Religions

21 pages, 235 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

by James P. Sterba

Religions 2021, 12(7), 536; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12070536 - 15 Jul 2021

Cited by 12 | Viewed by 3038

It is a rare event indeed to have sixteen philosophers join together in a symposium to reflect up the central question of one’s book [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

7 pages, 166 KiB

Open AccessEssay

James Sterba’s New Argument from Evil

by William Hasker

Religions 2021, 12(1), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12010021 - 29 Dec 2020

Cited by 10 | Viewed by 2271

Abstract

This article addresses the main argument in James Sterba’s book, an argument which claims that the existence of a good God is logically incompatible with the evil in the world. I claim to show that his main premise, MEPRI, is implausible and is [...] Read more.

This article addresses the main argument in James Sterba’s book, an argument which claims that the existence of a good God is logically incompatible with the evil in the world. I claim to show that his main premise, MEPRI, is implausible and is not a secure foundation for such an argument. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

9 pages, 207 KiB

Open AccessArticle

God, Moral Requirements, and the Limits of Freedom

by Laura W. Ekstrom

Religions 2021, 12(5), 285; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050285 - 21 Apr 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2147

Abstract

This article addresses James Sterba’s recent argument for the conclusion that God’s existence is incompatible with the degree and amount of evil in the world. I raise a number of questions concerning the moral principles that Sterba suggests God would be required to [...] Read more.

This article addresses James Sterba’s recent argument for the conclusion that God’s existence is incompatible with the degree and amount of evil in the world. I raise a number of questions concerning the moral principles that Sterba suggests God would be required to follow, as well as with respect to the analogy he draws between the obligations of a just state and the obligations of God. Against Sterba’s proposed justified divine policy of constraint on human freedom, I ask: What would motivate a perfect being to create human beings who imagine, intend, and freely begin to carry out horrific actions that bring harm to other human beings, to nonhuman animals, and to the environment? I argue that the rationale is lacking behind the thought that God would only interfere with the completion of the process of human beings’ bringing to fruition their horrifically harmful intended outcomes, rather than creating beings with different psychologies and abilities altogether. I end by giving some friendly proposals that help to support Sterba’s view that God, by nature, would be perfectly morally good. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

16 pages, 240 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Sovereignty of Humanity and Social Responsibility for Evil Prevention

by Janusz Salamon

Religions 2021, 12(6), 418; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060418 - 8 Jun 2021

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 2829

Abstract

In this paper, I suggest that James Sterba’s recent restatement of the logical problem of evil overlooks a plausible theistic interpretation of the divine–human relation, which allows for a theodicy impervious to his atheological argument, which boils down to God’s failure to meet [...] Read more.

In this paper, I suggest that James Sterba’s recent restatement of the logical problem of evil overlooks a plausible theistic interpretation of the divine–human relation, which allows for a theodicy impervious to his atheological argument, which boils down to God’s failure to meet Sterba’s “Evil Prevention Requirements”. I argue that such requirements need not apply to God in a world under full human sovereignty, which presupposes that God never intervenes to change the natural course of events to prevent evils, as God has a decisive “greater good justification” for not intervening, namely respecting human sovereignty. This non-interventionist view of divine providence can be made tenable by the great good and dignity of the God-granted human God-like self-creativity implied by human sovereignty (a concept inspired by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola). The Mirandolian theodicy can both accommodate and complement Dostoyevsky’s Russian Orthodox view of “beneficial suffering”, predicated against the background of the conception of “collective selfhood”, overlooked by Sterba despite “featuring” on the cover of his book, no doubt due to his libertarian–individualistic assumptions about human agency and human flourishing, which a proponent of a theistic theodicy may do well to resist. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

9 pages, 183 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Heaven and the Goodness of God

by Jerry L. Walls

Religions 2021, 12(5), 316; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050316 - 29 Apr 2021

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 2388

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that we should take fully seriously the doctrine of heaven when dealing with the problem of evil in our world. The hope of heaven is integral to Christian theism so it cannot be neglected in any substantive discussion [...] Read more.

In this essay, I argue that we should take fully seriously the doctrine of heaven when dealing with the problem of evil in our world. The hope of heaven is integral to Christian theism so it cannot be neglected in any substantive discussion of the problem of evil. Indeed, heaven provides resources to respond to even the worst of evils and to fully redeem them in such a way that the victims of those evils can fully affirm the goodness of their lives. Anyone who achieves heaven will experience a good of such significance and value that the ultimate beauty and goodness of their life could not be questioned. The Christian doctrine of the afterlife also provides resources to make sense of ultimate accountability. The perpetrators of horrendous evil cannot escape and will be called to account for their actions. However, even those who have committed such evil evils can be fully transformed in such a way that they can be fully reconciled with their victims and heartily embraced by them. This shows the doctrine of heaven to be not only profoundly hopeful, but also starkly honest and realistic. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

8 pages, 300 KiB

Open AccessArticle

God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

by Cheryl K. Chen

Religions 2021, 12(4), 266; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040266 - 12 Apr 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2582

Abstract

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why [...] Read more.

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

13 pages, 232 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Is God Morally Obligated to Prevent Evil? A Response to James Sterba

by Joseph Brian Huffling

Religions 2021, 12(5), 312; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050312 - 28 Apr 2021

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 3367

Abstract

James Sterba’s book, Is a Good God Logically Possible?, argues that given the amount of significant and horrendous evil in the world, it is not possible for a (morally) good God to exist. This article draws on the work of Brian Davies’ [...] Read more.

James Sterba’s book, Is a Good God Logically Possible?, argues that given the amount of significant and horrendous evil in the world, it is not possible for a (morally) good God to exist. This article draws on the work of Brian Davies’ interpretation of Thomistic metaphysics and theology proper and argues that God is not a moral being, and thus has no obligations to prevent such evil. If such is the case, then the problem of evil as presented by Sterba is not a problem for God’s existence. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

13 pages, 194 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Compensatory Response to the Problem of Evil

by Michael Douglas Beaty

Religions 2021, 12(5), 347; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050347 - 13 May 2021

Cited by 7 | Viewed by 2405

Abstract

In this essay, I affirm the univocity thesis while discussing some alternative positions that avoid the problem of evil by rejecting the univocity thesis. I reject Sterba’s assumption that God’s governance of creation is adequately understood as an analogy to good governance of [...] Read more.

In this essay, I affirm the univocity thesis while discussing some alternative positions that avoid the problem of evil by rejecting the univocity thesis. I reject Sterba’s assumption that God’s governance of creation is adequately understood as an analogy to good governance of a politically liberal democracy. I suggest that Sterba’s commitment to the Pauline principle forces a dilemma between significant human freedom and meticulous divine intervention. Finally, I argue that the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God, given a compensatory response to the problem of evil. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

17 pages, 256 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On James Sterba’s Refutation of Theistic Arguments to Justify Suffering

by Bruce R. Reichenbach

Religions 2021, 12(1), 64; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12010064 - 18 Jan 2021

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 2799

Abstract

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion [...] Read more.

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

12 pages, 213 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

by Elizabeth Burns

Religions 2021, 12(6), 442; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060442 - 15 Jun 2021

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 3156

Abstract

In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that [...] Read more.

In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that this is the underlying element in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a doctrine that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion. Although, as hypothetical trolley cases demonstrate, human beings sometimes cannot avoid doing or permitting evil in order to prevent a greater evil, Sterba argues that the same cannot be said of an omnipotent God and that, since our world contains horrendous evils, the existence of a God who is both omnipotent and good is therefore logically impossible. I argue that, if God is thought to be a conscious being with unlimited power to prevent horrendous evils, Sterba’s argument might be valid. I also argue, however, that divine power need not be construed in this way. Drawing on some ideas derived from the work of Charles Hartshorne, I suggest that God is not a kind of divine micromanager and that it is more coherent and, indeed, helpful to think of God as a social influencer whose power is a source of positive energy for the promotion of goodness. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

9 pages, 178 KiB

Open AccessEssay

Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission

by Ronald Hall

Religions 2021, 12(3), 200; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12030200 - 17 Mar 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3768

Abstract

Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption [...] Read more.

Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic force of the argument from evil. To rescue belief in God, I propose the adoption of a position I call compassionate deism. This position is a combination of Christian theism and traditional deism. The combination is produced by making a slight deistic modification of Christian theism in the direction of non-intervention, and a slight modification of deism in the direction of compassion. Such a compassionate deism denies the common assumption made by both Christian theism and atheism, namely, that God permits evil, and thus avoids the theistic denial of the reality of evil and the atheist’s denial of God’s goodness. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

13 pages, 233 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On the Significance of Assumptions about Divine Goodness and Divine Ontology for ‘Logical’ Arguments from Evil

by John Bishop

Religions 2021, 12(3), 186; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12030186 - 11 Mar 2021

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 2612

Abstract

Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) draws attention to the importance of ethical assumptions in ‘logical’ arguments from evil (LAfEs) to the effect that the existence of (certain types) of evil is incompatible with the existence of a God who is [...] Read more.

Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) draws attention to the importance of ethical assumptions in ‘logical’ arguments from evil (LAfEs) to the effect that the existence of (certain types) of evil is incompatible with the existence of a God who is all-powerful and morally perfect. I argue, first, that such arguments are likely to succeed only when ‘normatively relativized’—that is, when based on assumptions about divine goodness that may be subject to deep disagreement. I then argue that these arguments for atheism are also, and more fundamentally, conditioned by assumptions about the ontology of the divine. I criticise Sterba’s consideration of the implications for his own novel LAfE of the possibility that God is not a moral agent, arguing that Sterba fails to recognize the radical nature of this claim. I argue that, if we accept the ‘classical theist’ account that Brian Davies provides (interpreting Aquinas), then God does not count as ‘an’ agent at all, and the usual contemporary formulation of ‘the problem of evil’ falls away. I conclude by noting that the question of the logical compatibility of evil’s existence with divine goodness is settled in the affirmative by classical theism by appeal to its doctrine that evil is always the privation in something that exists of the good that ought to be. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

11 pages, 191 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding

by Toby Betenson

Religions 2021, 12(3), 154; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12030154 - 27 Feb 2021

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 3186

Abstract

Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason [...] Read more.

Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

18 pages, 230 KiB

Open AccessArticle

God and the Problem of Evil: An Attempt at Reframing the Debate

by Brett Wilmot

Religions 2021, 12(3), 218; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12030218 - 21 Mar 2021

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 6330

Abstract

This article attempts to reframe the traditional account of the problem of evil for God’s existence. The philosophical debates about the problem of evil for the existence of God within the traditional framework do not exhaust the available options for conceiving of God’s [...] Read more.

This article attempts to reframe the traditional account of the problem of evil for God’s existence. The philosophical debates about the problem of evil for the existence of God within the traditional framework do not exhaust the available options for conceiving of God’s perfection, including our understanding of God’s power and God’s relationship to the world. In responding to the problem of evil, rational theists should seek a reformulation of divine perfection consistent with God’s existence as both necessary and as morally relevant to human life in a manner that does not collapse in the face of the problem of evil. The neoclassical account of God’s nature as developed in the tradition of process philosophy is presented as an alternative that meets these requirements. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

17 pages, 229 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Thomistic Dissolution of the Logical Problem of Evil

by Edward Feser

Religions 2021, 12(4), 268; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040268 - 13 Apr 2021

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 17675

Abstract

In his book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’, James Sterba argues that the existence of much of the evil to be found in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I defend the Thomistic view that when one properly [...] Read more.

In his book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’, James Sterba argues that the existence of much of the evil to be found in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I defend the Thomistic view that when one properly understands the nature of God and of his relationship to the world, this so-called logical problem of evil does not arise. While Sterba has responded to the version of the Thomistic position presented by Brian Davies, I argue that his response fails. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

13 pages, 237 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Reconciling the God of Traditional Theism with the World’s Evils

by Robin Attfield

Religions 2020, 11(10), 514; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11100514 - 10 Oct 2020

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2604

Abstract

Replying to James Sterba’s argument for the incompatibility of the world’s evils with the existence of the God of traditional theism, I argue for their compatibility, using the proposition that God has reasons for permitting these evils. Developing this case involves appeal to [...] Read more.

Replying to James Sterba’s argument for the incompatibility of the world’s evils with the existence of the God of traditional theism, I argue for their compatibility, using the proposition that God has reasons for permitting these evils. Developing this case involves appeal to an enlarged version of both the Free Will Defence and Hick’s Vale of Soul-Making Defence, in the context of God’s decision to generate the kind of natural regularities conducive to the evolution of a range of creatures, including free and rational ones. Sterba writes as if God would be required to authorise frequent infringements of these regularities. Sterba’s arguments from ethics and from the inadequacy of post-mortem compensation are problematised. Predicates used of God must bear a sense appropriate to the level of creator, and not of a very powerful cosmic observer. The ethics that applies within creation should not be confused with the ethics of creating. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

8 pages, 240 KiB

Open AccessEssay

The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

by Scott M. Coley

Religions 2021, 12(5), 313; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050313 - 29 Apr 2021

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2577

Abstract

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely [...] Read more.

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

Journal Menu

Journal Browser

Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?

Share This Special Issue

Special Issue Editor

Special Issue Information

Keywords

Benefits of Publishing in a Special Issue

Published Papers (17 papers)

Further Information

Guidelines

MDPI Initiatives

Follow MDPI