Search Results (16)

This study investigates economic decision-making behaviors among welfare recipients in Miami, Florida, by leveraging well-established experimental protocols: the Guessing Game, the Prudence Measurement Task, the Risk Aversion Task, and the Stag Hunt Game. For this purpose, our study defines financial decisions as the underlying individual preferences that serve as validated proxies for savings behavior, debt management, job-search intensity, and participation in cooperative finance. A central objective is to compare the behavior of welfare recipients to that of undergraduate students, a cohort typically used in experimental economics research. The analysis reveals significant differences between the two groups in strategic thinking and coordination, particularly across ethnic and gender lines. Non-Hispanic/Latino participants in Miami displayed significantly higher average guesses in the Guessing Game compared to their counterparts in Tucson, indicating potential discrepancies in the depth of strategic reasoning. Additionally, female participants in Tucson exhibited higher levels of coordination in the Stag Hunt Game compared to females in Miami, suggesting variance in cooperative behavior between these groups. Despite these findings, regression models demonstrate that location, gender, and ethnicity collectively account for only a small fraction of the observed variance, as evidenced by low R² values and substantial mean squared errors across all games. These results suggest that individual heterogeneity, rather than broad demographic variables, may be more influential in shaping economic decisions. This study underscores the complexity of generalizing findings from traditional student samples to more diverse populations, highlighting the need for further investigation into the socioeconomic factors that drive financial decision-making. Full article

Population stability depends on environmental conditions and their changes, as well as the availability of energy resources. Animals allocate their energy to maintenance, growth, reproduction, and energy storage; therefore, trade-offs are expected between life history traits. Access to abundant resources is expected to manifest itself in the investment of male individuals in sexually selected traits, such as carcass mass and antler size. The study aimed to analyze environmental climate conditions on the carcass and antler mass, as well as on antler form in red deer (Cervus elaphus L.) populations. We analyzed the carcasses and the antler masses and forms of 550 red deer stags from three populations in Central–Western Europe that differ in climate conditions that were hunter-harvested between the 2017 and 2021 hunting seasons. Our data indicated that carcass mass was shaped by the location of the population, stag age, precipitation, and temperature, as well as the number of frost days from January to the harvest date. Antler mass and antler investment depended on stag age but not climatic factors. Regular antler forms were more often observed in the harsh environmental conditions. Our observation confirms that resource trade-off is related to carcass mass of red deer. Full article

As a reactive species, the red deer is sensitive to both negative exogenous and endogenous stimuli. An intensive hunting period may have a particularly negative impact on game animals. The aim of this study was to determine the plasma cortisol level and biochemical parameters in 25 wild red deer (Cervus elaphus) harvested during stalking hunts in correlation with the sex and age of the animals. The mean cortisol concentrations in the stags and hinds analyzed in this study were similar (20.2 and 21.5 ng/mL, respectively). Higher HDL cholesterol values were found in the blood of the hinds than in stags (p < 0.05). Similarly, the mean levels of LDL cholesterol, lactate dehydrogenase, and alanine aminotransferase were higher by 21%, 16%, and 42%, respectively, in the blood of the hinds. In contrast, the levels of alkaline phosphatase, bilirubin, and aspartate aminotransferase were higher in the stags (by 30%, 49%, and 36%, respectively). There was a negative correlation of the cortisol concentration with urea and bilirubin and a positive correlation between cortisol and aspartate aminotransferase in the stags (p < 0.05). In turn, a negative correlation was found between the cortisol and urea levels in the hinds (p < 0.05). In summary, the stress caused by stalking hunts and the characteristic behavior of red deer during the mating season had an impact on chosen biochemical parameters. The increased concentration of cortisol resulted in a decrease in the carcass mass, which may lead to the deterioration of the physical condition of animals on hunting grounds. Full article

A major challenge in cognitive science and AI has been to understand how intelligent autonomous agents might acquire and predict the behavioral and mental states of other agents in the course of complex social interactions. How does such an agent model the goals, beliefs, and actions of other agents it interacts with? What are the computational principles to model a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Deep learning approaches to address these questions fall short of a better understanding of the problem. In part, this is due to the black-box nature of deep networks, wherein computational mechanisms of ToM are not readily revealed. Here, we consider alternative hypotheses seeking to model how the brain might realize a ToM. In particular, we propose embodied and situated agent models based on distributed adaptive control theory to predict the actions of other agents in five different game-theoretic tasks (Harmony Game, Hawk-Dove, Stag Hunt, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Battle of the Exes). Our multi-layer control models implement top-down predictions from adaptive to reactive layers of control and bottom-up error feedback from reactive to adaptive layers. We test cooperative and competitive strategies among seven different agent models (cooperative, greedy, tit-for-tat, reinforcement-based, rational, predictive, and internal agents). We show that, compared to pure reinforcement-based strategies, probabilistic learning agents modeled on rational, predictive, and internal phenotypes perform better in game-theoretic metrics across tasks. The outlined autonomous multi-agent models might capture systems-level processes underlying a ToM and suggest architectural principles of ToM from a control-theoretic perspective. Full article

Cultures around the world show varying levels of conservatism. While maintaining traditional ideas prevents wrong ones from being embraced, it also slows or prevents adaptation to new times. Without exploration there can be no improvement, but often this effort is wasted as it fails to produce better results, making it better to exploit the best known option. This tension is known as the exploration/exploitation issue, and it occurs at the individual and group levels, whenever decisions are made. As such, it is has been investigated across many disciplines. We extend previous work by approximating a continuum of traits under local exploration, employing the method of adaptive dynamics, and studying multiple fitness functions. In this work, we ask how nature would solve the exploration/exploitation issue, by allowing natural selection to operate on an exploration parameter in a variety of contexts, thinking of exploration as mutation in a trait space with a varying fitness function. Specifically, we study how exploration rates evolve by applying adaptive dynamics to the replicator-mutator equation, under two types of fitness functions. For the first, payoffs are accrued from playing a two-player, two-action symmetric game, we consider representatives of all games in this class, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Stag Hunt games, finding exploration rates often evolve downwards, but can also undergo neutral selection as well depending on the games parameters or initial conditions. Second, we study time dependent fitness with a function having a single oscillating peak. By increasing the period, we see a jump in the optimal exploration rate, which then decreases towards zero as the frequency of environmental change increases. These results establish several possible evolutionary scenarios for exploration rates, providing insight into many applications, including why we can see such diversity in rates of cultural change. Full article

The stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already well established and stable due to sanctions imposed on non-conforming members. Thus, how does a population shift from the current social contract to a better one? In other words, how can a social system leave a locally optimum configuration to achieve a globally optimum state? Here, we investigate the effect of promoting diversity on the evolution of social contracts. We consider group-structured populations where individuals play the stag-hunt game in all groups. We model the diversity incentive as a snowdrift game played in a single focus group where the individual is more prone to adopting a deviant norm. We show that a moderate diversity incentive is sufficient to change the system dynamics, driving the population over the stag-hunt invasion barrier that prevents the global optimum being reached. Thus, an initial fraction of adopters of the new, better norm can drive the system toward the optimum social contract. If the diversity incentive is not too large, the better social contract is the new equilibrium and remains stable even if the incentive is turned off. However, if the incentive is large, the population is trapped in a mixed equilibrium and the better social norm can only be reached if the incentive is turned off after the equilibrium is reached. The results are obtained using Monte Carlo simulations and analytical approximation methods. Full article

This study attempted to model the stag and hare hunting behaviors of students using their interaction data in a mobile computer-supported collaborative learning application for Grade 5 mathematics. Twenty-five male and 12 female Grade 5 students with an average age of 10.5 years participated in this study. Stag hunters are more likely to display personality dimensions characterized by Openness while students belonging to hare hunters display personality dimensions characterized by Extraversion and Neuroticism. Students who display personality dimensions characterized by Agreeableness and Conscientiousness may tend to be either hare or stag hunters, depending on the difficulty, types of arithmetic problems solved, and the amount of time spent solving arithmetic problems. Students engaged in a stag hunting behavior performed poorly in mathematics. Decision tree modeling and lag sequential analysis revealed that stag and hare hunting behaviors could be identified based on personality dimensions, types of arithmetic problems solved, difficulty level of problems solved, time spent solving problems, and problem-solving patterns. Future research and practical implications were also discussed. Full article

Many situations require coordinated actions of individuals to achieve common goals. Such situations include organizing mass protests or adjusting behavior to new behavioral recommendations that aim to slow down the spread of a contagious disease. However, there is a risk of coordination failure in such situations that can lead to a worse outcome for those who acted in a coordinated manner than for those who chose not to. In this paper, we investigate the main determinant of individuals’ decisions in these situations to determine whether beliefs regarding the action of others (empirical expectations), beliefs regarding others’ beliefs (normative expectations), or risk attitudes are dominant determinants. To this end, we conducted an experiment analyzing the relationship between an individual’s choices in a stag hunt game, their probabilistic empirical and normative expectations (i.e., first-order and second-order beliefs, respectively), and their risk attitudes. Our central finding is that expectations, not risk attitudes, explain individuals’ strategy selection. In addition, we found evidence that normative expectations are a better predictor of strategy selection than empirical expectations. This could have implications for developing more targeted strategies intended to promote new behavioral standards and to guide individuals’ behavior toward a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Full article

The presence of hunting imagery in Beowulf has often been noted, but the significance of the figures of the stag and the wolf to the thematic design of the poem has yet to be fully explored. In this article, I first analyse the sustained presentation of the Danish royal hall as a stag, before exploring how the Beowulf poet exploited the various traditional associations of the wolf in the development of the figures of Grendel and Grendel’s mother. Finally, I consider the elaboration of the hunting imagery in the final section of the poem, which focuses on the Geatish Messenger’s account of the pursuit and killing of King Ongentheow by Eofor and Wulf, and the beasts-of-battle motif. The article concludes that the Beowulf poet made extensive use of animal and hunting imagery in order to ground his work in the lived experiences and fears of his audience. Full article

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks. Full article

Under the background of COVID-19, the conditions and environment of international cooperation in Arctic sustainable fisheries have changed. Accurately predicting the impact of environmental changes on the evolution of Arctic fishery cooperation, identifying its key influencing elements, and formulating appropriate corresponding measures have practical value for the sustainable development of Arctic fisheries. Based on the collection of fisheries trade data in Arctic sustainable fisheries trade cooperation countries, this paper builds a trade cooperation network, identifies key influencing factors, establishes a network game model, and uses simulation methods to verify the variables. The results show that the reward value given by neighboring countries has a positive effect on such cooperation. The higher the reward value is, the more countries choose to cooperate. The cooperation cost has the opposite effect, the lower the cost, the more countries choose to cooperate. The impact of cost on cooperation is greater than the incentives. The game structure also affects the outcome of cooperation, and the number of countries participating in cooperation based on the Stag Hunt Model is the largest. The change of network structure will have an impact on cooperation, and the COVID-19 pandemic has influenced cooperation on Arctic sustainable fisheries trade cooperation in the short term. Full article

Knowing the gender of a counterpart can be focal in the willingness to collaborate in team settings that resemble the classic coordination problem. This paper explores whether knowing a co-worker’s gender affects coordination on the mutually beneficial outcome in a socially risky environment. In an experimental setting, subjects play a one-shot stag hunt game framed as a collaborative task in which they can “work together” or “work alone.” We exogenously vary whether workers know the gender of their counterparts pre-play. When gender is revealed, female players tend to gravitate to collaboration and efficient coordination regardless of the knowledge. Males, when knowingly paired with another male, tend to collaborate less, and thus, are less likely to coordinate on the Pareto optimal outcome. These results demonstrate one way that gender focality can lead to inefficient outcomes and provide insight for organizations looking to induce collaboration among workers. Full article

We study a model where agents face a continuum of two-player games and categorize them into a finite number of situations to make sense of their complex environment. Agents need not share the same categorization. Each agent can cooperate or defect, conditional on the perceived category. The games are fully ordered by the strength of the temptation to defect and break joint cooperation. In equilibrium agents share the same categorization, but achieve less cooperation than if they could perfectly discriminate games. All the equilibria are evolutionarily stable, but stochastic stability selects against cooperation. We model agents’ learning when they imitate successful players over similar games, but lack any information about the opponents’ categorizations. We show that imitation conditional on reaching an intermediate aspiration level leads to a shared categorization that achieves higher cooperation than under perfect discrimination. Full article

Researchers are increasingly exploring the role of emotions in interactive decision‐making. Recent theories have focused on the interpersonal effects of emotions—the influence of the decisionmaker’s expressed emotions on observers’ decisions and judgments. In this paper, we examine whether people assess others’ risk preferences on the basis of their emotional states, whether this affects their own behavior, and how this assessment matches others’ actual behavior. To test these ideas, we used an experimental Stag Hunt game (n = 98), and included non‐trivial financial consequences. Participants were told (truthfully) that their counterparts’ previous task had left them happy, fearful, or emotionally neutral. People who were told their counterparts were fearful reported that they expected less risky decisions from these counterparts than people told their counterparts were neutral or happy. As a result, given that the Stag Hunt is a coordination game, these participants were themselves less risky. Interestingly, these participants’ expectations were not accurate; thus, coordination failed, and payoffs were low. This raises the possibility of a “curse of knowledge” whereby one player’s erroneous beliefs about the effects of the counterpart’s emotional state leads the first player to make poor action choices. Full article

Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunts, and other two-person two-move (2 × 2) models of strategic situations have played a central role in the development of game theory. The Robinson–Goforth topology of payoff swaps reveals a natural order in the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, visualized in their four-layer “periodic table” format that elegantly organizes the diversity of 2 × 2 games, showing relationships and potential transformations between neighboring games. This article presents additional visualizations of the topology, and a naming system for locating all 2 × 2 games as combinations of game payoff patterns from the symmetric ordinal 2 × 2 games. The symmetric ordinal games act as coordinates locating games in maps of the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, including not only asymmetric ordinal games and the complete set of games with ties, but also ordinal and normalized equivalents of all games with ratio or real-value payoffs. An efficient nomenclature can contribute to a systematic understanding of the diversity of elementary social situations; clarify relationships between social dilemmas and other joint preference structures; identify interesting games; show potential solutions available through transforming incentives; catalog the variety of models of 2 × 2 strategic situations available for experimentation, simulation, and analysis; and facilitate cumulative and comparative research in game theory. Full article