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14 pages, 361 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Religious Dimension of Mencius’ Theory of the Goodness of Human Nature: A Critique of Gaozi’s View

by Tianyang Cai and Yun Chen

Religions 2024, 15(12), 1504; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15121504 - 9 Dec 2024

Viewed by 413

This paper argues that the Confucian notion of the “goodness of human nature” (Xing Shan 性善) does not exclude a religious dimension by examining Mencius’ explanation of this theory. In his response to Gongduzi (公都子), Mencius articulates his understanding of the goodness of [...] Read more.

This paper argues that the Confucian notion of the “goodness of human nature” (Xing Shan 性善) does not exclude a religious dimension by examining Mencius’ explanation of this theory. In his response to Gongduzi (公都子), Mencius articulates his understanding of the goodness of human nature. Combining this response with Mencius’ criticism of Gaozi, the two discussions can illuminate each other. Mencius opposes Gaozi’s approach that relies on facts (Qing 情) and talents (Cai才) to define human nature. He argues that such an approach stems from an inductive mode of cognition and a detached observer’s stance toward the world, leading to a perspective devoid of a spiritual world. In contrast, Mencius posits that individuals, beyond sensory perception, can use the faculty bestowed by Heaven to perceive a world infused with noble spirit (Hao Ran Zhi Qi 浩然之氣). The heart-mind, deriving from a transcendent Heaven (天), holds religious significance for Mencius and represents an entity we must serve. However, this does not mean abandoning moral life. On the contrary, Mencius asserts that serving Heaven involves facing moral situations directly, discerning righteousness, and anchoring the direction of one’s actions. In realizing oneself, one also contributes to the realization of others, a significant interpretation of “human nature” as Mencius conceives it. By integrating religious belief with secular life, Mencius grounds the latter in the former, imbuing Confucian thought on the goodness of human nature with an implicit reverence. This approach invites us to understand human life within the comprehensive connection with the universe. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

13 pages, 343 KiB

Open AccessArticle

From Divinity to Humanity: The Threefold Transformation of Ethical Thought in Pre-Qin Confucianism

by Huanhuan Fu

Religions 2024, 15(10), 1205; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101205 - 3 Oct 2024

Viewed by 806

Abstract

By examining the evolution of pre-Qin Confucian thought on the Heaven–human relationship, and a new interpretive perspective can be applied to understanding ethical relations within pre-Qin Confucianism. In the pre-Classical period, the absence of scientific explanations for human origins shrouded these origins in [...] Read more.

By examining the evolution of pre-Qin Confucian thought on the Heaven–human relationship, and a new interpretive perspective can be applied to understanding ethical relations within pre-Qin Confucianism. In the pre-Classical period, the absence of scientific explanations for human origins shrouded these origins in mysticism, leading to practices such as totem worship, ancestor worship, and the worship of Heaven. However, through continuous exploration of the Heaven–human relationship, pre-Qin Confucians began to liberate human rights from divine authority, highlighting a profound sense of humanism. In light of this transformation, this paper aims to address three key questions: first, what distinctions did pre-Qin Confucians draw between humans and animals, and how did they emphasize individual human value? Second, how did pre-Qin Confucians transform ancestor worship through the traditions of Li and Yue? Third, how did the focus of pre-Qin Confucians shift from Heaven back to humanity? These three research areas are crucial for analyzing how the ethical relations of pre-Qin Confucianism closely integrated with political order. This exploration not only illuminates the philosophical evolution of the period but also offers a deeper understanding of how early Confucianism laid the groundwork for the interplay between personal value and societal responsibilities. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

25 pages, 365 KiB

Open AccessArticle

by Yurui Yao

Religions 2024, 15(9), 1031; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15091031 - 23 Aug 2024

Viewed by 868

Abstract

Both pre-Qin Confucianism and Mohism aimed to find a universalist consensus of belief in order to deal with social chaos and disunity, but they diverged at a basic level on what is the fundamental universality of humankind and how to achieve it. In [...] Read more.

Both pre-Qin Confucianism and Mohism aimed to find a universalist consensus of belief in order to deal with social chaos and disunity, but they diverged at a basic level on what is the fundamental universality of humankind and how to achieve it. In the debate between Mencius and Mohists, Mohists believed that the fundamental “similarity” of humankind lies in the field of “self-interest”, so they emphasized the acquisition of Heaven’s favor through external achievements and sacrificial offerings. On the contrary, Mencius took the fundamental similarity of humans to the level of the inner heart-mind and believed that the fundamental “sameness” of humans lies in their “heart-mind” rather than in being “self-interested”, so he advocated the connection with the heavenly part within us when we follow the guidance of the heart-mind. Their differing interpretations of the fundamental question of “the similarity of humankind” ultimately resulted in the divergences and discrepancies between two religious ethical forms and their outcomes in early China. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

16 pages, 666 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Where Should Morality Go: A Reexamination of the Confucian Rule by Virtue Thought in the Pre-Qin Dynasty and the Chinese Traditional Ideological Dilemma

by Yunlong Li

Religions 2024, 15(8), 928; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080928 - 30 Jul 2024

Viewed by 1510

Abstract

The thought of rule by virtue in ancient China holds a significant role in Chinese ideological history. Because of the similarity in nature and authority, morality in ancient China played a similar role to religion in Western countries. The Confucian rule by virtue [...] Read more.

The thought of rule by virtue in ancient China holds a significant role in Chinese ideological history. Because of the similarity in nature and authority, morality in ancient China played a similar role to religion in Western countries. The Confucian rule by virtue thought in the pre-Qin dynasty profoundly influenced subsequent generations. During the pre-Qin period, Confucian rule by virtue thought evolved—from personal cultivation to statecraft, integrating law and ritual. Concepts of rule by rite, rule by man, and rule by virtue intertwined with the legal philosophies of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. Confucian moral governance focuses on human values and life quality, retaining relevance today. Constrained by historical and social contexts, it had unique dilemma and unobservable limitations. In order to eliminate the ideological dilemma, a return to virtue and law while adhering strictly to their boundaries is a feasible path for the Confucian rule by virtue thought from the pre-Qin Dynasty to the modern era. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

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12 pages, 601 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Between “Jing 敬” and “Cheng 诚”: A Linguistic Study of the Internalization Process in the Pre-Qin Confucian Ethical System

by Cong Li

Religions 2024, 15(8), 908; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080908 - 26 Jul 2024

Viewed by 889

Abstract

From a semantic viewpoint, “Jing 敬” emphasizes an attitude of external respect and adherence to ritual propriety, whereas “Cheng 诚” signifies the true alignment between one’s internal attitudes and external actions. An exploration of “Jing” and “Cheng” in The Analects, The Great [...] Read more.

From a semantic viewpoint, “Jing 敬” emphasizes an attitude of external respect and adherence to ritual propriety, whereas “Cheng 诚” signifies the true alignment between one’s internal attitudes and external actions. An exploration of “Jing” and “Cheng” in The Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius from a linguistic perspective reveals the following: In the ethical system of The Analects, “Jing” represents an attitude towards others, and “Cheng” is rarely mentioned, with personal morality anchored in the social order; in The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, “Jing” is seldom discussed, while “Cheng” is emphasized as a requirement for individuals, highlighting the intrinsic nature and spontaneity of personal morality; The Works of Mencius, while inheriting Confucius’s concepts, also adopts the ideas from The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean and reinterprets “Jing” internally, achieving a unity between personal morality and social ethics. The shift from “Jing” to “Cheng” and the reinterpretation of “Jing” reflect the concentrated embodiment of the internal reconstruction of the Pre-Qin Confucian ethical system. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

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14 pages, 302 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Sage-King Naming Theory: A New Perspective on Understanding Xunzi’s Doctrine of the Rectification of Names

by Yingting Hao

Religions 2024, 15(2), 177; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15020177 - 31 Jan 2024

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1527

Abstract

By focusing on Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king and the sage-king naming theory, a new interpretive perspective can be applied to Xunzi’s doctrine of the rectification of names. During the Warring States period, mainstream views among Confucian and Daoist scholars tended to interpret [...] Read more.

By focusing on Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king and the sage-king naming theory, a new interpretive perspective can be applied to Xunzi’s doctrine of the rectification of names. During the Warring States period, mainstream views among Confucian and Daoist scholars tended to interpret the sage-king as the bearer of Heaven or Dao. However, Xunzi follows the principle of the division between Heaven and humanity, asserting that the sage-king is entirely subordinate to the realm of humans, embodying the ideal order of Confucian community. In light of this concept of the sage-king, this paper aims to address two questions: first, where the legitimacy of the sage-king naming prerogative comes from, and second, how the sage-king, as the master-signifier, quilts all floating signifiers to ensure the publicity and normativity of names. Moral norms emerge from the sage-king’s projection of intentions and emotions onto external objects. Sage-king naming theory provides the prerequisite for the superassertibility of moral norms, limiting the potential arbitrariness and private interpretations of names and norms, which ensures the public and authoritative nature of the social discourse system, thereby endowing the sage-kings with legitimacy. As the quilting point and stopping point, the sage-king performs the totalization and prohibition by means of which the floating names and norms are fixed and become parts of the structured Confucian discourse of meaning. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

16 pages, 849 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Ethics of Contingency: An Alternative (to) Morality in the Analects

by Paul D’Ambrosio

Religions 2023, 14(11), 1367; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111367 - 30 Oct 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1610

Abstract

An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising [...] Read more.

An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising and challenging ways to think about whether something might be moral or ethical. This paper attempts to deconstruct this familiar discussion along novel lines that can reveal new ways to reflect on the importance of flexibility in the Analects, while, at the same time, it reconstrues ways in which comparative projects might be oriented. The main argument is this: the Analects does not recognize a categorical distinction between a moral and non-moral realm. Whereas, in much modern academic thought, there is a distinction between what counts as contingencies and what is up to the individual, which, in turn, loosely corresponds to the non-moral and moral realms, the Analects does not make such clear distinctions. Everything, including core moral issues such as the individual’s own choice, moral guidelines, and the contextualization of (moral) models, is all ultimately grounded in contingencies. Nevertheless, the Analects provides ways of reflecting on choices and actions that aim to steer people in specific directions. We may understand this as a type of morality, but one that is significantly distinct from those wherein the difference between the moral (non-contingent) and non-moral (contingent) is foundational. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

13 pages, 808 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On the Coherence of Mencius’ Concept of Li: An Analysis Based on Moral Reasons Internalism

by Shuwen Liu and Xiaodong Xie

Religions 2023, 14(8), 1061; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081061 - 18 Aug 2023

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1889

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of coherence, i.e., whether the internal and external dimensions of li (礼 rituals, rites, and the observance of them) are compatible. This problem stems mainly from Mencius’ seemingly conflicting statements. On the one hand, he emphasized the goodness [...] Read more.

This paper addresses the problem of coherence, i.e., whether the internal and external dimensions of li (礼 rituals, rites, and the observance of them) are compatible. This problem stems mainly from Mencius’ seemingly conflicting statements. On the one hand, he emphasized the goodness of xing (性 human nature) in terms of the goodness of the heart-mind. On the other hand, he defended the act of following li regardless of one’s heart-mind. This paper argues that Mencius held coherent moral reasons internalism, asserting that moral reasons are embedded in people’s universal and potential instinct to do morally good things. Consequently, he distinguished morality from non-moral normativity and claimed that the former takes precedence over the latter. The concept of li is thus divided into moral li and non-moral li, with moral li taking precedence over non-moral li. Therefore, the act of “following li regardless of one’s heart-mind” refers to following non-moral li, as long as it does not conflict with moral li. Based on the fact that Mencius’ concept of li is a kind of coherent moral reasons internalism, this paper further responds to some challenges from moral reasons externalism. It does so by clarifying the meaning of “seeking the cause within oneself” (反求诸己 fan qiu zhu ji), showing that Mencius believed every individual could establish rational inner guidance and be motivated to lead a reflective and autonomous moral life. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

12 pages, 823 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Rethinking the Mengzi’s Concept of Tian 天

by Kevin J. Turner

Religions 2023, 14(8), 1015; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081015 - 8 Aug 2023

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 1619

Abstract

There is an undeniable relationship between humanity and tian 天 in the philosophy of the Mengzi 孟子 where the latter is generally conceived as the metaphysical or ontological source of the morality and ethics of the former. However, this line of interpretation is [...] Read more.

There is an undeniable relationship between humanity and tian 天 in the philosophy of the Mengzi 孟子 where the latter is generally conceived as the metaphysical or ontological source of the morality and ethics of the former. However, this line of interpretation is misleading because it not only imports foreign notions of transcendence into the thought of the Mengzi but also because it ignores the contribution humans make to tian. At the same time, there have been attempts to read the Mengzi in biological terms, thereby naturalizing human morality. This likewise does not satisfy as an adequate account of human morality because it also reduces it to a natural or biological realm where human culture is an external accessory. However, the relationship between humanity and tian in the Mengzi is one of mutual influence and emergence; therefore, this article analyzes their relationship and argues that tian is to be understood as “tradition” whereby humans in their process of becoming humans contribute to and invigorate it as successive generations carry it on into the future. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

10 pages, 800 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Interstate Relational Ethics: Mengzi and Later Mohists in Dialogue

by Ting-mien Lee

Religions 2023, 14(5), 659; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050659 - 15 May 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1745

Abstract

The popular interpretation holds that Mengzi was strongly critical of Mozi because the Mohist moral theory was antithetical to Confucian relational ethics. According to this interpretation, Mohism promotes the norm of “impartiality” or “impartial care”, which violates the Confucian norms of “filial piety” [...] Read more.

The popular interpretation holds that Mengzi was strongly critical of Mozi because the Mohist moral theory was antithetical to Confucian relational ethics. According to this interpretation, Mohism promotes the norm of “impartiality” or “impartial care”, which violates the Confucian norms of “filial piety” and “graded love”. Accordingly, Mengzi thought that the Confucian ideal would not be realized if Mohism continued to prevail. Scholars have tried to nuance and revise this dominant interpretation. For example, some have pointed out the importance of family-oriented values in Mohist ethical theory, arguing that Mengzi likely misunderstood or purposefully mispresented Mohism. This article is an initial attempt to modify the popular interpretation by arguing that the debate between Mengzi and Mohist regarding relational ethics is predominantly about the relations between states rather than individuals. This interpretation sheds light on a core difference between Confucian and Mohist ethical theories and can help make better sense of some later Mohist passages. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

17 pages, 779 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Positive Motivation of Shame: Moral Emotion in the Mencius

by Lan Yu

Religions 2023, 14(4), 495; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040495 - 4 Apr 2023

Viewed by 2854

Abstract

For Mencius, shame is the human way of existing in a virtuous disposition and concretely manifests not only as the self-affirming of the passion of shame in the action of stopping something bad from happening, but also as a way of handling affairs [...] Read more.

For Mencius, shame is the human way of existing in a virtuous disposition and concretely manifests not only as the self-affirming of the passion of shame in the action of stopping something bad from happening, but also as a way of handling affairs and processing things. This paper explains how shame functions as moral motivation by analyzing the affective mindset of shame and aversion (xiu e zhi xin 羞恶之心) and its relation to honoring decorum (yi 义) in the Mencius. Furthermore, I clarify that shame not only refers to cases of shameful self-concern but also to cases of morally detesting others and that the object of both is honoring decorum (yi 义). This unique psychological affect that we call shame develops from the dissonance or misalignment between one’s own moral conduct and the criteria of socially beneficial interaction; however, for this reason, it is commonly misinterpreted as negative. In order to demonstrate the positivity of shame and lay out the moral groundwork for an ethics of shame, this paper unfolds the complex interrelation between honoring decorum (yi 义) and shame. Lastly, this paper argues that shame is a deeply-rooted natural disposition that grows and expands in connection with self-approved norms during interactions with other people; therefore, it is the unfolding of a coherence between affect and norm and a relational moral emotion that takes us beyond the symmetry and asymmetry of utilitarian and deontological ethics, respectively. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

11 pages, 786 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Models of Humanism in Ancient China: An Explanation Centered on Early Confucian Ethics

by Jana S. Rošker

Religions 2023, 14(1), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010083 - 6 Jan 2023

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2566

Abstract

In China, humanism, especially within the framework of Confucian ethics, developed quite differently from humanist discourses in Europe. Therefore, it is important to understand the origins and development of Confucian ideas that place human beings at the center of culture and the cosmos. [...] Read more.

In China, humanism, especially within the framework of Confucian ethics, developed quite differently from humanist discourses in Europe. Therefore, it is important to understand the origins and development of Confucian ideas that place human beings at the center of culture and the cosmos. Through the lens of the cultural particularities of humanism, this knowledge can help us gain a more complex and multi-layered insight into the universal factors that make up human nature. This paper critically examines the foundations, development, and distinctive features of traditional Chinese humanism, which emerged within the framework of classical Confucian teachings. Beginning with an analysis of the Confucian view of the relationship between the individual and society, the author explains the conceptual origin and historical development of various models of humanism in the Chinese tradition. The paper then sheds light on the reasons for the transition from religions to humanities that took place in China during the Axial Age, and highlights various implications of this transition manifested in Confucian ethics and its search for a better social order. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)

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