Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure
AbstractRecent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising. View Full-Text
Share & Cite This Article
Bizzotto, J.; Solow, B. Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure. Games 2019, 10, 29.
Bizzotto J, Solow B. Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure. Games. 2019; 10(3):29.Chicago/Turabian Style
Bizzotto, Jacopo; Solow, Benjamin. 2019. "Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure." Games 10, no. 3: 29.
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.