Religion in the Russian National Security System: An Ontological Security Perspective and the Problem of the (De)Secularisation of Putin’s Russia

Abstract

This article examines the role of religion in Russia’s national security system through the lens of ontological security, assessing whether contemporary Russia is undergoing a process of desecularisation or, conversely, an intensified form of secularisation. Employing the theoretical framework of ontological security, this study argues that Russia’s securitisation of religion serves as a mechanism for consolidating state control, legitimising authoritarian governance, and constructing a distinct civilisational identity in opposition to Western liberalism. The Russian Orthodox Church, rather than functioning as an autonomous religious institution, has been absorbed into the state apparatus, where it operates as an instrument of state ideology. Religious rhetoric permeates Russian strategic security documents, reinforcing narratives of national exceptionalism, historical continuity, and moral superiority, particularly in justifying Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and military actions, including its war against Ukraine. The analysis challenges prevailing interpretations of religious resurgence in Russia, arguing that the increasing presence of religion in public life does not necessarily signify desecularisation. Instead, the instrumentalisation of religion for political and security purposes suggests a process of extreme secularisation, wherein religious institutions lose their autonomy and doctrinal substance, becoming tools of state power.

1. Introduction

A ‘conservative turn’ has been discernible in Russia, particularly since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term. This shift is evident in state-supported measures aimed at challenging Western liberal values and legislative changes designed to reinforce so-called traditional Russian values and lifestyles. These developments have been accompanied by the increasing integration of religion—primarily the largest religious organisation, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)—into state structures, despite the constitutional guarantee of the secular nature of the state and the separation of church and state.

Can we speak of the twilight of the secularisation in Putin’s Russia? Are processes of desecularisation taking place? Is it possible to interpret state–church relations, alongside the prominence of religious discourse and institutions in public life, as a prelude to a post-secular society, in line with the expectations of scholars who view contemporary developments as signalling the decline of post-Enlightenment secularism? Or, conversely, does the evolution of state–church relations in contemporary Russia represent the culmination of secularism, whereby religious organisations lose their essence, abandon key aspects of doctrine, and are reduced to mere instruments of state policy?

This article seeks to address these questions from a research perspective that is less commonly explored in discussions on the role of religion in public life—namely, a security perspective, with particular attention to the ROC as the largest and most influential religious organisation in Russia. Despite the constitutional guarantee of the state’s ideological neutrality and the separation of church and state, the ROC is deeply and multifacetedly integrated into power structures at both the central (federal) and regional levels. Religious values and the attitudes they inform are, at least in terms of official rhetoric, embedded in Russian legislation and strategic state documents covering various aspects of governance, including foreign policy, national security, and information policy. Religion, as a cultural phenomenon and as an institutional actor in public life, constitutes a significant element of contemporary Russian security thinking, both domestically and internationally.

The manner in which religion is integrated into Russian strategic planning suggests that it plays a significant role in the country’s national security system. An examination of the presence of religion in Russian security discourse and in strategic security documents sheds light on the role the modern Russian state assigns to religion and religious institutions. Based on this analysis, this article explores whether the prominence of religion in Russian public life is indeed indicative of ongoing desecularisation processes and the emergence of a new, post-secular society. Alternatively, it considers whether this phenomenon might instead be a distinctive manifestation of secularisation—or even its ultimate stage—where religion loses its autonomy from both the state and society, as well as its fundamental mission. At least in the context of Orthodox Christianity and Islam, the two principal religions in Russia, this mission traditionally involves regulating individual and social life in ways that secure believers’ eternal salvation. However, in the Russian context, religion may instead be evolving into a mechanism for consolidating state control over its citizens.

2. Theoretical Approach: Ontological Security

The reasoning presented in this article is based on the theoretical model of ontological security, which integrates critical research perspectives in contemporary security studies with reflections on the ideological foundations and justifications of domestic and foreign policies in modern states. The concept of ontological security provides a valuable analytical framework for examining state security policies and, in particular, for uncovering their ideological underpinnings. This approach is particularly relevant in the case of the Russian Federation. Despite its vast territory and significant military capabilities, contemporary Russia is considered a weak state (Hale 2016, p. 222; Monaghan 2012, p. 14; Sakwa 2021, p. 28). Its power structures, administrative system at both the central (federal) and regional levels, and judicial institutions are subordinated to informal networks, some of which exhibit oligarchic or even mafia-like characteristics. Consequently, the state remains structurally unstable, despite its outward projection of strength.

It is not merely a product of propaganda or journalistic exaggeration when prominent figures within the Russian political elite express concerns over the potential threat to Russia’s territorial integrity or even the possibility of its disintegration (Predsedatel’ 2025; Voprosy 2006). Although such rhetoric serves to consolidate societal support for the government and construct a convenient image of an external enemy, it also reveals a genuine perception of the state’s structural fragility. This sense of vulnerability has prompted efforts to establish a more enduring foundation for both internal and international security—one that extends beyond the formal structures of governance, public administration, legislation, and the judiciary. Since the beginning of the ‘conservative turn’, Russian political discourse has increasingly emphasised a conservative, neo-imperialist, anti-individualist, anti-liberal, and broadly anti-Western ideology. This ideological framework constitutes the core of Russia’s understanding of ontological security.

Ontological security is typically defined in relation to the fundamental security needs of individuals before being extended to the societal and state levels. According to Mitzen (2006, p. 342), ‘[o]ntological security refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly changing—in order to realise a sense of agency.’ Contemporary constructivist approaches within International Security Studies apply this concept to states, positing that states construct historical and ideological narratives to justify their origins, territorial claims, international relationships, and engagement with global norms. Such identity construction is manifested in state symbols, official rituals, and speeches by government representatives (Krickel-Choi 2024, p. 14).

This dynamic is particularly evident in contemporary Russia, where the consolidation of authoritarian rule has effectively suppressed civil society initiatives and resulted in the state’s monopolisation of all spheres of public life (Ingvarsson and Kalinina 2024; Ivanova 2021), including absolute control over citizens’ access to information. In this context, crafting a specific image of Russia is a crucial means of legitimising the increasing totalisation of social life and the country’s deliberate isolation from the West. Achieving this objective requires the construction of a distinctive state identity that fundamentally separates Russia from states and societies perceived as a threat—namely, liberal Western societies. This separation is not limited to political or economic dimensions but extends to values, culture, and fundamental attitudes towards life.

The relationship between secularisation and desecularisation and contemporary trends in international relations has already been addressed in the context of the politicisation of religion and its use as a tool for implementing state policies. As Hurd (2017, p. 101) notes, ‘Religion is identified, and then evacuated, ignored, recuperated, celebrated, condemned or reformed, depending on which ‘kind’ of religion (dangerous or salutary) prevails in any particular political, institutional or ideological context.’ By examining how religion is instrumentalised to construct the state identity desired by the Russian authorities and to legitimise domestic and foreign policies, this article seeks to address the overarching question of whether contemporary Russia is undergoing a process of desecularisation or, conversely, experiencing an extreme form of secularisation that strips religion of its intrinsic essence and purpose.

The primary sources for this analysis are Russian strategic documents addressing various aspects of national security, as well as Russian academic literature on security studies. Extracted from these sources is content that links the identity Russia’s leadership seeks to project—both domestically and internationally—with religious themes, particularly those associated with Orthodox Christianity (and, to a lesser extent, Islam). This analysis highlights how religious values, lifestyles, and societal attitudes, as sanctioned by the state, serve as a basis for state legitimacy. Furthermore, it exposes the religiously grounded justifications for Russia’s cultural distinctiveness and its purported historical mission, which is framed as resisting Western pressure and rejecting the socio-political models associated with liberal Western culture. Of particular significance is the exploration of religious motifs—primarily within Russian Orthodoxy—that are embedded in Russian strategic documents and academic security discourse, as they provide ideological support for Russia’s aggressive actions, most notably the war against Ukraine.

This study is subject to certain limitations, stemming from the adoption of an ontological security perspective. This approach is closely tied to the defence of the state’s desired status, which is regarded as essential to its existence and identity (Steele 2008, p. 3). Consequently, theological issues—such as the Russian adaptation of the Orthodox concept of the ‘symphony’ between church and state—are not addressed here. By focusing on ontological security, the analysis considers the processes of secularisation and desecularisation primarily from the standpoint of the state, as reflected in Russian strategic documents concerning security and foreign policy.

The argument advanced in this article posits that the Russian authorities instrumentalise the ROC as a functional tool for bolstering ontological security. This does not preclude the possibility that, from the ROC’s perspective, the state is also being instrumentalised, as its support facilitates the Church’s activities. However, this article does not explore the complex, and at times symbiotic, relationship between the state and the ROC in Putin’s Russia. Rather, it focuses exclusively on how the state’s pursuit of ontological security contributes to the secularisation of Russia, despite the ROC’s active involvement in the political and social spheres.

This article advances two interrelated claims: (1) secularisation is occurring in Putin’s Russia, understood as the marginalisation of institutionalised religion as an autonomous actor in social life with goals and ideologies distinct from those of the state; (2) institutionalised religion has simultaneously become an integral component in the state’s efforts to maintain ontological security, as it underpins the ideological foundations of Russia’s national identity and status.

Following an examination of the challenges associated with defining secularism and post-secularism in the Russian context (Section 3), this article explores the principal religious themes in Russia’s conceptualisation of ontological security and their deployment in strategic documents (Section 4). Finally, it seeks to answer the central question of whether contemporary Russia is witnessing processes of desecularisation or, rather, an intensified form of secularisation (Section 5).

3. Secularisation and Desecularisation in the Russian Context

The debate on the role of religion in public life and its transformations—including secularisation and desecularisation—has primarily been shaped by developments in Western societies. On the one hand, traditional Christian denominations are in decline, while on the other, new denominational groups are emerging within Christianity itself (Hervieu-Léger and Champion 2008, pp. 140–41; Martin 1999). On a global scale, the political and social influence of Islam is increasing (An-Na’im 1999). Moreover, in the sphere of international security, the role of religion as a potential source of conflict and threat is becoming more pronounced.

These transformations are multidirectional. Secularisation processes remain active in Europe, manifesting not only in the numerical decline of Christian denominations but also in their growing marginalisation within public life (Davie 1999). At the same time, opposite trends are observable in other parts of the world. In the ‘conservative revolution’ associated with Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States, religion and its associated values played a significant role in political discourse (Brisbane 2024; Haynes 2021).

However, as in the case of Putin’s Russia, it remains difficult to determine the extent to which these values genuinely influenced policy or whether they were merely instrumentalised for political purposes. A clear departure from secularist principles is also evident in Türkiye, where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policies have led to an increased public role for Islam, reversing the secularist legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic (Gumuscu 2024).

Against this backdrop, it is worth questioning whether the growing presence of religion and religious institutions in Russian public life under Putin reflects a broader non-European and anti-Enlightenment trend—one that rejects secularisation as an inevitable process accompanying social and technological modernisation. Is Russia attempting to chart an alternative path for social and technological development, in which religion retains a public role and religious values actively shape state policies and social norms? In examining Russia—and indeed, in considering transformations in the role of religion beyond the Western world—one of the key challenges is determining how to conceptualise secularisation and desecularisation in relation to Western societies. The difficulties in defining secularisation and desecularisation are also linked to changes in religiosity, especially its institutional forms. Secularisation can be understood in two ways: either as the loss of religion’s social significance or as the decline in religiosity (Uzlaner 2025). These understandings are not necessarily related or interdependent. It may happen that the definition of secularisation adopted determines whether it occurs in a particular case or whether desecularisation is taking place. Russia is a very good example of this.

3.1. Manifestations of Alleged Desecularisation in Russia

Scholars typically analyse secularisation from a Western-centric perspective, focusing on the diminishing role of churches in public life and transformations in religiosity within liberal Western societies. Secularisation, in this view, is understood as a process that marginalises churches—not only by excluding them from public life or reducing the number of adherents but also by diminishing the influence of religious beliefs, values, and associated behavioural patterns in shaping individual lives and societal norms. As Bruce (2002, p. 3) states, secularisation manifests itself in ‘(a) the declining importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions such as those of the state and the economy; (b) a decline in the social standing of religious roles and institutions; and (c) a decline in the extent to which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs.’ Stoeckl (2019, p. 4) similarly defines secularisation as ‘the historical process of separation of political and social institutions, science, and the arts from religion that took place with the onset of modernity’. While religion remains present in society, its role is largely confined to the private sphere. Consequently, it ceases to be a defining factor in social and political life (Bell 1977, p. 327; Merdjanova 2022). It is important to distinguish secularisation from secularism, which is a normative state policy advocating the separation of church and state (Stoeckl 2019, p. 5).

Karpov (2010, p. 238) interprets desecularisation as ‘a process of social change associated with religions’ resurgence and their expanding societal influences.’ This understanding is correlated with his interpretation of secularisation as ‘a multi-faceted social transformation in the course of which religion’s influences on society decline.’ Does the evolving position of the ROC in contemporary Russian public life signify a reversal of secularisation? Can the transformations in Russian public life and political discourse be interpreted as evidence of desecularisation—a sign that Russia is entering a post-secular era? Some scholars argue that this is indeed the case (Ponomariov 2017, pp. 33–42). Stoeckl (2019, pp. 1–2) observes that Western scholars often provide a one-sided assessment of the resurgence of Orthodoxy in post-Soviet Russia. Many focus on the structural revival of the ROC and interpret the increased public role of religion as a sign of rapid desecularisation. However, as Stoeckl (2019, p. 2) rightly notes, such views are often premised on the assumption that Russian Orthodoxy and secularism are inherently in conflict.

If one adopts a Western understanding of secularisation and applies it uniformly across different political, cultural, and social contexts, then Russia’s post-Soviet religious revival could indeed be interpreted as a case of radical desecularisation, with contemporary Russian society representing a post-secular model. This perspective is shared by Berger (1999, p. 6), Bruce (2011, p. 12), and Harrison (2017, p. 54), who see Russia as an example of a society in which religion has reasserted its influence in public life.

The number of Russians who consider themselves religious is obviously the most striking argument here. If we limit ourselves to Orthodox Christianity, according to a 2024 Levada Centre survey, 74% of Russians consider themselves Orthodox (this is a significant increase from 2020, when 65% of Russians considered themselves Orthodox). Since 1993, there has also been a significant increase in the number of Russians who declare that religion plays an important or very important role in their lives. Interestingly, a sharp increase in the number of respondents who consider religion important or very important occurred between 2023 and 2024 (Levada 2024). The increase in declarations of Orthodox affiliation in the context of war, pervasive war propaganda, and the pro-war involvement of the ROC is a separate topic worthy of further research.

Leaving aside Russians’ declarations of religious affiliation, from a Western analytical perspective, other indicators can also be identified that support the view of Russia’s desecularisation:

(1)

The presence of religion and religious institutions in public life. The ROC, as the country’s largest religious organisation (Mitrokhin 2006, p. 35), plays an active role in national and regional (Adamsky 2019, pp. 176–79) political events. No major political event in contemporary Russia takes place without the participation of ROC representatives.

(2)

The integration of religious references into public discourse. Religious values and narratives are a recurring feature of statements made by Vladimir Putin and other members of the Russian political elite (Agadjanian and Rousselet 2005, p. 36). A defining moment in this trend was Putin’s declaration at the outset of the ‘conservative turn’, in which he emphasised the importance of strengthening ‘spiritual bonds’ within Russian society (Składanowski and Smuniewski 2022, p. 882). It is also common practice for political leaders to participate in religious ceremonies.

(3)

The influence of religious values on state policy and legislation. Russian state policy and legal frameworks have incorporated religious rhetoric (Fagan 2013, p. 149), often at the expense of human rights and constitutional freedoms. Religion has also played a role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy (Adamsky 2019, pp. 181–84), most notably in justifying its aggression against Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Moscow’s Orthodoxy from alleged discrimination (e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2024). Additionally, Russian authorities seek to portray the country’s religious conservatism as part of its international identity—positioning Russia as an antithesis to the secular, anti-religious West and a potential ideological centre for nations resistant to secularisation (Vsemirnyy Russkiy Narodnyy Sobor 2022).

(4)

The expansion of cooperation between religious institutions and the state. The ROC works closely with federal and regional authorities across multiple sectors, including military chaplaincy, hospital pastoral care, prison chaplaincy, and religious education in schools (Adamsky 2019, p. 181; Mitrokhin 2006, pp. 275–315). The Russian state not only permits but actively promotes the increasing involvement of religious institutions in these domains.

(5)

The widespread use of religious symbolism in state institutions. In Orthodoxy, religious iconography plays a significant role, and its presence in state institutions is highly visible. Icons, crosses, and other religious symbols are commonly displayed in workplaces and government buildings, often exhibited by state officials themselves.

(6)

The legal protection of religious institutions and beliefs. Under Putin’s leadership, laws protecting religious institutions and religious sensibilities have been strengthened, despite the constitutional guarantee of the secular and ideologically neutral nature of the Russian state. The expansion of legal protections for religious beliefs has not been accompanied by equivalent protections for those who do not share these beliefs (Składanowski 2022).

3.2. Difficulties in Interpreting the Concept of Desecularisation in Russia

The major political, social, and cultural phenomena outlined above, which influence the evolving role of religion and religious institutions in contemporary Russia, can be interpreted as evidence of desecularisation only from a Western, predominantly European perspective. This perspective assumes post-Christian liberal societies as the point of reference—societies in which religious institutions play an increasingly marginal role in public life, and religious beliefs hold diminishing relevance for the majority of the population.

The complexity of secularism in Russia—both historically and in contemporary times—is extensively discussed in Kristina Stoeckl’s insightful and comprehensive study (Stoeckl 2019). Here, however, while acknowledging her findings, I adopt the research perspective of security studies and apply the theoretical model of ontological security. By moving beyond the Western (European) frame of reference, I seek to analyse these phenomena within their proper historical and political context, rooted in Russian social and political traditions. This perspective leads to the argument that rather than representing desecularisation, recent developments in Russian public life and religious institutions—particularly the ROC—are better understood as manifestations of further secularisation. A more detailed argument on this issue is available (Składanowski and Smuniewski 2023). In summary, under Russian conditions, there has been neither an increase in the role of religion and religious institutions as autonomous actors in public life nor a genuine rise in the prominence of religious discourse in public debate. Instead, a different phenomenon is occurring: religion is increasingly becoming a tool of state control, and religiously inspired rhetoric is functioning as an instrument of state propaganda and ideological influence, both domestically and internationally.

This model of state–religion relations is not without historical precedent in Russia. A similar system was in place in the Russian Empire following the reforms of Peter I, who abolished the patriarchate and brought the Orthodox Church under state control—an arrangement that remained in place until the February Revolution of 1917 (Knox 2005, pp. 43–44; Ponomariov 2017, p. 118). However, Putin’s state–religion model surpasses its imperial predecessor in its instrumentalisation of the Church. While the ROC remains formally independent today—unlike during the pre-1917 period—it is being used more actively and systematically as an instrument of state policy (Mitrokhin 2006, pp. 236–38), particularly in national security and foreign policy. At the same time, Orthodoxy is becoming increasingly important in Russian politics, albeit in a selective manner. Russia is positioning itself as a defender of traditional values against secularism, liberalism, and individual human rights (Stoeckl 2019, p. 2). The political significance of religion in contemporary Russian public life, and especially the role of the ROC, should not be interpreted as evidence of desecularisation. Rather, it is a continuation of Russian Orthodox tradition and historical state–church relations. The Soviet period, during which attempts were made—though inconsistently—to marginalise the ROC, was an exception in Russian history. The Soviet Union’s project to create a ‘Soviet person’, with a new set of atheist and collectivist values, ultimately failed. Moreover, as Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, has noted, many of communism’s fundamental values overlap with Orthodox Christianity (Kotlyar 2021). This is particularly evident in anthropological aspects, where both ideologies prioritise the subordination of individual interests to those of the collective (Neretina 2016, p. 151).

However, a major generalisation is the claim, still found today, that ‘a characteristic feature of the secularism of the Soviet period in Russia was an aggressive atheistic, Marxist ideology directed against religion’ (Tagayev 2025, p. 27). Interestingly, even during the Soviet period, secularisation—understood as the reduction of religion’s role in public life—was neither complete nor consistent. The Soviet authorities at times exploited the Orthodox Church for political purposes. Following the breakdown of the Nazi–Soviet alliance, and with the outbreak of what Russian historiography refers to as the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), the Soviet leadership sought the support of the ROC (Petrenko 2011, pp. 216–18; Ponomariov 2017, pp. 125–28). After the war, the ROC was utilised as a tool of Soviet foreign policy, particularly to enhance the USSR’s image in the West, where Christian communities remained influential. The presence of Moscow Patriarchate representatives at the Second Vatican Council (Zvonarev n.d.) and their involvement in the World Council of Churches (Petrenko 2011, p. 228; Ponomariov 2017, p. 132) served this purpose. Notably, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow’s early career was shaped by his work in the West, an experience that has influenced his approach as head of the ROC today (World Council of Churches 2022). The inconsistency of Soviet secularisation was not only the result of the political utility of the ROC but also reflected shifts in state policy towards ideology and religion. Nikita Khrushchev’s rule—often associated in the West with efforts to reform Soviet totalitarianism—also marked the last period of state-organised persecution of the ROC (Knox 2005, p. 45). By contrast, in 1988, despite the Soviet Union’s officially atheist ideology, the government supported the millennium celebration of the baptism of Rus (Ponomariov 2017, pp. 132–34), reflecting a growing accommodation of religion in state policy. From the perspective of contemporary Russian neoconservatives, the failure of Soviet secularisation was also linked to the ideological weakness of communism. Aleksandr Dugin, for instance, argues that since Khrushchev’s era, Soviet ideology had become hollow, offering no real alternative to religious belief for Soviet citizens (Dugin 2019, pp. 832–34).

Dugin’s argument regarding the ideological collapse of Soviet communism is difficult to dispute, particularly given the social chaos that ensued following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In this context, the state-controlled reintroduction of religion into public life—a phenomenon deeply embedded in Russian historical and political traditions—should not be seen as a novel development. Rather, it serves as a means of ideological consolidation within the state-centric political system of Putinism. Religion and religious institutions—particularly the ROC—have not become autonomous actors in society. Instead, they exist within the Putinist system only to the extent that they support state policy. Religious groups that refuse to submit to state control face persecution, as exemplified by the designation of Jehovah’s Witnesses as an extremist organisation (Fagan 2013, pp. 168–70) and their subsequent ban and liquidation (Verkhovnyy sud RF 2017).

If we assume that desecularisation is a ‘counter-secularising social change’ (Karpov 2010, p. 238), then this process is not taking place in contemporary Russia. For desecularisation to take place, there must be a demonstrable increase in the social role of religion, including the influence of religious institutions on political, social, and cultural life. In contrast, under Putin—particularly since the onset of the so-called ‘conservative turn’—there has been a deliberate attempt to appropriate elements of religious ideology, cultural references, values, and religiously inspired norms of conduct in the service of constructing a state ideology.

Reliance on the number of individuals who self-identify as religious or as adherents of a specific institutional religion to support claims of Russia’s desecularisation may be misleading. Nominal religiosity is widespread in Russia; many individuals identify with a particular religious tradition yet neither adhere to its core practices nor profess belief in God (Musayev 2024, p. 226). In present-day Russia, only a minority of those who declare membership of the ROC actively participate in religious practices, despite often affirming the personal importance of religion. Tagayev (2025, p. 28) interprets this phenomenon as akin to what is known in the West as ‘believing without belonging’—that is, the presence of individual religious belief in the absence of institutional affiliation. However, this interpretation is problematic in the Russian context: most individuals identify explicitly with the ROC, yet take minimal or no part in institutional religious life. To understand this, it is crucial to recognise the post-Soviet tendency to equate being Russian (or Slavic) with being Orthodox—a trend that, as Stolz and Voas (2023, p. 4) argue, enables the ROC to confer social legitimacy upon the Russian state.

As Tagayev (2025, pp. 28–29) observes, the public role of religion in Russia has increased in connection with the military aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022. The ROC has offered unequivocal support for the war, providing it with religious and ideological justification aligned with the state’s objectives. Particularly noteworthy in this context is the document issued by the 25th World Russian People’s Council, The Present and Future of the Rus World [Russkiy mir], published on 27 March 2024 (Vsemirnyy Russkiy Narodnyy Sobor 2024). In the context of the war and the broader confrontation with the West, this text frames Russian identity in terms of the concept of uderzhivayushchiy (Greek: katechon, or ‘withholder’), portraying Russia as a bulwark against evil and a refuge for those defending traditional values.

Although, according to Knox and Mitrofanova (2014, p. 58), the ROC ‘has gained confidence as an independent political actor and lobbyist in post-Soviet Russia’, such opinions as to its independence seem greatly exaggerated, as shown especially by its unconditional compliance with the policies of the state authorities after the 2022 aggression against Ukraine. In reality, amid tightening authoritarianism in Putin’s Russia, the ROC is gradually losing its independent agency, despite its formal autonomy from the state, and is being subordinated to the implementation of state policy.

4. The Religious Factor in the Russian Understanding of Ontological Security

Although the debate over whether secularisation or desecularisation is occurring in contemporary Russia remains open-ended—and is contingent upon the definitions adopted for both concepts—this article advances the argument in favour of secularisation. This position is grounded in an analysis of how religious ideas are appropriated by the state to construct and safeguard Russia’s desired status and identity. From the perspective of ontological security, understood as the preservation of the state’s preferred identity, the secularisation and instrumentalisation of religion become necessary. This allows the state to selectively utilise elements of a religiously motivated axiology, ethics, and worldview that support its identity goals, while disregarding other fundamental aspects of religion. In the case of Christianity, for example, such neglected dimensions include its eschatological orientation and its universal character, which transcends ethnic boundaries and is not confined to any particular form of political organisation.

The utility of religion for the Russian state, as well as its instrumentalisation, is particularly evident when examining Russia’s security policy, both domestically and internationally. However, this does not imply that religion itself is inherently valued by the authorities as a positive and constructive force in social and cultural life, nor that all religious organisations receive state support. On the contrary, the treatment of individual religious groups depends on their perceived usefulness to the state (Rousselet 2009, p. 58). On the one hand, religious organisations not controlled by the state, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, are subjected to persecution, accused of posing a threat to national security. On the other hand, selected religious ideas—particularly those derived from Orthodox anthropology, ethics, and eschatology—are strategically employed to construct ontological security. This concept refers to a state-sanctioned vision of Russia, encompassing its identity, distinctiveness, historical trajectory, and destiny, with the ultimate goal of ensuring political and social stability and reinforcing state power in anticipation of an inevitable confrontation, including armed conflict, with other states.

4.1. Two Key Religiously Rooted Concepts in the Russian Security Discourse

In the Russian framework of ontological security, it is crucial to legitimise historical continuity and territorial claims—including those concerning regions currently under the sovereignty of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Russia’s cultural distinctiveness and perceived moral superiority serve as fundamental components of this security paradigm. The spiritual essence of Russian values, which underpin Russian conservatism, is juxtaposed against the progressivism and liberalism of the West. In these respects, Russian public and academic discourse on security draws heavily from religion, particularly Russian Orthodoxy, although its ideological foundation extends beyond religious narratives to incorporate secular elements as well. Two key religiously inspired beliefs underpin Russian security discourse:

(1)

The notion of Russian cultural superiority and distinctiveness: Russian state propaganda and official rhetoric frequently promote the idea that Russian culture is uniquely deep and spiritual, setting it apart from other cultures to such an extent that some scholars refer to a distinct ‘Russian civilisation’ (Tsygankov 2016, pp. 37–38). The preservation of this cultural uniqueness, particularly against external influences, is framed as essential to Russia’s survival as a state (Biscop 2019, p. 12). Consequently, under Putin’s leadership, Russia has witnessed an increasing ideologisation and securitisation of cultural and axiological matters, wherein religion has become a tool of state policy, and anti-Western sentiment dominates official rhetoric and propaganda (Papkova 2011, p. 190). Russia’s self-perception as a world power is constructed on the belief in its civilisational distinctiveness, which entails the rejection of liberalism, individualism, and progressivism (Dugin 2017, p. 140). This ideological stance positions Russia as the antithesis of the West, not only culturally but also politically. Accordingly, Russia perceives itself as the leader of nations resisting Western political, cultural, economic, and military hegemony. This perspective extends beyond rhetoric, shaping Russia’s geopolitical aspirations, particularly in the regions formerly encompassed by the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. Here, Russia seeks to assert itself as the centre of Eurasian integration, with the Russian language and culture serving as unifying forces (Shamakhov and Kovalev 2020, pp. 38–39). The belief in Russian cultural superiority is also linked to heightened securitisation of social life, culture, and media within Russia. Domestically, this manifests in anti-Western propaganda, resistance to Western cultural influences, and restricting access to non-state-controlled information (Kobyakov and Aver’yanov 2016, p. 195; Panarin 2020, p. 28). Internationally, this is reflected in efforts to maintain linguistic and cultural hegemony in post-Soviet states and suppress historical narratives that challenge Russian state-sanctioned history.

(2)

The religious justification for Russia’s imperial narrative: The second key element of Russia’s ontological security has gained particular significance in the context of its war against Ukraine. The Russian state narrative, drawing parallels with the Russian Empire, promotes the ahistorical thesis of a continuous, thousand-year-old Russian state. This constructed historical continuity is used to legitimise the notion of ‘Holy Rus’, a spiritual and civilisational unity that transcends political transformations and has allegedly been preserved through the Orthodox faith. This narrative was explicitly articulated by Vladimir Putin in a 2021 article, which is now widely regarded as part of the ideological preparation for war—a war aimed at either annihilating Ukraine’s sovereignty or reducing it to a subjugated state akin to Belarus (Putin 2021). However, the assertion that Russia’s history extends back to the tenth century necessitates the appropriation of Ukraine’s historical legacy. This revisionist approach ultimately serves to deny Ukraine’s distinct statehood, culture, language, and national identity (Putin 2021). In this context, state control over historical narratives is viewed as essential to projecting Russia as a historically victorious and morally righteous power (Giles 2019, p. 105; Kobyakov and Aver’yanov 2016, pp. 103–4). Any alternative interpretations of history are perceived as threats to Russia’s historical mission and, by extension, its national identity.

The integration of religious elements into Russia’s ontological security discourse demonstrates how Orthodox theology, cultural nationalism, and imperialist aspirations have become interwoven into state ideology. However, this should not be interpreted as a genuine religious revival or desecularisation. Instead, religion serves as an instrument of state control, reinforcing historical revisionism, cultural exceptionalism, and geopolitical ambitions. Through this lens, Orthodoxy is not merely a faith but a strategic asset—a means of legitimising Russia’s domestic policies and foreign interventions, particularly in Ukraine and the broader post-Soviet space.

4.2. Application: References to Spiritual and Moral Values in Russian Strategic Documents

The assertion of Russian cultural exceptionalism, its alleged superiority over Western culture, and the millennial continuity of Rus/Russian statehood, unified by Orthodoxy, are not merely elements of public discourse. These narratives—anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian, and highly confrontational—have been institutionalised in official Russian strategic documents on national security. Consequently, they now constitute the ideological foundation of Russian security policy.

References to traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are particularly prevalent in these documents. Successive Russian strategic and foreign policy doctrines since 2007—particularly following Putin’s confrontational speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference—have increasingly emphasised ‘traditional values’ (NSS 2015, sct. 43; FPC 2016, sct. 5; NSS 2021, scts. 84–93; FPC 2023, sct. 8). It is no coincidence that the Information Security Doctrine states that under conditions of ‘external information aggression’, Russia is obliged to protect its spiritual and moral values (ISD 2016, sct. 8a). This principle has served as the legal justification for increasing restrictions on freedom of information.

4.2.1. The 2021 National Security Strategy: The Securitisation of Religion and Morality

The 2021 National Security Strategy exemplifies how religion and spirituality have been securitised—that is, framed as matters of national security—particularly in the context of Russia’s preparations for war with Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the West. According to the strategy’s provisions, spiritual capacity is identified as a core component of state security policy, alongside economic, political, and military capacity (NSS 2021, sct. 10). While similar provisions appeared in earlier documents, the 2021 strategy reveals a form of ‘axiological totalitarianism’, in which a singular system of state-sanctioned values is declared essential for Russia’s stability and unity (NSS 2021, scts. 11, 22). The state is explicitly tasked with the protection and promotion of these values (NSS 2021, scts. 21, 25.7, 26.8, 46), with a particular focus on young people, who are deemed most vulnerable to external ideological influences (NSS 2021, sct. 33.14). The strategy presents Russia’s spiritual values as not only unique but also exemplary, positioning them as a model for other societies rejecting Western liberal values (NSS 2021, scts. 23, 28). The West, in this framing, is not only in ideological decline but is also deliberately working to undermine Russian spiritual values—an effort seen as a threat to Russia’s very existence (NSS 2021, sct. 19). Accordingly, the strategy identifies as a core state priority the resistance to foreign ideological influences, particularly those that seek to secularise Russian society (NSS 2021, scts. 85–89). To this end, the state is called upon to support social organisations and so-called ‘traditional religions’ (NSS 2021, scts. 98.8–10; see also PSTV 2022, sct. 6)—a legally defined category that excludes certain religious groups deemed undesirable by the authorities (Fagan 2013, pp. 131–33; Richters 2013, pp. 38–43).

4.2.2. Moral Superiority and the 2022 Concept of Humanitarian Policy Abroad

In the midst of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, following the revelation of Russian war crimes, another strategic document was introduced––the Concept of Humanitarian Policy Abroad. This concept updates and replaces the 2010 Basic Directions of the Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of International Cultural and Humanitarian Cooperation. Similar in nature is another document signed by Putin in 2022, entitled ‘Bases for State policy on preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values’. The 2022 Concept reinforces the notion of Russian moral superiority, attributing it to Russia’s distinct spiritual and cultural traditions (HPC 2022, sct. 6). The ROC and Islamic organisations are specifically assigned the task of promoting these values, reinforcing Russia’s image as a guardian of traditional values (HPC 2022, scts. 108–9; see also PSTV 2022, sct. 7). The document condemns Western neoliberalism, which it claims threatens traditional moral values—particularly family values. Significantly, it also explicitly asserts that Russia’s claimed moral superiority should be a key element of its foreign policy. It presents Russia as a state of exceptional spiritual culture (HPC 2022, sct. 12), one that preserves its cultural heritage and opposes the imposition of foreign values (HPC 2022, sct. 15.1).

4.2.3. Putinism’s Foundational Myths and the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept

The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept enshrines the two central myths of Putinism—namely, the notion of millennial Russian statehood and the idea of Russia as a distinct civilisation—as fundamental principles of Russian foreign policy (FPC 2023, sct. 4). The document maintains an overtly confrontational stance, including veiled military threats against Western countries. Such rhetoric, while common in Russian state media, had not previously appeared in official strategic documents until Putin’s 2024 amendments to Russia’s nuclear weapons doctrine. The 2023 Concept accuses the West of seeking global domination through neo-colonial policies, portraying Russia as the leader of global resistance against Western ideological imposition. It also claims that neoliberalism has a corrosive impact on international relations (FPC 2023, sct. 8) and pledges Russia’s commitment to counteracting pseudo-humanist, neoliberal ideological influences, which are framed as eroding humanity’s moral foundations. Notably, the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept portrays Russia as a defender of traditional religions—particularly the ROC—and commits the state to protecting the Moscow Patriarchate’s influence abroad, particularly in Ukraine (FPC 2023, sct. 43.4).

5. Conclusions

The institutionalisation of spiritual and moral rhetoric in Russian strategic documents demonstrates how religion and traditional values have been weaponised to serve state policy. These documents construct a vision of Russia as a civilisational bulwark against Western secularism and liberalism, reinforcing state legitimacy, internal social cohesion, and geopolitical ambitions—particularly in Ukraine and the post-Soviet space.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ROC has been gradually strengthening its presence in public life. However, this transformation has been slow and complex. Notably, during the dissolution of the USSR and the democratisation processes of the early 1990s, the ROC played no significant role. Moreover, as Rousselet rightly observes, even in the immediate post-Soviet years and during the early years of Putin’s presidency, state–ROC relations were not free from conflict (Rousselet 2009, pp. 54–55).

The evolving position of the ROC in Russian public life can be attributed to two primary factors—one frequently overestimated and the other often overlooked. The first factor is personal in nature, concerning the leadership styles of successive Moscow Patriarchs—Aleksiy II (1990–2008) and Kirill (since 2009). Despite some similarities, the ROC under Aleksiy II and Kirill has exhibited notable differences in its approach to the state (Knox and Mitrofanova 2014, pp. 43–44). A striking example is the Moscow Patriarchate’s independent and distanced stance during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, in contrast to its explicit support for the Russian authorities during the 2014 conflict with Ukraine. By 24 February 2022, this stance had evolved into full-fledged endorsement of Russia’s war against Ukraine. As Smytsnyuk (2023, p. 544) rightly notes, ‘the ROC is providing a theology to militarism.’

However, personal differences, while significant, do not fully account for the broader transformation of the ROC’s role in Russian public life, nor do they explain its integration into Russia’s national security apparatus. The more decisive factor is political: the ‘conservative turn’ in Russian domestic and foreign policy and the escalating confrontation with the West. In Putin’s Russia, religion—particularly the ROC—is treated as an integral component of the state structure, an institution tasked with strengthening the state and advancing its domestic and foreign policy objectives. While religious rhetoric permeates public discourse—including national security strategy documents—there is a clear adaptation of religion to serve state interests. This ‘tailoring’ of religious discourse ensures that Orthodoxy is exclusively framed as a source of values that unify society around the state and shield it from Western cultural influences.

For foreign policy purposes, religion is instrumentalised to promote traditional notions of marriage, family, and gender roles, thereby justifying discrimination against non-heterosexual individuals and their exclusion from public life. Crucially, other fundamental aspects of religion—particularly Christianity’s eschatological dimension, which relativises state authority and limits obedience to it—are completely absent from the religiously infused political discourse.

How has the ROC itself responded to the state’s instrumentalisation and distortion of religion? A telling example is Patriarch Kirill’s reaction during a meeting with the clergy of the Moscow Metropolitanate on 12 February 2025. When a priest suggested that the Orthodox Church should focus less on promoting patriotism and more on guiding people towards the Kingdom of Heaven, Kirill responded ironically, questioning whether the clergyman was from Western Ukraine (Vy ne iz Zapadnoy Ukrainy 2025). This exchange exemplifies the Moscow Patriarchate’s political alignment. Since the outbreak of war against Ukraine in 2022, the ROC has unequivocally supported military aggression and has actively persecuted clergy who have prayed for peace (e.g., Tserkovnyy sud 2023). Kirill’s pro-war statements and the ROC’s broader actions suggest that the Church has fully accepted the role assigned to it by the state. It has subordinated itself to state objectives, even at the cost of abandoning significant elements of its doctrine.

The political significance of religion in contemporary Russia does not reflect a process of desecularisation. Instead, it is deeply rooted in Russian Orthodox tradition and the historical pattern of state–church relations. However, in Putin’s Russia, this historical pattern has evolved considerably. The ROC is no longer merely an institution subordinate to the state—particularly since it formally retains autonomy. Rather, it has been transformed into a religious institution integrated into the national security system, tasked with advancing state security objectives both domestically and internationally. The ROC’s active participation in state policy, particularly in the sphere of security, raises the question of whether Russia is experiencing desecularisation or, conversely, an extreme form of secularisation. Indeed, the instrumentalisation of the ROC by the state and its direct involvement in state security policy suggest a process of profound secularisation. So deep is this secularisation, some argue, that it threatens the very identity of the ROC as a religious institution.

The integration of the ROC into the Russian state apparatus, particularly its national security system, signifies not a resurgence of religion but its transformation into an instrument of state power. In this context, the ROC no longer operates as an autonomous religious institution but as a state-controlled entity, dedicated to advancing the political and security interests of the Russian government. This development challenges traditional understandings of secularisation. It suggests that, rather than witnessing desecularisation, Russia is experiencing an extreme form of secularisation, where religion loses its autonomy and is fully co-opted by the state.