3. Balanced Weights and Status-Based Preferences
Let , , and with . We assume that every agent is assigned a rank which induces a unique ordering of agents within each type such that any two consecutive players’ ranks differ by one unit. The highest ranked agents of each type all have rank , and the lowest ranked agents in the sets , and have ranks , , and 1, respectively. We take the rank of the empty set to be equal to zero. Underlying the ranking of agents may be a distribution of abilities or material endowment. By letting the highest ranked agents of all types have equal ranks we rule out scale effects. The assumption that the lowest ranked a-agent may have a higher rank than the lowest ranked b- and c-agent reflects the scarcity of a-type individuals relative to those of b- and c-types.
In addition to his preference , each agent is characterized by a non-negative weight vector . The corresponding vectors for and are and , respectively. We call these weights balanced if the following two conditions hold:
(1) for each , , and .
(2) for each , and all and with , .
One possible interpretation of such a restriction on the weights is as follows. Each agent has exactly one unit of communication time that is efficiently allocated between the other two types of groups, as reflected in (1). Similarly, condition (2) imposes that the communication time of agents of two different types with agents of the third type sums up to one. It follows from the balancedness condition that assigning a value to some
,
, determines also the rest of the weights. For instance, if we fix
, then (1) and (2) imply
and
.
1 Thus, this condition inherits and strengthens the spirit of cyclicity from the standard three-sided matching model (cf. [
5]).
By using the above setup, let us now define agents’ preferences in a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights. For
, each
and each
,
if and only if
Thus, in such a hedonic game, each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups (cf. [
11]). Moreover, each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
Theorem 1 Let be a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights. Then the set of core stable coalition structures is non-empty.
Consider the coalition structure . We will show that π is core stable.
Let and . In what follows we will denote by () the rank of the highest (lowest) ranked d-agent in Y.
First, for all
we have by construction that
In addition, since the highest ranked agents in all types have the same rank and the weights are balanced, we have for the status of agent
in the coalition structure
that
Next, we will show that there is no coalition that blocks the constructed coalition structure π. Suppose, on the contrary, that such a coalition exists.
First, suppose that
for some
. Let
j be the lowest ranked member of
X. This agent’s status in
X is given by
The same agent’s status in
π, however, is given by
This establishes a contradiction to
X blocking
π.
Suppose next that agents of all the types are contained in
X and let
,
, and
. Then, for
,
, and
one should have
Summing up, we get
Since the weights are balanced, we have
which is a contradiction.
Take finally the case where
X contains two agents’ types, say
a and
b, and let
and
. As
X is a blocking coalition, one should have for
and
that
Summing up, and applying the balancedness of the weights, we get
Since
,
, and
, we have again a contradiction. We conclude that
X cannot block
.
Next we study in more detail the core stable outcomes when there is an equal number of
a-,
b-, and
c-type of agents. For this, we need to introduce some new notation. Let
. We denote by
the status that agent
attains in a coalition structure
π,
i.e.,
Furthermore, we define the set
and note that
as, for instance, the coalition structure
belongs to Π when
.
Theorem 2 Let be a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights, and . If , then π is core stable.
Proof. Take and suppose that there is a coalition X that blocks π.
Consider first the case where
X contains only one type of agents. Then, one should have
which is a contradiction. Thus,
X cannot be blocking
π.
Suppose next that
X contains two agents’ types, say
a and
b (considering other two agents’ types does not alter the proof argument), and let
and
. For
and
one should then have
Summing up, we get
which is a contradiction since
.
Take finally the case where agents of all the types are contained in
X and let
,
, and
. Then, one should have
Summing up, we get
which is again a contradiction since the weights are balanced. We conclude that
π is core stable.
Notice that the reverse implication of Theorem 2 does not hold as the following example shows.
Example 1 Consider for each . The agents are ranked as follows: , , and for each . Let the weight vector be such that for all with , . Consider the coalition structure . It is easy to compute the status of each agent in π: , , , , , and . We will show that π is core stable.
As every agent’s status in π is at least as high as when being alone, no agent can block π by himself. Moreover, it is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that there cannot be a blocking coalition with for any (the status of the lowest ranked member of X is non-positive).
Furthermore, notice that
for all
with
. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a blocking coalition
with
and
. Therefore, there must be agents
for whom
Summing up, we get
. This leads to a contradiction as a group’s average rank is strictly positive.
Next, suppose that with and . One can show that if π is blocked by X, then for an agent , it must hold that , which implies that . This is only satisfied in the case when and , i.e., we have . Notice that if , then agent has no incentive to participate in X as his ranking in this case would be which equals his ranking in the partition π. Analogously, if , then the ranking of in X would be , i.e., agent has no incentive to participate in X either. Similarly, one can show that there is no coalition with and which blocks π.
Last, suppose that there is a blocking coalition
X with
,
and
. Consider an agent
and an agent
. If
π is blocked by
X, this implies that
Summing up, we get
. As
,
,
, and
, this implies that
.
Notice finally that, for
X to block
π, one should have for each
that
Using
, we get
for each
. This implies that
. In addition, recall that
. Since
, this implies that
, hence,
. Therefore,
and
, which in turn implies that
and
as no agent among
and
can obtain a higher status.
Let us finally consider a hedonic game with status-based preferences and individual weights that are defined on coalitions and are, therefore, not balanced. As our last example shows, a core stable coalition structure may fail to exist in this case.
Example 2 Let
for
. Let
and
for all
. Consider the following non-balanced weight vector:
We will show that there is no core stable coalition structure.
First, consider coalition structure . The status of each player in the given coalition structure can be computed easily: , , , , , and . This coalition structure can be blocked by coalition in which the blocking players can obtain status of 6, 5, and 4, respectively, by forming a coalition.
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures , , , , and can be blocked by .
Next, consider coalition structure . The status of players , , and in this coalition structure is 2, , and , respectively. The status of players and is given above. Coalition structure is blocked by and who can form a coalition and obtain status of , 6, and .
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures , , , and can be blocked by coalition .
Next, consider coalition structure . The status of players , , and in this coalition structure is , , and , respectively, and the status of the remainder of the players is given above. This coalition structure is blocked by coalition where the members obtain a higher status of , , and .
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures , , and are blocked by .
Next, consider coalition structure . Players’ status is , , , , , and . This coalition structure is blocked by players who can obtain status , , 4, and 2, respectively, by forming a coalition.
Similarly, one can show that coalition structures and are blocked by .
Next, consider coalition structure . Note that . This coalition structure is blocked by the grand coalition, .
Similarly, one can easily show that coalition structures , and are blocked by the grand coalition.
Consider coalition structures where , , , , , and . This coalition structure is blocked by whose members can obtain status of , and , respectively.
Similarly, we can show that coalition structure can be blocked by coalition .
In all of the remainder of the coalition structures a blocking coalition can be found easily. There is either at least one player who forms a blocking coalition by himself, e.g., consider coalition structure where the status of player is ; or there are at lest two players of distinct types who have status of 0 and by forming a coalition obtain strictly higher status, e.g., consider coalition structure where players , and have 0 status and can obtain strictly positive status by forming coalition .