Competitive Asymmetries and the Threat to Supply Chain Resilience: A Comparative Analysis of the EU–Mercosur Trade Agreement’s Impact on the European Union’s and Polish Agri-Food Sectors

Abstract

This study analyzes the competitive asymmetries and trade effects of the proposed EU–Mercosur Trade Agreement on the European Union’s (EU) and Polish agri-food sectors. The comparative analysis reveals that Mercosur holds a significant structural advantage driven by substantially lower labor costs, cheaper agricultural land, and a climate permitting multiple harvests. This cost advantage is further compounded by weaker regulatory standards (e.g., on pesticides and antibiotics). This structural edge is most pronounced in high-volume commodities, leading to Mercosur trade surpluses in products such as soybeans, sugar cane, and wheat, which pose the primary competitive threats to the EU market. Conversely, the EU maintains an intensive advantage through superior yields in intensive farming (e.g., maize) and specialization in high-value, processed products. This creates quantifiable export opportunities for EU/Polish producers in sectors where Mercosur is a consistent net importer, notably other frozen vegetables, preserved tomatoes, and apples. The findings confirm an asymmetric effect of liberalization, which necessitates a dual strategy of internal structural reform (e.g., the EU Protein Strategy) and the implementation of external protective mechanisms, including strategic Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) adaptations and safeguard clauses, to maintain the long-term competitiveness and Supply Chain Resilience of European agriculture.

1. Introduction

The proposed trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur—a culmination of negotiations spanning two decades—represents a critical juncture for both blocs, promising economic diversification and enhanced global Supply Chain Resilience [1,2,3]. While the agreement is projected to foster export opportunities for certain sectors [4,5,6], it remains politically fragile, largely due to fierce opposition from European farmer organizations who fear its disruptive impact on the agricultural sector [7,8]. This conflict centers on the potential for trade liberalization to accelerate structural vulnerabilities within the EU’s agri-food system, thereby demanding a rigorous, evidence-based assessment of the resulting competitive dynamics [9].

The root of the conflict lies in structural competitive asymmetries. Mercosur countries possess a distinct structural advantage based on significantly lower labor and agricultural land costs, coupled with climatic conditions that allow for multiple harvests per year, enabling low-cost production of bulk commodities [9]. This contrasts sharply with the EU’s high-cost, intensive production model. Moreover, the EU’s deep reliance on imported protein crops, particularly soybeans for animal feed, creates a critical vulnerability, directly challenging the EU’s food system. This dependence links the EU market to Mercosur’s production system and, consequently, to associated environmental issues such as deforestation [10,11].

The resulting trade effects present a duality of threats and opportunities. The competitive threat is concentrated in “sensitive” agricultural goods like beef, poultry, and soybeans, where Mercosur is a dominant net exporter, leading to concerns over market “flooding” and price depression, thereby posing a risk to the long-term Supply Chain Resilience of European domestic production [12,13,14]. Conversely, the agreement opens significant export opportunities for the EU in high-value, processed products, leveraging the EU’s intensive advantage [15,16]. This duality is particularly relevant for Poland, which, despite having significant agricultural resources, is challenged by structural deficiencies—such as low labor productivity—that may compromise its competitiveness against low-cost Mercosur imports [16,17,18].

Given the scale of these structural asymmetries and the concentrated nature of the competitive threats, a comprehensive comparative analysis is urgently needed. This study aims to comparatively analyze and evaluate the structural competitive asymmetries and the resulting trade effects of the EU–Mercosur Agreement on the agri-food sector of the EU and Poland. By identifying specific threats, validating the EU’s intensive advantages, and examining the trade-offs, the ultimate objective is to determine the adaptive strategies, such as internal CAP reforms, and external protective mechanisms required to mitigate asymmetric impacts and safeguard the long-term competitiveness and Supply Chain Resilience of the European agri-food sector.

2. Literature Review

The proposed trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) is a pivotal subject in agricultural policy research, drawing scrutiny due to its potential to redefine global supply chains and competitive landscapes, and crucially, its impact on Supply Chain Resilience [2,4]. The following literature review is structured to address the core components of the proposed methodology: competitive asymmetries, production potential, and resulting trade effects. Research highlights structural differences between the EU and Mercosur agri-food sectors that form the foundation of competitive asymmetry. Mercosur’s economy is undergoing a process of “re-primarization,” with significant political interest in the agreement concentrated in the agribusiness sector [1,7].

Supply Chain Management (SCM) serves as the strategic framework for this analysis, defined as the integration of key business processes across a network to improve the flow of goods, services, and information, with the objective of reducing system-wide costs while maintaining required service levels [19].

Supply Chain Resilience is defined as “the adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining continuity of operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over structure and function.” [20]. This multidisciplinary perspective highlights that resilience is not just the ability to “bounce back,” but a dynamic process that integrates preparedness, an efficient response, and the possibility of achieving a post-disruption state even better than the original. This is crucial in a context of structural change, such as the one imposed by the EU–Mercosur agreement.

The analysis of the competitive and structural threats of the EU–Mercosur agreement can be framed within a classification of Supply Chain Risks (SCR). These risks are typically categorized into: demand-side risk (such as prediction fluctuations or poor understanding of customer preferences), supply-side risk (such as financial instability of suppliers or raw material quality issues), and logistic risk (such as transport mode or transit risks) [21]. The competitive asymmetries highlighted in this study, like Mercosur’s lower labor and land costs, can be interpreted as a form of macro-level supplier stability risk, as they threaten the viability of European producers by depressing prices [21].

The elements of Supply Chain Resilience are organized into two essential categories that facilitate analysis and management: proactive (ex-ante) strategies and reactive (ex-post) strategies [22]. Proactive strategies, such as supply chain visibility and flexibility, are implemented before a disruption to increase readiness. Conversely, reactive strategies focus on response and recovery, aiming to minimize impact and restore operations. This distinction is critical for the EU–Mercosur agreement analysis, as successful adaptation to structural change will depend on the correct combination of proactive investment in capabilities and the speed of reactive response to ensuing market shocks [22].

A significant competitive gap arises from differing regulatory standards, which fundamentally affects the security and resilience of imported supply chains [1,7]. This can be formally analyzed as an Inbound Supply Risk, defined as “the potential occurrence of an incident associated with inbound supply (…) in which its outcomes result in the inability of the purchasing firm to meet customer demand or cause threats to customer life and safety” [23]. As regulations governing agricultural production in Mercosur are generally weaker than in the EU, particularly regarding key safety standards, the resulting inbound supply risk must be rigorously assessed based on its probability and impact, particularly regarding:

• Pesticides: Active ingredients banned in the EU remain authorized and in use in Mercosur, creating a serious risk concerning maximum residue limits (MRLs) in imported food and raising questions about the effectiveness of EU border controls [7,14,24].
• Antibiotics: Growth-promoting antibiotics, such as bacitracin, flavomycin, and monensin, are still authorized and used intensively in animal production in parts of Mercosur, despite being banned in the EU [7,14,24].
• Traceability and Animal Welfare: With the exception of Uruguay, Mercosur countries display a global lack of cattle production traceability and poorly developed animal welfare regulations [7,14,24].

The EU’s structural dependence on high-protein feed imports is a long-standing vulnerability, with the self-sufficiency rate for soybean meal at only 3% [10]. This dependence is a core threat to Supply Chain Resilience as it exposes the EU to global price volatility and indirectly links its consumption to deforestation and land degradation in South American biomes like the Amazon and the Cerrado [10,11]. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by EU agricultural policy’s tendency to treat the sector as homogeneous, which, according to [9], disproportionately disadvantages territorially embedded, mid-sized cereal farms by amplifying the competitive advantage of vertically integrated agribusinesses.

It is crucial to understand the role of supply chain complexity, which can modulate the effectiveness of adaptation strategies. Research distinguishes between structural complexity (the intricacy and interdependence of network components) and dynamic complexity (the chain’s adaptability to external changes, such as market volatility and technological disruptions) [25]. These factors not only influence the adoption of initiatives like green innovation or efficient logistics but can also amplify or diminish resilience [25]. In a context of structural change imposed by the EU–Mercosur agreement, lower structural complexity appears to amplify the effectiveness of innovation strategies [25].

The Polish agri-food sector, despite possessing the largest labor resources and the fifth largest land resources in the EU, is characterized by structural deficiencies, notably low capital expenditure, low labor productivity, and low production intensity relative to other EU Member States [17]. These weaknesses compromise the competitive position of Polish producers against lower-cost Mercosur imports [8,17].

The comparative analysis of production potential reveals two distinct competitive models that align with modern SCM strategies. Mercosur’s structural advantage—leveraging vast land resources, lower input costs, and favorable climatic conditions—enables large-scale, low-cost production of bulk commodities [10,11]. This model closely resembles a Lean Supply Chain strategy, which prioritizes process efficiency, waste elimination, and is typically implemented via a make-to-stock (MTS) approach to ensure high volume and low cost [26].

Conversely, the EU, constrained by higher costs and limited land, competes primarily through high-yield, high-intensity production and a focus on value-added, processed agri-food goods [14,17]. This aligns more with an Agile or Leagile strategy [26]. Specifically, the EU’s advantage in processed goods allows for the adoption of form postponement, a key leagile hybrid strategy where the production of generic, semi-finished goods is lean, but the final, customized value-added processing (e.g., specific cuts of meat, processed vegetables) is agile and market-responsive [27,28].

The agreement is seen by some as an accelerator of internal structural consolidation, where the reliance on cheap foundational commodities (soy, maize, wheat, rice) from Mercosur creates severe price pressures, leading to the marginalization and acquisition of mid-sized EU cereal farms by larger agribusinesses [9].

The principal threats are concentrated in sensitive agricultural sectors. It is estimated that under full implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), EU beef imports from Mercosur could increase by +23% to +52% by 2030 [7]. This anticipated surge is a major concern, as the Mercosur cuts are significantly cheaper, posing a substantial threat to the revenue of EU cattle producers [7]. The Polish government, in line with farmer opposition, has explicitly stated its position against ratifying the current agreement, citing the threat to competitive conditions from the excessive market opening to sensitive goods [8].

Contrary to high-end estimates of harm, the impact will be “very limited.” [13]. This is based on the analysis of the two new Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for fresh (54,450 tonnes) and frozen beef (44,550 tonnes). The TRQs will largely result in a “switching” of existing, high-tariff over-quota imports to the new lower-tariff quota, rather than generating an equivalent volume of new trade, thus predicting a maximum depression of EU beef producer prices of only around 2% [13]. Negative trade effects, though concentrated, are limited due to the inherent defensive mechanisms of the agreement [4].

The agreement is projected to create export opportunities for the EU, consistent with its intensive advantage. These opportunities are concentrated in high-value, processed products such as dairy (cheese, milk powder) and processed foods like chocolate [14]. This aligns with the historical performance of the Polish agri-food sector, which has maintained a positive trade balance with the EU, primarily through the export of high-value processed products of animal and vegetable origin [18].

The dual effects of threat and opportunity necessitate a strategic, adaptive response from the EU. The use of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for sensitive products acts as a necessary protective mechanism against sudden market shocks [13,14]. Beyond these structural mechanisms, successful adaptation requires a shift toward a relationship-based approach to managing the supply chain, a perspective increasingly relevant in outsourced logistics [29].

Relational performance is the single most important factor in engendering customer satisfaction, suggesting that the long-term, mutually beneficial relationship between the blocs—or between the EU and its domestic partners via CAP reforms—is as critical to resilience as the product flow itself [30]. This supports the structural adaptation focus, such as the EU Protein Strategy, which aims to boost domestic production and diversify sources to reduce external dependence [10,31].

For its part, the Polish government’s firm opposition and demand for a comprehensive analysis of all negotiated concessions (including the EU-Ukraine agreement) underscore the need for political safeguard clauses to protect the most vulnerable sectors [8].

The EU has responded to the vulnerability by endorsing the EU Protein Strategy [10]. Supported by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) strategic plans (2023–2027), this strategy aims to reduce Mercosur dependence by boosting domestic protein crop production, diversifying protein sources, and increasing circularity and efficiency [10]. Structural adaptation for the Polish sector, as suggested by its low-productivity metrics, requires investment in labor and capital factors to shift its production mix toward higher-value goods, thereby leveraging its competitive potential within the EU’s intensive model [17]. Finally, while the 2019 agreement’s “sustainable development” chapters were non-enforceable dialogue-based sections [7], the subsequent 2024 version includes a legally binding commitment for Mercosur to halt deforestation by 2030, a key, albeit ambitious, political adaptation [1].

A broader strategic framework, driven by digital transformation, is required to simultaneously address efficiency, resilience, and sustainability. The evolution toward Industry 5.0 (and its extension, Supply Chain 5.0) represents a paradigm shift that balances automation and efficiency (the focus of Industry 4.0) with three fundamental pillars: sustainability, resilience, and human-centricity [32]. By integrating technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), and big data analytics, supply chains move from static, reactive structures to dynamic, predictive ecosystems [32]. This framework is essential for guiding the EU’s strategic adaptation, ensuring that internal reforms and external protective mechanisms seek not only efficiency but also systemic robustness and integrated environmental responsibility.

In the context of trade policy and geopolitical risks, resilience is often operationalized as geographic diversification of sourcing. A recent analysis [33], underscores that geographically diversified supply chains are less vulnerable to exporter-specific supply shocks (such as tariffs or natural disasters), much like an investment portfolio reduces overall risk. Specifically, products with more diversified import sources have been shown to exhibit greater resilience to trade cost shocks, such as rising shipping rates or tariffs. However, diversification carries a trade-off with efficiency, as it may necessitate sourcing goods from suppliers with marginally higher costs. This balance between cost (efficiency) and security (resilience) is a central factor in the strategic evaluation of an agreement like EU–Mercosur, where the opening of new supply sources must be weighed against cost implications [33].

Poland provides an informative case within the EU for three reasons. First, it combines a large agricultural base with a production structure in which several subsectors remain closer to commodity-oriented competition, which may increase exposure to price-based import pressure [1,8,17]. Second, the sector faces documented productivity and capital-intensity gaps relative to higher-performing EU Member States, potentially affecting its capacity to adjust through upgrading or product differentiation [17]. Third, Poland is an important participant in intra-EU agri-food supply chains; pressures or adjustments in Polish production can therefore have distributional and resilience implications that extend beyond national outcomes [10,31].

Existing work on the EU–Mercosur agreement often focuses either on sector-level welfare outcomes, on specific sensitive products (notably beef), or on sustainability provisions and regulatory concerns [1,17]. Less attention has been paid to an integrated comparative framework that connects (i) structural cost and production asymmetries, (ii) crop productivity differences, and (iii) product-level trade balance signals that indicate where competitive pressures and export opportunities are concentrated—while also drawing clear implications for policy instruments (e.g., TRQs, safeguard clauses, and protein-crop strategies) [7,15,17]. This study addresses that gap by combining a structured comparison of competitive fundamentals with a product-group trade balance assessment for Mercosur across multiple time windows, and by translating these findings into policy-relevant implications for the EU with a specific focus on Poland.

Mercosur is not a homogeneous production space: factor costs, production systems, and regulatory enforcement vary across Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay [6,7]. Aggregating results at bloc level is useful for a first-order comparison aligned with the EU’s trade policy unit, but it may mask country-specific patterns and volatility [34]. To reduce sensitivity to single-year shocks, the trade balance analysis is reported across three multi-year windows (2014–2018, 2019–2021, 2022–2024), which smooth short-term fluctuations related to weather events, macroeconomic cycles, and pandemic-era disruptions [35]. The paper therefore interprets point estimates as indicative signals of persistent net exporter/importer positions rather than precise forecasts, and it treats heterogeneity and volatility as limitations that motivate cautious policy interpretation [36].

In summary, there is a significant competitive and structural asymmetries between the EU and Mercosur agri-food sectors, driven primarily by Mercosur’s substantial cost advantage in labor and land, as well as its superior climatic conditions allowing for multi-harvest production. This body of research collectively indicates a resulting asymmetric trade effect, outlining competitive threats in raw commodities (like soybeans and grains) and identifying export opportunities for European producers in processed and temperate-zone products (such as frozen vegetables and apples). To systematically translate these documented structural differences and potential trade implications into a cohesive, evidence-based evaluation—and thereby achieve the general objective of the study—a rigorous analytical framework is required. Consequently, this study will employ a Comparative Analysis Approach, structuring the methodology into a systematic investigation of the competitive asymmetries, production potentials, and historical trade balances between the EU (with a focus on Poland) and Mercosur to diagnose the full nature and magnitude of the proposed trade liberalization’s impact.

3. Methodology

The present study is grounded in a Comparative Analysis Approach as its central methodological framework. This approach is designed for the systematic and structured evaluation of the competitive disparities, the resulting trade effects, and the implications for Supply Chain Resilience of the EU–Mercosur Agreement on the European Union’s (EU) agri-food sector, with a specific focus on the context of Poland.

The research problem focuses on the nature and magnitude of the potential impact of trade liberalization resulting from the proposed EU–Mercosur Trade Agreement on the agri-food sector of the European Union, and specifically, Poland. The underlying concern is whether the significant structural competitive asymmetries (such as labor and land costs, and climatic advantages) favor Mercosur to such an extent that they compromise the long-term competitiveness and Supply Chain Resilience of European producers, which necessitates the identification of threats and opportunities to formulate adaptive strategies and safeguard mechanisms.

General Objective

To comparatively analyze and evaluate the structural competitive asymmetries and the resulting trade effects of the EU–Mercosur Agreement on the agri-food sector of the EU and Poland, with the ultimate aim of identifying specific threats and opportunities for European production and proposing the adaptive strategies required to safeguard Supply Chain Resilience.

Research Questions

The following questions guide the research to achieve the general objective:

• What are the main competitive asymmetries between the agri-food sectors of the EU/Poland and Mercosur in terms of labor costs, land prices, and climatic advantages (multiple harvests)?
• Which agri-food product groups represent a competitive threat to the EU/Poland sector (where Mercosur is a net exporter) and which represent an export opportunity (where Mercosur is a net importer) in the context of trade liberalization?
• How are Mercosur’s structural advantage (high production at low cost) and the EU’s intensive advantage (high yields and value-added products) manifested in the cereal and maize production potential of both blocs?
• What adaptive strategies (innovation, focus on high quality) and protective mechanisms (safeguard clauses) are required within the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to mitigate the asymmetric effects and maintain the competitiveness of the European agri-food sector, particularly the Polish one?

The methodology is systematically organized into four distinct and interconnected key dimensions, each carefully designed and integrated to ensure a robust and comprehensive approach. This structural alignment is imperative, as it facilitates the direct and exhaustive evaluation required to meet the overarching general objective of the study, particularly regarding the maintenance of Supply Chain Resilience, and provides a dedicated framework for answering each of the guiding research questions with precision.

• Analysis of Competitive Asymmetries (Structural Comparison): Data regarding labor costs, unemployment rates, population, farmland prices, agricultural land area, and climatic conditions (including the possibility of two harvests) for the EU, Poland, and Mercosur countries were extracted from the source materials, primarily based on the data presented in Table 1 and Table 2.
• Assessment of Production Potential (Productivity Analysis): Comparative data on the area, production, and yields of total cereals and maize for 2023 were analyzed (Table 3) to quantify the scale and intensity differences in grain production.
• Identification of Trade Effects (Trade Balance Analysis): Quantitative trade balance data for selected agri-food products in Mercosur were analyzed over three periods (2014–2018, 2019–2021, and 2022–2024). This analysis will be used to identify product groups representing threats (where Mercosur is a net exporter) and opportunities (where Mercosur is a net importer) for the EU/Polish agri-food sector.
• Formulation of Adaptive Strategies and Protective Mechanisms (Policy Synthesis): Based on the results of the Trade Balance Analysis (Dimension 3), a systematic review and synthesis of relevant literature (EU Protein Strategy, CAP, Tariff Rate Quotas, Safeguard Clauses) and institutional positions (e.g., the Polish government) were conducted to formulate evidence-based policy recommendations designed to mitigate the asymmetric competitive impacts and safeguard Supply Chain Resilience.

The foundation of this research rests entirely upon the analysis of robust and verifiable secondary data. This exclusive reliance is critical given the study’s comparative nature, which necessitates harmonized, reliable, and globally recognized statistical figures across two distinct economic and geographical blocs: the European Union (with focus on Poland) and Mercosur. The data utilized are drawn exclusively from authoritative international institutional reports, peer-reviewed academic literature, and established global trade and economic databases. The primary, underlying sources of the data, as cited and leveraged within the reference documents, include internationally recognized bodies such as the European Union’s statistical office (Eurostat) [37], the World Bank [38], the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT) [39], and the United Nations Comtrade database [40,41]. The application of these cross-regional data sets is thus fundamental to successfully executing the quantitative analyses required for the Structural Comparison, Productivity Analysis, and Trade Balance Analysis dimensions of this methodology.

As a sensitivity check, we replicate the trade-balance sign (net exporter vs. net importer) for the top five products using country-level Mercosur data (Argentina/Brazil/Paraguay/Uruguay) and verify whether bloc-level signals are driven by a single member.

Table 1. Competitive Asymmetries: Labor Costs and Demographics (EU, Poland, and Mercosur).

Region/Country	Average Labor Cost (€/h)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Population (mn)
EU (average)	15–20	5.9	448
Poland	7–9	2.8	37.6
Brazil	1.2–1.6	6.2	216
Argentina	2–3	7.9	46
Uruguay	3–4	7.0	3.5
Paraguay	1.6–2.0	5.6	7.4
Mercosur (average)	2.3	7.5	273

Source: Based on Eurostat [42], World Bank [38], Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) [43], Playroll [44], Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC) [45] Notshe [44], Unión Argentina de Trabajadores Rurales y Estibadores (UATRE) [46], Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social del Uruguay (MTSS) [47].

Table 1. Competitive Asymmetries: Labor Costs and Demographics (EU, Poland, and Mercosur).

Region/Country	Average Labor Cost (€/h)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Population (mn)
EU (average)	15–20	5.9	448
Poland	7–9	2.8	37.6
Brazil	1.2–1.6	6.2	216
Argentina	2–3	7.9	46
Uruguay	3–4	7.0	3.5
Paraguay	1.6–2.0	5.6	7.4
Mercosur (average)	2.3	7.5	273

Source: Based on Eurostat [42], World Bank [38], Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) [43], Playroll [44], Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC) [45] Notshe [44], Unión Argentina de Trabajadores Rurales y Estibadores (UATRE) [46], Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social del Uruguay (MTSS) [47].

Table 2. Competitive Asymmetries: Agricultural Land Costs and Climatic Advantage.

Region/Country	Average Agricultural Land Cost (€/ha)	Utilised Agricultural Area (mn ha)	Climatic Advantage (Possibility of Two Harvests/Year)
EU (average)	11,000–30,000	156	Temperate climate—usually 1 harvest/year
Poland	12,000–15,000	14.7	Temperate climate—1 harvest/year, occasionally 2
Brazil	2000–5000	263	Tropical and subtropical climate—yes, 2 harvests/year in many regions
Argentina	3000–8000	156	Temperate, semi-arid climate—yes, 2 harvests in the Pampas regions
Uruguay	2000–4000	16	Warm temperate climate—no, 1 harvest/year
Paraguay	1500–3000	22	Tropical climate—yes, 2 harvests/year
Mercosur (average)	≈3000–5000	≈457	Yes/Partially, 2 harvests/year possible in most countries

Source: Based on [24,39,40,48,49].

Table 2. Competitive Asymmetries: Agricultural Land Costs and Climatic Advantage.

Region/Country	Average Agricultural Land Cost (€/ha)	Utilised Agricultural Area (mn ha)	Climatic Advantage (Possibility of Two Harvests/Year)
EU (average)	11,000–30,000	156	Temperate climate—usually 1 harvest/year
Poland	12,000–15,000	14.7	Temperate climate—1 harvest/year, occasionally 2
Brazil	2000–5000	263	Tropical and subtropical climate—yes, 2 harvests/year in many regions
Argentina	3000–8000	156	Temperate, semi-arid climate—yes, 2 harvests in the Pampas regions
Uruguay	2000–4000	16	Warm temperate climate—no, 1 harvest/year
Paraguay	1500–3000	22	Tropical climate—yes, 2 harvests/year
Mercosur (average)	≈3000–5000	≈457	Yes/Partially, 2 harvests/year possible in most countries

Source: Based on [24,39,40,48,49].

Table 3. Production Potential: Area, Production, and Yields for Cereals and Maize (2023).

Country/Region	Crop	Area (ha)	Production (t)	Yield (t/ha)
Argentina	Cereals, primary	16,293,288	62,106,557	3.81
Brazil	Cereals, primary	29,210,869	155,877,474	5.34
European Union (27)	Cereals, primary	50,949,250	271,494,220	5.33
Mercosur (4)	Cereals, primary	47,894,414	228,793,670	4.78
Poland	Cereals, primary	7,188,220	35,183,860	4.89
Uruguay	Cereals, primary	857,114	3,937,367	4.59
Argentina	Maize (corn)	8,104,641	41,409,448	5.11
Brazil	Maize (corn)	22,316,340	131,950,246	5.91
European Union (27)	Maize (corn)	8,298,960	61,035,320	7.35
Mercosur (4)	Maize (corn)	31,493,681	178,117,144	5.66
Poland	Maize (corn)	1,255,630	8,981,890	7.15
Uruguay	Maize (corn)	187,900	265,900	1.42

Source: Self-made based on FAO 2023 data [39].

Table 3. Production Potential: Area, Production, and Yields for Cereals and Maize (2023).

Country/Region	Crop	Area (ha)	Production (t)	Yield (t/ha)
Argentina	Cereals, primary	16,293,288	62,106,557	3.81
Brazil	Cereals, primary	29,210,869	155,877,474	5.34
European Union (27)	Cereals, primary	50,949,250	271,494,220	5.33
Mercosur (4)	Cereals, primary	47,894,414	228,793,670	4.78
Poland	Cereals, primary	7,188,220	35,183,860	4.89
Uruguay	Cereals, primary	857,114	3,937,367	4.59
Argentina	Maize (corn)	8,104,641	41,409,448	5.11
Brazil	Maize (corn)	22,316,340	131,950,246	5.91
European Union (27)	Maize (corn)	8,298,960	61,035,320	7.35
Mercosur (4)	Maize (corn)	31,493,681	178,117,144	5.66
Poland	Maize (corn)	1,255,630	8,981,890	7.15
Uruguay	Maize (corn)	187,900	265,900	1.42

Source: Self-made based on FAO 2023 data [39].

4. Results

The analysis of competitive asymmetries, production potential, and trade balances yields quantitative data that directly address the four research questions, outlining the structural context and potential impacts of the EU–Mercosur Agreement on the EU and Polish agri-food sectors, particularly concerning Supply Chain Resilience. The comparison of key structural factors reveals significant competitive asymmetries between the EU/Poland and the Mercosur bloc, primarily driven by divergent costs for labor and agricultural land.

As shown in Table 1, Mercosur countries possess a substantial structural advantage in labor costs. The average labor cost per hour in the EU is significantly higher, ranging from €15 to €20/h, with Poland at €7–€9/h. In stark contrast, the Mercosur average is approximately €2.3/h, with Brazil and Paraguay exhibiting the lowest rates at €1.2–€2.0/h. This cost difference, combined with Mercosur’s larger combined population (273 million) compared to Poland (37.6 million), underpins the bloc’s capacity for high-volume, cost-competitive production.

Poland’s position in Table 1 shows its position as an intermediate cost zone within the EU. Its labor costs (€7–€9/h) are well below the EU average (€15–€20/h), which can support competitiveness in labor-intensive segments of agri-food production and processing within the EU single market. However, the gap relative to Mercosur remains large: even using conservative ranges, Poland’s hourly costs are several times higher than those reported for Brazil and Paraguay. This implies that if liberalization increases competition in price-sensitive product categories, Poland may face adjustment pressure despite being “low-cost” by EU standards.

At the same time, Poland’s comparatively low unemployment rate (2.8%) suggests limited slack in the labor market, which can constrain rapid cost adjustment through labor supply expansion. In practical terms, this points to a competitiveness pathway that depends less on lowering wages and more on improving labor productivity, mechanization, and value-added upgrading. Therefore, Table 1 does not simply show “cheap vs. expensive” blocs; it highlights Poland as a case where competitiveness hinges on whether productivity and processing intensity can offset cost-based import competition.

The asymmetry in land costs and productivity is detailed in Table 2. The average cost of agricultural land in the EU ranges from €11,000 to €30,000 per hectare, with Polish land costing between €12,000 and €15,000/ha. Conversely, the Mercosur average land cost is estimated to be between €3000 and €5000/ha, a significant cost advantage. Furthermore, Mercosur benefits from a critical climatic advantage: its tropical and subtropical zones, especially in Brazil and Paraguay, allow for two harvests per year (e.g., maize and soybean), effectively doubling the annual productivity of the land compared to the temperate climate of the EU and Poland, which typically permits only one harvest.

For Poland, Table 2 shows the combination of two constraints that shape its adjustment capacity: (i) relatively high land prices compared to Mercosur, and (ii) a climatic regime that largely limits production to one annual harvest cycle. Even if Poland’s land costs are closer to the lower bound of the EU range, they remain substantially higher than Mercosur averages, which affects the economics of scale expansion in field crops. In contrast, the multi-harvest potential in parts of Mercosur effectively increases annual land productivity and can reinforce cost advantages in bulk commodities where margins are tight.

Poland’s utilised agricultural area (14.7 mn ha) indicates meaningful production capacity, but the key implication is that expansion-based competition (producing more of the same commodities at lower unit cost) is structurally harder to sustain than in multi-harvest contexts. As a result, Poland’s adaptation logic is likely to be more “quality-and-efficiency” oriented: improving yields, input efficiency, and shifting output composition toward higher value-added chains. The climatic note (“occasionally 2 harvests”) is analytically important as well: it suggests some regional or crop-specific flexibility, but not at a scale that would close the structural gap with tropical/subtropical production systems.

4.1. Production Potential: Scale and Intensity (Addressing RQ3)

The analysis of 2023 production data for cereals and maize shows a trade-off between the extensive scale of Mercosur and the intensive yields of the EU, as presented in Table 3. The Mercosur bloc exhibits a structural advantage in terms of production scale, particularly for maize. The total area dedicated to maize in Mercosur is 31.5 million hectares (ha), substantially larger than the EU-27’s 8.3 million ha. This extensive cultivation area allows Mercosur to achieve a total maize production of 178.1 million tonnes (t), nearly three times the EU’s output of 61.0 million t. For total cereals, Mercosur utilizes 47.9 million ha to produce 228.8 million t, close to the EU’s total area of 50.9 million ha and production of 271.5 million t.

In contrast, the EU and Poland demonstrate a pronounced intensive advantage through superior yields. This intensity is most evident in maize production: the EU-27 yield is 7.35 t/ha, significantly exceeding Mercosur’s 5.66 t/ha. Poland specifically recorded a high maize yield of 7.15 t/ha, confirming the EU’s competitive edge in high-intensity, high-yield farming, while Mercosur’s yield for total cereals (4.78 t/ha) is slightly below the EU’s average (5.33 t/ha).

While Mercosur dominates in maize area and total output, Poland’s maize yield (7.15 t/ha) is close to the EU-27 average (7.35 t/ha) and substantially above Mercosur (5.66 t/ha) (Table 3). This is an important point for interpretation: Poland is not only a peripheral participant captured in aggregated EU figures, but a contributor to the EU’s yield-based competitiveness in key crops.

At the same time, Poland’s cereals yield (4.89 t/ha) sits below the EU-27 cereals average (5.33 t/ha). This within-country contrast suggests that Poland’s competitiveness is crop- and technology-specific: in some segments (maize), intensity and productivity are already aligned with EU performance; in others (aggregate cereals), there may be scope for productivity catch-up. From a policy and strategy perspective, this pattern supports targeted upgrading rather than uniform intensification. It also implies that exposure to import competition may differ by product group: Poland’s higher-yield segments can compete on efficiency, whereas lower-yield segments may be more sensitive to price-based competition from extensive, low-cost suppliers.

4.2. Trade Effects: Threats and Opportunities (Addressing RQ2)

The trade balance analysis of Mercosur across three periods identifies clear sectors of competitive threat (positive balance) and sectors of potential export opportunity for the EU (negative balance) for the 2022–2024 period.

Sectors where Mercosur is a net exporter represent the primary competitive threats (see

Table 4. Trade Effects: Mercosur Net Exporter (Competitive Threats in Thousand Tons).

CN Code	Product Description	2014–2018	2019–2021	2022–2024
1201	Soya beans	74,107.2	66,201.6	96,740.0
1701	Sugar cane	30,723.7	19,511.9	32,491.8
1001	Wheat	5069.6	5252.0	5604.4
2009	Fruit and vegetable juices	2457.4	2519.0	2784.0
200911, 200912, 200919	Orange juice	2170.9	2185.7	2526.2
1003	Barley	2128.7	2054.3	2466.8
1007	Sorghum	700.0	965.6	1256.3
1512	Sunflower seed	522.3	322.1	760.8
230630	Sunflower seed cake	540.5	386.0	671.1
071331; 071333	Beans, dry	378.2	418.7	439.4
1205	Rape or colza seed	51.1	128.5	246.3
2008	Fruit, nuts, and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved in some way	344.8	94.5	68.4
0806	Grapes	18.8	54.7	49.4
080830	Pears	154.8	171.2	146.3

Note: Positive trade balance indicates Mercosur is a net exporter, posing a competitive threat to the EU market. Source: United Nations [38,41].

). The largest threat is in Soya beans (CN 1201), with a positive trade balance of 96,740.0 thousand tonnes in the most recent period, which indicates dependency of global feed chains on this commodity, posing a risk to the resilience of the supply chain. Other significant threats, representing major high-volume Mercosur exports, include:

• Sugar cane (CN 1701): 32,491.8 thousand tonnes
• Wheat (CN 1001): 5604.4 thousand tonnes
• Orange juice (CN 2009): 2526.2 thousand tonnes

These bulk commodities are poised to exert significant price pressure on comparable EU products.

In Table 4, the very large surplus in soybeans is particularly consequential given the EU’s feed-protein dependence: even if Poland is not a major soybean producer relative to global suppliers, its livestock and feed industries are embedded in EU protein supply chains and therefore exposed to price volatility and sourcing concentration. In that sense, soybean surpluses relate to Poland’s vulnerability through upstream inputs rather than through direct crop competition alone.

For cereals and other bulk commodities (wheat, barley, sorghum), Poland’s exposure is more direct. Poland has sizable cereal production and participates strongly in EU grain markets; downward price pressure in EU commodity markets can translate into income risk for farms that operate with higher factor costs and stricter standards. This matters for structural adjustment: where farm margins are already constrained, intensified import competition can accelerate consolidation pressures or incentivize a shift toward alternative crops and more processed value chains. Therefore, Table 4 should be interpreted as a signal of where competitive pressure could concentrate in EU markets and indirectly affect Poland’s farm income stability and investment capacity.

Conversely, sectors where Mercosur is a net importer represent potential export opportunities for the EU’s high-value, processed food sector (see

Table 5. Trade Effects: Mercosur Net Importer (Export Opportunities in Thousand Tons).

CN Code	Product Description	2014–2018	2019–2021	2022–2024
2004	Other vegetables prepared or preserved by other means than vinegar or acetic acid, frozen	−197.7	−199.6	−146.1
2002	Preserved tomatoes	−155.6	−168.9	−130.3
080810	Apples	42.1	75.8	−92.6
2005	Vegetable preserves including homogenized	−64.0	−84.2	−57.2
70310	Onions and shallots, dry (excluding dehydrated)	−88.2	−42.1	−38.4
80940	Plums and sloes	−30.5	−25.1	−35.3
710	Frozen vegetables	−27.9	−29.8	−33.8
711	Vegetables provisionally preserved	−14.6	−7.1	−22.9
1105	Potato flour, meal, powder, flakes and granules	−11.3	−8.1	−15.5
81110	Strawberries frozen	−4.4	0.2	−13.1
71220	Dried onions (whole, cut, sliced, broken, or powdered).	−5.7	−9.6	−11.8
71151	Mushrooms and truffles preserved	−8.6	−10.9	−11.7
80930	Peaches and nectarines	−19.9	−13.2	−11.3
71021	Peas, dry	−8.8	−9.4	−10.5
701	Potatoes	−9.3	−9.3	−9.5
2001	Vegetable preserved	−3.7	−4.7	−5.4
2003	Mushrooms preserved	−5.7	−5.2	−3.5
81310	Apricots	−3.7	−4.3	−3.1
70320	Green garlic	−87.5	−67.2	−1.3

Note: Negative trade balance indicates Mercosur is a net importer, representing an export opportunity for the EU’s high-value, processed products. Source: United Nations [41].

). The largest negative trade balances (net imports) were observed in:

• Other frozen vegetables (CN 2004): −146.1 thousand tonnes.
• Preserved tomatoes (CN 2002): −130.3 thousand tonnes.
• Vegetable preserves (CN 2005): −57.2 thousand tonnes.

This pattern suggests that Mercosur relies on imports for certain processed and high-value agricultural goods, aligning with the EU’s core export strengths and supporting the theory of complementary trade in processed goods.

Several of the product groups where Mercosur is a net importer—frozen vegetables, preserved tomatoes, vegetable preserves, selected fruits—align with capabilities in EU agri-food processing and with Poland’s established role as a processor and exporter within European value chains. In analytical terms, this table supports the argument that the agreement’s effects are not only competitive threats but also potential channels for complementary trade in higher value-added segments (Table 5).

However, converting net-import signals into realized export gains is not automatic. Poland would need to overcome distance-related logistics costs, ensure consistent quality and certification compliance, and potentially invest in market development (branding, distribution partnerships, cold-chain integration). The implication is that Table 5 represents an opportunity set conditional on supply-chain organization: the capacity to deliver processed goods reliably at scale, with stable quality and competitive landed costs. This is precisely why Poland is analytically useful in the paper: it is large enough to matter quantitatively, but its gains depend on whether productivity improvements and coordinated processing/logistics strategies can translate comparative advantage into sustainable market access.

4.3. Synthesis of Structural and Trade Effects

The convergence of structural asymmetries (low Mercosur labor and land costs confirmed in Table 1 and Table 2, combined with climatic advantages) with significant trade surpluses in bulk commodities (soy, sugar, wheat, demonstrated in Table 4) confirms the magnitude of the competitive threat to the EU’s sensitive agri-food sectors and their Supply Chain Resilience. Conversely, the high-yield performance of EU/Polish maize and cereals, alongside Mercosur’s import dependency on specific processed vegetable products (as shown in Table 3 and Table 5), validates the theoretical intensive advantage of the EU. These results collectively necessitate the formulation of the adaptive strategies and protective mechanisms addressed in Research Question 4.

5. Discussion

The comparative analysis demonstrates that the cost and structural asymmetries between the EU and Mercosur are the primary drivers of potential trade impacts. Mercosur’s “extensive advantage”—low labor and land costs combined with climate allowing for high-volume, multi-harvest production (Table 1 and Table 2) [17] —makes its raw commodities highly price-competitive. This structural edge is further compounded by a critical asymmetry in regulatory oversight. Specifically, Mercosur’s continued authorization of pesticides and growth-promoting antibiotics banned in the EU creates an unlevel playing field, reducing production costs while raising serious questions about food safety compliance and the effectiveness of EU border controls [1,7]. This is likely to lead to increased imports of products like soybeans, grains, and sugar cane (Table 4) [35], resulting in downward pressure on commodity prices in the EU, particularly in Poland [4,7], which poses a significant challenge to the long-term economic sustainability and Supply Chain Resilience of the EU’s domestic production.

However, the impacts are not uniformly negative, but rather asymmetric. The EU’s “intensive advantage”—high yields (Table 3), advanced technology, and consumer demand for premium, high-quality, and certified products—provides a mitigating factor (Addressing RQ3). The capacity of the EU to achieve superior maize yields (7.35 t/ha) compared to Mercosur (5.66 t/ha) (Table 3) underscores its competitive edge in intensive, high-productivity farming. This technical advantage, coupled with the higher purchasing power of European consumers, partially shifts demand toward products less vulnerable to direct price competition from Mercosur [14]. Nevertheless, this internal dynamic suggests that the core vulnerability for the EU lies less in overall agricultural capacity and more in its structural dependency on Mercosur for feed protein. This dependency is the primary threat challenging the fundamental Supply Chain Resilience of the EU’s food system, a vulnerability that the agreement threatens to deepen [9,10].

The identification of Mercosur’s net import status for processed temperate-zone products (frozen vegetables, preserves) and certain fruits (apples, onions) (Table 5) presents concrete opportunities for EU/Polish exporters (Addressing RQ2). Mercosur’s consistent negative trade balance in these high-value, processed goods validates the EU’s specialization in high-quality, finished products. For example, Mercosur is a net importer of Other frozen vegetables (−146.1 kt) and Preserved tomatoes (−130.3 kt), sectors where Polish producers can leverage their existing market competence [18]. The removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers under the agreement could intensify trade in these complementary sectors. Successful market entry, however, will require targeted promotional and logistical efforts to overcome geographical distance and integrate into new supply chains.

Several empirical studies conclude that the negative effects of the EU–Mercosur agreement on European agriculture are likely to be limited. These assessments typically emphasize the agreement’s defensive architecture, particularly the use of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) for sensitive products and the expectation that a substantial share of Mercosur exports would consist of trade reallocation rather than genuinely new market penetration. Under this interpretation, lower-tariff quota imports primarily replace existing over-quota flows, leading to modest aggregate price effects, especially in sectors such as beef. In addition, modeling approaches that assume relatively low supply elasticities and stable compliance with EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards tend to produce conservative estimates of import growth and farm income impacts.

The findings of the present study do not directly contradict these more optimistic assessments, but they point to mechanisms that such aggregate estimates may understate. By focusing on structural cost asymmetries and persistent trade balance signals at the product-group level, the analysis highlights how even limited increases in import volumes can exert disproportionate pressure in segments characterized by thin margins and high exposure to price competition. Moreover, while TRQs may constrain headline volumes, they do not eliminate competitive effects transmitted through input markets, particularly in the case of feed proteins, where dependence on external suppliers links domestic livestock production to global price dynamics. In this sense, the potential impact of the agreement is better understood as concentrated and structural rather than uniform and volume-driven.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that the divergence in empirical findings is less a contradiction than a reflection of differing analytical scopes and assumptions. Studies emphasizing limited impacts are more likely to hold under conditions of strict quota enforcement, effective SPS controls, and stable market conditions. Conversely, analyses that foreground structural asymmetries become more relevant when adjustment capacity is uneven across regions and production systems, or when indirect channels—such as upstream input dependency and cumulative price pressure over time—are taken into account. A balanced interpretation therefore implies that the agreement’s outcomes are contingent: negative effects may remain moderate in aggregate terms, while still posing meaningful adjustment challenges for specific sectors and regions, particularly those operating close to cost thresholds. This conditionality reinforces the need for policy designs that are responsive not only to average effects, but also to distributional and structural vulnerabilities.

From a Polish and broader EU industrial perspective, the agreement offers significant export and cost-reduction opportunities that often counterbalance the agricultural risks. Poland, with a currently low share of exports to Mercosur, has the greatest potential for growth in the automotive, machinery, pharmaceutical, and environmental technology sectors, including IT services [5]. Crucially, the agreement facilitates the import of key agricultural and industrial raw materials, such as protein feedstuffs and vegetable oils, which can lower costs for the Polish food and processing industries, thereby increasing their global competitiveness [5]. This aligns with the broader EU goal of increasing resilience through trade diversification [5,14].

While concerns regarding food safety and environmental impact have been central to the political opposition, the agreement’s actual provisions provide a more nuanced picture. Critiques that the deal would undermine European food safety are largely refuted, as Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the existing EU ban on hormone-treated meat will continue to apply to all imports [14]. Regarding deforestation, while illegal logging rose significantly under the previous Brazilian administration, data under the current administration (since 2023) indicates a clear slowdown. Furthermore, research suggests that the demand for products like ethanol could be met without expanding deforestation if sustainable production practices, particularly the intensification of livestock farming to prevent the expansion of pastureland, are adopted [14].

The final balance of benefits and costs for the Polish agri-food sector will depend crucially on its ability to adapt and specialize. Sectors relying on raw commodity production will face intense competition, while processing and high-value-added sectors may see growth opportunities. This underscores the necessity of implementing both internal structural reform and external protective mechanisms to secure the long-term resilience of the supply chain of the agri-food sector (Addressing RQ4). The internal adaptation must focus on overcoming the low capital and labor productivity metrics in Polish agriculture [17]. Externally, the EU must ensure the rigorous application of the new protocol on deforestation and, critically, the strategic use of protective mechanisms. While the Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) may limit the volume of beef and sugar imports [13], the official position of the Polish government remains firm against the agreement’s current form, emphasizing the continued need for effective safeguard clauses to prevent unfair competition across all sensitive product lines and protect the supply chain from excessive dependency [8,14].

6. Conclusions

The comparative analysis of structural asymmetries, production potential, and trade effects confirms that the trade liberalization resulting from the proposed EU–Mercosur Agreement will generate asymmetric competitive pressures on the EU agri-food sector, requiring strategic adaptation. This conclusion is robustly supported by empirical evidence of divergent production models. Specifically, Mercosur benefits from a substantial structural advantage rooted in significantly lower labor and agricultural land costs, coupled with climatic conditions that facilitate multi-harvesting (

Table 6. Summary of Foundational Competitive Asymmetries.

Bloc	Advantage Type	Key Drivers
MERCOSUR	Structural (Low-Cost/Extensive)	– Substantially lower labor Costs (€2.3/h avg.). – Cheaper Agricultural Land (€3k–€5k/ha avg.). – Climatic advantage (multi-harvesting). – Weaker Regulatory Standards (pesticides, antibiotics).
EU/Poland	Intensive (High-Yield/Value-Add)	– Superior Yields (e.g., Maize: EU 7.35 t/ha vs. Mercosur 5.66 t/ha). – Focus on High-Value, Processed Products. – Higher Cost Base and more stringent standards.

Source: Self-made (2025).

) [17]. This structural edge results in trade surpluses in bulk commodities—most notably soybeans, sugar cane, and wheat (Table 4)—which are poised to intensify price competition for European producers already operating under much higher cost bases and more stringent regulatory standards [7]. Consequently, mitigating these pressures necessitates a comprehensive strategy centered on exploiting the EU’s intensive advantage—evidenced by superior yields in crops like maize (Table 3)—and implementing necessary market protection mechanisms to safeguard vulnerable domestic sectors and secure long-term Supply Chain Resilience [14].

• Threats are Concentrated in Raw Commodities: Mercosur’s Structural Cost Advantage.

The primary competitive threat is concentrated in high-volume, bulk agricultural commodities, rooted in Mercosur’s undeniable structural cost advantage. Quantitative data reveal that the average labor cost in Mercosur is approximately €2.3/h, significantly lower than the EU average of €15–€20/h (Table 1). This is compounded by an immense disparity in land costs, with Mercosur’s average agricultural land costing an estimated €3000–€5000/ha, a fraction of the EU’s average (Table 2). Crucially, the climatic advantage of two annual harvests in key Mercosur regions effectively doubles the land’s yearly productivity, cementing its cost-competitive edge. This translates directly into Mercosur trade surpluses in bulk products (Table 4), notably Soya beans (96,740.0 kt), Sugar cane (32,491.8 kt), and Wheat (5604.4 kt). This influx of low-cost commodities, exacerbated by weaker Mercosur regulatory standards on pesticides, antibiotics, and traceability [7], will intensify price competition, threatening the economic viability of comparable EU and, specifically, Polish production [17].

2.

Opportunities Exist in Value-Added and Temperate-Zone Products: The EU’s Intensive Advantage.

Conversely, the EU and Poland maintain an advantage in high-intensity production and value-added goods (

Table 7. Asymmetric Trade Effects and Their Impact (Based on Mercosur’s Net Trade Balance 2022–2024).

Effect Category	Product Type	Evidence (Mercosur Net Trade Balance)	Impact
Threats	Raw, Bulk Commodities	Trade Surpluses in Soybeans, Sugar Cane, and Wheat. (Ref. Table 4)	Intensify price competition, threatening the economic viability of comparable EU/Polish production.
Opportunities	Value-Added, Processed Goods	Consistent Net Importer status for Frozen Vegetables, Preserved Tomatoes, and Processed Potato Products. (Ref. Table 5)	Validate a complementary model and create quantifiable export potential for EU/Polish high-quality producers.

Source: Self-made (2025).

). While Mercosur achieves superior scale in production (e.g., Maize production of 178.1 million tonnes) due to its extensive cultivated area, the EU demonstrates a superior intensive advantage through higher yields, with EU Maize yields reaching 7.35 t/ha compared to Mercosur’s 5.66 t/ha (Table 3). This intensive focus aligns with commercial opportunities arising from Mercosur’s import deficiencies. The bloc consistently shows a negative trade balance (net importer) in specific high-value, processed products (Table 5), such as Other frozen vegetables (−146.1 kt), Preserved tomatoes (−130.3 kt), and Processed potato products (−15.5 kt). These trade patterns validate a complementary model, creating significant, quantifiable export expansion potential for high-quality EU and Polish producers specializing in processed and temperate-zone products [14,18].

3.

Need for Adaptive Strategy: Internal Structural Reform and Market Protective Mechanisms.

To mitigate the asymmetric effects, the competitiveness of European agriculture depends on a dual strategy of internal structural strengthening and external market protection. First, the EU must actively pursue the EU Protein Strategy [10] to reduce its import dependency on Mercosur’s soybeans, which is a major point of structural vulnerability threatening the resilience of the supply chain (

Table 8. Required Adaptive Strategy to Mitigate Asymmetric Effects.

Strategy Focus	Necessary Actions	Goal/Rationale
Internal Structural Reform	– Implement the EU Protein Strategy to reduce soybean import dependency. – Targeted investment in Poland to overcome lows productivity and shift to higher-value goods [17].	Strengthen the domestic sector and reduce core structural vulnerability by exploiting the EU’s intensive advantage to enhance Supply Chain Resilience.
External Protective Mechanisms	– Rigorous enforcement of safeguard clauses for sensitive sectors (e.g., beef, sugar cane). – Political maintenance of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) [14].	Protect vulnerable domestic sectors from low-cost imports and ensure long-term resilience and sustainability of the Supply Chain.

Source: Self-made (2025).

). For the Polish sector, this necessitates targeted investment to overcome existing low-productivity metrics and shift production toward higher-value goods [17]. Second, the implementation of effective market protective mechanisms is non-negotiable. While some analysis suggests the impact may be limited by the nature of the Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) [13], the explicit, concentrated threat posed by Mercosur’s cost advantage necessitates the rigorous enforcement and political maintenance of safeguard clauses for sensitive sectors like beef and sugar cane, ensuring that trade liberalization does not compromise the long-term resilience and sustainability of European domestic food production [14].

The evidence confirms that Mercosur’s structural cost advantage in raw materials will continue to generate intense market pressure. This threat to economic viability and Supply Chain Resilience can only be counteracted by the consistent exploitation of the EU’s intensive advantage in high-value-added production. Therefore, the success of the agreement crucially depends on the rapid implementation of the EU Protein Strategy and the political will to maintain effective and legally binding safeguard clauses for all sensitive agricultural sectors, thereby securing long-term systemic resilience.

Rather than indicating a uniform impact on European agriculture, the comparative evidence suggests that the EU–Mercosur agreement is likely to generate highly differentiated adjustment pressures across product groups and production systems. The central finding is that competitive effects are driven less by trade liberalization per se and more by pre-existing structural conditions, notably persistent differences in labor costs, land prices, and climatic production potential. These factors shape where price-based competition is most likely to intensify—primarily in bulk, commodity-oriented segments—and where the EU’s production model retains relative strength through productivity, processing intensity, and regulatory-driven differentiation. Interpreted this way, the agreement acts as an amplifier of structural asymmetries rather than as an exogenous shock with uniform sectoral consequences.

Poland emerges as a particularly informative case for understanding these dynamics within the EU. Its agri-food sector combines significant production scale with cost and productivity characteristics that place it between higher-cost Western European producers and low-cost Mercosur suppliers. This intermediate position implies that Poland is neither fully shielded by high-cost differentiation nor able to compete on price in bulk commodity markets. As a result, the country’s adjustment path is likely to depend disproportionately on productivity gains, capital deepening, and the expansion of value-added processing rather than on cost compression. From an analytical standpoint, Poland therefore functions as a stress-test case: pressures and adaptation challenges observed in Poland are indicative of broader adjustment tensions that may arise in other EU regions with similar structural profiles.

The policy implication is that effective management of the agreement’s asymmetric effects requires a dual strategy combining internal structural adaptation with targeted external safeguards. Internal measures—such as productivity-enhancing investment, support for processing capacity, and strategies to reduce dependence on imported feed proteins—address vulnerabilities that persist regardless of trade volumes. External instruments, including Tariff Rate Quotas and safeguard clauses, remain relevant where competitive pressure is concentrated and adjustment capacity is limited. Importantly, these tools should be understood as complementary rather than substitutive: safeguards can moderate short-term shocks, but long-term competitiveness and system robustness depend on the EU’s ability, and that of Member States such as Poland, to leverage intensive production advantages and move further along value-added agri-food chains.

The scope of this analysis is delineated by two key methodological parameters. Firstly, the comparative evaluation is based on the necessary use of aggregated data for the EU and Mercosur blocs. While this approach is essential for a high-level, macro-regional comparison, it is important to note that the findings may not fully reflect the significant variations that exist at the individual member-state or regional levels. Secondly, the study is intentionally focused exclusively on the agri-food sector to provide a dedicated and in-depth assessment of its competitive dynamics and structural asymmetries. Consequently, the analysis does not incorporate the potential trade benefits or costs in other economic sectors (e.g., industrial goods or services) covered by the comprehensive EU–Mercosur agreement.

Future research should focus on several key areas to further understand and manage the implications of the EU–Mercosur trade agreement for the resilience of the supply chain. One critical dimension is the Quantitative Modeling of Price Effects, which involves developing econometric models to precisely estimate the impact of increased Mercosur imports (e.g., soybeans, wheat) on EU/Polish domestic market prices and farm income. Another important line of inquiry is the direct Analysis of Supply Chain Resilience, investigating how increased dependence on Mercosur raw materials (e.g., protein crops for feed) affects the stability and food security of the EU supply chain, especially under external shocks. Furthermore, research should address the Impact of Regulatory Convergence, conducting a detailed study on the economic effect of harmonizing environmental and phytosanitary standards, including the influence of the EU’s “European Protein Plan” strategy (E) as a measure to enhance self-sufficiency and resilience in the context of cheaper soy imports. A practical necessity is evaluating the Effectiveness of Safeguard Mechanisms, which calls for an in-depth evaluation of the proposed bilateral safeguard clause (G) for sensitive agricultural products (e.g., sugar cane) and its efficacy in balancing market openness with the need to protect vulnerable sectors and maintain domestic production capacity for resilience. Finally, Targeted Market Research is needed to understand Mercosur consumer preferences for EU/Polish products (e.g., apple varieties, processed foods) to inform effective promotional and marketing campaigns that support diverse, resilient supply chains.