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Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little

Department of Economics, Universität Rostock, Ulmenstr. 69, 18057 Rostock, Germany
Games 2019, 10(4), 47; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040047
Received: 17 September 2019 / Revised: 29 October 2019 / Accepted: 30 October 2019 / Published: 8 November 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be ‘repaired’ only by assuming that the marginal abatement cost curve changes its curvature extremely once the stable coalition has been reached. View Full-Text
Keywords: international environmental agreements; coalition theory; climate change international environmental agreements; coalition theory; climate change
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MDPI and ACS Style

Rauscher, M. Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little. Games 2019, 10, 47. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040047

AMA Style

Rauscher M. Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little. Games. 2019; 10(4):47. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040047

Chicago/Turabian Style

Rauscher, Michael. 2019. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little" Games 10, no. 4: 47. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040047

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