Review Reports - Atheist Morality Without God

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The paper addresses a valuable and relevant topic. In the opinion of the writer, it requires further development on some central points, including:

1. The problem of evil is not fully developed, it is only used to show the counter-intuitive that seems to believe in God in the presence of horrendous evil, appealing among other things to the number of evil events. Once the text develops the supposed superiority of a secular or atheistic ethic, it does not return to why in that presumed better scenario for moral progress, horrendous evils would occur anyway. The central point here is, I think, that if horrendous evils are instrumentalised to diminish belief in the existence of God, I do not see why they cannot be used to diminish the rationality of a secular ethic.

2. The text does not consider as an option that rationality itself can be understood from a theistic point of view, so that claiming that rational decisions are secular by default implies accepting the epistemic assumption that gives rise to the disagreement: a non-secular ethic would be less rational. This point cannot be conceded without even being discussed.

3. Establishing a link between religious positions and regrettable historical antecedents is, of course, an empirical background difficult to counter-argue. That said, what is discomforting is the permanent sense of cherry-picking evidence that offers the worst picture of a particular religion. Any scenario suggesting atheistic moral superiority must not deal with this past, in a general sense of the term. Nor does it seem prudent to simply analogise various religious systems without considering their differences, or by simply quoting the most polemical passages of what can be quoted from certain sacred texts. Suggesting that terrorism is the result of a certain religious system shows the extent of how unwise such a linkage can be, or at least the need to substantiate.

In addition to these points, I suggest maintaining a self-critical stance on what negative implications atheism can or does have. If it is a question of highlighting the social aspect (despite the accusation of a certain tribalism, a point that should also be developed and not just stated), it is clear that religion has historically fulfilled this role. Perhaps what is needed is to highlight an ecumenical religious, not necessarily an atheistic option. The attack on a universalist position suggests a dismissal of its viability, but care must be taken not to assume a situational universalism in arguing for the correctness of an atheistic, or secular ethic.

While I do not agree with the position being advocated, the problem I see is that it is weakly justified, and that its main strength is attacking the weaknesses of a believing position, which should call into question the supposed advantage of valuing one's neighbour, believers are also in that neighbourhood and should not be judged as ethically incapable, or inherently vicious in their decisions. There is no charitable reading of the believer, and that is a problem. There is a suggestion of a certain irrationality of the believer, and that is not respectful. Of course, the atheist should receive the same respect, but it seems that it is not his rationality that is at issue, but whether he is willing to recognise that rationality may be a divine gift.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Comments on the paper titled “Atheist Morality Without God”

It would be a pleasure to read this deep and insightful paper. However, I have several comments that I think will help the author improve his or her argument, or perhaps change his or her mind. This paper is, in my view, publishable but requires major revisions.

Comments on Page 1:

The author states “... including sending people into an eternal conscious torment in hell.” It is not true that people will be sent to hell, but only wicked persons who do not repent will go to hell. It is also not true that hell is eternal for all wicked persons; many who go to hell may eventually be released to heaven. Hell may function as a purification. Moreover, it is not conclusively established that God will not forgive everyone, since He is merciful; given His mercy and compassion, it may be possible that all sins could be forgiven. Who knows?
The author writes: “... The force of this problem is perhaps the greatest for Calvinists who believe in theological determinism, as opposed to non-Calvinists who believe in free will.” While a Calvinist can be compatibilist and accept both theological determinism and human free will, I agree that those who reject free will cannot employ the free-will theodicy or defense and will face difficulties in understanding God’s permission of evil arising from human freedom. But this difficulty is not unique to Calvinists.
The author states: “… pantheists, who believe everything is an illusion.” The term “illusion” here is arguably not correct. Pantheism views everything as a modification of the One, so everything truly exists as a modification rather than as an independent substance. Seeing everything as an independent substance could be described as illusory, whereas understanding everything as interconnected or as modification is not.
The author claims: “Process theologians believe their God can’t force free-willed agents to do good. He can only persuade them to do good. But given the horrendous suffering in our world, such a God is shown to be useless in the face of natural disasters, and powerless when it comes to liars, thieves, rapists, kidnappers, and killers who refuse to be persuaded.” The first sentence is acceptable, but the assertion about process theology’s handling of horrendous evil seems too quick. Regarding natural disasters, process theology can address them by appealing to the freedom inherent in the nature of reality. Process thought holds that God grants freedom to the world, including the natural world, to develop and progress. This development is not predetermined, so God may risk the outcomes. Horrendous evils can result from natural orders and the free evolution of processes, rather than from God’s predetermined decisions.

Comments on Page 2:
5. The author states: “Atheism is, after all, a moral position. Many of us come to [atheism] due to the suffering allowed by, and caused by, religionists.” The claim that atheism is a moral position seems questionable. Atheism is a claim about the nonexistence of God. One can be an atheist while denying any moral norm or value. The next sentence is also problematic, since many theists are troubled by atheist or secular violence as well. For example, several thousands in Libya were displaced or made refugees by foreign interventions under the banner of democracy and peace. What happens now in Gaza, the genocide of people of Palestine has been done by help of secular and atheist European countries. Violence is not solely due to religion.

The author writes: “Failing to focus on it is a failure to honestly search for the truth, for when horrendous suffering is our focus, the standard theodicies don’t work.” It is unclear why standard theodicies fail in cases of horrendous evil. For example, consider the soul-making theodicy: even faced with horrendous evil, one could view it as a process through which the soul is formed, becoming more resilient or more distant from mundane life.
The author states that Sterba proves “such a God concept is logistically incompatible with the degree and amount of horrendous suffering that exists in our world.” If the author accepts Sterba’s claim, he or she should engage the objections raised against Sterba’s account. The claim of logical incompatibility requires demonstration that “the God of Abrahamic religions exists” is fundamentally incompatible with “there are cases of horrendous evil.” Sterba does not establish this; a loving, omnipotent, omniscient being could permit horrendous evil for a greater good or due to reasons beyond our understanding. Even if one finds the reasons improbable or unseeable, that is an evidential (not purely logical) argument that reduces the probability of God’s existence. Metaphysically, there could exist a good reason for God’s permission that we cannot know, given an epistemic gap.
The author mentions Allah among non-theistic gods, but Allah is a theistic God in the Abrahamic tradition.
The author argues that “since a god of cultures dies after the culture goes extinct then God was invented by humans.” This argument is flawed since God exists whether humans or other beings know Him or not. The existence of God is distinct from humans’ epistemic relation to Him. The argument conflates metaphysical reality with epistemic knowledge.
The author says, “If we want to search for a fact-based morality, or some kind of objective ethics, we need to leave a God, gods, and goddesses out of it.” Yet, if moral facts exist objectively, there would be a ground for them. The best explanation for the grounding of objective moral facts is the Good, which is God in Abrahamic thought. Contrary to the author’s claim, the existence of God can help explain the objectivity of ethical facts or norms; without God, as Hume argued, we cannot derive value from natural facts.
The author asks: “Why not teach human beings the truth from the get-go, unless the specific gods were invented by myth-makers to reflect their barbaric moralities?” A very good question. One possible answer is that moral value arises from freely chosen commitments. Perhaps God implants a sense of morality or conscience, but development and understanding of moral norms require effort. God commands major moral guidelines to guide ethical life, but understanding and following them also rely on human reasoning. Myth-makers may have distorted truths, but the existence of fakes depends on the reality of truths.
The author says, “I’m fairly certain there is no god of any kind.” That kind of certainty is notable. However, certainty can be dangerous, as it may foster intolerance toward others.

Comments on Page 4:
13. The author argues against Adams with the claim: “But this difference makes no difference. It does no good to step back behind the commands of God to His purported nature, for we still want to know whether or not God’s nature is good. God’s nature cannot be known to be good without a standard of goodness showing that it is.” But God, by nature, is the Good; if He were not Good, He would not be God and would not be worthy of worship. This is a metaphysical claim rather than an epistemological one. Questions like how we know God is Good, whether we can rationally believe God exists, or whether God is Good, are epistemic questions. If morality is objective, then the ultimate reality of all goods is God—the Love—whose commands flow from His nature as goodness and love, whether we know it or not.

The author prefers Pojman and says, “Because then with Pojman, we must ask what difference it makes whether or not the same ethical principles come from ‘a special personal authority (God) or from the authority of reason.’” I’m not sure why we should distinguish between divine command as a source of understanding goodness and ethical norms and the commands of reason. Both reason and revelation are sources God bestows upon humans to know the moral way of life, and both provide guidance. Metaphysically, reason can discover divine commands. Like science, we discover natural laws through experience and reason, but the ultimate reality is divine laws and mind.
The author writes, “There is the barbaric god Yahweh in the Old Testament. There is also the militant god of Muslim terrorists. Need I go on?” This concern is worth noting. But we should constrain religious commands and our understanding of divine command by reason. If we think God commands atrocities, we should reject that as not being a genuine divine command, since it conflicts with reason. Our epistemic path to goodness is through reason, but metaphysically goodness depends on God’s command. So we should reject the god of Muslim terrorists as not reflecting true divine command, because our reason indicates it cannot be. By following reason, we can arrive at God’s real commands.

Comment on Page 6:
16. The author asks: “So if morality is indeed objective in the sense that 2+2=4, how could believers get it so wrong for so long, inflicting so much pain and suffering upon others and themselves?” A good question. But this question could also be asked of scientists. If the real world’s norms and laws exist, why were physicians and physicists wrong about certain laws for long periods? The epistemic failures of believers do not prove that the metaphysical nature of reality is relativistic.

Final comment:
17. This is a general note: I understand the author’s concern about the intolerance and immorality that may arise from religious morality. As noted in p.7 and elsewhere, power struggles in early Christianity and early Islam show how religion can be used to empower priests, clerics, and rulers. Religious morality without reasonable boundaries can be dangerous, but this does not refute the existence of a pure religious command guiding human beings toward goodness. Reason alone can ground moral life, but motivation to be moral often comes from the heart, and God can shape such hearts. Faith can help believers be moral more readily than atheists, but they should also follow reason; otherwise, their faith may mislead them into fake divine commands.

Overall assessment:
I thoroughly enjoyed reading your insightful paper. I recommend its publication after substantial revisions to address the points above.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The response to my comments has been a counter-argument, not addressing the suggested changes or improvements (because they do not seem to be pertinent). It refers to having written about the problem of evil, indicating that this exempts further development in this paper, an opinion that this reviewer does not share. The most problematic thing is that s/he does not take charge of relevant observations, alluding that a secular ethic should be accepted by all and therein lies its advantage. The author does not seem to perceive that for this to be so, secular ethics must include all the principles of a non-secular ethics, which seems implausible. I could continue to respond to the rest of the answer, but it seems unnecessary.

Author Response

I agree with what the Editor wrote for the reasons he gave. My paper should be published.