise urban micro-grid sizing, prevent free-rider dynamics, and foster resilient, self-balancing smart cities. Full article

Edge-enabled Internet of Things (IoT) systems are rapidly becoming the operational substrate of mission-critical infrastructure spanning industrial automation, smart healthcare, vehicular ecosystems, and cyber–physical environments. The distributed, resource-constrained, and physically exposed nature of these systems makes them persistent targets for a diverse and evolving spectrum of cyber attacks. Critically, cyber attacks on edge-enabled IoT systems do not merely threaten data confidentiality; they simultaneously erode two interdependent operational objectives: sustainability, the ability of the system to maintain continuous, energy-efficient operation within its resource envelope and resilience, the ability to absorb adversarial disruptions, recover operational continuity, and adapt to prevent recurrence. The structural conflict between defending sustainability and maintaining resilience under active cyberattack conditions constitutes a research gap that prior surveys have not systematically addressed. This survey introduces a cyber attack-driven Sustainability–Resilience (S-R) framework that positions cyber threats as the primary stressor forcing a bilateral trade-off between operational efficiency and continuity in edge-enabled IoT systems. A five-layer, attack-centric taxonomy is developed spanning: network-layer attacks (DDoS, MitM, routing manipulation, jamming); device and firmware attacks (malware injection, firmware compromise, sensor spoofing); data and AI/ML attacks (adversarial inputs, data poisoning, model inversion); federated and Byzantine attacks (gradient poisoning, backdoor injection, free-riding); and advanced persistent threats (APT-class intrusions, ransomware, LLM prompt injection, zero-day exploitation). For each attack class, the survey systematically analyses the impact on sustainability and resilience objectives, the resulting S-R conflict, and the state-of-the-art defensive strategies. The framework is formalised as a maximin optimisation over the joint S-R objective surface, incorporating the adaptive, goal-directed nature of the adversary through a game-theoretic formulation. Cross-domain analysis spanning Industrial IoT, smart healthcare, Internet of Vehicles, UAV-assisted IoT, smart grids, and tactical edge networks establishes domain-specific S-R operating constraints under representative attack scenarios. The survey concludes with a structured characterisation of open research challenges and forward-looking directions, providing a prioritised research agenda for advancing simultaneously sustainable and adversarially resilient edge-enabled IoT ecosystems. Full article

As electric vehicles scale up, battery recycling has become critical to the circular economy. Yet ESG adoption in battery recycling is not merely an internal managerial choice but is also shaped by green social expectations and social comparison among firms. This study examines how these two forces affect recycling and pricing under non-adoption, partial adoption, and full adoption. We develop a dynamic game model in which green social expectations generate goodwill premiums and losses, while comparison-induced pride and guilt feed back into goodwill accumulation and strategic decisions. We find that green social expectations strengthen recycling incentives and reshape market demand through goodwill effects. Interestingly, guilt exerts a stronger effect than pride in social comparison, encouraging firms to increase recycling effort and accumulate higher goodwill. We also find that full ESG adoption helps firms build stable goodwill advantages, ease price competition, and improve long-term profitability. By contrast, partial adoption may trigger free-riding and strategic divergence. A key theoretical contribution is the joint integration of green social expectations, social comparison, and ESG adoption within a unified dynamic framework, with goodwill linking behavioral responses to firms’ recycling and pricing decisions. Managerially, firms should align ESG practices with continuous recycling effort, while regulators should improve the transparency and comparability of ESG performance to facilitate coordinated adoption. Full article

This cross-sectional study examined how children integrated social strategy and initial resource endowment when responding to others as third-party observers in a cooperative context. Using an age-appropriate collective dilemma game, 141 Chinese children observed fictional peers choosing among cooperation, self-reliance, and free-riding strategies under conditions of high or low resource endowment, yielding a 3 (strategy) × 2 (resource endowment) experimental design. Children responded to each target through punishment, social evaluation, and partner choice. Results showed a strong preference for high-resource individuals among younger children (ages 5–6), which diminished with age, suggesting a developmental shift away from reliance on external cues such as resource. Across all age groups, children consistently responded most negatively to free riders, regardless of resource endowment, indicating their moral sensitivity to exploitative intent and fairness violations. Importantly, self-reliant individuals with high resources were viewed more favorably than those with low resources, indicating that children adjust their responses based on social strategy and resource endowment. These findings suggest two key developmental patterns: (1) an age-related decline in resource-based preferences and (2) early-emerging ability that enables children to weigh contextual cues when responding to non-cooperative behaviors. The study highlights age-related patterns in children’s third-party responses, reflecting their sensitivity to both social strategy and situational information in cooperative contexts. Full article

Disaster governance in the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) spans multiple administrative regions, institutions, and platforms, and hazards such as typhoons, storm surges, and urban waterlogging generate strong cross-boundary spillovers that no single city can manage alone. To explain the persistent problems of stakeholder hesitation, underinvestment, and free-riding, this study treats collaborative disaster governance as a multi-actor system and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model linking the regional coordinating regulatory authorities, local emergency management actors, and social participation actors. Static, linear dynamic, and nonlinear dynamic reward–punishment regimes are embedded into the payoff matrix and examined through stability analysis and numerical simulation. The results show that, without incentives, the system settles into an imbalanced “regulatory authorities-driven, weak collaboration” equilibrium; static mechanisms improve targeted behavior but erode the regulatory authorities’ willingness to lead; and linear dynamic mechanisms induce strategy oscillations in cross-regional settings. Under a parameter-adjusted nonlinear dynamic mechanism that combines incremental incentives with progressive constraints, the tested system converges toward “active leadership–proactive collaboration–active participation” under the assumed cost, benefit, and initial-condition settings. These findings provide a basis for designing differentiated subsidies, performance-based rewards, and liability recovery in GBA disaster governance. Full article

Purpose: This paper investigates how product quality and green information transparency jointly influence customer trust in green products and examines competing retailers’ green disclosure and suppliers’ quality investment strategies under information asymmetry. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model of two competing retailers and two suppliers with asymmetric quality investment costs. We characterize equilibrium outcomes in sequential disclosure games and study the effects of the trust factor and transparency level on the equilibrium outcomes. Findings: Three main results emerge. First, a second-mover advantage exists in sequential disclosure, namely, the later retailer free-rides on the first mover’s information. Second, higher trust intensifies competition by homogenizing customer utility, whereas greater transparency softens competition by making valuations more heterogeneous. Third, customer trust can incentivize both retailers to disclose simultaneously. Novelty: First, this paper studies consumers’ heterogeneous green preferences and considers the information asymmetry of green attributes between supply and demand. Second, this paper determines the suppliers’ quality investment considering the retailers’ strategic green disclosure and constructs the endogenous trust function. Third, this paper analyzes the retailers’ green disclosure in equilibrium, further determines the market coverage, and points out the effects of key parameters on the market coverage and the product competition. Full article

Background/Objectives: Free riding in healthcare occurs when actors benefit from health-related public goods, risk-pooling arrangements, common resources, or cooperative institutions while contributing less than is socially optimal. This review clarifies how free-rider dynamics differ across vaccination, health insurance and universal health coverage, antimicrobial resistance, organ donation and transplant allocation, and global health cooperation. Methods: A narrative review with conceptual synthesis was conducted. Searches of PubMed and Scopus were complemented by citation tracking and targeted inclusion of foundational economics, game theory, public-health ethics, and market-design sources. Sources were mapped by domain, actors, strategies, payoff structure, information conditions, time horizon, enforcement mechanism and policy relevance. Results: Across domains, free riding arises when private payoffs diverge from collective welfare, but the underlying game differs: threshold public-good and coordination games in vaccination, adverse-selection and participation games in insurance, common-pool-resource dilemmas in antimicrobial use, donor-registration and matching-market problems in transplantation, and repeated public-goods games in global health. The review identifies three policy functions: altering payoffs, altering information and beliefs, and changing the structure, repetition, or enforceability of the game. Conclusions: Game theory is most useful as a mechanism-based framework rather than a stand-alone policy prescription. Its policy value depends on empirical calibration, institutional context, ethical legitimacy, and attention to equity, incomplete information, behavioral responses, and enforcement capacity. The synthesis also emphasizes boundary conditions: game-theoretic prescriptions can fail when political economy, asymmetric power, implementation capacity, access barriers, or trust-related drivers are ignored. Full article

Public goods provision is vulnerable to free riding, making sustained cooperation a central challenge in economics. Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity-aversion model explains how fairness concerns can support cooperation, but it treats preferences as fixed. Motivated by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov’s norm-sensitivity framework, this paper develops a reduced-form dynamic framework in which observed norm violations erode normative commitment over time. As normative commitment declines, the model maps this change into Fehr–Schmidt-style fairness parameters: guilt weakens and envy rises. These parameters provide an interpretive representation of norm erosion, while behavior is generated through a tractable contribution-scaling rule. The framework is calibrated illustratively to the public goods experiment of Fischbacher and Gächter. The calibration is not causal evidence of preference change and does not directly identify inequity-aversion parameters. It shows that a context-dependent preference channel can reproduce the observed aggregate decline in cooperation and generate testable implications. When no free-rider exposure is present, cooperation does not decline within the model. The model also predicts a nonlinear relationship between population-level free-rider prevalence and cooperation. Finally, because the model imposes a lower bound on normative commitment, this institutional floor determines long-run cooperation. The findings should be interpreted as model-based hypotheses for future experimental and field research. Full article

This study focuses on the argument that greenwashing behavior (GWB) among key stakeholders leads to the degradation of governance networks in large-scale construction projects. Grounded in opportunism theory, a cross-scale computational model is developed by integrating a four-party evolutionary game with differential dynamics to capture the co-evolution of stakeholder strategies and network states. The results indicate that GWB exhibits free-riding and herd-like characteristics, and that governance networks possess a degradation equilibrium. Sensitivity analysis based on 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations shows that the frequency of GWB by subcontractors has the greatest impact on network degradation (sensitivity range: 0 to −0.98), followed by general contractors (0 to −0.38), while the influence of supervisory roles is relatively weaker. In contrast, contractual penalties demonstrate limited effectiveness (sensitivity range: −0.08 to 0.06), whereas reputational loss exerts a stronger inhibitory effect (up to −0.5 during the mid-stage evolution). These findings suggest that contract-based governance alone is insufficient to constrain GWB, thereby challenging the conventional assumption of its effectiveness. The results highlight the necessity of shifting from contract-centric governance toward reputation-based and market-oriented mechanisms to effectively mitigate GWB and enhance the resilience of green construction governance. Full article

As an effective approach to boosting consumption and facilitating the recycling of consumer goods, trade-in programs have been widely adopted by branders and e-commerce platforms. A platform supply chain system comprising e-commerce platforms and branders is investigated in this paper for this purpose. We construct a two-stage dynamic game model encompassing eight scenarios, discussing the provision of trade-in programs and product recycling issues under the resale and agency selling modes. Below are the key findings: (1) Trade-In Programs: In the resale mode, both branders and platforms prefer to adopt self-recycling when market potential is large, while opting for recycling undertaken by the other party when market potential is small. In the agency selling mode, branders prefer to adopt self-recycling (B-II) when fixed costs are high and the salvage value of used products is high, while platforms choose platform-led recycling (P-II) when fixed costs are low and the salvage value of used products is high. (2) Product Recycling: In the resale mode, branders should opt for self-recycling when facing high fixed costs, small market potential, and high salvage values, while outsourcing is more appropriate when salvage values are low. When the market potential is low, the platform ought to prefer self-recycling if the salvage value is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low; otherwise, outsourcing is preferable. In the agency selling mode, when the salvage value of used products is relatively high, platforms tend to have a free-riding mentality. When platforms provide trade-in programs, they will prioritize self-recycling if the salvage value is higher. In contrast, branders consistently achieve maximum profits when platforms adopt self-recycling. (3) Selection of Selling Mode: Branders always prefer the agency selling mode, while platforms’ mode selection depends on the trade-off between salvage value and commission rate. This study provides strategic insights for platform-based supply chain decisions. Full article

Urban flooding poses significant challenges to urban safety and resilience, and effective cooperation between emergency management agencies and functional departments is crucial for successful emergency responses. This study constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the cooperative behavior of municipal emergency management authorities and supporting departments in response to urban flooding, focusing on the impact of information consistency. The model explores various scenarios to assess how changes in key parameters affect the evolution of cooperation strategies. Results reveal that information consistency fundamentally influences the equilibrium of interdepartmental cooperation, with collaborative payoffs and losses linked to information inconsistency driving the shift from low-quality to high-quality cooperation. The study also finds that increasing free-riding payoffs destabilizes cooperation, while strengthening penalties and enforcement improves the sustainability of high-quality cooperation. Based on these findings, the paper suggests enhancing information consistency through an integrated emergency information system, refining incentive mechanisms, and reinforcing supervision and accountability to strengthen interdepartmental collaboration and improve disaster management efficiency. Full article

Against the background of carbon neutrality, the government’s carbon regulations have had a profound impact on the distributed energy sharing behavior of industrial parks. To deeply explore the interactive relationship between distributed energy sharing in industrial parks and government regulation, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model composed of the government, core enterprises and supporting enterprises; endogenizes government behavior; and integrates inter-enterprise contractual mechanisms into the evolutionary framework. By establishing a revenue payment matrix and a replication dynamic equation, the stability conditions and system evolution paths of the strategy choices of each subject are analyzed, and numerical simulations are conducted. The results show that there are multiple evolutionary stable equilibria in the system, among which the equilibrium where core enterprises actively share, supporting enterprises actively share, and the government actively regulates carbon is the ideal state. Cost-sharing contracts and cooperative penalty contracts play a significant role in promoting the participation of supporting enterprises in sharing and curbing “free-riding” behavior, respectively. The changes in government subsidy rates and carbon tax rates have a crucial impact on the evolution of corporate strategies. Quantitatively, the carbon tax rate exhibits a threshold effect; enterprises shift to positive energy sharing when the tax rate exceeds 0.8, while a subsidy rate above 0.4 leads the government to withdraw from regulation. This indicates that a reasonable design of carbon regulations can help achieve coordinated energy emission reduction between the government and enterprises. The findings provide theoretical support for optimizing carbon regulations and designing cooperation strategies. Full article

Against the backdrop of China’s dual-carbon goals and the global green transition, low-carbon production in the manufacturing sector is crucial to achieving high-quality development. Based on the dual mechanisms of the free-riding effect and technology spillovers, this paper develops a Moran stochastic evolutionary game model of manufacturing firms’ low-carbon production strategies under government regulation. We analyze the dynamic evolution and stability of low-carbon versus conventional production strategies under strong- and weak-selection conditions. The results show that under strong selection, a low free-riding payoff promotes the diffusion of the low-carbon strategy and the formation of a stable equilibrium; a moderate free-riding payoff makes population size the key factor shaping evolutionary outcomes; and a high free-riding payoff leads the system to degenerate into a steady state dominated by conventional production. Under weak selection, government subsidies and fines increase the fixation probability and stability of the low-carbon strategy, whereas excessive free-riding payoffs undermine the persistence of the transition. Numerical simulations validate the theoretical analysis and indicate that government regulation, technology spillovers, and population structure jointly shape the long-term evolution of low-carbon behavior, providing a theoretical basis and decision-making reference for optimizing policy mechanisms and promoting the low-carbon transition of the manufacturing sector. Full article

This study proposes a novel theoretical synthesis, bridging the sociology of lived religion with economic club good theory to explore the high-commitment dynamics in domestic spheres in the analysis of “Amen meals”, a rapidly spreading ritual among Jewish women. Using a qualitative–ethnographic methodology based on 23 participant observations and 53 in-depth interviews with a diverse spectrum of Jewish women in Israel, the research examines the ways this ritual functions as a gendered religious economy. The findings identify emotional stringency as a key mechanism for communal cohesion: unlike traditional religious clubs that filter out free riders through external prohibitions, this economy demands a tariff of emotional exposure and vulnerability, where public tears serve as costly signals of commitment. These enable the participants to gain access to exclusive club goods such as social insurance and spiritual agency. The study concludes that Amen meals challenge the binary between institutional–rational and private–emotional spheres, positioning women’s ritual creativity as a mutual insurance system for risks that formal institutions fail to cover. It reveals the powerful economies operating within the lived religion of women. Full article

The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates whether platform enterprises, as core actors occupying structural holes in cluster networks, can foster the co-construction of a digitally inclusive ecosystem. We developed a complex network public goods game model, incorporating performance feedback into a modified Fermi learning to capture firms’ adaptive decision-making based on historical and social aspirations. The model simulates strategic interactions on both small-world and scale-free networks, characteristic of industrial clusters. Numerical simulations reveal that: (1) The core driver of co-construction is the investment return coefficient; (2) Performance feedback amplifies individual rationality, accelerating the formation or collapse of cooperation depending on the investment return coefficient; (3) Platform empowerment—specifically, selectively connecting and incentivizing cooperative firms—effectively promotes ecosystem co-construction, with this strategy proving most impactful when investment returns are moderate. Furthermore, while this selective empowerment strategy benefits the cluster overall, its effect on the platform’s own revenue is network-dependent, showing a more pronounced decline in small-world structures. This study provides a novel analytical framework for understanding strategic interactions in digital inclusion and offers practical insights for policymakers and platform leaders in orchestrating collaborative digital transformation. Full article