Fiction and Metaphysics

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 December 2023) | Viewed by 13519

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Auckland 1010, New Zealand
Interests: formal and philosophical logic; philosophy of language; metaphysics

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Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy and Education Science, University of Turin, I-10124 Turi, Italy
Interests: philosophy of fiction; metaphysics and ontology of fiction

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The philosophy of fiction has become an acknowledged part of mainstream philosophy, with a history that goes back at least to the early debates about the role of poets and dramatists found in the works of Aristotle and Plato. However, one theme in the philosophy of fiction has probably dominated the interests of contemporary philosophers more than any other: the ontology and metaphysics of the objects or entities that we encounter in fiction. These include fictional characters—individuals who make their first appearance in a work of fiction and are in one way or another meant to engage the interest of readers—but also inanimate objects such as fictional places, fictional belief-systems, fictional sexes, and much more. To talk of their fictionality suggests that fictional entities constitute a special type of entity. Not surprisingly, then, among the fundamental philosophical questions we can ask about fictional entities are questions about their nature: what kind of thing is a fictional entity, and how does it differ not only from ordinary individuals but also from other allegedly nonexistent entities such as hallucinatory objects? There is now a formidable array of theories in this area. However, an even more fundamental question is: why suppose that there are any fictional entities in the first place? Why suppose they are any more real than the objects of our dreams? The anti-realist viewpoint on this question is also alive and well. These questions have in turn led to other questions, among them the question of how broadly we should construe the class of fictional objects. Some think the class should be extended to include entities (fictional surrogates) that are imported into fiction from the real world but are not identical to their real-world counterparts, such as the Napoleon of War and Peace. Others think that there are fictional properties and kinds that cannot be reduced to ordinary properties—being a hobbit or a bandersnatch, for instance. There are yet other theorists who worry about the way the philosophical literature has tended to focus on written works of fiction. Is there anything significantly different about characters encountered in visual media such as TV, film, or video games, for example?

Fiction and fictional entities have proved a rich area for philosophical investigation over the last few decades, and there is no sign that interest is waning.  This Special Issue on Fiction and Metaphysics is devoted to an exploration of the many questions the topic is continuing to raise.

In this Special Issue, original research articles are welcome. Papers devoted to an exploration of some of the newer issues are especially welcome.

We look forward to receiving your contributions.

Prof. Dr. Frederick Kroon
Prof. Dr. Alberto Voltolini
Guest Editors

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Published Papers (7 papers)

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Research

13 pages, 252 KiB  
Article
Beyond Fictionality: A Definition of Fictional Characterhood
by Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Philosophies 2023, 8(6), 111; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060111 - 22 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1921
Abstract
While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional [...] Read more.
While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional characterhood. I claim that fictional characters are fictional intentional systems, a thesis that I label as FIST. After introducing FIST, I compare it to some rival definitions of fictional characters found in the literature, explaining why FIST is preferable. Finally, I briefly delve into the implications of FIST for other issues related to the nature of fictional characters. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
9 pages, 211 KiB  
Article
Taking Abstract Artifacts Seriously—The Functioning and Malfunctioning of Fictional Characters
by Enrico Terrone
Philosophies 2023, 8(6), 105; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060105 - 9 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1618
Abstract
This paper presents and discusses Simon Evnine’s hylomorphic account of fictional characters and proposes some amendments to it with the aim of explaining the functioning of fictional characters. The paper does so by relying on a case study, viz. Edgar Allan Poe’s short [...] Read more.
This paper presents and discusses Simon Evnine’s hylomorphic account of fictional characters and proposes some amendments to it with the aim of explaining the functioning of fictional characters. The paper does so by relying on a case study, viz. Edgar Allan Poe’s short story Berenice. The amended hylomorphic account of fictional characters will also be capable of explaining the malfunctioning of fictional characters. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
17 pages, 966 KiB  
Article
The Paradox of Fictional Creatures
by Louis Rouillé
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050092 - 28 Sep 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1851
Abstract
Authors create fictional characters; that is a “creationist locution”. Artefactualism takes such statements very seriously and holds that fictional characters are abstract artefacts, i.e., entities that are both created and abstract. Anti-creationists, by contrast, deny that we need to postulate such doubtful entities [...] Read more.
Authors create fictional characters; that is a “creationist locution”. Artefactualism takes such statements very seriously and holds that fictional characters are abstract artefacts, i.e., entities that are both created and abstract. Anti-creationists, by contrast, deny that we need to postulate such doubtful entities to explain creationist locutions. In this paper, I present this debate in the form of a paradox, which organises the many existing theories of creationist locutions in a single logical space. This new way of framing the problem displays the crucial role of so-called “linking principles”. In general, it seems that fictionality entails nonexistence, while creation entails existence. This is why “fictional creatures” are puzzling. I further argue that to create means to invent and to realise, and finally, that fictional characters are invented but not created, contra artefactualism. I thus advocate for a new kind of anti-creationism about fictional characters. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
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12 pages, 264 KiB  
Article
Why Realisms about Fiction Must (and Can) Accommodate Fictional Properties
by Frederick Kroon and Paul Oppenheimer
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 82; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050082 - 7 Sep 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1251
Abstract
The topic of fictional objects is a familiar one, the topic of fictional properties less so. But it deserves its own place in the philosophy of fiction, if only because fictional properties have such a prominent role to play in science fiction and [...] Read more.
The topic of fictional objects is a familiar one, the topic of fictional properties less so. But it deserves its own place in the philosophy of fiction, if only because fictional properties have such a prominent role to play in science fiction and fantasy. What, then, are fictional properties and how does their apparent unreality relate to the unreality of fictional objects? The present paper explores these questions in the light of familiar debates about the nature of fictional objects. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
12 pages, 259 KiB  
Article
Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Table
by Jeonggyu Lee
Philosophies 2023, 8(4), 67; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040067 - 25 Jul 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2408
Abstract
The primary aim of this paper is to provide a plausible fictional creationist explanation of when and how a fictional object comes into existence without a successful creative intention, focusing on the problem posed by Stuart Brock’s nominalist author scenario. I first present [...] Read more.
The primary aim of this paper is to provide a plausible fictional creationist explanation of when and how a fictional object comes into existence without a successful creative intention, focusing on the problem posed by Stuart Brock’s nominalist author scenario. I first present some intuitions about parallel scenarios for fictional objects and concrete artifacts as data to be explained. Then I provide a sufficient condition for the existence of artifacts that can explain both cases. An important upshot of this is that there is an overlooked way to bring artifacts into existence that should merit serious consideration, and this leads to a version of the mind-dependence, but not the intention-dependence, view of artifacts. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
9 pages, 230 KiB  
Article
How to Create Indeterminately Identical Fictional Objects
by Elisa Paganini
Philosophies 2023, 8(4), 56; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040056 - 26 Jun 2023
Viewed by 1320
Abstract
Suppose that fictional objects are abstract objects dependent for their existence and their identity on the creative intentions of their authors. Is an author who intends to create indeterminately identical fictional objects committed to incoherent created objects? My claim is that she is [...] Read more.
Suppose that fictional objects are abstract objects dependent for their existence and their identity on the creative intentions of their authors. Is an author who intends to create indeterminately identical fictional objects committed to incoherent created objects? My claim is that she is not so committed. I argue that indeterminate identity is an ambiguous notion, allowing for an incoherent interpretation and for at least three coherent ones; and I show that if an author of fiction applies coherent indeterminate identity when creating fictional objects, she succeeds in creating coherent objects, whereas she fails to create fictional objects when she tries to apply incoherent indeterminate identity in her creation. In so doing, I offer a reply to a challenge first raised by Everett against realist philosophers on fictional objects and more recently reproposed by Friedell, allowing for the creation of fictional objects along the lines proposed by Evnine. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
10 pages, 239 KiB  
Article
The Strange Case of Dr. Moloch and Mr. Snazzo (or the Parmenides’ Riddle Once Again)
by Alberto Voltolini
Philosophies 2023, 8(4), 54; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040054 - 23 Jun 2023
Viewed by 1702
Abstract
Once one draws a distinction between loyal non-existent items, which do not exist in a non-universal sense of the first-order existence predicate, and non-items, which fail to exist in a universal sense of that predicate, one may allow for the former but not [...] Read more.
Once one draws a distinction between loyal non-existent items, which do not exist in a non-universal sense of the first-order existence predicate, and non-items, which fail to exist in a universal sense of that predicate, one may allow for the former but not for the latter in the overall ontological domain, so as to adopt a form of soft Parmenideanism. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for this distinction. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
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