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Open AccessArticle

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

by

Sylvain Béal

, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran and Philippe Solal

Games 2010, 1(3), 338-356; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030338 - 21 Sep 2010

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6460

Abstract

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for [...] Read more.

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

Open AccessArticle

Universally Balanced Combinatorial Optimization Games

by

Gabrielle Demange

and

Xiaotie Deng

Games 2010, 1(3), 299-316; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030299 - 13 Sep 2010

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 5988

Abstract

This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer [...] Read more.

This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer constraints. In economic settings, the integer requirement reflects some forms of indivisibility. We are interested in the classes of games that guarantee a non-empty core no matter what are the admissible values assigned to the parameters defining these programs. We call such classes universally balanced. We present characterization and complexity results on the universally balancedness property for some classes of interesting combinatorial optimization games. In particular, we focus on the algorithmic properties for identifying universally balancedness for the games under discussion. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

Open AccessArticle

Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

by

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

,

Ana Mauleon

and

Vincent Vannetelbosch

Games 2010, 1(3), 286-298; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030286 - 02 Sep 2010

Cited by 17 | Viewed by 7245

Abstract

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if [...] Read more.

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

Open AccessArticle

Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

by Emiliya Lazarova and

Dinko Dimitrov

Games 2010, 1(2), 159-167; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020159 - 25 Jun 2010

Viewed by 5713

Abstract

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average [...] Read more.

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

Open AccessArticle

Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?

by Christine Grüning and

Wolfgang Peters

Games 2010, 1(2), 137-158; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020137 - 24 Jun 2010

Cited by 11 | Viewed by 8211

Abstract

The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a [...] Read more.

The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

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Open AccessArticle

The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games

by Chen-Ying Huang and

Tomas Sjöström

Games 2010, 1(2), 66-88; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020066 - 15 Apr 2010

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 6422

Abstract

We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically [...] Read more.

We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

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