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  • Open Access

31 March 2022

23 Pages

CEO Bias and Product Substitutability in Oligopoly Games

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Department of Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331, USA
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This article belongs to the Topic Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of competition. We lay out the conditions under which it is profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases need not improve social welfare.

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