Ethical Norms Are Based on Consensus, and Ethics Compatible with Darwinian Evolution Is Necessary for Consensus

Abstract

Harrison has argued that ethics requires a god and, thus, keeps ethical norms from being threatened by evolutionary debunking. This paper argues that consensus is a better guarantee for ethics than gods, and ethics compatible with evolution is necessary for us to achieve consensus. To reduce the divide between theists and atheists and to prevent us from losing our pursuit of the common good, I start from the key consensus already achieved by Sterba and Harrison, that is, ethics does not specifically require God. It follows that ethics does not require gods and is our own affair. The Darwinian evolutionary theory shows that, when we are adapting to the environment, we develop different behaviors. This provides a common ground for understanding our differences and motivates us to adapt to a new environment where we, who are vastly different, have to live together. Finally, I take Confucian ethics as an example to show how ethics that begins with blood relations has given rise to our golden rule. Thus, the Darwinian evolutionary theory should not be seen as a threat.

1. Introduction

Building on the argument that God is not compatible with all the evil in the world, James Sterba further proposes an atheistic ethics that is compatible with Darwinian evolution (Sterba 2024). Harrison objects to Sterba’s atheistic ethics from an epistemological perspective (Harrison 2025). It is worth noting that, although Sterba and Harrison disagree in their conclusions, they do achieve the consensus that ethics does not require God specifically. It follows that theists and atheists can achieve consensus on ethics.1

Sterba says the following:

Of course, these determinations would have to be made simply on the basis of what we can know about ourselves and others, independently of any theological beliefs that we may or may not happen to have.

(Sterba 2024, p. 7.)

Harrison says the following:

It is true that ethical norms do not require God specifically (which I take to be a label for a mind that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent).

(Harrison 2025, p. 1.)

After this consensus, differences emerged. Sterba turns to an atheistic ethics that is compatible with Darwinian evolution, while Harrison moves toward a god as a guarantee of ethics. In what follows, I will go back to the consensus of Sterba and Harrison and argue that ethical norms are consensus that we humans develop and adjust over the process of our lives. Ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution is necessary for us to achieve consensus that works for everyone or the majority.

2. Who Guarantees Ethical Norms? Gods or Consensus?

In order to show why this consensus can serve as a starting point for an argument, I will first explain the important role of consensus for ethical norms; that is, consensus is more of a guarantee than gods. Consensus refers to agreement in judgment or opinion. This agreement may either be inevitably formed within a certain group based on the same reason or accidentally formed between different groups based on different reasons. Consensus itself does not necessarily involve ethical judgments about what ought to be. As Rawls argues in Political Liberalism, consensus must be distinguished from mere convergence of preferences since only a shared recognition of reasons can confer normative weight (Rawls 1993, p. 133). In addition, as a type of norm, ethical norms should not be accidental. However, in terms of the function of ethical norms, they are meant to constrain our behavior, although this only works if we recognize them. This echoes Habermas’s claim that the legitimacy of norms arises from their acceptance in processes of communicative action (Habermas 1990, p. 66). Furthermore, the legitimacy of ethical norms also depends on consensus. As Scanlon observes, a principle is only binding if it cannot reasonably be rejected by others, which implies a minimal form of consensus (Scanlon 1998, p. 5). A norm is considered ethical precisely because it aligns with our shared understanding of goodness. Otherwise, it is either non-ethical coercion or empty slogans that can never be put into practice. Thus, consensus is not necessarily an ethical norm but an ethical norm must, in form, be a consensus. MacIntyre (1988) makes a similar point when he insists that rationality is always tradition-constituted, meaning that ethical reasoning presupposes some communal agreement; however, this raises a deeper ontological question: what grounds the very possibility of consensus as the basis of ethics? It cannot merely be agreement as such, since agreement can also form around injustice or prejudice. Philosophers such as Darwall (2006) argue that consensus has force only because of our relational nature as beings who depend on cooperation for survival; Habermas (1990) further emphasizes that consensus embodies procedural objectivity by securing intersubjective justification rather than private belief. In this sense, consensus presupposes a more fundamental basis in human dignity and our capacity for mutual recognition. Without this ontological grounding, consensus would collapse into mere opinion.

It should be noted that consensus is a necessary condition for ethical norms, not a sufficient one. The fact that a factor serves as a necessary condition does not prevent other factors from being sufficient conditions. The idea that consensus can better guarantee ethical norms than gods or reason does not hold in all cases. For example, among theists, gods as a sufficient condition for ethical norms implies consensus within the group in itself, and does not require a special discussion of consensus as a necessary condition. Special discussion on consensus is based on a specific context, that is, some of our explorations into the sufficient conditions of ethical norms cannot even meet the basic necessary conditions because the discussion is not just within a certain group. It is like rain makes the ground slippery but slippery ground is not necessarily caused by rain. Plus, to avoid the fallacy of affirming the consequent, it is important to clarify that while consensus is required for ethical norms to function, it must be supplemented by substantive grounds, such as respect for human dignity or recognition of shared vulnerabilities, that render the consensus ethically meaningful (Nussbaum 2011, p. 36). Reason or gods may not be consensus and fail to meet the necessary conditions, although they are able to provide sufficient conditions for ethical norms.

Then, in what way does the exploration of the sufficient conditions of ethical norms neglect the necessary conditions? To avoid ethical norms becoming purposeless contingencies, ethical norms need to be guaranteed. Harrison argues that the Darwinian evolutionary theory cannot provide such guarantees because evolution is contingent. Indeed, the Darwinian evolutionary theory itself cannot provide such a guarantee. On the one hand, evolution does not yield deterministic outcomes like mathematics or logic. Moreover, using the Darwinian evolutionary theory to guarantee ethical norms would lead to the following circular argument:

(1)

The Darwinian evolutionary theory proposes that natural selection preserves traits favorable for survival;

(2)

Ethical norms exist because they promote human survival and reproduction;

(3)

Therefore, the Darwinian evolutionary theory proves the inevitability of ethical norms.

The flaw here is that Premise (2) already presupposes that the value of ethical norms lies in their evolutionary adaptability, while the conclusion uses the evolutionary theory to prove this very presupposition, creating a circular argument where the conclusion is used to validate the premise.

In response to the ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory, Harrison asserts that ethical norms require certainty and purposefulness. In Harrison’s view, it is reason that provides certainty for ethical norms, and it is the mind that provides purposefulness, as he says in the following:

If Reason is a mind, then she qualifies as a god.

(Harrison 2025, p. 3.)

However, is the combination of reason and mind only possible in the form of a god? If not, then it is not a necessary premise of an ethical norm, and Harrison’s inference is not a logical deduction. Moreover, Harrison’s argument faces an epistemological problem, although he emphasizes that his argument is epistemologically based. How can we be sure that our perceptions of certainty, of purposefulness, are correct?2 If we can answer this question by ourselves, then we do not require a god. If we cannot answer this question by ourselves, then that means we cannot recognize intentions of a god.

Generally speaking, we utilize two approaches to attain certainty. One is the empirical method, and the other is the rational method. However, Hume argues that the path of establishing certainty through sensory experience is unfeasible. He says the following: “That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond” (Hume [1740] 2009, p. 302). Thus, sense, as one’s own sense, cannot transcend itself to guarantee ethical norms. The frustrating realization led Hume to argue that only reason can provide certainty: “So far from being able by our senses merely to determine this question, we must have recourse to the most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it” (Hume [1740] 2009, p. 303).

This is the philosophical reason why Harrison claims that Sterba’s view is epistemologically impossible but is possible in metaphysics. Then, the question that follows immediately is whether reason possesses such capability? A representative response comes from Kant3:

With these principles it rises (as its nature also requires) ever higher, to more remote conditions. But since it becomes aware in this way that its business must always remain incomplete because the questions never cease, reason sees itself necessitated to take refuge in principles that overstep all possible use in experience, and yet seem so unsuspicious that even ordinary common sense agrees with them. But it thereby falls into obscurity and contradictions, from which it can indeed surmise that it must somewhere be proceeding on the ground of hidden errors; but it cannot discover them, for the principles on which it is proceeding, since they surpass the bounds of all experience, no longer recognize any touchstone of experience. The battlefield of these endless controversies is called metaphysics.

(Kant 1998a, p. 99.)

In Kant’s view, it is the nature of reason to continuously trace back conditions but conditions in the empirical world are limited. Reason’s pursuit of completeness, thus, compels it to go beyond experience and rely on those transcendental principles. Since these transcendental principles lack empirical verification, reason’s application of them is bound to fall into irreconcilable contradictions. However, Kant’s conception of pure reason, while groundbreaking, must be understood within its intellectual context. As Beck demonstrates, his metaphysical framework inherited core problematics from Christian Wolff’s rationalist system, particularly the tension between logical necessity and empirical contingency (Beck 1965, p. 438). When Kant claims that reason’s pursuit of completeness compels transcendence of experience, this move retains what Sala identifies as “empiricist residue”: the unexamined presupposition that cognitive legitimacy derives solely from sensory verification (Sala 1994, p. 72). Thus, the distinction made by Kant between normative and constitutive needs to be critically reassessed. Following Lonergan’s generalized empirical method (GEM), we recognize that human knowing operates through three basic levels of consciousness: experience, understanding, and judgment (Lonergan 1957, 1972). The subsequent dimensions of ethical and religious consciousness, though discussed by Lonergan, are not parts of his critical realist cognitional theory but rather developments that presuppose the prior three levels. Misrepresenting these as part of the cognitional structure risks conflating epistemology with moral or theological reflection. Within this framework,

(1)

Reason’s “purposefulness” manifests at the judgmental level through validating systematic unity. The purpose of reason is not to passively accept but to achieve an orderly grasp of reality through judgment. Reason does not handle fragmented experiences in isolation; instead, it constructs coherent explanations of reality by integrating experience, understanding, and reflection.

(2)

Its “necessity” claims depend on experiential grounding through categories of understanding. Categories of understanding serve as the mediator in elevating experience into concepts. However, claims that a conclusion is necessarily true cannot be divorced from empirical foundations; otherwise, such necessity amounts to nothing more than subjective conjecture.

(3)

Ethical validity, as Lonergan (1972, p. 9) emphasizes, arises not at the epistemological but at the decisional level of practical reason, where judgment guides concrete choice.

This clarification also allows us to engage more faithfully with Lonergan’s and Sala’s critique of Kant. Kant assumes that reason, in its drive for completeness, necessarily oversteps experience into the transcendental. Lonergan and Sala argue instead that by attending carefully to the operations of consciousness, namely experience, understanding, and judgment, we can avoid Kant’s oscillation between empiricism and transcendental metaphysics (Sala 1994, p. 72). In this sense, consensus is not a replacement for reason but emerges from the responsible exercise of judgment within shared human operations of knowing.

According to Kant’s critical epistemology, reason constitutes a distinct cognitive faculty. Unlike understanding, it generates no empirical knowledge. Its essential role is to furnish regulative ideas that guide the understanding toward systematic unity (Kant 1998a, p. 605). Harrison explicitly addresses this epistemic limitation by distinguishing two constitutive elements in his framework:

(1)

Reason as the metaphysical source of normative reasons (“the single unifying source of all normative reasons” (Harrison 2025, p. 2);

(2)

The faculty of reason as our cognitive capacity (“the faculty by means of which we seem to gain some awareness of what Reason favours” (Harrison 2025, p. 3).

This distinction, absent in Kant’s architectonic, allows Harrison to position reason as a transcendent entity while acknowledging our cognitive constraints within sensibility or understanding frameworks. Kant says, “For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which is alone given to us” (Kant 1998a, p. 168). Our cognition is always limited by the mode of sensible intuition. What we can grasp is always only how things appear to us, not things as they are in themselves. Given this premise, even if Harrison distinguishes between reason as the metaphysical source and the faculty of reason, we must recognize Kant’s foundational epistemological framework: human knowledge arises exclusively from two interdependent sources, that is, sensibility and understanding (Kant 1998a, p. 193). Critically, Kant’s transcendental philosophy explicitly positions reason as a distinct higher-order faculty that regulates but does not constitute knowledge (Kant 1998a, p. 387). Thus, our cognitive capacities, including the act of understanding, operate strictly within the phenomenal realm. This necessitates a rigorous distinction:

(1)

The faculty of understanding provides categorical synthesis;

(2)

The act of understanding applies categories to intuitions.

Thus, although it remains unstated by Kant himself, any attempt to grasp reason—whether as a metaphysical source or cognitive faculty—through an act of understanding rather than permitting reason to exercise its regulative function must be mediated by sensibility and understanding as constitutive faculties, rendering our comprehension inherently phenomenal and constrained by a priori forms.

This analysis, however, must be safeguarded against misinterpretation as an argument from ignorance. The claim that reason cannot guarantee ethical norms does not stem from our current inability to demonstrate such a guarantee but from Kant’s positive transcendental demonstration of cognition’s constitutive boundaries. As established in the Transcendental Dialectic (Kant 1998a, pp. 383–84), human cognition operates exclusively through the mediation of sensibility and understanding, the faculties of which are constitutionally restricted to the phenomenal realm. Consequently, any attempt to ground the necessity of ethical norms in reason, whether conceived as a metaphysical source or cognitive faculty, encounters an insuperable structural constraint: the categories of understanding can synthesize only empirical intuitions, while pure reason possesses merely regulative validity (Kant 1998a, p. 591). It is this a priori demarcation between phenomena and noumena, not contingent epistemic limitations, that precludes reason from conferring objective necessity upon ethical norms. To guarantee norms would require access to the supersensible ground of obligation (Kant 1998b, p. 459), an access fundamentally barred by the conditions of possible experience. Thus, the constraint identified is not a negative inference from ignorance but a positive consequence of Kant’s critical epistemology that defines the very possibility of human knowledge.

Moreover, it is wrong to accuse Sterba’s view of being epistemologically impossible. Sterba’s epistemological starting point is firmly rooted in the phenomenal world, specifically, the observable conflicts of human interests inherent in our existence. Sterba asserts the following: “Such an appropriate weighing of competing interests of ourselves and others should then enable us to understand that murder and stealing are morally wrong” (Sterba 2024, pp. 7–8). Moral properties (“good” as fair treatment, “evil” as unfair harm, (Sterba 2024, p. 9)) inhere in these phenomenal states of affairs and our reasoned assessment of them. His proposed ethical norms are derived from and justified by this phenomenal starting point and the constraints of human reason, making his view consistent with an epistemology grounded in observable reality. His project seeks new possibilities for ethical justification precisely because he recognizes the limitations of human reason and the need to build ethics from the ground up within the phenomenal world, rejecting transcendent- or principle-based foundations like God’s commands or nature. Crucially, the term “inhere” denotes qualitative dependence. Evil manifests as unfair harm embedded in actions and outcomes, not as a freestanding entity. This means that ethics must be fundamentally established within the limits of the phenomenon. As Sterba says, “Murder is wrong because it unfairly destroys competing interests” (Sterba 2024, p. 8); Sterba further contends, “Do not permit especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions to be inflicted on would-be victims when a greater good would result from preventing them” (Sterba 2019, pp. 49–50). This is a kind of thinking conducted within the phenomenal world that we can perceive. Scientists have already taken an important step in honestly facing our limitations. Peirce says the following:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.

(Peirce 1878, p. 300.)

In the candid acceptance of the fact that we are not omnipotent, consensus becomes a more fundamental basis than reason or gods. On the one hand, if reason or gods do exist, then since it ought to possess universality, it would be manifested in our consensus; as Harrison says, “The god is to some degree benevolently inclined towards us all, which in turn allows us to infer that she would favour us being altruistic towards one another” (Harrison 2025, p. 1). On the other hand, if they do not exist or we are uncertain of their existence, then consensus formed through negotiation is the best outcome that our capabilities can achieve. It must be acknowledged that the fundamental issue of ethics is ontological. For recognizing what is ethically good, the real question is what makes something good. The fundamental ontological issue in ethics concerns the grounds of moral reality; specifically, what constitutes the existence of ethical properties and their relationship to non-moral facts. However, ontological commitments diverge radically. Theists ground norms in divine commands, while naturalists derive them from wellbeing metrics. Such foundational divergence precludes ontological monism as a viable starting point as it inevitably exacerbates disagreement rather than resolving ethical coordination problems. Darwall offers a perspective on human social ontology, arguing that ethical norms exist because of our inherently relational nature as beings who require cooperation for survival (Darwall 2006, p. 43). However, the following question remains: does consensus actually play such a role? What is more, it still cannot avoid ontological disagreements.

Consensus emerges as the necessary epistemological perspective precisely because it bypasses irresolvable ontological disputes. When agents with conflicting metaphysical commitments converge on norms like “murder is wrong” through practical reasoning, they achieve procedural objectivity (Habermas 1990, p. 68). This process achieves the following:

(1)

Acknowledges the functional role of ethical norms, coordinating behavior amid ontological pluralism;

(2)

Operationalizes epistemology by positing that validity stems from intersubjective justification rather than inaccessible truth-conditions;

(3)

Secures normative force through recognizing that consensus embodies the only non-arbitrary authority possible in a metaphysically fragmented world.

Thus, consensus is not merely pragmatic but constitutively essential for ethics in pluralistic contexts. It transforms irreducible ontological differences into actionable norms without requiring their resolution. It should be noted, however, that Habermas’s view of consensus relies on overly idealized premises:

(1)

Participants must have equal speaking rights, with no differences in power or social status;

(2)

Participants always express themselves sincerely, with no deception or strategic pretense;

(3)

Consensus itself is the goal, with no coercion involved.

But in reality, problems such as unequal power, information asymmetry, and conflicting interests still exist in large numbers. These idealized premises are almost impossible to achieve. In particular, when the core values of different cultures and communities conflict fundamentally, idealized dialogue may not reach consensus. Forcing consensus in such cases may push minority groups to compromise, leading to self-contradiction in their positions. Thus, while consensus is a formal necessary condition for ethical norms, we should first focus on substantive consensus that arises accidentally; that is, before reaching necessary consensus based on shared reasons, we should fully pay attention to accidental consensus reached based on different reasons.

Consensus emerges among different individuals, which requires us to maintain understanding and care for others. This practice can prevent us from negating others based on the so-called unassailable ethical norms, thereby avoiding moral apathy4 and moral laziness5 that arise from oversimplifying epistemological judgments. Even though many ethical consensuses are reached accidentally based on different reasons, they are very valuable to us. For example, the norm “you should not kill” is a survival strategy from an evolutionary perspective, a divine command from divine command theory, and according to theological natural law, our lives bear the purpose and order bestowed by God. These accidental consensuses allow us to resolve differences through negotiation rather than war. Without these accidental consensuses based on different reasons, we who are different could not live together under the same norms. In addition, epistemologically, without shared life, we could not possess shared sensory materials, cognitive phenomena, or argumentative materials in the process of seeking non-accidental ethical norms.

3. A Consensus on Ethics Between Sterba and Harrison and Its Inferences

While I emphasize the important place of consensus, it must be acknowledged that it may be epistemologically contingent.6 This is, however, the trouble with the determinism-seeking epistemology, not ours, and this contingency frees us from the negative freedom of being prescribed, with the vast differences and even incommensurability between reasons providing the basis for our free choice (Berlin 1969, p. 171). Consensus is formed not because it has value in itself but so that we can live together. Thus, consensus offers us the opportunity that people who cannot understand each other can live together, and in living together, we gain the possibility of understanding each other. It also means that the place where epistemology stops is the true starting point of our ethics.

Forming common ethical norms between theists and atheists is not easy. Different beliefs and worldviews can easily exacerbate disagreements by leaving communication on both sides without a consistent basis, which is clearly incompatible with the goodness to others.7 Fortunately, the discussion between Sterba and Harrison has achieved consensus, which implies that ethical norms do not specifically require an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. This provides an important foundation for achieving more consensus, sparing us from endless disputes over metaphysical and epistemological divergences. It also frees us from the contradiction of wanting ethical norms to have inherent value while constantly making them secondary. However, does acknowledging the fact that Sterba and Harrison have reached a consensus and using this to reason about ethical norms run into Hume’s problem? It should be noted that acknowledging certain facts about human life is a necessary condition rather than a sufficient condition for establishing ethical norms. If completely divorced from these facts, ethical norms would become empty dogma. For ethical norms, a necessary condition refers to a premise that an ethical norm must rely on to be established. If this condition is lacking, the norm will definitely not hold. However, having this condition does not guarantee that the norm will necessarily hold. A necessary condition is the minimum requirement for an ethical norm but its existence alone is insufficient to ensure that the norm is effective. A sufficient condition is a premise that is enough to establish an ethical norm. As long as this condition is met, the norm will definitely hold. However, the establishment of a norm does not necessarily depend on this condition. There may be other ways for it to hold. Taking the ethical norm “do not harm others” as an example, “What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others” is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for it. Furthermore, the consensus reached by Sterba and Harrison, as well as my inferences, are value-based choices made on the basis of facts, not a natural deduction from the facts themselves.

Then, why are Harrison and Sterba able to achieve consensus? Is this a purely accidental event, or are there necessary causes behind it? Although there may be some significant differences or even oppositions between their viewpoints, these disagreements do not prevent them from sharing recognition of certain facts in our lives.8 These undeniable facts include not only the facts themselves but also our shared judgment about their epistemological objectivity and their ethical importance. These shared judgments suggest that we are confirming by consensus that we can form ethical norms that are determinate rather than arbitrary, universal rather than incommensurable. As Rawls distinguishes between consensus and modus vivendi, modus vivendi is a passive concession under the weighing of interests, which is temporary and fragile, while consensus is the active pursuit of the “common good”, which is stable and sustainable (Rawls 1993, p. 134).

Thus, the consensus achieved by Sterba and Harrison will not exist only between the two of them. It should be noted that any consensus may face opposition, which is a normal manifestation of the diversity of thought. Moreover, the diversity of thought is an important reason why we need consensus. However, this does not mean that a consensus can only be confined to its initial proponents. The expandability of a consensus depends on the rationality of its arguments and shared practical foundations. Furthermore, when I make inferences based on this consensus to obtain more conclusions, it is not only a deduction on reason but also an expansion of the mind. For those who do not believe in God, ethics without God is certainly acceptable. For those who believe in God, this is equally acceptable. Because even if God exists, since we are imperfect, we can only recognize divine commands through limited forms. Therefore, in the process of God commanding us and us recognizing the commands, God does not need to demonstrate all of their potencies. Furthermore, consensus is only resultant and different groups have their own reasons for it. Thus, consensus is not a compromise.

Of course, there may be some problems here. Since consensus is often formed amid different opinions, it is itself regarded as a compromise. In the process of reaching consensus, those who believe in God are not equal to those who do not, and Peter Berger argues that this is more a case of those who believe in God being tolerant of others (Berger 1999, p. 54). Based on his view, they are not equal interlocutors, and those who do not believe in God are merely objects to be tolerated rather than to be truly identified with. Moreover, this consensus, which transcends religious boundaries, may become a de-religious consensus, creating a sense of crisis among theists (Berger 1967, p. 120). This interrogates whether we want to, can, or should be faith-neutral in our ethical life. The fundamental question is whether we want to abandon our uniqueness to fit into a common life that is neither yours nor mine but can be ours? Obviously, neither theists nor atheists will favor this kind of common life, and it can only arise from compromises that we are compelled to make. In addition, due to different understandings of the common good, striving for common life is not yet a consensus. However, we must face an unavoidable fact that is, with increasingly close global interactions, the Earth as an integrated whole—a phenomenon that never truly existed in all previous human history—has now emerged. Thus, a real distinction between consensus and compromise should not only find the similarities in the differences but also find new foundations that carry both the similarities and the differences and keep them from harming each other. Therefore, I return to the consensus between Sterba and Harrison and make the following inferences:

(1)

If ethical norms do not require an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God,9 then there is no requirement for gods;10

(2)

If ethical norms do not require gods, then they are our own affairs;

(3)

If ethical norms are our own affairs, then ethics is the process of adaptation in achieving consensus.

In the following section, I will provide some good reasons, not for why they are the only answers that ultimately fit the truth of the world 11 but rather for why these are things that we12 can agree on.

4. Ethical Norms Do Not Need God or a God

If an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God is not necessary, why do ethical norms still require a god? This is because we find that good intentions can lead to bad results and that there are many moral dilemmas in life. This suggests that the results of some behaviors do not align with their original purposes, and that some of our intentions may conflict with others. Thus, we need something beyond us to provide grounds for our choices and behaviors. Starting from the need for something beyond us, the conclusion would naturally be that ethical norms need gods. However, the guarantor of ethical norms needs to guarantee both the content of the norm and the purpose of the guarantor.13 Therefore, before identifying the content of ethical norms, we need to clarify the purpose or function of ethical norms.

No matter who the guarantor is, how are ethical norms changing us through their influence exerted on us? In particular, what is the purpose of the existence of ethical norms in this world if evil is non-existent or merely an illusion under the purpose of good? I am not going to continue discussing this question in an attempt to find a definitive answer or, ultimately, no answer, thus questioning the premise that evil does not exist. I am not going to try to justify one type of ethics by disregarding another type of ethics that is already widespread among people. If I need to further clarify my position, I oppose all ethical stances that merely affirm their own nobility within their own theories while ignoring the sufferings of others. I support all ethical actions that strive for common happiness and make efforts in whatever way they can. In a word, ethics requires not only good in idea but also happiness in reality. It should be noted that opposing an ethical position does not mean that this ethical position is wrong or incoherent. These ethical positions can still serve as sufficient conditions for ethics for some groups. However, we need to start from these sufficient conditions and analyze the necessary conditions of the ethical norms they contain so as to realize the transition from accidental consensus based on different reasons to necessary consensus based on shared reasons. Thus, I am trying to find out which types of ethics are acceptable to all of us, or which types of ethics do not exist due to their own uniqueness, to form ethical norms that are readily accepted by all or most people. What I want to further clarify, therefore, is not the affirmation or denial of the existence of God or gods but the fact that ethics does not require them, whether they exist or not.

When God or gods do not exist, it is easy to understand and accept that ethics does not require them. However, some changes are also needed here, that is, not attempting to replace theistic ethics with atheistic ethics. We all know that no “ought” is derived from an “is” but the question of whether “ought” can result in “is” has often been ignored. If we acknowledge the existence of evil or our limitations, we must accept their reality and treat them as objects to adapt to rather than to eliminate. Even granting that evil does not subsist as an independent entity but inheres as a property of harmful actions or unjust relations, this ontological status does not preclude its practical addressability. The crucial distinction lies in recognizing that our ethical response targets not “evil-as-object” but the agential sources perpetuating its inherence. The purpose of medical intervention is not the disease itself but the restoration of health by altering pathology. Similarly, ethical engagement addresses not “evil” per se but human agents whose actions embed unfair harm, seeking to transform agential dispositions and relational contexts (Nussbaum 2011, p. 36).

Then, when God or gods exist, why does ethics not require them either? Before it becomes a question about ethics, this must first be a question we ask of ourselves; that is, must we wait until some ultimate existence is revealed to find the grounds for moral norms? In fact, just as we have found that we do not need to wait for a direct revelation from an oracle to recognize the necessity of ethical norms, we also do not need to wait for divine commands to form ethical norms. In this regard, Sterba has given some good reasons, such as the fact that the Euthyphro makes us rethink our understanding of the divine commands (Sterba 2024, p. 3). Theistic natural law provides a useful illustration of how consensus functions within a tradition. Aquinas (1953) holds that God orders creation toward goodness, and humans participate in this order through reason. What is crucial for my argument is not whether this claim is metaphysically true but that even within theistic ethics, recognition of divine law requires intersubjective discernment. In other words, the faithful do not access God’s will directly but through shared rational reflection within a community. This shows that consensus is not opposed to theistic ethics but a constitutive element of how it operates. Furthermore, there are some facts that are very clear in our world today. Different religions or denominations differ in their interpretations of the divine oracle, and even within the same religious scriptures, there are textual contradictions. The different understanding of divine commands and firm beliefs in these contradictory interpretations does not guarantee the common good but rather increases the differences among us from “is” to “ought”. Certainly, this is not a problem of God or gods but stems from our excessive dependence on them. These disagreements in interpretation are themselves limits on divine oracles. They raise questions about how to interpret theistic ethics and may even be revisions to divine oracle ethics, although this does not mean theistic ethics is not true. It is important to note that, even if these interpretations are disputed or even questioned, they can still serve as a sufficient condition for ethics. The sufficiency of an ethic does not depend on whether the theory is absolutely correct but on whether it can provide core ethical functions, such as a value system, behavioral norms, and meaning. Even if theistic ethics is questioned in its metaphysical premises, the norms, values, and motivational mechanisms it produces still cover these core functions. Theoretical flaws do not prevent it from meeting the needs of ethical practice. This is exactly why it can be a sufficient condition for ethics. It could be compared to a calendar based on geocentrism: even though its premise is wrong, it could still guide ancient people in farming and daily routines.

Thus, God or a god is a sufficient condition for ethics, not a necessary one. Within a theistic framework, God’s or a god’s will, commands, or attributes can provide clear grounds for ethical norms. If one acknowledges the existence of God and believes that God’s revelation is the source of morality, then an ethical system can be established on this basis. In such a case, the existence of God is sufficient to sustain the establishment of ethics, and thus constitutes a sufficient condition. However, God or a god is not a necessary condition for ethics. Without relying on God or gods, we can still establish ethical norms through other paths.

Let us go back to the World Conference of Religions (Parliament of the World’s Religions 1993), Publishing the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic,14 and confirm whether we will come to nothing when we stop depending on gods for everything? Although our connections with one another have become closer, differences between various cultures, religions, ethnic groups, and nations still persist and may even give rise to opposition, discrimination, oppression, and violence due to conflicts of interest. People from different religions have drawn on the basic requirements that all humanity should abide by the moral codes of the world’s major religions and cultures, thereby identifying ethical norms that are not dependent on specific cultural traditions or religious beliefs and, thus, are capable of transcending differences:

• Every human being must be treated humanely.
• Including four irrevocable directives:
• Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life;
• Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order;
• Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness;
• Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women.

These processes of consensus achievement provide a lens for understanding the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma poses the following question: Is a good thing good because the gods or God command it to be good? Or do gods or God command it because it is good in itself? The consensus-based lens, however, reframes this by focusing on how moral norms gain traction through collective agreement, rather than fixating on their ultimate source. Consider how consensus unfolds: Initially, we may converge on a basic moral judgment for wildly different reasons, one might cite divine revelation, another human empathy, or a third societal utility. This is accidental consensus without shared justifications. From here, we then work to extend this consensus, inferring new norms by building on the initial agreement, even as our underlying reasons remain distinct. This process reinterprets the Euthyphro Dilemma in two critical ways:

(1)

It rejects the need to choose between divine command and inherent goodness as the sole foundation of morality. Instead, moral norms are shown to emerge from the interplay of diverse justifications. Take kindness as an example. Its goodness does not have to come only from divine order or inherent virtue. It might first take root as accidental consensus. Believers support it for religious reasons. Secular people back it for relational ones. Then, it becomes a stable norm through collective reasoning.

(2)

It shifts the dilemma’s focus from “what makes something good” to “how goodness becomes socially binding.” The Euthyphro Dilemma fixates on where goodness comes from. Consensus looks at how goodness becomes binding in a community. A norm’s validity comes not from one source; it comes from its ability to grow from accidental agreement through shared reasoning.

In this reframing, the Euthyphro Dilemma loses its force as a forced choice. Morality is neither purely commanded nor purely inherent. It is a collaborative achievement, rooted in the messy, dynamic work of building shared norms from diverse starting points. Consensus, in this sense, offers a way to understand goodness not as a fixed truth to be discovered or dictated but as a living agreement to be sustained and extended.

When we propose four ethical norms based on the principle that “every human being must be treated humanely,” is it because of these ethical norms that we are ends in ourselves, or is it that we are ends in ourselves, thereby giving rise to ethical norms? It is easy to see from the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic that we are first recognized as ends in ourselves before ethical norms can be proposed.

However, the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic also reflects the fact that if consensus is merely the common elements across different religions and cultures, then it is nothing more than a call to act in accordance with the behaviors already required by the ethical norms formed within our respective religious and cultural contexts. Meanwhile, the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic is not a rigorous academic discussion; it is an important ethical initiative, not only among different cultures and religions but also between academic researchers and non-academic individuals. However, without a rigorous ethical theory as its foundation, ethical action may run into problems due to ignorance. That is why we need to take more responsibility and mobilize all our capacities to explore ethics that is compatible with global coexistence, based on the consensus we have already achieved and the need for a global ethic. Furthermore, the future of humanity has never been the concern of a single individual but of all of us. Climate crises, transnational pandemics, the gap between rich and poor, the risk of war, and other such issues are our shared problems. No single individual or group has the ability to tackle them alone, nor can personal moral codes alone cover global responsibilities. Only when “we” first establish an ethics of coexistence can the survival and development of each “I” become possible. Moreover, such a global ethic cannot be imposed by a single country, religion, or culture. It can only be created and safeguarded by ourselves on the basis of consensus. This requires that the subject of ethical norms shift from the individual “I” to the collective “we”. In other words, ethics is our own affairs.

5. Ethics Is Our Own Affair

Then, on what basis should we establish ethical norms in our own affairs? First, co-living itself cannot provide the basis, as “is” cannot derive “ought”. Second, “we” cannot provide the basis either as there exist enormous differences among us. Furthermore, it cannot be derived from any particular religion or culture, which amounts to a negation of “we”. For the core meaning of “we” precisely encompasses the coexistence of different religions, cultures, and groups, rather than the existence of a single group alone. Moreover, we are faced with a major problem. Even if we establish some common ethical norms, how can we ensure they apply to everyone and are based on the common good, rather than a compromise of interests, if they lack certainty and a reliable source? As we search for such a basis, we are forced to confront three problems.

The first problem is how it can avoid egocentrism. When we have sufficient reasons to prove that the derivation of ethical norms from a certain guarantee is correct, we will naturally regard other views as wrong or secondary. The second problem is how it can establish a connection between “is” and “ought”. Once we explain “ought”, we will define the content and meaning of “ought” according to this explanation. However, can an explanation serve such a function? Moreover, why should “ought” determine that we must act in this way? The third problem is how it can avoid infinite regression. To prove the correctness of a certain premise, one needs to constantly seek more fundamental premises. This shows that the object at each stage is not self-sufficient. Then, where to stop the regression is a matter of subjective choice. Due to cognitive limitations or value preferences, we stop the regression at different points and claim that this is the ultimate basis. This is nothing more than taking our own views as the criterion.

These problems are not entirely ethical issues but rather epistemological ones. Does this mean that ethics is impossible if epistemological problems are not solved? However, if the ethical goodness must depend on the epistemological truth, this clearly makes us return to the question between “is” and “ought”. Therefore, if the ethical good must be ensured by the epistemological truth, then common ethical norms must presuppose that all people are intellectually sound and mentally clear-minded, and the essence of goodness is to know goodness. From the positive perspective, the reason why the essence of goodness is bound to the understanding of goodness is that goodness can only become a value criterion for guiding behavior after being perceived, understood, and recognized by us. In other words, without the understanding of goodness, goodness loses its connection with us. However, reason becomes an end because of humans, or humans become an end because of reason—which one truly regards us as an end in ourselves? Requiring everyone to score full marks in intelligence tests and achieve a good life through this ability or ensuring that both those with good and poor grades receive fair treatment—which one is consistent with the good and capable of becoming a real-life phenomenon?

To answer this question and discover what our common ethical affairs should commit to, we need to reconsider the problem of the harmony of virtue and happiness. In our world, it is not an occasional event that good people suffer and bad people benefit. Thus, some ethicists distinguish between virtue and happiness, and claim that God guarantees the ultimate consistency between them. Kant says the following: “the necessary connection of the hope of being happy with the unremitting effort to make oneself worthy of happiness that has been adduced cannot be cognized through reason if it is grounded merely in nature, but may be hoped for only if it is at the same time grounded on a highest reason, which commands in accordance with moral laws, as at the same time the cause of nature” (Kant 1998a, p. 680). In Kant’s view, the highest good must encompass both virtue and happiness, and their union must conform to the principle of desert. A person with virtue deserves happiness, and happiness should only belong to those who are worthy of it. Kant also distinguished between the legality of actions that conform to the law and the morality of actions that proceed from the law. The motive of the former lies in external interests, emotions, and other such factors, while the motive of the latter is the internal respect for the moral law. However, must happiness come only from desert? If the highest good includes both virtue and happiness, then we can pursue the good of virtue on our own but why can we not pursue the good of happiness by ourselves? Requiring us to rely on fixed standards to identify norms and then behave according to them becomes a repression of our instinctive needs. If this need for happiness is not justified, it does not have to be ultimately guaranteed by God. If the need for happiness is justified, then the good of happiness is a moral good. It also means that these standards should not override our life instincts.

Therefore, regarding these identifying activities as the key to ethical norms will either lead to loss of the will for goodness in egocentrism or result in the absence of good outcomes in the negation of happiness. Let us consider the relationship between ethics and norms within the concept of ethical norms. A norm can be called an ethical norm because it embodies ethical values. Ethics consists of values and judgments of good and evil formed by us in the moral domain, while norms transform these ethical values into operable, specific, and practical rules. Thus, ethical norms are primarily ethical, not normative properties, and the normative properties of ethical norms must be consistent with ethical properties. What, then, are the properties of ethics? If we try to define this, we will once again make the mistake of norms overriding ethics. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights15 likewise does not provide a direct definition of ethics but rather a list of ethics. To be honest, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is not an academic article, and I should not put forward my own definition of ethics simply because it does not define ethics itself. However, just as this declaration must face the world’s diverse cultures and religions, if it first gave a specific definition of ethics, it would actually exclude other understandings of ethics and go against respect for cultural diversity. It only needs to clarify how we should treat others and handle relationships in specific situations. In other words, it does not require everyone to agree on ultimate ideas, it only seeks consensus in real actions. This approach shows precisely that ethics is not an abstract theory separated from reality. Instead, it is a set of rules we form in shared life to regulate our relationships. Therefore, its core is respect, care, and responsibility between us, not dogma prescribed by some authority. It is an agreement we ourselves need to get along well. This is why it is our own affairs.

Thus, ethics, as our common affairs, is not about interpretation but about action. Action requires that we not only understand why we need to care for others but also authentically and specifically understand what of others needs to be cared for, what kind of care they need, and finally how we should provide care. In this regard, we cannot demand that everyone practices this naturally, nor can we hope that a given ethical norm, once fully interpreted, works for everyone. We need to establish the connection between “is” and “ought” ourselves, through our actions, not explanations. Moreover, the point is not how my claim can be argued as the only truth but how it can be more acceptable as an action.

Certainly, this is also acceptable to both atheists and theists. For atheists, the possibility of acceptance is confirmed by Kai Nielsen (1985) and Nel Noddings (1984). Our various flaws make it necessary for us to achieve a better life through mutual dependence,16 which implies that we need to be cared for. In the absence of gods, this can only be satisfied through our own caring actions. For theists, Eugene Anthony (2019) is a pioneer in this regard, and he pointed out the following: “In the process of taking action, we not only put the beliefs in our hearts into practice, responding to each other’s needs, but also create our true common life. The consensus formed in common life serves as the factual basis for our ability to form non-compromising and non-bottom-line common ethical norms”.

Noteworthily, since Sterba proposed the logical incompatibility of God with evil and ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution, there have been many refutative arguments. However, these arguments have almost entirely come from the aspect of explanation, attempting to explain in terms of the properties and purposes of God. The problem is that, even if these explanations can be logically justified, the answers to whether God exists and whether the logic of evil is compatible do not depend on these explanations to be the truth. Therefore, even if God exists, these reasonings based on doctrine and logic are only a contingent connection to God, not a necessary connection from God. This judgment is not based on a God’s-eye view that directly knows ultimate reality. Instead, it comes from recognizing the limits of human cognition and reasoning. Even if God does exist, the connection between these reasonings and God depends on accidental conditions. For example, we just happen to choose this set of doctrines, and our cognitive abilities just happen to reach this level. It is not that God’s very existence necessarily requires humans to understand God in this way. Even if there is an inherent necessary connection that holds whether humans use doctrines to work it out, or is an attribute or result naturally contained in God’s existence, we can only build fragments of this necessary connection through accidental links, from our limited perspective.

However, it is essential to directly engage with the challenge of a “God’s-eye view” rather than sidestepping it, for two interrelated issues:

(1)

If there is an absolute divine perspective, does it dissolve the necessity of human interpretive processes?

(2)

Can claims about divine necessity, if unmediated by consensus, be translated into binding human obligations?

The necessity of consensus is constitutive rather than merely pragmatic, as demonstrated by three pivotal theological frameworks:

(1)

George Lindbeck’s cultural–linguistic model establishes that religious truths cannot be accessed as raw divine knowledge but only through the mediating structures of a faith community. As Lindbeck argues in The Nature of Doctrine, humans depend on a shared “grammar” of practices and beliefs to render divine realities intelligible (Lindbeck 1984, pp. 33–34). Even if a God’s-eye view perceives eternal truths, humans require a communal “rule theory” (Lindbeck 1984, p. 80) to translate these truths into meaningful and actionable norms, a theory forged through dialectical processes of “dialogue, disagreement, and reconciliation” within the tradition (Lindbeck 1984, p. 94).

(2)

David Tracy’s hermeneutics reinforces this point by arguing that theological claims achieve meaning only through a “public” conversation between tradition, society, and individual (Tracy 1981, p. 67). Consensus here is not a mere pragmatic compromise but the very medium through which religious truth becomes ethically binding. Without such dialogical consensus, even divine revelation risks remaining private opinion.

(3)

Similarly, MacIntyre’s thesis that all rationality is “tradition-constituted” clarifies why consensus is indispensable (MacIntyre 1988, p. 12). Ethical reasoning does not occur in a vacuum. It is embedded in historical practices and communal forms of life. Thus, consensus is the way traditions sustain rationality across generations. It transforms potentially “abstract and inert” propositions into living norms (MacIntyre 1988, p. 401).

Taken together, Lindbeck, Tracy, and MacIntyre do not merely offer disparate authorities but jointly demonstrate that whether within natural law, hermeneutical theology, or virtue ethics, the normative force of ethical claims depends on their reception and confirmation within communities. This reception is precisely what I mean by consensus as the necessary condition for ethical norms. These frameworks collectively demonstrate that the God’s-eye view, if ontologically real, does not supplant but presupposes the discursive work of consensus. The divine perspective may ground ultimate truth but human access to its ethical significance, its translation into lived norms, remains irreducibly communal, interpretive, and dialogical. Consensus, therefore, is not a concession to human limitation but the theologically necessary pathway through which transcendent possibility becomes immanent obligation.

According to Gettier’s (1963) seminal counterexamples to the Justified True Belief (JTB) account of knowledge, a belief may satisfy the JTB conditions yet fail to be knowledge because its justification rests on a false lemma or is subject to environmental epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005, p. 145). As Duncan Pritchard explains, such cases demonstrate that “a belief’s being true and justified is consistent with its being only accidentally true relative to the agent’s evidence” (Pritchard 2005, p. 146). This epistemological dilemma directly informs our analysis of theological judgments. Even if beliefs about God are assumed true, their justification, grounded in limited cognitive capacities, may succumb to Gettier-type instability. The truth of God’s existence could be disconnected from human justification by contingent factors. Linda Zagzebski’s diagnosis reinforces this point: “All Gettier cases share a common structure where cognitive success is divorced from cognitive competence” (Zagzebski 1994). In theological terms, human cognition’s finitude risks introducing epistemic luck into God-beliefs, wherein truth coincides with justification only fortuitously rather than through reliable cognitive access. Thus, these refutative arguments from explanations would face logical problems. Even if their belief on God is true and justified, the justification could be incidentally related to the belief’s truth. The Gettier problem between “justify” and “truth” leads us to realize that Hume’s problem is not just that “is” cannot derive “ought” but also that there is a gap between what we believe “ought to be” and the truth.

In conclusion, I defend the thesis that consensus is the necessary condition of ethical norms. Ethical rules, whether grounded in divine law, rationality, or evolutionary explanations, become binding only when they are recognized and affirmed intersubjectively. Consensus does not provide sufficient content by itself, agreement can also form around injustice; however, it is what transforms individual convictions into norms that regulate shared life. Without consensus, claims about God, reason, or nature risk remaining coercive or empty. The ontological foundation of this view lies in our human condition: beings who are vulnerable, interdependent, and capable of mutual recognition. As Darwall (2006) argues, normativity arises from the “second-person standpoint”, where we address and acknowledge each other as persons. Habermas (1990) similarly insists that the legitimacy of norms rests not on metaphysical certainty but on intersubjective justification. Consensus is, thus, not merely procedural but expresses our dignity as beings who can only flourish in shared life. From this foundation, other traditions can be reinterpreted: Aquinas’s natural law presupposes communal discernment of divine order; Tracy (1981) shows that theological truths require public conversation; MacIntyre (1988) reminds us that rationality itself is tradition-dependent. All converge on the same point: consensus is not an optional supplement to ethics but its very condition of possibility. Therefore, what I ultimately defend is not that consensus replaces God, reason, or nature but that any of these can only serve as ethical grounds if they are mediated through consensus. Ethics is, in this precise sense, our own affair: the ongoing task of transforming plurality into shared norms, sustained by mutual recognition, and guided by the pursuit of the common good.

Next, I will illustrate the difference between explanation-based ethics and action-based ethics by comparing Social Darwinism with ethics that is compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory. Through this, I attempt to prove that ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution is acceptable to both theists and atheists, and it is necessary for forming consensus in our ethical norms.

6. Evolutionary Theory as an Explanation: Social Darwinism

Whether we see the Darwinian evolutionary theory as an objective law that acts on everyone or just a part of atheist views, as long as we still seek ethical norms that work for everyone or gain the approval of the majority, the Darwinian evolutionary theory deserves sufficient discussion in ethical topics. At present, the Darwinian evolutionary theory is primarily engaged with ethical topics in two forms. One is Social Darwinism, and the other is ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory. The former considers evolution as the law, which prescribes how we ought to act, in nature and human society (Weikart 2004, p. 35). The latter considers the Darwinian evolutionary theory as a summary of phenomena in nature and human nature and provides summaries that can assist us in perfecting human nature in accordance with its essence (Sterba 2024, p. 15). A concise distinction is that Social Darwinism is strongly associated with the Darwinian evolutionary theory, whereas ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory is weakly associated with it. The perspective from which the Darwinian evolutionary theory is incorporated into ethical discourse depends both on what the Darwinian evolutionary theory itself is and on how we understand it.

An impartial summary of Darwinian evolution is as follows:

“According to Darwin’s Origin of Species, it is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the strongest that survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds itself.”

(Megginson 1963, p. 4.)

However, a localized discussion on the Origin of Species is as follows:

“One general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die.”

(Darwin 2001, p. 244.)

This has led many to view nature as a jungle law and apply this law to human society. Obviously, the law of survival by eliminating other species conflicts with the compassion and cooperation in our ethics.17 Social Darwinism treats inequality among humans as the inevitable result of natural laws. Those with greater capabilities are deemed entitled to privileges in social resource allocation, while individuals in vulnerable positions, whether due to physical conditions, economic limitations, or other constraints, are considered deserving of neglect or even sacrifice for the sake of societal progress. This perspective not only reduces human relationships to a struggle for survival but also undermines fundamental human rights and ethical boundaries, historically justifying social injustices, racial discrimination, and systemic oppression.

However, this undeniable error, verified by the painful history we experienced in the anti-fascist wars, raises a critical question: what caused it? Some may attribute it to the Darwinian evolutionary theory itself, while others to flawed reasoning. However, Darwin clarified in The Descent of Man that, although humans share biological evolutionary laws with other species, moral and social behaviors are shaped by complex cultural, historical, and environmental factors. In the realm of ethics, Darwin emphasized that the connection between evolution and human behavior lies solely in the formation and development of our instinctual moral sense. He noted that, while these biological instincts provide a starting point, we have developed unique ethical norms through cultural evolution. Therefore, Darwin wrote the following:

“The highest stage in moral culture is when we recognize that we ought to control our thoughts.”

(Darwin 2009, p. 103.)

Though biological instincts furnish the foundation, ethics ultimately remain our own affairs and responsibility. Ethical progress stems from our capacity to reflect on and shape these evolutionary legacies. Since this error does not originate from the Darwinian evolutionary theory itself, we need not regard the Darwinian evolutionary theory as a threat but should focus on how this fallacious reasoning arises. As for fallacious reasoning, it stems either from ignorance or from a preference for the outcomes that such reasoning can produce. Since Darwin has already pointed out the possible errors, this is not due to ignorance but rather a preference for and connivance with such erroneous outcomes. In this regard, we do not need abstruse reasoning or answers provided by divinity. We only need to ask ourselves questions and remain honest. If I were a leader in a certain field, should I be entitled to more resources, whether for personal enjoyment or for the better development of the field? If I were born with certain genetic diseases, would I seek to treat them through gene modification? I would like to emphasize that, if honesty is an ethical norm, we must be honest about both our virtues and our vices.

7. Using Evolutionary Theory to Act: Ethics Compatible with Darwinian Evolution

It should be acknowledged that whether the Darwinian evolutionary theory is consistent with the facts remains controversial.18 This renders Social Darwinism, which uses the Darwinian evolutionary theory as an explanation, invalid because its premise is not an established fact. Thus, since the ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory also has the problem that the authenticity of the objects it adapts to remains undetermined, does the invalidity of Social Darwinism also occur in the case of ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory? The answer is no. The key difference is that ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory does not consider the Darwinian evolutionary theory as an unquestionable fact or law. The meaningful question is as follows: what continues to attract us to the Darwinian evolutionary theory even before its truth is confirmed? Furthermore, setting aside the problem of authenticity, we need to answer the following question: what remains of the Darwinian evolutionary theory?

The first remnant is the mind. When something attracts us, from the subjective perspective, it means we favor it, implying that it can meet our needs. Meanwhile, something that does not exist can only exist in our mind as an idea. Thus, favoring something that may not exist is essentially favoring an idea already existing in our mind. For atheists, this idea is that we can evolve independently, without relying on gods. For theists, this can also become an object of favoring, for example, God endows us with free will.

The second remnant is behavior. As a conclusion, the Darwinian evolutionary theory explains the relation between behavior and the environment. If we assume that the Darwinian evolutionary theory is wrong, what might be its error? In the explanatory process, it may impose a connection between behavior and the environment that does not inherently exist. However, is this error due to the use of behavior as an object of study? Certainly, we can still find some problems. For example, behavior may be accidental or arbitrary but universal knowledge cannot be derived from particular knowledge. Then, why do our minds focus on behavior? What behavior remains and attracts our mind is its presence in the external world.19 This shows that our mind not only wills existence in the internal world but also wants to be realized in the external world. The external world is an end. For atheists, of course, there is only the external world. Furthermore, for theists, this is a reply that there is also an internal world.

The third remnant is the environment. This is what makes Darwinian evolutionary theory most distinctive. Behavior, as an activity carried out in the external world, interacts with the various environmental factors. Thus, we should not ignore the influence of the environment on behavior. The environment not only constrains us from doing everything exactly according to our mind but also supports us by providing the things we need. Thus, through constraint and support, we not only act in accordance with our mind but also need to make adjustments in accordance with the environment. In this sense, the environment influences our behavior and how our mind is realized in the external world.

Accordingly, the ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution also needs to be sufficiently understood in three aspects.

(1)

What Darwinian evolution provides for ethical norms is not a fact-based yet controversial certainty but a new source of the mind that favors things. Furthermore, the new source is ourselves. This is why ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution appeals to both naturalistic ethicists and ethicists who believe that our good will is the origin of all goodness. This ability to attract diverse groups provides the subjective foundation for forming common ethical norms.

(2)

Ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution is not just an explanation of ethical norms based on principles or facts but the conversion of ethical norms to actions in life. These actions do not necessarily correspond to theism or atheism but require a foundation on how actions are possible. To have the ability to act, ethical norms must be accepted by the majority. An approach is to distinguish between right and wrong on the basis of some standard, and promote the consistency of moral norms by debate. This is a necessary way for us to achieve consensus in our rational understanding. However, the problem is that knowing an ethical norm and acting in accordance with it are not necessarily causally linked.20 An ethical norm based purely on reason cannot necessarily produce an ethical action. Thus, the addition of evil, profit, and instinct to the consideration of ethical norms is a prerequisite for ethical norms to achieve a balance between our rationality and irrationality and become a reality.

(3)

By adapting to the environment, ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution makes ethical norms a reality. We cannot acknowledge that the environment influences behavior, including ethical behavior, while regarding the environment as irrelevant to ethics. Therefore, some elements commonly regarded as unethical or even non-ethical should become the objects of ethical norms. Particularly, we are facing an unprecedented environment, where we, who are vastly different, have to live together. Different natural environments, social contexts, histories, and cultures have led to our diverse views on ethical norms. In our past history, these differences did not become our problems as we all formed relatively stable and consensual ethical norms within our own living environments, and dissenters were always a minority.

On the basis of these three dimensions, the ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution offers a crucial contribution to establishing the connection between “is” and “ought”. Although no “ought” is obtained from an “is”, the “ought” must pay sufficient attention to the “is”; this is because the “is” constitutes the context in which we find ourselves and influences what we can achieve in accordance with the “ought”. From the perspective of pure “ought”, whether an ethical system can be established only concerns whether its internal logic is self-consistent. As Jens Timmermann (2013) points out in his analysis of moral dilemmas in Kantian ethics, there can be no conflict between moral duties and ethical obligations because they are essentially based on objective practical necessity. However, the real conflict is always in a specific situation in which non-moral environmental factors directly influence our ethical choices, forcing us to prioritize ethical norms. This makes us either morally indifferent, who do not make any choices, or morally utilitarian, who have trade-offs.

For example, consider the well-known trolley problem (Thomson 1985). The distinction between subjects within the causal chain and external observers has become a classic paradigm for assigning responsibility in the trolley problem. However, only the subjects are out in the open, and the subjects hidden in the environment are ignored. Marion Smiley makes an important supplement that responsibility not only involves direct actors but also needs to be traced back to organizational omissions (Smiley 1992, p. 214), such as inadequate track maintenance and a lack of safety supervision. Now, we can imagine a more extreme scenario, that is, a maintenance worker encounters a homicide on his way to repair the railway guardrail. Out of kindness, he chooses to stop it at the risk of his own safety. However, at this moment, several children enter the railway from the damaged fence, triggering a trolley problem incident. The purpose of envisioning this scenario is not to assign blame in an extreme situation, but rather, if we cannot prevent such things from happening, how can we claim to be good merely based on the perfect ethical norms in our own concepts? Do we confirm that we are good by blaming ourselves or others in misfortune? Do our reason or gods guarantee ethical norms to allow us to attribute misfortune to occasional problems of luck and accomplish nothing more than change our minds?

As we can see, the essence of this moral laziness in treating environmental factors as unethical is moral indifference. The key to making changes is to prevent evil or, to be more acceptable, moral dilemmas. Fortunately, environmental factors are also objects that can be exploited by us. Rob White’s research indicates that climate change has brought about a series of environmental changes and social pressures, which indirectly affect the crime rate. Meanwhile, it also identifies intervention methods for crime prevention (White 2016). Since even external climate change has become relevant to ethics and is even an important link in preventing evil, why should we exclude our biological instincts and evolution in the environment?

8. Ethics Compatible with Evolutionary Theory Has No Dilemmas: Support from Confucian Ethics

Evolution is considered to potentially affect the independence of ethical norms, thus being excluded from ethics. As Sharon Street points out regarding the dilemma, if evaluative truths are considered to be independent and unaffected by evolution, then since evaluative judgements are affected by evolution, the consistency of evaluative judgements with evaluative truths depends only on luck. However, to argue that evaluative truths are also influenced by evolution would be to face Hume’s problem (Street 2006). The logic of this view is self-evident and mirrors the errors of Social Darwinism. However, this does not constitute a refutation of the ethics compatible with Darwinian evolution. Moreover, the reasons are as follows:

(1)

If evaluative truths are general, then evaluative judgements are put in a dilemma with evaluative truths. Both evaluative judgements and evaluative truths can always remain consistent, which would make the criticism of accidental luck invalid because any real contingency is the result of the necessity of truth at work. Alternatively, evaluative judgements and evaluative truths cannot always be consistent, and evaluative judgements can only achieve consistency with evaluative truths through some correct means. This shows that there is a distinction between the incorrect and the correct in evaluative judgements, and the process by which evaluative judgements can be consistent with evaluative truths is the result of evolving from incorrectness to correctness. It is not that the judgment itself is true or not but rather whether the way evaluative judgments align with evaluative truths is necessary or accidental.21 Initially, evaluative judgments may connect with truths through accidental and one-sided bases, for example, relying solely on intuition or prejudice. Later, they gradually build a stable connection with truths through more reliable methods, such as introducing universal principles and eliminating subjective interference. This evolution does not involve judgments changing from true to false or vice versa. Instead, it refers to the shift in the relationship between judgments and truths, that is, from being accidental and unreliable to being necessary and justifiable. Furthermore, without accidental connections, necessary connections would never be discoverable in the first place.

(2)

If evaluative truths are not general, it means that independent evaluative truths or ethical norms cannot guarantee our virtue and happiness. Thus, we certainly need to link ethics with evolutionary theory or other things. However, this connection is not a task for pure reason but for the imagination. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, cited by Street, contains the following content: “that the problem of determining surely and universally which action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, so that there can be no imperative with respect to it that would, in the strict sense, command him to do what would make him happy; for happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination” (Kant 1998b, p. 29). In addition, in Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant states the following: “This state of a free play of the faculties of cognition with a representation through which an object is given must be able to be universally communicated, because cognition, as a determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject it may be) should agree, is the only kind of representation that is valid for everyone” (Kant 2000, pp. 102–3). Admittedly, Kant’s views themselves do not touch on evolutionary theory; however, his ideas show that when ethics needs to address how happiness is achieved in specific situations, rather than focusing solely on pure principles of virtue, it requires imagination to integrate concrete experiences. Imagination does not replace practical reason. Instead, it serves as an auxiliary capacity for practical reason to take root in the empirical world. Meanwhile, concrete experiences include our survival instincts and evolutionary experiences. Thus, ethics adapted to evolutionary theory is a necessary imaginative effort to combine ethics with the empirical realm, thereby transforming universal principles of virtue into operable life norms. Furthermore, Kant limited cognitive faculties to sensibility and understanding, and identified the core feature of knowledge as certainty valid for all people. However, this is a characteristic of determinative judgment, which subsumes the particular under universal laws. What distinguishes ethics compatible with evolutionary theory from social Darwinism is precisely that it is not a determinative judgment but a reflective judgment that reflects on the universal within the particular.

This means that virtue and happiness are not guaranteed by evaluative truths. Imagination, rather than pure reason, carries the vital function of making us both free and natural, particular and universal, and flawed and in a state of flawlessness. Furthermore, these elements are issues in our ethics, whether theistic or atheistic. Regarding atheistic ethics, if humans are a product of natural evolution, how can we establish autonomous moral responsibility? In the case of theistic ethics, if ethical norms are derived from divine commands, are we merely passively obedient? Atheists and theists may not admit to having such problems. However, if we put together the questions that we have been challenging each other with, it is easy to see that these are the real problems faced by our common ethics. It is not about choosing between theism and atheism but about freedom and responsibility, defects, and perfections.

Thus, there is no dilemma in evolutionary compatible ethics, which aims to establish the consistency between instinct and ethics under the aim of goodness. It certainly threatens ethical norms but only the kind of ethical norms that, based on epistemology, would have to be established as consistent with nature and freedom. Furthermore, evolution is nothing more than our process of not only adapting to the limitations of the environment through behavior but also utilizing them to create the virtue and happiness that we originally did not possess or had insufficiently. In what follows, I will use the example of Confucian ethics to illustrate that evolution and ethics can coexist, evolution is not a threat to ethics, and that ethics compatible with evolution is possible. There are two threads here: one is the relationship between instinct and ethics, and the other is the relationship between self and others.

In the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, a fundamental ethical consensus we have formed is the Golden Rule:

What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others.22

Noteworthily, this Golden Rule comes from the Confucian ethics, which is considered to be based on blood ties, emphasizes graded love, and is incompatible with the value of equality. Logically, this Confucian ethics of particularism should be exclusive. However, defenders of Confucian ethics argue that “because of the ontological unity of human beings and the myriad things, a complete realization of humanity must lead to the realization of things as well. The self-completion of Ch’Eng is, therefore, not confined to the individual, nor is it restricted to the anthropological realm” (Tu 1989, p. 80).

Perhaps influenced by the Yin–Yang ideology, Confucianism believes that just as day and night alternate, things that do not coexist are yet mutually inherent, together composing the operation of the world. The reasoning behind this seemingly logically paradoxical idea is not complicated. Day moves in the direction of night and night moves in the direction of day; therefore, day has the property of becoming night and night has the property of becoming day. In conclusion, night lies within day and day lies within night. Dong Zhongshu, a Confucian scholar of the Han Dynasty, argued that this relationship—which is both non-coexistent and intrinsic to each other—exists not only in non-coexistent natural phenomena but also in an even more fundamental relationship of non-coexistence—between humans and nature, as well as the relationship within us, the self and the other.

Regarding the relationship between humans and nature, the attributes of what is uniquely human have already arisen in nature, and what is uniquely human will change towards conformity with nature. Therefore, Confucian ethics regards our biological instincts not only as natural necessities but also as ethical imperatives. The Li Ki states the following: “The things which men greatly desire are comprehended in meat and drink and sexual pleasure” (Legge 2019a). This means that appetites and sexual desires are included in ethical concerns, and it even means that our ethical norms have the same natural necessity as appetites and sexual desires. The Works of Mencius makes reproduction an ethical norm as well: “There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them” (Legge 2019b). This is not to say that the purpose of ethical norms is to help us better fulfill our biological instincts. However, it does illustrate that without happiness, life cannot really be improved, and ethical norms cannot display the attributes of goodness. How can we distinguish between kindness and indifference to others if we cannot realize their happiness? Thus, in Confucian ethics, the fulfillment of our biological instincts and our need for happiness is seen as fundamental.

At the same time, the emphasis on instinct does not make Confucian ethics Social Darwinism. Huang Yong points out that the core of Confucian ethics is not egoism. By incorporating individual needs such as eating and drinking into the social order, it actually accomplishes the socialization of biological instincts, considering self-perfection as a process to achieve social harmony (Huang 2018). By this, it accomplishes the cultural construction that the selfish nature of the individual should be constrained by ethical norms, thus differing from the Social Darwinism of laissez-faire instincts. It also accomplishes the construction of the self in relation to others. The needs of the self are not only individual but also social. We have both the instinct to realize our own happiness and the obligation to realize the happiness of others.

In terms of the relationship between self and others, Confucian ethics believes that we should understand ourselves clearly and be honest with ourselves in order to better achieve our own happiness. Meanwhile, we should also strive to understand others and embrace differences as part of our obligation to contribute to realize the happiness of others. Similarly, our biological instincts are not only objects to be constrained but also objects to be utilized. The more we understand what we regard as happiness, the more we can comprehend what others consider happiness. This is particularly evident in “filial piety” as an ethical norm. “Filial piety”, as a kind of good treatment of parents by their children, is both derived from blood relations and not entirely consistent with the reproduction of life.23 We need to rely on our parents for support during childhood, and then we also understand that our parents require support when they are older. Understanding others in understanding ourselves gives our instincts an important ethical function. From this, we generate ethical norms that transcend ego and instinct. In this way, not only do we provide basic food for our elderly parents but we also provide them with moral support, as well as treating not only one’s own elderly parents well but also other elderly people.

Undoubtedly, none of the above is based on rigorous logical reasoning. From instinctual needs to moral norms and from the self to the other all rely on the imagination of the harmony of all things and the alignment of the self with the other. This provides support for Kant’s view that ethical norms that lead to stable and harmonious happiness are not the product of reason but of imagination. Furthermore, it is the imagination that seeks to make the connections that reason cannot make. We create new environments in which we live by refining the virtues and wellbeing of the self and others. This new environment supports us in solving previously unsolvable metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical problems. There is a very simple truth here: when there is not enough food, we have to compete with each other, and when there is enough food, we have true equality and freedom in terms of our appetites. Ethics compatible with the evolutionary theory is working on both how we avoid the evils that result from competition when we have to compete, and, when some people are in the lead in the competition for survival, how they should act to create new environments that free us from the competition for survival.

Furthermore, does this lead to ethical norms falling into arbitrariness? Absolutely not. We cannot obtain all truth from a single perspective. In today’s world, where vastly different religions and cultures coexist, ethics compatible with the evolutionary theory provides us with the possibility of embracing differences, understanding others, and forming consensus within our own perspectives, while consensus ensures that ethical norms are not arbitrary. However, ethical norms change since the changing environment presents us with new challenges and, of course, provides new support. What remains unchanged? As both theism and atheism agree, the ethical dilemma is not a problem that belongs to gods but to us. Thus, it is our responsibility to use ethical norms to achieve a better life together. Moreover, we, who are not perfect, need to draw on all the elements available.

9. Conclusions

Sterba argues that ethical norms do not require God, and Harrison argues that ethical norms do not require God specifically but do need gods. In response to the discussion of Sterba and Harrison, I argue that ethical norms do not require God or gods but rather are our own affairs, whether for theists or atheists. This is because reason cannot independently guarantee our virtue and happiness, and ethical norms based on explanation can lead to moral laziness and moral indifference as in Social Darwinism. Thus, ethical norms also require action and imagination. The ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory shows us the ethical functions of non-ethical and unethical elements that not only trouble us but also provide us support. In utilizing these elements, we will be able to realistically and effectively achieve better virtue and happiness, and build a harmonious common life. Thus, the ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory is an ethical consensus acceptable to both theists and atheists. The case of Confucian ethics shows that the ethics compatible with the Darwinian evolutionary theory does not lead to what Sharon Street calls a debunking threat; rather, it utilizes all available elements to make our virtue and happiness better.