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Games, Volume 8, Issue 4 (December 2017)

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Open AccessArticle Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule
Games 2017, 8(4), 52; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040052
Received: 15 September 2017 / Revised: 30 October 2017 / Accepted: 3 November 2017 / Published: 2 December 2017
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Abstract
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based
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We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Good Games)
Open AccessArticle Polarization and Segregation through Conformity Pressure and Voluntary Migration: Simulation Analysis of Co-Evolutionary Dynamics
Games 2017, 8(4), 51; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040051
Received: 5 October 2017 / Revised: 1 November 2017 / Accepted: 6 November 2017 / Published: 22 November 2017
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Abstract
While conformity pressures people to assimilate in a community, an individual occasionally migrates among communities when the individual feels discomfort. These two factors cause segregation and cultural diversity within communities in the society. By embedding a migration dynamic into Kuran and Sandholm’s model
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While conformity pressures people to assimilate in a community, an individual occasionally migrates among communities when the individual feels discomfort. These two factors cause segregation and cultural diversity within communities in the society. By embedding a migration dynamic into Kuran and Sandholm’s model (2008) of preference evolution, we build an agent-based model to see how the variance of preferences in the entire society quantitatively changes over time. We find from the Monte-Carlo simulations that, while preferences assimilate within a community, self-selected migrations enlarge the diversity of preferences over communities in the society. We further study how the arrival rate of migration opportunities and the degree of conformity pressures affect the variance of preferences. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Contribution-Based Grouping under Noise
Games 2017, 8(4), 50; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040050
Received: 12 October 2017 / Revised: 31 October 2017 / Accepted: 3 November 2017 / Published: 17 November 2017
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Abstract
Many real-world mechanisms are “noisy” or “fuzzy”, that is the institutions in place to implement them operate with non-negligible degrees of imprecision and error. This observation raises the more general question of whether mechanisms that work in theory are also robust to more
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Many real-world mechanisms are “noisy” or “fuzzy”, that is the institutions in place to implement them operate with non-negligible degrees of imprecision and error. This observation raises the more general question of whether mechanisms that work in theory are also robust to more realistic assumptions such as noise. In this paper, in the context of voluntary contribution games, we focus on a mechanism known as “contribution-based competitive grouping”. First, we analyze how the mechanism works under noise and what happens when other assumptions such as population homogeneity are relaxed. Second, we investigate the welfare properties of the mechanism, interpreting noise as a policy instrument, and we use logit dynamic simulations to formulate mechanism design recommendations. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Computing Human-Understandable Strategies: Deducing Fundamental Rules of Poker Strategy
Games 2017, 8(4), 49; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040049
Received: 21 August 2017 / Revised: 3 October 2017 / Accepted: 23 October 2017 / Published: 6 November 2017
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Abstract
Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In many situations, we would like to compute strategies that
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Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In many situations, we would like to compute strategies that can actually be implemented by humans, who may have computational limitations and may only be able to remember a small number of features or components of the strategies that have been computed. For example, a human poker player or military leader may not have access to large precomputed tables when making real-time strategic decisions. We study poker games where private information distributions can be arbitrary (i.e., players are dealt cards from different distributions, which depicts the phenomenon in large real poker games where at some points in the hand players have different distribution of hand strength by applying Bayes’ rule given the history of play in the hand thus far). We create a large training set of game instances and solutions, by randomly selecting the information probabilities, and present algorithms that learn from the training instances to perform well in games with unseen distributions. We are able to conclude several new fundamental rules about poker strategy that can be easily implemented by humans. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Game Theoretic Interaction and Decision: A Quantum Analysis
Games 2017, 8(4), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040048
Received: 12 July 2017 / Revised: 19 October 2017 / Accepted: 21 October 2017 / Published: 6 November 2017
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Abstract
An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint matrices and hence a spectral representation. As a
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An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint matrices and hence a spectral representation. As a result, cooperation systems, decision systems and quantum systems all become visible as manifestations of special interaction systems. The treatment of the theory is purely mathematical and does not require any special knowledge of physics. It is shown how standard notions in cooperative game theory arise naturally in this context. In particular, states of general interaction systems are seen to arise as linear superpositions of pure quantum states and Fourier transformation to become meaningful. Moreover, quantum games fall into this framework. Finally, a theory of Markov evolution of interaction states is presented that generalizes classical homogeneous Markov chains to the present context. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
Games 2017, 8(4), 47; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040047
Received: 26 July 2017 / Revised: 28 September 2017 / Accepted: 18 October 2017 / Published: 1 November 2017
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Abstract
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets
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This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to support the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the corresponding strategies are simple as the players face the same augmented game on each round but they play different mixed actions after each realized pure-action profile. We find that certain payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium with much lower discount factor values compared to pure strategies. The theory and the concepts are illustrated in 2 × 2 games. Full article
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Open AccessReview Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
Games 2017, 8(4), 46; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040046
Received: 1 September 2017 / Revised: 17 October 2017 / Accepted: 17 October 2017 / Published: 23 October 2017
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Abstract
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players
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We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg’s representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman’s solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Choice and Decision Making)
Open AccessArticle Shapley Value-Based Payment Calculation for Energy Exchange between Micro- and Utility Grids
Games 2017, 8(4), 45; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040045
Received: 31 July 2017 / Revised: 2 October 2017 / Accepted: 11 October 2017 / Published: 23 October 2017
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Abstract
In recent years, microgrids have developed as important parts of power systems and have provided affordable, reliable, and sustainable supplies of electricity. Each microgrid is managed as a single controllable entity with respect to the existing power system but demands for joint operation
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In recent years, microgrids have developed as important parts of power systems and have provided affordable, reliable, and sustainable supplies of electricity. Each microgrid is managed as a single controllable entity with respect to the existing power system but demands for joint operation and sharing the benefits between a microgrid and its hosting utility. This paper is focused on the joint operation of a microgrid and its hosting utility, which cooperatively minimize daily generation costs through energy exchange, and presents a payment calculation scheme for power transactions based on a fair allocation of reduced generation costs. To fairly compensate for energy exchange between the micro- and utility grids, we adopt the cooperative game theoretic solution concept of Shapley value. We design a case study for a fictitious interconnection model between the Mueller microgrid in Austin, Texas and the utility grid in Taiwan. Our case study shows that when compared to standalone generations, both the micro- and utility grids are better off when they collaborate in power exchange regardless of their individual contributions to the power exchange coalition. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Moral Entitlements and Aspiration Formation in Asymmetric Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from Germany and China
Games 2017, 8(4), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040044
Received: 31 July 2017 / Revised: 26 September 2017 / Accepted: 28 September 2017 / Published: 17 October 2017
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Abstract
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from Germany
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Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from Germany and China. Over the course of the negotiation, bargainers discuss the distribution of an amount of money by alternating offers until they consent or break off. Legal rights are randomly assigned by asymmetric outside options. We videotape and code the in-group discussions. In total, verbal data from 30 groups, 1100 pages of transcripts, and 65 h of discussions are content-analyzed. Our main finding is that strong groups derive and defend moral entitlements from equity concerns with regard to their outside options. They strive for equitable but unequal distributions (e.g., proportional split and split the difference). Moral entitlements materialize in the recorded aspiration levels and final payoffs, which exceed the equal split. By contrast, weak groups aim at equality. Over the course of the negotiation, equity tends to lose, while the prominence of round numbers gains importance. Similarities between the subject pools are found in that equity and prominence are both decisive for the formation of aspiration levels. Chinese negotiations are characterized by long periods of stagnation, only minimal concessions, and the communication of false goals. By contrast, Germans steadily reduce their goals and make concessions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity
Games 2017, 8(4), 43; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040043
Received: 28 July 2017 / Revised: 29 September 2017 / Accepted: 6 October 2017 / Published: 13 October 2017
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Abstract
This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are
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This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)
Open AccessArticle Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario
Games 2017, 8(4), 42; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040042
Received: 4 September 2017 / Revised: 21 September 2017 / Accepted: 21 September 2017 / Published: 2 October 2017
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Abstract
This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and
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This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice. Full article
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle Towards a Fair Distribution Mechanism for Asylum
Games 2017, 8(4), 41; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040041
Received: 31 July 2017 / Revised: 18 September 2017 / Accepted: 20 September 2017 / Published: 25 September 2017
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Abstract
It has been suggested that the distribution of refugees over host countries can be made more fair or efficient if policy makers take into account not only numbers of refugees to be distributed but also the goodness of the matches between refugees and
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It has been suggested that the distribution of refugees over host countries can be made more fair or efficient if policy makers take into account not only numbers of refugees to be distributed but also the goodness of the matches between refugees and their possible host countries. There are different ways to design distribution mechanisms that incorporate this practice, which opens up a space for normative considerations. In particular, if the mechanism takes countries’ or refugees’ preferences into account, there may be trade-offs between satisfying their preferences and the number of refugees distributed. This article argues that, in such cases, it is not a reasonable policy to satisfy preferences. Moreover, conditions are given which, if satisfied, prevent the trade-off from occurring. Finally, it is argued that countries should not express preferences over refugees, but rather that priorities for refugees should be imposed, and that fairness beats efficiency in the context of distributing asylum. The framework of matching theory is used to make the arguments precise, but the results are general and relevant for other distribution mechanisms such as the relocations currently in effect in the European Union. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)
Open AccessArticle Vector Games with Potential Function
Games 2017, 8(4), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040040
Received: 1 August 2017 / Revised: 10 September 2017 / Accepted: 15 September 2017 / Published: 21 September 2017
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Abstract
The theory of non cooperative games with potential function was introduced by Monderer and Shapley in 1996. Such games have interesting properties, among which is the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. The paper by Monderer and Shapley has inspired many game theory
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The theory of non cooperative games with potential function was introduced by Monderer and Shapley in 1996. Such games have interesting properties, among which is the existence of equilibria in pure strategies. The paper by Monderer and Shapley has inspired many game theory researchers. In the present paper, many classes of multiobjective games with potential functions are studied. The notions of generalized, best-reply and Pareto potential games are introduced in a multicriteria setting. Some properties and Pareto equilibria are investigated. Full article
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