Search Results (16)

Background & Objectives: Quantitative ultrasound (QUS) radiomics extracts microstructure-sensitive spectral features from radiofrequency data and may provide contrast-free, early indicators of neoadjuvant chemotherapy (NAC) response in breast cancer. This review synthesized open access human studies evaluating QUS radiomics for a priori prediction and early on-treatment monitoring. Methods: Following PRISMA-2020, we included English, free full-text clinical studies of biopsy-proven breast cancer receiving NAC that reported QUS spectral parameters (mid-band fit, spectral slope/intercept) ± textures/derivatives and machine learning models against clinical/pathologic response. Data on design, RF acquisition/normalization, features, validation, and performance (area under the curve (AUC), accuracy, sensitivity/specificity, balanced accuracy) were extracted. Results: Twelve cohorts were included. A priori baseline models achieved accuracies of 76–88% with AUCs 0.68–0.90; examples include 87% accuracy in a multi-institutional study, 82% accuracy/AUC 0.86 using texture-derivatives, 86% balanced accuracy with transfer learning, 88% accuracy/AUC 0.86 with deep learning, and AUC 0.90 in a hybrid QUS and molecular-subtype model. Early monitoring improved discrimination: week-1 results ranged from AUC 0.81 to 1.00 and accuracy 70 to 100%, noting that the upper bound was reported in a small cohort using combined QUS and diffuse optical spectroscopy features, while week 4 typically peaked (AUC 0.87–0.91; accuracy 80–86% in observational cohorts), and one series reported week-8 accuracy of 93%. Across reporting cohorts, mean AUC increased with a 0.05 absolute gain. A randomized feasibility study reported prospective week-4 model accuracy of 98% and demonstrated decision impact. Conclusions: QUS radiomics provides informative a priori prediction and strengthens by weeks 1–4 of NAC, supporting adaptive treatment windows without contrast or radiation. Standardized radiofrequency (RF) access, normalization, region of interest (ROI)/margin definitions, and external validation are priorities for clinical translation. Full article

This article examines how the role of digital platforms is reshaping political communication and consensus-building in contemporary societies. It questions how algorithmic architectures are transforming the relationship between leadership, audiences, and power. Drawing on an empirical analysis of online interaction data, the study analyses Donald Trump’s political communication during the August 2025 summit with Putin in Alaska, presenting it as a paradigmatic example of networked leadership. The study focuses on the dynamics of mobilisation, polarisation, and identity construction within digital ecologies. The findings show that the leader’s centrality derives not only from traditional party structures, but also from the ability to coordinate heterogeneous communication flows as well as activate processes of affective and symbolic resonance. The article proposes a theoretical model that conceptualises Trump’s audience as a cognitive and emotional power device, highlighting the convergence of post-organisational populism, algorithmic mediatisation, and communicative governance. This leadership expresses forms of “algorithmic charisma” that redefine the modalities of political legitimacy. Methodologically, the study highlights the value of data-driven interpretive approaches, while also addressing their limitations related to algorithmic transparency and replicability. In conclusion, the article offers a critical reflection on emerging ecologies of consensus and the democratic implications of the ongoing “platformisation” of the public sphere. Full article

We study the properties of opinion formation on Wikipedia Ising Networks. Each Wikipedia article is represented as a node, and links are formed by citations of one article to another, generating a directed network of a given language edition with millions of nodes. Ising spins are placed at each node, and their orientation up or down is determined by a majority vote of connected neighbors. At the initial stage, there are only a few nodes from two groups with fixed competing opinions up and down, while other nodes are assumed to have no initial opinion with no effect on the vote. The competition of two opinions is modeled by an asynchronous Monte Carlo process converging to a spin-polarized steady-state phase. This phase remains stable with respect to small fluctuations induced by an effective temperature of the Monte Carlo process. The opinion polarization at the steady state provides opinion (spin) preferences for each node. In the framework of this Ising Network Opinion Formation model, we analyze the influence and competition between political leaders, world countries, and social concepts. This approach is also generalized to the competition between three groups of different opinions described by three colors; for example, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping, or the USA, Russia, and China, within English, Russian, and Chinese editions of Wikipedia of March 2025. We argue that this approach provides a generic description of opinion formation in various complex networks. Full article

Putin’s Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and launched a massive invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This study is predicated on framing theory, which posits that the media contribute to the creation of individuals’ perceived reality. We analyzed how the European press presented Russian President Vladimir Putin during both episodes. Content analysis was used to examine a sample of 1009 opinion articles and editorials published in two leading newspapers in each of the five largest European economies. Subsequently, we quantified the frequency of the predominant frames as well as the tone (positive, neutral, or negative) the articles struck towards Putin. The results show that many more articles were published in 2022 than in 2014, and that the degree of negative views of Putin is also more pronounced in 2022. In both instances, historical motives were most often employed to frame Putin’s actions, such as Putin’s urge to reassert Russian influence in the former Soviet space and his reaction to the alleged lack of recognition of Russia as a superpower. Full article

This article examines the role of religion in Russia’s national security system through the lens of ontological security, assessing whether contemporary Russia is undergoing a process of desecularisation or, conversely, an intensified form of secularisation. Employing the theoretical framework of ontological security, this study argues that Russia’s securitisation of religion serves as a mechanism for consolidating state control, legitimising authoritarian governance, and constructing a distinct civilisational identity in opposition to Western liberalism. The Russian Orthodox Church, rather than functioning as an autonomous religious institution, has been absorbed into the state apparatus, where it operates as an instrument of state ideology. Religious rhetoric permeates Russian strategic security documents, reinforcing narratives of national exceptionalism, historical continuity, and moral superiority, particularly in justifying Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and military actions, including its war against Ukraine. The analysis challenges prevailing interpretations of religious resurgence in Russia, arguing that the increasing presence of religion in public life does not necessarily signify desecularisation. Instead, the instrumentalisation of religion for political and security purposes suggests a process of extreme secularisation, wherein religious institutions lose their autonomy and doctrinal substance, becoming tools of state power. Full article

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, which escalated into full-scale military confrontation in February 2022, originated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the backing of pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. However, this war extends beyond bilateral hostilities, reflecting a broader geopolitical confrontation with the West that aligns with Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, as signalled in his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech. Russian security doctrines have consistently framed the West as an existential threat, a perception reinforced by state-controlled media. This study examines the role of Russian state media in shaping public perceptions of the West between 2014 and 2022. It explores how Russian media, particularly RIA Novosti, constructed adversarial narratives about Latvia, Poland, and Serbia within the framework of Russian security policy. Through qualitative content analysis, the research investigates the alignment of media narratives with official strategic objectives, the portrayal of Western nations as threats, and the intended audience of these narratives. The findings underscore the integral role of state-controlled media in Russia’s security strategy, highlighting an increasing consolidation of media control to sustain domestic legitimacy and justify external aggression. As Russia faces growing challenges, media restrictions are expected to intensify, reinforcing state-driven narratives and information isolation. Full article

Similarly to “wars” on drugs and terrorism, the fight against corruption has recently emerged as an attractive political tool. From Argentina and India to the United States and the Philippines, anti-corruption rhetoric has been successfully utilized by political outsiders to challenge establishment candidates. It remains less clear, however, whether anti-corruption enforcement allows incumbent politicians to hold on to power. In this article, we use a comparative subnational design to analyze the impact of corruption prosecutions on electoral support for the president of Russia. By combining original survey data on popular political attitudes and behaviors as well as citizens’ own participation in petty corruption with official statistics on corruption prosecutions, on the one hand, and data on media coverage of regional corruption scandals, on the other, we reveal a small negative effect of anti-corruptionism on voting for Putin. Our data allow us to adjudicate among several theoretical mechanisms that may lead to this effect. We find that, although ordinary Russians dislike corruption and expect the federal government to fight it, Putin’s anti-corruption enforcement has failed to convince the population that he is the right man for the job. Some Russians, we argue, take the Kremlin’s prosecutions as an indicator of the regime’s failure to prevent corruption among its agents, while others resent the administration for trying to score political points through hyped-up and punitive anti-corruptionism. Full article

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 ignited propaganda efforts from the U.S. executive branch of government and the U.S. media, as the country tried to position itself towards the war not just in the eyes of its citizens but of the entire world as part of its geopolitical power position. A comparative quantitative and qualitative analysis of official U.S. communications and U.S. partisan media coverage in the first week of the invasion aims to uncover how the U.S. government set the agenda and framed the events, and to what extent the media copied or diverged from this agenda-setting and framing. The results suggest a narrow focus and distinct framing on the part of the U.S. government, partly taken over by partisan media. The latter also touched on other topics that fit media logic and provided some counter-frames in line with their ideological positions, yet overall confirmed the dominant framing of the war as unjust, unprovoked and premeditated, as Putin’s choice, and the position of the U.S. as the leader of the free world and defender of democracy. Full article

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. Among these values, representatives of the ROC mention concern for marriage and family. To what extent is the position of the ROC an expression of commitment to the traditional Christian concept of marriage and family? In this article, we analyse the contemporary Orthodox discourse in Russia since Kirill Gundyayev became the Patriarch of Moscow in 2009. From a political science and security studies perspective, we highlight the main ideological elements of this discourse. We contrast these elements with similar content in Russian official documents and Vladimir Putin’s statements. An analysis of what the ROC says about the problems and protection of marriage and family in Russia, against the background of Putin’s statements and the actions of the state authorities, shows that the ROC’s discourse on marriage and family echoes the main themes of the political discourse controlled by the state authorities. In its understanding of marriage and in its efforts on behalf of the family, the ROC represents a conservative doctrinal position. Although, in doctrinal terms, it essentially expresses the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, the strong ideologisation and securitisation of demographic issues in Russia are also reflected in church discourse. Full article

This study, using content analysis and frame analysis, examines whether there is any connection between the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) announcement on the fifth day of Russia’s war against Ukraine (which began on 24 February 2022) that it would investigate credible allegations of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, and the reporting of the international press in those first five days. This study finds a functional relationship between the ICC’s application of international law and international press reporting, in that the latter pursued an agenda grounded in the sources of international law. This reporting appeared to have made people think about the likelihood of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine (accessibility effect) and that Putin and his regime should be punished under international law (applicability effect). In turn, this was advantageous to the ICC’s announcement that it would investigate allegations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The speed of the ICC’s decision to open this investigation opens questions as to what distinguished the situation in Ukraine from similar situations. Media reporting may have contributed to a broader rationale for potential realpolitik objectives concerning Ukraine and Russia, underpinned by laudable humanitarian and legal concerns. This study concludes that if power saturates law, then the media is a diffusing agent of that power—an actor that spreads and amplifies elite narratives into the public sphere, rationalising the actions of institutions like the ICC. Full article

The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless, during Putin’s rule, a seemingly desecularising transition has taken place in Russia. This transition can be observed on legal, ideological, and social levels. This article presents the characteristics of a new secular-state model that has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We claim that the evolution of the public role of religion in Russia and the state’s attitude towards religion cannot be considered in any way a symptom of the post-secularisation tendencies observed in some Western societies. Desecularisation in Russia takes place only at the verbal level. However, this façade desecularisation conceals a profound secularisation of religious institutions and organisations, understood as their total subordination to state policy objectives and, thus, their becoming elements of the state structure. Full article

The article discusses an artistic method of the post-Soviet artist Vlad Mamyshev-Monroe (1969–2013) as the nexus of several traditions embedded in modernist legacy. His main genre is remastered (scratched) photographs depicting him impersonating various historical and fictional characters, from Marylyn Monroe (whom he considered his alter ego) to Hitler, Jesus Christ, and Putin. His art and artistically designed image creatively develop the tradition of modernist life-creation (zhiznetvorchestvo), which he enriches by camp, thus becoming a pioneer of this elusive sensibility in post-Soviet culture. Camp, in turn, facilitates Mamyshev-Monroe’s self-fashioning as the trickster whose transgressivity and ambivalence absorb his queerness and drag spectacles, and whose hyperperformativity manifests itself in his performative art. The article analyzes how Mamyshev-Monroe appropriates various cultural material in the trickster’s way by using camp for its critique and deconstruction. The case of Mamyshev-Monroe is especially important since it demonstrates the limits of the trickster’s transgression that resists its instrumentalization by the authoritarian state. Full article

On 24 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the order to invade neighbouring Ukraine; a typical trend during the war is considering events in a one-sided way, emphasising the exclusive contribution of one opponent over the other for the outbreak of war. War may trigger the experience of emotions, such as anger, shame, and disgust. The present study reproduces previous studies on the influence of emotional regulation in support of aggressive reactions (AR) in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. A questionnaire referring to the Russian–Ukrainian conflict has been implemented and spread in the Italian territory. A multiple moderated mediation model was proposed to evaluate the effect of emotional cognitive reappraisal on the propensity for AR, including conflict-related emotions (anger, shame, disgust) as mediators and political alignment and the appraisal of one’s own emotions subscale of the brief emotional intelligence scale as moderators. The results show that cognitive reappraisal of emotions has a negative effect on AR; moreover, recognising and regulating emotions decreases anger, while taking sides with Ukraine or not siding seems to have an effect on AR depending on the emotion felt (anger or shame). The results are discussed according to the current literature on the topic, highlighting the practical implications and limits of the research. Full article

Despite its global rise, theoretical frameworks to capture populism have been derived primarily from case studies in the Western hemisphere. To assess if and how the premises of populism travel across different contexts, we offer a comparative analysis of populist discourses in Turkey, India, and Russia, countries with different political contexts and religions. The content analysis of 1682 speeches of Erdoğan, Modi, and Putin shows that they depart from their European and American counterparts because they are neither nativist nor inclusive. Instead, they introduce a new notion of “people” anchored in a religiously defined community, interpret the nation’s past to achieve their own political goals, and identify different driving forces to restore their lost global role. A comparison of Erdoğan, Modi, and Putin highlights the blind spots of existing studies, which fail to carefully contextualize the term, thus obscuring the country-specific constituents of populist discourses and the role of religions. Understanding the regional variants of populism not only helps us capture the reasons behind the leaders’ appeal and resiliency but also their so-called unexpected actions and decisions, such as Putin’s territorial and religious claims over Ukraine. Full article

This article explores the growing affinity for the post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church by far-right Orthodox converts in the United States, highlighting how the spiritual draw to the faith is caught up in the globalizing politics of traditionalism and a transnational, ideological reimaging of the American culture wars. Employing ethnographic fieldwork from the rural United States and digital qualitative research, this study situates the post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church in the international flows of conservativism focused on reclaiming social morals and traditional religiosity. In doing so, this article sheds light on how the post-Soviet Orthodox Church is viewed politically by a growing contingent of American religious and political actors who are turning to Russian Orthodoxy and Putin’s government during this New Cold War moment of tension between the United States and Russia. I argue that the allure of the post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church for conservatives in the West offers us a window into how the institution is situated imaginatively within transnational politics, thereby providing us insights into the rapidly transforming culture wars fomenting globally. Full article