Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects
AbstractThis paper presents evidence from a lab experiment investigating whether the preeminence of conditional cooperators in studies using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001, Economics Letters) is sensitive to changes in the experimental frame. The treatments vary the framing such that the salience of conditionality to subjects is reduced. The results show that these manipulations affect the distribution of elicited types. However, there is no evidence that the framing of Fischbacher et al. overestimates the fraction of conditional cooperators compared to the other frames considered in the experiment. Furthermore, this research finds that conditional contributions elicited using the Fischbacher et al. (2001) frame are the most consistent with contributions in a one-shot public good game. View Full-Text
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Dariel, A. Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects. Games 2018, 9, 37.
Dariel A. Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects. Games. 2018; 9(2):37.Chicago/Turabian Style
Dariel, Aurélie. 2018. "Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects." Games 9, no. 2: 37.
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