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Philosophies
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Moral Psychology of the Emotions
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Moral Psychology of the Emotions

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (1 January 2024) | Viewed by 14462

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Laura Candiotto

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Guest Editor
Centre for Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Pardubice, Studentská 95, Pardubice, Czech Republic
Interests: philosophy of emotion (love, shame, and wonder); social epistemology; 4Ecognition (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended Cognition); environmental ethics; ancient philosophy (Plato)
Prof. Dr. Rick Anthony Furtak

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Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, CO 80903, USA
Interests: the moral psychology of the emotions; the relations between philosophy and literature; the tradition of existential thought (especially Søren Kierkegaard and his legacy)

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

We are pleased to invite you to submit a paper to a Special Issue on the Moral Psychology of Emotions.

We aim to collect papers about the following research questions (this is not an exhaustive list—we are happy to receive contributions about other related questions):

  • What is the general significance of emotion for moral agency?
  • What is the role of specific emotions, such as love, shame, indignation, anger, grief, pride, guilt, relief, and others, in the moral life?
  • What is the relation of emotions to the meaning of life?
  • Which conceptual frameworks can help in understanding the moral significance of emotion?
  • What are the most urgent ethical issues that a moral psychology of emotions should answer? What are the conceptual tools it can offer regarding climate change, epistemic exclusion and discrimination, and the upsurge of insecurity (wars, economic crisis, pandemic, etc.)?
  • What theories of the mind are the most apt to understand the moral role of emotions?
  • How do emotions contribute to moral change and moral development?
  • How do emotions inform moral responsibility?
  • How do they relate to personal identity and selfhood?
  • Is moral psychology necessarily individualistic? Is a social turn in moral psychology required? If so, what are its core characteristics?
  • Which interdisciplinary dialogues should be nourished in order to specify the role of emotions in our moral life—for example, psychoanalytic theory, neuroethics, or existential psychotherapy?
  • How can different philosophical traditions or methods contribute to the development of new paths of investigation into the moral psychology of emotions?

This Special Issue aims to nourish and further develop the contemporary debate on the significance of emotions in the moral life. It will include papers from different philosophical traditions of thought as well as other disciplines, such as psychology, psychotherapy, neuroscience, and literature.

In this Special Issue, original research articles and reviews are welcome. The length of original papers is from 6000 to 12000 words, and 3000 for reviews. The papers will be published online, open access, and also in print format.

We look forward to receiving your contributions.

Prof. Dr. Laura Candiotto
Prof. Dr. Rick Anthony Furtak
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Philosophies is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • emotions
  • moral education
  • transformative practice
  • moral responsibility
  • the meaning of life
  • ethics
  • personal identity
  • epistemology
  • social philosophy

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Further information on MDPI's Special Issue polices can be found here.

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

15 pages, 288 KiB  
Article
What Is There to Be Ashamed Of? Nietzsche and Plato
by Ondřej Sikora
Philosophies 2024, 9(3), 76; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9030076 - 24 May 2024
Viewed by 1070
Abstract
The motif of shame represents an interesting and hitherto neglected intersection in the discussion of the relationship between Nietzsche and Plato. The first part of the essay recapitulates the function of this motif in Nietzsche’s culminating texts (mainly Zarathustra and Gay Science), [...] Read more.
The motif of shame represents an interesting and hitherto neglected intersection in the discussion of the relationship between Nietzsche and Plato. The first part of the essay recapitulates the function of this motif in Nietzsche’s culminating texts (mainly Zarathustra and Gay Science), while the second part focuses on the motif of shame in Plato’s work, specifically the two extreme contexts of death (Apology, Crito) and love (Symposium). It turns out that for both authors, shame is a constitutive moral phenomenon that is thematized in relation to logos. Shame and logos thus stand in close and contrasting relation. Their tension is decisive for the life of the soul, for its upward movement (Plato) or gradation (Nietzsche). It is therefore not a simple subjugation of the “bad”, irrational element by the “good”, rational component of the soul that plays the central role but an interplay of irreducible, mutually demanding moments. The interpretation of their interplay has both historical and systematic importance—it sheds new light on the relationship between these seemingly opposing philosophers and contributes to answering the following question: what is there to be ashamed of? Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Psychology of the Emotions)
16 pages, 259 KiB  
Article
Ecological Grief Observed from a Distance
by Ondřej Beran
Philosophies 2024, 9(2), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9020037 - 14 Mar 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1799
Abstract
The paper discusses ecological grief as a particular affective phenomenon. First, it offers an overview of several philosophical accounts of grief, acknowledging the heterogeneity and complexity of the experience that responds to particular personal points of importance, concern and one’s identity; the loss [...] Read more.
The paper discusses ecological grief as a particular affective phenomenon. First, it offers an overview of several philosophical accounts of grief, acknowledging the heterogeneity and complexity of the experience that responds to particular personal points of importance, concern and one’s identity; the loss triggering grief represents a blow to these. I then argue that ecological grief is equally varied and personal: responding to what the grieving person understands as a loss severe enough to present intelligibly a degradation of her life and the world, to their meaningfulness or even sustainability. More specifically, both personal and ecological grief may manifest in an eroded sense of the future as a space in which one would invest oneself with plans, projects, ideas, desires, and endeavours. On the other hand, personal grief is, in some cases, conceptualised as having embedded the inherent possibility to come to closure or “move on” (e.g., by marrying again), while with ecological grief, the intelligibility of overcoming (replacing) the loss may be, depending on its scale, severely limited. I argue that this erosion of the future need not take the shape of paralysing sadness but rather of a disruption of taking some options of projecting oneself into the future seriously or as real. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Psychology of the Emotions)
20 pages, 3490 KiB  
Article
Ressentiment in the Manosphere: Conceptions of Morality and Avenues for Resistance in the Incel Hatred Pipeline
by Tereza Capelos, Mikko Salmela, Anastaseia Talalakina and Oliver Cotena
Philosophies 2024, 9(2), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9020036 - 13 Mar 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3524
Abstract
This article investigates conceptions of morality within the framework of ressentimentful victimhood in the manosphere, while also exploring avenues for resistance among young individuals encountering the “hatred pipeline”. In Study 1, we use the emotional mechanism of ressentiment to examine how incels construct [...] Read more.
This article investigates conceptions of morality within the framework of ressentimentful victimhood in the manosphere, while also exploring avenues for resistance among young individuals encountering the “hatred pipeline”. In Study 1, we use the emotional mechanism of ressentiment to examine how incels construct narratives of victimhood rooted in the notion of sexual entitlement that remains owed and unfulfilled, alongside its “black pill” variant emphasising moral and epistemic superiority. Through a linguistic corpus analysis and content examination of 4chan and Incel.is blog posts, we find evidence of ressentiment morality permeating the language and communication within the incel community, characterised by blame directed at women, and the pervasive themes of victimhood, powerlessness, and injustice. In Study 2, we delve into young individuals’ reflections on incel morality and victimhood narratives as they engage with online networks of toxic masculinity in the manosphere. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with young participants who have accessed the manosphere, we explore their perceptions of risks, attribution of blame, and experiences of empathy towards individuals navigating the “hatred pipeline”. Our analysis underscores the significance of ressentiment in elucidating alternative conceptions of morality and victimhood, while shedding light on the potential for acceptance or resistance within online environments characterised by hatred. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Psychology of the Emotions)
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13 pages, 232 KiB  
Article
Contempt and Invisibilization
by Laurent Jaffro
Philosophies 2024, 9(2), 34; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9020034 - 6 Mar 2024
Viewed by 2215
Abstract
Why is contempt seen as potentially lacking in the respect for persons and therefore prima facie subject to negative moral evaluation? This paper starts by looking at a distinctive feature of contempt in the context of thick relationships, such as those of friendship, [...] Read more.
Why is contempt seen as potentially lacking in the respect for persons and therefore prima facie subject to negative moral evaluation? This paper starts by looking at a distinctive feature of contempt in the context of thick relationships, such as those of friendship, close professional collaboration, or romantic love: there is an irreversibility effect attached to the experience of contempt. Once contempt occurs in a thick relationship, it seems very difficult to return to non-contemptuous reactive attitudes. The second part argues that the irreversibility effect is due to the fact that contempt is an affective attitude which tends to invisibilize the person who is the object of contempt. The tendency to invisibilize is inscribed in the intentional structure of contempt as well as in its motivational dimension. The final part explores some consequences of this hypothesis, and in particular argues that it also explains why contempt motivated by abject wrongdoing, as opposed to resentment, anger, or hatred, tends to block any process of forgiveness. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Psychology of the Emotions)
16 pages, 240 KiB  
Article
Reason, Emotion, and the Crisis of Democracy in British Philosophy of the 1930s
by Matthew Sterenberg
Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010022 - 4 Feb 2024
Viewed by 1957
Abstract
This article examines how British philosophers of the 1930s grappled with the relationship between reason, emotion, and democratic citizenship in the context of a perceived “crisis of democracy” in Europe. Focusing especially on Bertrand Russell, Susan Stebbing, and John Macmurray, it argues that [...] Read more.
This article examines how British philosophers of the 1930s grappled with the relationship between reason, emotion, and democratic citizenship in the context of a perceived “crisis of democracy” in Europe. Focusing especially on Bertrand Russell, Susan Stebbing, and John Macmurray, it argues that philosophers working from diverse philosophical perspectives shared a sense that the crisis of democracy was simultaneously a crisis of reason and one of emotion. They tended to frame this crisis in terms of three interrelated concerns: first, as a problem of balancing or integrating reason and emotion; second, as a problem of the relationship between emotions and democratic citizenship; and third, as a problem of how to properly train or educate the emotions. Significantly, British philosophers addressed these issues most directly in writings for a non-professional audience, as they sought to translate their professional expertise into popular works that might rejuvenate democratic citizenship. This historical episode is a reminder of how philosophers were deeply engaged in the cultural politics of the interwar period and is a telling example of how personalist concerns were central to philosophy even as the “analytic revolution” was gathering steam. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Psychology of the Emotions)
13 pages, 266 KiB  
Article
Love, Grief, and Resilience
by Songyao Ren
Philosophies 2023, 8(4), 74; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040074 - 16 Aug 2023
Viewed by 2766
Abstract
This paper defends resilience in bereavement by way of responding to two prominent objections in the contemporary philosophical literature. Resilience in bereavement pertains to the ability to return to one’s functional and emotional baselines in a comparatively short period after the death of [...] Read more.
This paper defends resilience in bereavement by way of responding to two prominent objections in the contemporary philosophical literature. Resilience in bereavement pertains to the ability to return to one’s functional and emotional baselines in a comparatively short period after the death of a loved one. Contrary to what Moller thinks, resilience is compatible with having a deep appreciation for the deceased loved one. Appealing to the example of Zhuangzi’s grieving of his wife, I argue that the agony of grief is assuaged as one comes to terms with one’s loss through a realization of the universality and inevitability of death. This can be so even as one continues to appreciate the significance of what one has lost. Also, contrary to Smuts’ view, resilience does not indicate a failure to care. Although the resilient is free from prolonged and intense grief, she could continue to care for the deceased by constructing a new relationship with her and contributing to this relationship in ways that are appropriate to it. This view is further corroborated by empirical bereavement research. According to the continuing bonds theory, healthy grief is resolved by establishing changed ties with the deceased rather than detaching ourselves from them. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Psychology of the Emotions)
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