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The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go

1
Resource Economics Group, Humboldt Universiät zu Berlin, 10117 Berlin, Germany
2
Section Economics, Wageningen University, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2020, 11(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010003
Received: 19 July 2019 / Revised: 30 October 2019 / Accepted: 16 December 2019 / Published: 1 January 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives. View Full-Text
Keywords: binary action game; cartel game; Cournot-like game; coalition formation; equilibrium coalition structure; potential game; symmetric game; two-stage game binary action game; cartel game; Cournot-like game; coalition formation; equilibrium coalition structure; potential game; symmetric game; two-stage game
MDPI and ACS Style

Hagen, A.; von Mouche, P.; Weikard, H.-P. The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go. Games 2020, 11, 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010003

AMA Style

Hagen A, von Mouche P, Weikard H-P. The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go. Games. 2020; 11(1):3. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010003

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hagen, Achim, Pierre von Mouche, and Hans-Peter Weikard. 2020. "The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go" Games 11, no. 1: 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010003

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