Dear Colleagues,

Moral realism consists of three claims: (1) judgements of the form ‘it is wrong/bad to do act A’ are beliefs, and so have a truth value; (2) at least some of these beliefs are true; and (3) what makes those beliefs true are corresponding mind-independent moral facts. For much of the twentieth century, moral realism, especially in its non-naturalist form, looked dead and buried, and various forms of non-cognitivism prospered. But during the 1980s and 1990s realism re-emerged as a philosophically respectable position, even in its non-naturalist form.

Nonetheless, it is still plagued by serious philosophical worries, especially on metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological grounds. A growing number of philosophers argue that the supposed mind-independent moral facts that would make our beliefs true are so metaphysically suspect that they feel forced to deny that there are any such facts. Those who accept that moral judgements are beliefs are forced to conclude that all moral beliefs are false. Non-cognitivists argue that we should abandon the realist assumption that moral judgements are beliefs. They maintain that their view also fits with certain psychological facts about the motivational force of moral judgements. Yet others argue that we should abandon the idea that what makes moral judgements true are mind-independent moral facts, and maintain that truth in ethics is determined by the outcome of some constructive procedure.

Epistemological concerns about moral realism tend to focus on non-naturalistic versions of the view that, if the moral facts are non-natural, we could not know them in the way in which we know natural facts. But all forms of realism are subject to certain epistemological concerns, for instance, those that arise as a result of evolutionary debunking arguments. Significant progress has been made in addressing these issues over the past 30 years, but there still remain significant issues to be resolved for non-naturalist realists, for instance, about the nature of intuitions, how they put us in the right relation to the moral facts, what the role of adequate understanding is, and how such knowledge could motivate.

This Special Issue will contribute to the ongoing debate around the metaphysics and epistemology of moral realism. Must realist assumptions drive us towards nihilism (error theory)? Is this something we could believe, and if so what would it be like to genuinely think that nothing matters? Can we know mind-independent moral facts, and if so how? Can evolutionary debunking arguments be rebutted, or are these fatal to realism? If there are moral facts, must they be non-natural facts, and how do these facts relate to our knowledge of them?

Prof. Dr. Philip Stratton-Lake
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Philosophies is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

• moral realism
• epistemology
• intuition
• non-naturalism
• self-evidence