From Religious Representation to Conceptual Truth: The Role of Religion in Hegel’s Philosophical System

Abstract

The present study interprets the indispensable mediating role of religion within Hegel’s monistic system. This study undertakes a systematic investigation of the development of Hegel’s religious thought in different periods, his logical reconstruction of multiple religions, and the positioning of religion within his system. The central argument posits that religions, particularly Christianity, serve as a pivotal experiential and representational conduit that facilitates Spirit’s ascent from the inherent dualism of consciousness, as inherited from Descartes and solidified by Kant, to the monistic paradigm of the speculative concept (Begriff) or absolute Knowing (absolutes Wissen). Whilst art offers immediate sensuous intuition (Anschauung) of the Absolute, philosophy achieves pure conceptual comprehension (begreifendes Denken). The function of religion can be considered to be twofold. Firstly, it is important to note that religion provides the essential communal form for grasping substantial content. Secondly, the representational form demands inherent necessity, its own sublation (Aufhebung), and elevation to conceptual truth. The rational content of Christianity, found in the Trinity’s logical structure and the Incarnation (Menschwerdung Gottes), demands translation into the self-determining concept (Begriff). “The death of God” is posited by representation as a means to facilitate the subsequent reconstruction of the Concept. Philosophy serves to sublimate religion by preserving its truth-content, negating its inadequate form, and elevating it into pure conceptual truth. Consequently, religion functions as the indispensable “prelude to scientific truth”, and the necessary pathway to absolute knowing, where absolute Spirit achieves complete self-transparency in the speculative Concept. Hegel affirms religion’s vital mediating role not as the endpoint, but as the essential bridge enabling Spirit’s ascent from religious representation (Vorstellung) to conceptual absolute knowing. Finally, in exploring the interplay of truth and meaning, Hegel’s notions of Vorstellung and Begriff offer a speculative framework where religious meaning is embodied in logical and historical contexts, while philosophical truth transforms it into conceptual form, thus enriching both hermeneutics and dialectical understanding.

1. Introduction: Truth, Dualism, and Religion’s Mediating Ascent in Hegel’s Monistic System

The philosophical tradition, initiated by Descartes’ seminal separation of res cogitans (the thinking substance) and res extensa (the extended substance), which introduced the intractable mind–body problem, and further developed by Kant’s critical demarcation of the phenomenal realm accessible to theoretical reason from the inaccessible noumenal realm of thing-in-itself (Ding an sich), has been characterised by a series of fundamental dualisms. The philosophical landscape was structured by a series of oppositions, including subject and object, reason and faith, finite and infinite, freedom and necessity. These oppositions gave rise to persistent anxieties regarding alienation (Entfremdung) and the possibility of truth, meaning and freedom. The central task for post-Kantian idealism was to surmount these dualisms, thereby attaining a unified comprehension of truth and the self within it.

By the time of the Frankfurt period, G.W.F. Hegel had initiated the construction of a monistic philosophical system, with the objective of overcoming the series of binary oppositions previously mentioned. In the period known as the Jenaer period, Hegel positioned his “Phenomenology of Spirit” as the “Science of the Experience of Consciousness”. The text delineates the arduous journey of consciousness (Bewusstsein) from its most immediate, sense-certain form through various stages of self-alienation and division, culminating in “Absolute Knowing” (absolutes Wissen). The fundamental motivation for this undertaking is rooted in the inherent dissatisfaction with the prevailing forms, particularly the pervasive subject-object dichotomy. Hegel’s profound insight is that the pivotal moment enabling the crucial transition from models of consciousness and self-consciousness to a unified standpoint of absolute knowing is significantly provided by religious representation and its unique way of understanding truth. This transformation marks a transition towards the conceptual truth of speculative philosophy.

The significance of religion within Hegel’s system lies precisely in its function as the necessary bridge across the chasm of dualism found in Consciousness Mode. It is within the sphere of religious consciousness, particularly in its consummate form as Christianity, that the fundamental oppositions plaguing modern consciousness find their most developed representational reconciliation (Versöhnung). The central representation of the Incarnation (Menschwerdung Gottes)–God becoming a specific human being–synthesises the radical transcendence of Judaism with Greek immanence, infinite substance with finite subjectivity.

Nevertheless, the process of religious reconciliation continues to be constrained by its representational form. The transition from the pictorial consciousness of religion to the self-transparent conceptual Knowing of philosophy is thus a logical necessity driven by the truth-content of religion itself. The doctrines of the Trinity prefigure the logical movement of the Concept (Universality-Particularity-Singularity) and the Incarnation, signifying the overcoming of abstract transcendence. Implicit in these doctrines is the demand for philosophical comprehension. Religion is posited as the pivotal “prelude to scientific truth”, the indispensable pathway that Spirit must traverse to attain its full self-Knowing in the element of pure thought. The mediating role of the concept is intrinsic; it provides the experiential and substantial content–the felt unity, the narrative of reconciliation, the communal certainty of being Spirit–that philosophy subsequently elevates, negates in its inadequate form, and preserves in its truth, translating it into the rigorous, self-mediating movement of the Concept. In this ascent, the “death of God” as representation of the speculative Good Friday gives way to the reconstruction of the Concept, enabling Spirit to finally think itself without pictorial residue.

In contrast to Hegel, who sees modernity as the historical condition for reconciling religion and philosophy, Fackenheim emphasises the fundamental role of religion within Hegel’s system. However, he contends that the crises of modernity—such as fragmentation and extremism—render Hegel’s proposed reconciliation between religion and philosophy nearly impossible (Fackenheim 1967, p. 12). In his thesis, Calvin Lake defends Hegel’s view that religion is not superseded in a destructive manner, but is immanently transformed into philosophy (Lake 1974, p. 6). Philosophy preserves the content of religion, while elevating it to conceptual form. Religion—particularly Christianity—is necessary for philosophy, since it supplies the content and historical-conceptual groundwork that philosophy articulates. Differing from Hegel’s emphasis on the reconciliation between faith and reason, Žižek places special importance on the Young Hegel’s proposition of the “death of God.” He argues that this does not signify a simple triumph of atheism, but rather means that the transcendent God becomes immersed within the human community (the Community of the Holy Spirit), thereby opening a path for a radical, immanent, materialism and collective action. This constitutes the ‘fate’ of religion after dialectical negation (Žižek 2000, p. 98). Regardless of which perspective one adopts regarding the relationship between religion and philosophy in Hegel’s thought, or how one attempts to develop or contemporize it, all such efforts must ultimately return to a clarification and systematic reconstruction of Hegel’s own position, within the context of the seeking for truth and meaning—which is the central objective of this article.

The present study examines the crucial mediating function of religion in overcoming dualism inherent in modes of consciousness. This work is structured in four sections. It explores distinct dimensions of Hegel’s analysis of religion and its role in transitioning from religious consciousness to conceptual truth within his monistic system of absolute Spirit. In light of the aforementioned considerations, four guiding questions are hereby proposed for further discussion and analysis.

(1)

The development of Hegel’s philosophy of religion: This part will explore the transition of Hegel’s philosophical trajectory from a religious critique to a systematic integration of religious elements within his systematic philosophy. How does the evolution of Hegel’s philosophy—from critiquing Kantian dualism and the positivity of Christianity to formulating the “speculative Good Friday” (spekulativer Karfreitag)—resolve modern consciousness’s divisions and redefine religion as a necessary moment within Spirit’s self-mediation?

(2)

Logical reconstruction of pluralistic religions: Spirit’s dialectical-logical progression in religious forms. How does Spirit’s historical trajectory through Natural Religion, culminating in Christianity as consummate religion (vollendete Religion), demonstrate its struggle to reconcile subject and object, substance and subject?

(3)

The role of religious consciousness in Hegel’s system: Why is religious representation (Vorstellung) the indispensable yet inadequate mediator enabling Spirit’s transition to Absolute Knowing (absolutes Wissen), necessitating its sublation (Aufhebung) into the self-comprehending Concept (Begriff)?

(4)

Finally, the present paper will offer some concluding remarks on the interplay of truth and meaning in Hegel’s monistic system. How does Hegel’s dialectic of representation and concept provide a framework for understanding the reciprocal mediation between truth and meaning, such that religious representation preserves dialectical and historical meaningfulness, while conceptual comprehension achieves rational transparency, without reducing one to the other?

2. The Evolution of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion: From Critique to Systematic Incorporation of the Religious Moment

The intellectual trajectory of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s early philosophy of religion constitutes a dynamic and dialectical process, profoundly intertwined with the evolution of his entire philosophical system. This journey is indicative of a deepening comprehension of religion’s essential role in the actualisation of Spirit (Geist) and its relationship to absolute truth. Shaped by critical engagements with Enlightenment rationalism, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, and contemporaries such as Schleiermacher and Schelling, Hegel progressively integrated religious representation into his developing framework of absolute idealism. From his early critiques of religious “authoritative imposition” (Positivität) and Kantian dualism, through explorations of “life” and “love” in Frankfurt, to the period of reflection on”Faith and Knowing” in Jena, Hegel sought to demonstrate the inherent rationality and indispensable function of religion in the human journey towards self-Knowing and truth. In undertaking this endeavour, he positioned religion as a pivotal component in the absolute spirit, as evidenced by the preliminary system plan in Jena and the encyclopedia system. This section outlines this evolution, focusing particularly on the period from Tübingen to Jena (1793–1801), during which Hegel’s concept of religion underwent an important evolution.

2.1. Tübingen and Bern: Volksreligion, Kantian Ruptures, and the Critique of Positivity

Hegel’s initial engagement with religion, evident in his Tübingen (1788–1793) and Bern (1793–1796) periods, was decisively framed by Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant’s theoretical reason was restricted to phenomena, and God, freedom, and immortality were relegated to the postulates of practical reason and faith (Glauben). This constitutes the theoretical background of Hegel’s philosophy of religion. It is evident that Hegel was engaged in a process of grappling with this legacy, as evidenced by fragments such as “Folk Religion and Christianity 1793–1794” (Hegel 1986a). While endorsing the Enlightenment critique of “authoritative religion” (positive religion)—characterised by reliance on external authority, dogma, and historical revelation—Hegel perceived a profound irony. The argument was made that the triumph of reason over positive faith had not truly liberated reason, but potentially subjected it to new forms of subjective confinement. These were exemplified by Kant’s practical postulates, Jacobi’s appeal to feeling, or Fichte’s “flight into faith” (Flucht zum Glauben). For Hegel, this signified a return to the notion of reason relinquishing its autonomy, re-emerging as the “handmaid of faith” (Magd des Glaubens), thereby replicating the subjugation it had purportedly overcome (Hegel 1968, GW 4, S. 414).1

Simultaneously, Hegel sharply distinguished dead “objective religion”—a system of doctrines reliant on intellect dogmas—from living “subjective religion”, conceived as a vital force influencing heart, feelings, and will, essential for motivating concrete ethical (sittliches) life. His ideal was a folk religion, modeled on ancient Greece, permeating public life and fostering ethical dispositions (Gesinnungen) through shared imagination and sensibility. Such a religion would be public, shaping the lifeworld and fostering confidence in societal institutions. Conversely, the doctrine of Christianity was denounced for what was termed authoritative imposition, fostering alienation (Entfremdung) by separating individuals from nature, community, and themselves through an otherworldly focus and reliance on external authority. This external authority was seen as an obstacle to genuine moral autonomy inspired by Jesus as a teacher of virtue (Sembou 2012, pp. 9–14). This early critique already identifies the socio-political and cultural fragmentation of his time as rooted in a distorted religious consciousness.

2.2. The Frankfurt Breakthrough: Life, Love, and the Affective Ground of Unity

Hegel’s intellectual sojourn in Frankfurt (1797–1800) marked a decisive and fertile departure from the Kantian frameworks that had dominated his Bern period. Reacting against what he perceived as the profound limitations of Kantian moral philosophy, characterized by its abstract formalism and the unbridgeable chasm it posited between the dictates of universal moral law (Sittengesetz) and the concrete inclinations and desires of the finite human subject, Hegel sought a more profound ground for unity. This quest led him, significantly influenced by Hölderlin and the currents of early Romanticism, to embrace the potent concepts of life and love as the central pillars of his evolving religious and philosophical thought. This shift represents not merely a change in terminology but a fundamental reorientation in his understanding of the divine, the human condition, and the path to reconciliation (Versöhnung).

The locus classicus for this transformation is Hegel’s unfinished manuscript, “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate 1798–1800” (Hegel 1986a). In this passage, Hegel advanced beyond the predominantly socio-political critique of positivity that was evident in his earlier writings. His focus shifted towards exploring the metaphysical depths and existential significance of religion itself. He sought to ascertain the fundamental spirit of original Christianity, interpreting it, particularly through a Johannine lens, as a powerful striving to overcome fundamental divisions—between humanity and God, the individual and the community, law and inclination—and to achieve a state of profound reconciliation. It is evident that the figure of Jesus occupied a central position within the original Christian ethos. Hegel’s portrayal of Jesus transcends the conventional perception of him as a mere moral teacher, instead depicting him as the living manifestation of the unification of the human and the divine. The crux of Jesus’ message was the concept of love, which Hegel theorised not as a sentimental feeling, but as a transformative, unifying force of immense power. According to Hegel, the quest for love is characterised by the pursuit of union rather than separation (Hegel 1986a, S. 298–99).2.The concept of love, as it is theorised in this study, functions by dissolving the rigid oppositions that are characteristic of legalistic morality (Moralität) and abstract reflection. It offers a reconciliation of consciousness and object, the particular individual and the universal, providing a dynamic, pre-dialectical model for understanding the relationship between the finite and the infinite within the immediacy of lived experience. Within the context of love, the other is not perceived as an external entity to be fulfilled through obligation or conflict, but rather as an integral component of a dynamic, living connection that transcends the limitations of separation.

Concurrently, the concept of life surged to the forefront of Hegel’s thinking during the Frankfurt period. Life emerged as a fundamental ontological category, denoting a dynamic, organic unity that precedes and underlies the analytical separations imposed by the reflective understanding (Verstand). Life signifies a process of becoming, a flowing totality where distinctions (like subject and object, finite and infinite) are moments within a greater whole rather than absolute divisions. This concept provided Hegel with a crucial alternative to the static categories of Kantian reason and the deadening positivity he critiqued in institutionalized religion. Religion itself was now fundamentally understood in terms of this vital principle. Hegel conceived it as the elevation (Erhebung) of the human being from the fragmented state of finite life to participation in infinite life. This elevation is not an escape from the world but a transformation within existence, an awakening to the divine presence immanently unfolding within the relational fabric of human life and historical reality. Paul Tillich aptly identified this development as Hegel’s crucial “existential turn”, signifying a grounding of religion in the individual’s concrete struggle for self-unification and reconciliation with the divine ground of being (Fujita 1985, S. 75–93). The divine was no longer a remote postulate of practical reason but was intuited as actively present and accessible within the depths of human experience.

This reorientation had significant implications for Hegel’s view of the relationship between philosophy and religion. While philosophy, particularly in its critical function, still played a vital preparatory role by exposing the inherent finitude and contradictions of reflective categories, its capacity to grasp the living infinite was seen as limited in Frankfurt. Religion, anchored in the immediate, unifying experiences of love and the intuition of infinite life, was now accorded primacy as the mode of consciousness most directly capable of accessing and expressing the ultimate reality. It provided the vital content—the experience of unity and the divine—which reflective philosophy could analyze but not originate. This elevation of religion’s epistemic status, centered on affective and immediate modes of apprehension (Gefühl, Anschauung), laid crucial groundwork for Hegel’s later, mature conception of religion as the representational (vorstellend) form of Absolute Spirit, where the truth of the absolute is grasped through images, narratives, and devotional feeling before being conceptually comprehended by philosophy (Fulda 2007, S. 313–314).

Furthermore, Hegel’s exploration of unity and reconciliation in Frankfurt drew upon sources external to Christianity. His engagement with Greek thought, particularly evident in his adoption of the concept of “punishment as fate”, illustrates his search for immanent principles of justice and unity within life itself. The distinction between fate and abstract law is that the former is regarded as the intrinsic consequence of an act that disrupts the living bond of love or the organic unity of life, whereas the latter is understood as the external, positive punishment imposed by abstract law. This restoration of balance within the disrupted whole was a concept that resonated with his developing ideas about life’s dynamic unity and the consequences of fragmentation. The integration of Greek perspectives served to enrich his attempt to articulate a vision of divine immanence and reconciliation grounded in the very structure of existence.

The Frankfurt period is, in essence, characterised by Hegel’s profound attempt to locate the ground of religious truth and human fulfillment not in abstract understanding or external authority, but within the affective and relational depths of concrete existence. This is conceptualised through the dynamic unity of life (Leben) and the reconciling power of love (Liebe). This constituted a significant step in his subsequent dialectical synthesis, which, although not yet fully systematised, established that the dimensions of emotion, existence and unity are indispensable for understanding the relationship between man and God.

2.3. Jena Radicalism: “Faith and Knowing” and the Critique of Modern Subjectivity

The period known as the Jena period was marked by the significance of Hegel’s 1802 treatise “Faith and Knowing” (Glauben und Wissen), which represents his profoundly critical examination of post-Kantian philosophy and religious thought. This phase is characterised by a pivotal shift in which reason is elevated to the status of the supreme monistic foundation, although religion continues to play a significant role. Moreover, he provides a thorough examination of the pathologies intrinsic to contemporary subjectivity. Hegel conceptualises these pathologies as manifestations of a pervasive “reflective culture” (Reflexionskultur), a mode of thinking that is trapped in irreducible oppositions—finite and infinite, consciousness and object, reason and faith (Hegel 1968, S. 315–18). This structure of thought inevitably produced what he termed a “bad infinity”, where the divine remained perpetually transcendent, conceptually inaccessible, and knowable only through non-rational forms of immediacy such as feeling, intuition, or blind faith. This epistemological impasse, Hegel argued, mirrored a deeper cultural and spiritual crisis.

Central to Hegel’s critique was his dismantling of the dominant philosophical systems of his time. He accused Kant and Fichte of reducing God to a mere “postulate” of practical reason, effectively confining religion within the subjective certainty of the individual and its utility for moral motivation. This approach, while seeking to secure morality, ultimately rendered God an instrumental concept lacking inherent substance, severed from the concrete totality of reality. Similarly, Jacobi’s appeal to immediate feeling or faith (Glauben) as the pathway to the Absolute was rejected as fundamentally inadequate. Hegel argued that Jacobi’s immediacy remained stubbornly subjective and non-conceptual; it could never grasp the inherently mediated, self-differentiating, and self-reconciling nature of the true Absolute. It offered only a mute encounter, devoid of the rational comprehension necessary for genuine philosophical and religious truth (Hegel 1968, S. 320–25).

Hegel powerfully connected philosophical deadlock to the broader cultural and political trauma of the era, particularly the catastrophic aftermath of the French Revolution. The Reign of Terror, for Hegel, was not merely a political failure but a terrifying revelation of the consequences of abstract ideals—freedom, reason, equality—violently severed from the concrete fabric of historical institutions, ethical life (Sittlichkeit), and the mediating power of reason itself. The Revolution’s descent into violence exposed the bankruptcy of Enlightenment “eudaemonism” (Eudämonismus), which reduced human flourishing to mere well-being and instrumentalized reason into calculative “cleverness” (Aufklärerei). Against this impoverished Enlightenment rationality, and equally against Jacobi’s fideistic leap and Fichte’s formalistic “Absolute Ego” (absolutes Ich), Hegel sought the grounds for a new philosophy. This philosophy will capture the speculative identity of the concept, in which “Faith and Knowing”, consciousness and object, reason and reality, the infinite and the finite are comprehended not as dichotomous opposites but as interconnecting elements of a dynamic, self-unfolding rational whole. (Hegel 1968, S. 413).

“Faith and Knowing" provided the indispensable diagnostic groundwork for this philosophical project. It dissected the structure of modern alienation—the sense of rupture between the individual and the world, the human and the divine, the ideal and the real—tracing its roots to the fundamental dualisms of the “reflective culture”. Its most iconic and provocative notion, the “speculative Good Friday” (spekulativer Karfreitag), served as a profound metaphor for modernity’s spiritual condition. According to Hegel, the concept of “the Death of God” encapsulates both the profound anguish and the pivotal moment marking the unification of divine and human nature (Hegel 1968, S. 413). This “death” signified not merely the demise of traditional theological representations but, more radically, the negation inherent in modern thought itself: the annihilation of immediate transcendence, the dissolution of fixed oppositions, and the painful realization of finitude. Yet, Hegel insisted, this very negation, this “infinite grief”, was the necessary precondition for a higher reconciliation. Just as the Christian narrative moved through death to resurrection, the philosophical “speculative Good Friday” pointed towards a resurrection of meaning—not as a return to old immediacy, but as the emergence of a higher, mediated unity of faith and reason, finite and infinite, within the concept.

Consequently, “Faith and Knowing” marked Hegel’s decisive turn away from seeking ultimate grounding in religion (as in his earlier hopes for a renewed Volksreligion) and towards Spirit (Geist) as the central, self-mediating principle. Spirit was posited as the only framework capable of overcoming the Kantian dualism that had proven insurmountable. Spirit was understood as the dynamic, historical process of self-realisation through self-alienation and return. The essay thus prepared the way for Hegel’s mature system, where religion would be systematically reintegrated, not as the endpoint or sole foundation, but as a necessary, representational moment within Spirit’s journey towards absolute self-Knowing. The truths of religion, particularly the profound intuition of God’s incarnation and reconciliation found in Christianity, would find their rational justification and ultimate truth only within the mediated, conceptual framework of speculative philosophy. The Jena critique, therefore, dissolved the immediate claims of both rationalist philosophy and feeling-based faith into a dialectical process, thereby paving the way for Spirit’s ascent to its own conceptual comprehension. This established the core of systemic for the “Phenomenology of Spirit” and the subsequent system, where the reconciliation first gestured towards in the “speculative Good Friday” would be fully articulated as the self-mediation of absolute spirit.

2.4. Towards Systematic Maturity: Religion as Representational Consciousness

The trajectory of Hegel’s thought, from his early theological fragments to the systematic structures of Berlin, reveals a profound transformation in his understanding of religion’s role within human consciousness and the Absolute’s self-realization. While his mature conception finds its definitive expression in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1821–1831) and the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline (Hegel 1995, TWA 10; Hegel 1994, TWA 17), the seeds were undeniably sown in the intense struggles documented in his “Early Theological Writing”. The path from Tübingen to Jena marks a decisive shift: religion ceases to be envisioned as the foundational basis for overcoming the dualisms plaguing modern life—such as those between subject and object, reason and feeling, individual and community—and is progressively reconceived as an essential, yet intrinsically limited, form or mode through which Spirit (Geist) achieves consciousness of itself and its own absoluteness. The Frankfurt period, especially in “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate”, witnessed a crucial, albeit still pre-systematic, advance. Here, concepts like “life” and “love” emerged as powerful, albeit somewhat intuitive and aesthetic, principles of unification. They represented forces capable of healing the “fateful” splits—like that between the Jewish spirit of “separation” and Jesus’s message of reconciliation (Versöhnung)—inherent in religious and ethical development. Jesus himself was seen as embodying a unity of the divine and human, tragically fractured by the subsequent institutionalization and “apotheosis” of his figure, reintroducing an “ungodly objectivity”(Nohl 1907, S. 337).

The pivotal development occurred with the formulation of the system in the Jena period, which was already apparent in “Faith and Knowing”, was significantly reflected in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”, and was fully elaborated in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline (Hegel 1995, TWA 10) and the lectures on the philosophy of religion in the Berlin period. Within the mature framework of Absolute Spirit, religion is definitively positioned as its second moment, following Art and preceding Philosophy. Art intuits the Absolute immediately through the sensuous form; religion grasps it mediately through representation (Vorstellung); and philosophy comprehends it conceptually through the pure Concept (Begriff). Religion, therefore, constitutes the representational form in which absolute truth becomes consciously available to humanity at a communal level. Hegel’s revolutionary thesis, articulated forcefully in the Lectures, is that “The true content of religion is therefore spirit itself, and indeed absolute spirit” (Hegel 1986b, TWA 16, S. 40). This means religion is not merely humanity’s belief about God; it is fundamentally the process whereby Absolute Spirit achieves self-consciousness. God comes to know Godself through humanity and its religious consciousness, practices, and historical development: “God is only God in so far as he knows himself; his self-knowing is… his self-consciousness in man” (Hegel 1995, S. 374; Sans 2017, p. 303).

Consequently, the task of the philosophy of religion shifts radically. It is no longer primarily concerned with external justification or apologetics. Its essential mission is to comprehend religion’s inner rationality, to discern the logical necessity within its historical forms and doctrinal content. This involves translating religion’s essential truth-content—fundamentally, God as Spirit—from the inherently limited form of representation into the adequate form of the Concept (Begriff). Representation employs concrete, frequently sensory or narrative, vehicles: images (Christ on the cross), myths (creation, redemption), historical narratives (the life of Jesus), feelings (piety, faith, awe), and anthropomorphic language (Father, Son). While the Absolute is rendered accessible and vital for communal life across diverse levels of cultural and intellectual development, this form introduces elements of externality, pictorial separation, and sequential narrative that obscure the inherent unity and logical mediation of the Concept. Philosophy’s function is thus that of Übersetzung (translation or transposition), thereby fulfilling religion’s own implicit intention by liberating its rational core from the confines of its representational shell (Hegel 1980, GW 9, S. 416–22).

The Frankfurt emphasis on “life” and “love” as unifying forces finds its rational reformulation and integration within this mature schema. On the basis of these premises, Hegel elevated religion’s unique and indispensable functions, recognising its power within the system of Spirit. The language of feeling, imagery, and narrative employed in this context serves to render the truth of the Absolute accessible to all members of a community, thus transcending purely intellectual barriers. Protestantism’s emphasis on “faith in feeling” is particularly valorised by Hegel as embodying modernity’s principle that subjective conviction (Überzeugung) is the essential mediator of divine truth, thus bypassing the need for hierarchical ecclesiastical authority.

Christianity as the absolute religion attains the zenith of religious consciousness because, in the doctrine of the Incarnation (Menschwerdung) and the Trinity, it conceptually realises (albeit still in representational form) the identity of the divine and the human, of substance and subjectivity. The pivotal speculative insight, prefigured in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”, is that here “substance becomes subject” (Hegel 1980, GW 9, S. 400). The concept of God no longer remains confined to the realm of the abstract; rather, it permeates the very fabric of finitude, embracing the concepts of suffering, death (the speculative Good Friday), and resurrection as the impetus of the Spirit within the religious community (Gemeinde). This process signifies the attainment of concrete universality and self-consciousness through humanity.

However, this elevation of religion occurs within a framework where philosophy, as conceptual comprehension (begreifendes Denken), represents the highest and most adequate form of Spirit’s self-Knowing. Philosophy sublates religion: it preserves religion’s essential truth-content (God as Spirit, the unity of infinite and finite), negates its representational form as inadequate for full self-comprehension, and elevates this content into the self-mediating, dialectical movement of the pure Concept. While religion remains vital as the form of Absolute Spirit accessible to the community in its Vorstellung, philosophy completes the journey that religion implicitly initiates, achieving the “absolute knowing” where Spirit finally thinks itself without mediation or pictorial residue, fully at home in the element of pure thought. The journey from the young critic of religious positivity to the systematic philosopher culminates in recognizing religion’s necessary and exalted, yet ultimately superseded, role in the Absolute’s arduous path to complete self-transparency.

2.5. Conclusion of the Dialectical Path

The development of the young Hegel’s philosophy of religion, from Tübingen to Jena, demonstrates a sophisticated dialectic evolution. Initially, under the influence of Kant and drawing inspiration from Greek models, he sought in “folk religion” a subjective force to overcome the alienation fostered by authoritative Christianity and the abstractions of Enlightenment rationalism. The Frankfurt school’s concept of “life” and “love” represented a profound, metaphysical endeavour to comprehend the divine as immanent unity within human relationality and historical existence, thereby establishing religion as the primary conduit to the infinite. Nevertheless, it was the Jena period, which reached its zenith in “Faith and Knowing”, that marked the important breakthrough. Hegel’s diagnosis identified the impasses of Kantian and Fichtean subjectivism—all variations in the “philosophy of reflection” trapped in dualism—and identified their connection to contemporary socio-political crises. The “speculative Good Friday” thus became the powerful symbol of the necessary negation of immediate transcendence (whether in faith or abstract reason) that clears the ground for a higher, mediated synthesis within the Concept.

By 1800–1801, Hegel had effectively abandoned the project of establishing religion itself as the core monistic system capable of reconciling faith and reason. This project was shared in different ways by contemporaries like Schleiermacher. Instead, he elevated Spirit as the ultimate, self-differentiating, and self-reconciling principle. Religion was reconceived not as the foundation, but as a crucial, representational moment within Spirit’s dialectical journey towards absolute self-Knowing. This moment was characterised by its affective power, historical embodiment, and capacity to present the Absolute in imagery. However, it was ultimately destined to be comprehended and sublated by philosophical thought. The transition from seeking religious solutions to pure idealism and then to establishing religion in the self-development of the spirit constitutes the fundamental achievement of Hegel’s early philosophy of religion and is conducive to the establishment of his later mature system. The aforementioned theories furnished a series of potent instruments—anchoring religion in reason, freedom, and historical consciousness—for navigating the tensions between “Faith and Knowing”, immanence and transcendence, that continue to define modernity. Hegel’s early journey can be regarded as a monumental attempt to secure the truth content of faith not against reason, but within its deepest structures. This affirmation is of religion’s indispensable, yet mediated, role in the human spirit’s arduous journey towards absolute self-comprehension.

3. Hegel’s Logical Reconstruction of Pluralistic Religions: Spirit’s Dialectical-Logical Progression in Religious Forms

This section is concerned with the historical embodiment of religious forms of the absolute spirit, specifically the logical transition from natural religion to Christianity in the context of religious representation. In his “Phenomenology of Spirit” (Hegel 1980, GW 9), Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline (Hegel 1995, TWA 10), and Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Hegel 1994, TWA 17), Hegel presents religion as a dynamic, historically embodied process. It is through this process that truth progressively actualises itself via evolving forms of representation (Vorstellung). This dynamic unfolds through representational modes characterised by sensuous imagery, mythical narratives, symbolic rituals, and anthropomorphic depictions. It is evident that these modes inherently contain substantive truth concerning the absolute (God, absolute spirit). It is crucial to note that, while each stage of religious consciousness embodies a necessary configuration of truth, the form of Vor-Stellung simultaneously constrains full comprehension. This constraint persists until the culmination of the dialectical journey in Christianity and its ultimate Aufhebung (sublation) into the pure form of the Concept within philosophy. The historical progression from natural religion to Christianity as the Offenbare Religion (revealed religion) or Vollendete Religion (consummate religion) exemplifies this profound dialectic of content and form, wherein Spirit laboriously represents its own essence, progressively refining the concrete embodiment of its self-knowing.

3.1. Natural Religion: The Substance Is Enmeshed in Sensuous Immediacy

The dialectical genesis emerges in Natural Religion (Naturreligion), exemplified for Hegel in African, Inuit, ancient Chinese traditions, and aspects of Buddhism/Lamaism. Here, Spirit remains fundamentally embedded in nature; the Absolute is apprehended as immediate being (unmittelbares Sein) or substance, constituting an undifferentiated unity devoid of self-conscious differentiation. This apprehension manifests through distinct modalities: Light-Being (Lichtwesen). In Persian and Near Eastern traditions, the divine is conceived as pure, omnipresent light, characterized as “this abstract subjectivity in the sensuous” (Hegel 1992, GW 20, S. 223). Light symbolizes universality and power yet remains undifferentiated and nature-bound, epitomizing “the conjoined unity of extremes” (Vieweg 2019, S. 294). Its truth-content—the intuition of absolute unity and power—is diminished to a mere natural element. Plant and Animal Worship: Religions like those of India and Egypt deify specific natural entities (sacred trees, animal totems such as cows, animal spirits). This signifies an incipient movement toward individuation (multiplicity of being-for-self) but remains confined to immediate, innocent natural life. This immediacy subsequently manifests as inherent negativity and conflict (struggle of animal spirits), reflecting unreflective particularity and violence within unmediated nature. Although the truth of life’s sacredness and inherent strife is apprehended, it remains objectified solely within finite, natural forms.

The Artisan (Werkmeister) and Immanent Divinity: Egyptian religion, symbolized by the Sphinx and pyramid builders, marks a pivotal transition. Spirit initiates self-externalization through conscious Arbeit (labor), shaping nature according to inner spiritual forms (hieroglyphs, geometry, monumental architecture, termed “freie Architektur”). This constitutes the objectification of a spiritual form. Simultaneously, the divine is sensed within specific natural objects (sun, rivers) or human individuals (magicians, emperors, Lamas), perceived not symbolically but as the divine presence itself in raw immediacy. It is noteworthy that Hegel references the veneration of the Dalai Lama: The assertion is made that this human being is God; that he is the present God, and not merely a symbol of God (Cruysberghs 2012, p. 34). The focus rests on singular, immediate existence (daseiende Einzelheit), devoid of spiritual mediation (geistlose Einzelheit).

Epistemological Character: Divine Knowing is primarily immediate certainty (unmittelbare Gewissheit) or Glaube (faith), akin to non-sensory intuition (Anschauung). It operates at the level of consciousness, dominated by feeling, understood as a subjective sense of dependence or awe before nature’s sensed power, and rudimentary Vorstellung (representation) fixated on the immediate object as divine. Conceptual thought is virtually absent. Although the unity of spirit and nature is felt and represented, it remains uncomprehended, fostering fear, superstition, and magical endeavors (Zauberei) to control or appease natural forces. Contained Truth and Limitation: Natural Religion embodies the fundamental truth of the substantial unity of the divine with reality, affirming the Absolute’s immanence within the finite world. Spirit is present “an sich” (in-itself), yet only implicitly. Spirit is consciousness, but at this stage it is only implicitly Spirit; it is consciousness immersed in nature. Consequently, the truth of divine immanence is present but confined within sensuous immediacy and undifferentiated unity, perceived as an external, objective “Other”.

3.2. The Dialectical Negation: Division and the Rise of Distinction

According to Hegel, the dialectic’s inherent dynamism necessitates the negation of immediate unity. The subsequent stage, encompassing Hinduism, Zoroastrianism (Persian Religion), Judaism, and Greek Religion, involves the splitting (Entzweiung) of religious consciousness. Spirit begins differentiating itself from nature, conceiving the divine as distinct yet related to the natural and human world, marking a crucial advance toward objectification and determinateness. Hinduism (Religion of Fantasy): The substantial unity (Brahm) articulates itself internally, propelled by the instinct of the concept. Brahm differentiates into the Trimurti (Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva) and innumerable deities (Devas) embodying natural forces, ethical principles, and human passions. This signifies a movement beyond pure immediacy toward particularization (Besonderung) and determinateness.

The prevailing faculty is Phantasie (fantasy, imagination), which engenders a vast, frequently bewildering array of images and narratives (Vorstellungen). While exhibiting greater richness than Natural Religion in terms of its immediacy, it nevertheless remains arbitrary and unsystematic: The standpoint adopted is one of concrete empiricism. However, it is a distinctive phenomenon characterised by the absence of a coherent system, and instead, there are merely suggestions of that which is comprehensible and essential, a multitude of diverse elements coalescing into a vibrant whole (Hegel 1986b, TWA 16, S. 374–75). Unity (Brahm) is recognised in an abstract sense, frequently through the practice of asceticism (Yoga) with the objective of achieving a state of consciousness characterised by the complete destruction of the ego (Nichts, or Nothingness). This demonstrates the inability to conceptualise unity within the context of differentiation. Hinduism embodies the Concept’s (Begriff) logical moments—Universality (Brahm), Particularization (the gods), and a rudimentary third moment (Return) via Shiva’s destruction. It manifests Spirit’s drive toward self-determination within the world’s richness. However, this third moment remains deficient, conceived as natural change or annihilation rather than spiritual reconciliation. The truth of differentiation is dissolved in a phantasmagoria lacking subjective freedom (epitomized by caste), thereby undermining spiritual unity.

Persian Religion (Religion of the Good): Zoroastrianism elevates the divine to a more universal ethical principle—Light as the embodiment of the Good, opposed to Darkness. Epistemology: Vorstellung becomes more abstract and universal, transcending sensuous particularity toward a cosmic ethical principle (Good vs. Evil). The Persian religion’s view of truth can be summarised as follows: It embodies the divine as the world’s ethical foundation, the struggle between good and evil, and the ultimate triumph of the good principle, signifying a significant step toward spiritualization.

Jewish Religion (Religion of Sublimity): Here, Division culminates. God is radically transcendent—the One, Holy, Creator ex nihilo, utterly distinct from finite, sinful creation. Epistemology: Vorstellung focuses intensely on the absolute distinction between the infinite Creator and finite creation. God is known through His commands (Law, Gesetz) and historical acts (covenant, deliverance). Feeling is dominated by awe and Furcht des Herrn (fear of the Lord). The cultus centers on obedience, sacrifice, and yearning for reconciliation. Judaism embodies crucial truths: absolute divine unity, transcendence, holiness, creation by Spirit, the infinite worth of the individual soul before God, and history as the arena of divine purpose. It establishes the necessary moment of radical distinction and the painful consciousness of finitude, preparing the ground for reconciliation. The Law (Gesetz) is a pivotal representation of the ethical absolute.

3.3. Greek Art-Religion: Spiritual Subjectivity in Aesthetic Form

Greek Kunstreligion (art-religion) constitutes a significant synthesis within division (Entzweiung). The divine is conceived as spiritual powers—the Olympian gods—both distinct from nature (anthropomorphic) and immanent within it (embodying natural and ethical forces), representing idealized human individuality. This stage operates primarily at the level of self-consciousness. Statues and hymns are vehicles for the idealised presentation of the divine in human form: The question of whether the form of the god has assumed individuality is a complex one. The concept of oracles is understood to represent divine communication, yet they remain enigmatic and external. Hymnic devotion (Andacht) offers a glimpse of communal self-consciousness united in worship: The spirit is characterised by its inherent and introspective nature. Spirit is characterised by introspection, altruism and a sense of unity. The truth is apprehended intuitively, but lacks conceptual mediation.

The Living Artwork (Das lebendige Kunstwerk): Rituals like the Eleusinian Mysteries and Olympic games enact the unity of nature and spirit. Consuming bread and wine symbolizes nature’s self-sacrifice for spiritual life. The athlete embodies the ensouled living artwork, signifying the human form as the divine vessel. Truth resides in the lived experience (Erfahrung) of spiritualized nature and the beauty (Schönheit) of human potential as divine expression. The Spiritual Artwork: Epic poetry, tragedy, and comedy represent the culmination. Tragedy (e.g., Sophocles) stages the conflict and reconciliation of ethical powers (sittliche Mächte). Comedy—as exemplified by Aristophanes—enacts a decisive epistemic shift: actual self-consciousness becomes the destiny of the gods. Through skeptical laughter and philosophical reflection (embodied in Stoicism and Skepticism), the human self asserts its freedom, establishing the individual as the negative power while Faith perishes. This reveals the profound truth: “I am free… absolutely with myself,” for the Self constitutes the absolute essence (Hegel 1994, TWA 17, S. 112).

Contained Truth and Limitation: Greek religion embodies the truth of the divine as spiritual individuality, the affirmation of the human ethical world (polis), and the aesthetic realization of the spiritual in sensuous form. It represents the highest potential for representing the divine in a finite, human-like form. However, its Vorstellungen remain aesthetic and narrative; truth is presented and represented (vorgestellt) through mythos and image, not yet grasped conceptually (begrifflich). The gods persist as finite powers subject to Moira (fate), lacking true infinity and subjectivity. Its dissolution in comedy and philosophy exposes Vorstellung’s inherent limitation for fully expressing Spirit’s self-identity.

3.4. Christianity: The Consummate Religion—Representation Pointing to Conceptual Truth

Christianity, as offenbare Religion or consummate religion (vollendete Religion), constitutes the dialectical culmination. It resolves prior contradictions, fully represents the truth implicit in preceding forms, and simultaneously generates the determination for its own sublation (Aufhebung) into the Concept.

The represented truth centers on the central representation of the Incarnation (Menschwerdung Gottes), where God becomes a specific human being, Jesus Christ. This representation synthesizes prior truths. The utterly transcendent God of Judaism becomes fully immanent in finite human existence, reconciling transcendence and immanence. Furthermore, infinite divine substance, found in Natural Religion or Hinduism, unites with finite human individuality, characteristic of Greek Religion, reconciling the infinite and finite. An absolute distinction between divine and human, emphasized in Judaism, is mediated through the God-Man, fully divine and fully human. Christ’s death signifies the negation of the merely natural and finite, while the Resurrection embodies Spirit’s triumph and reconciliation (Versöhnung) between God and humanity. The concept of the Holy Spirit (Heiliger Geist) is understood to denote the divine presence within the congregation of the faithful. The doctrinal framework encompassing the Trinity, Creation, Fall, and Redemption employs a representational approach to articulate the sequential progression of the Spirit’s actions, encompassing self-differentiation (Father/Son), externalisation (Creation), self-alienation (Fall), and ultimately, reconciliation through self-sacrifice and return (Death/Resurrection, Holy Spirit). As previously stated, “Christ’s death and his continued life in the community thus simultaneously contain the death of the abstraction of the divine essence” (Hegel 1994, TWA 17, S. 286–87). This profoundly embodies the truth of absolute negativity, identity-in-difference, and Spirit’s life as reconciliation.

Christianity’s Epistemological Ascent and Tension inherently drive toward conceptual comprehension while utilizing representation. Initial reception involves feeling (Gefühl)—love, reverence—and faith in Christ and revelation, providing an immediate certainty grounded in revelation’s content. Core doctrines are articulated through representation, using narratives, symbols, and dogmas like the Trinity, Two Natures, and Atonement, offering a rich, concrete, historically grounded articulation. The cultus (comprising prayer, sacraments, and especially the Eucharist) constitutes the community’s practical experience of reconciliation, described as the including, within one’s own self, of oneself with God, the knowing of oneself within God and of God within oneself. Ethical life within the community (Gemeinde) becomes the most genuine cultus. Crucially, the content of Christian representation-the Trinity (with its logical structure: Universal-Particular-Individual), the unity of divine and human natures, the Spirit in community—is inherently rational and conceptual, demanding understanding beyond mere belief or picturing. This drives theology and philosophy to translate representational truth into conceptual form, since philosophy shares religion’s content but expresses it in the form of the concept, the highest form of spirit (Hegel 1995, TWA 10, S. 408–09).

Despite its supreme content, Christianity remains bound to representation of religious consciousness, generating persisting limitations or an unovercome side manifesting as a diremption of thought and object. Treating Jesus’s life as a purely past event, a spiritless recollection of a single common figure, risks obscuring its eternal, logical significance. Sensory imagery, such as metaphors like “Father,” “Son,” “dove,” “fire,” and “sacrifice,” binds concepts to sensuous immediacy. Doctrinal elements (Trinity, Creation, etc.) often appear as sequential, external events (the form of happening) rather than necessary moments of one immanent logical process. Furthermore, full unity is frequently deferred eschatologically, maintaining the reconciliation of essence and self in the distant future. This perpetuates a gap between the believer and realized truth. While the community possesses the truth in-itself (an sich), its representational form sustains a vestigial consciousness model (Bewußtseinsmodell).

3.5. Religious Representation as Necessary Pathway to Absolute Knowing

Hegel’s dialectical analysis demonstrates that religion functions as the quintessential historical medium for Spirit’s formidable odyssey towards self-knowledge. Each stage embodies a necessary, truth-bearing moment. Natural Religion grasps divine immanence and substantial unity while remaining confined to sensuous immediacy, externality, and the absence of spiritual subjectivity. Religions of division (Entzweiung) achieve crucial differentiation, with Hinduism manifesting particularization and Spirit’s drive for self-manifestation yet dissolving it in arbitrary fantasy. Persian religion elevates the ethical universal, while Judaism establishes radical transcendence, divine holiness, creation, and individual worth before God, simultaneously generating an unreconciled opposition. Greek Art-Religion synthesizes differentiation representationally by achieving the beautiful expression of spiritual individuality and affirmation of the human ethical world (polis), alongside the profound aesthetic intuition of human freedom as the divine destiny. However, it retains the finitude of its gods and aesthetic limitations.

Christianity, as the consummate representation, serves to reconcile fundamental oppositions—such as transcendence and immanence, infinite and finite, divine and human—within its representational narrative. It fully images Spirit’s truth as the Trinitarian movement of self-differentiation, self-sacrifice, and reconciliation realized in the community, with its content constituting the rationally structured absolute truth. Yet the form of religious consciousness (representation) proves ultimately inadequate for Spirit’s complete self-transparency. This applies whether considering nature worship’s immediacy, Hinduism’s fantastical multiplicity, Jewish law’s sublime transcendence, Greek gods’ beautiful finitude, or Christianity’s historical narrative and sensory metaphors. The journey from Natural Religion’s magical immediacy to Christianity’s conceptually rich dogmas narrates Spirit’s progressive embodiment of truth in historically determined representational forms. Each contains rationality while remaining constrained. Christianity’s inherently rational content generates the imperative for its sublation (Aufhebung), requiring the transition from religious representation into philosophy’s pure, self-mediating concept. Representation thus constitutes the necessary, truth-bearing, yet ultimately superseded pathway through which Spirit laboriously guides humanity toward the threshold of Absolute Knowing. This point pertains to the speculative relationship between religious representation and Hegel’s philosophical concepts, a subject that is addressed in the next section of this article.

Furthermore, a concise synopsis of the issue of Hegel’s Eurocentrism is provided in the context of his reconstruction of pluralistic religions. Hegel’s work demonstrates a profound understanding of the contents of world religions, and offers a powerful dialectical framework for understanding the relationship between religion and philosophy. However, his interpretation of non-Western religions reveals a clear Eurocentric bias. Chinese Daoism/Taoism can be taken as an example. Relying on limited translations and secondary sources, Hegel reduces the Dao to an indeterminate, empty abstraction, equating it with mere Reason (Vernunft), while overlooking its generative, multidimensional nature. Furthermore, he erroneously conflates philosophical Daoism (Daojia, 道家)—an early, systematic tradition centred on cosmological and ethical reflection—with 700 years later religious Daoism (Daojiao, 道教), which incorporates practices aimed at immortality and transcendence. This conflation leads him to dismiss Daoist thought as pre-philosophical and spiritually deficient, ignoring its proto-scientific contributions and profound introspective wisdom. Hegel’s systematic critique offers a valuable framework for intercultural philosophical engagement; however, it also possesses a Eurocentric and hierarchical character. The reconceptualisation of Hegel’s Spirit should emphasise cultural–spiritual self-sublation (Selbstaufhebung) through cultivation and education (Bildung), and recognise the fluidity of the word Spirit (Weltgeist) as it unfolds.3

4. The Mediating Role of Religion: Religion as the Indispensable Pathway to Conceptual Truth in Hegel’s System

According to Hegel, religion occupies a position of transition within the process of unfolding absolute spirit (Geist). It is posited that this concept stands alongside art (Kunst) and philosophy as one of the three fundamental, irreducible, and necessary “absolute forms” through which humanity expresses its universal self-understanding. Religion is identified as an important moment of the spirit’s journey through the forms of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason (Vernunft), and objective spirit.4 It is posited that this process ultimately arrives at the “true content” of the absolute. Within the sphere of religion, particularly in its consummate form as revealed religion (offenbare Religion), spirit grasps the fundamental truth, the identity of substance and subject, the unity of the divine and the human. This notion is encapsulated in the complementary propositions that are fundamental to Christianity. The concept of God as Self is posited as being immediate and as an individual human, and the Self is further defined as representing the life of the divine spirit. In this context, the absolute essence is recognised as the spirit itself—the spirit conscious of itself as spirit. It is evident that religion attains the “certainty of being spirit” and presents the simple totality of spirit’s moments gathered into their ground. This status underscores religion’s indispensable role in the cultural fabric and its proximity to the absolute, constituting “the Knowing of absolute spirit about itself as absolute spirit” (Hegel 1976, GW 8, S. 280). This self-relation is manifested as consciousness of God, involving feeling, representation (Vorstellung), and cognition (Erkenntnis), inherently containing two inseparable moments, the objective divine content and the subjective consciousness relating to it.

Hegel’s work posits that “God is essentially in his congregation, has a congregation, is objective to himself and is this truly only in self-consciousness; his highest determination itself is self-consciousness” (Hegel 1986b, TWA 16, S. 73; Jaeschke 2001, S. 293–94). This perspective underscores the notion that any adequate concept of God must intrinsically lead to the lived reality of religion. Nevertheless, the manner in which religion apprehends and expresses this absolute content remains fundamentally inadequate to its truth. Its defining characteristic and limitation is the “form of representation”. The concept of representation occupies a precarious position between sensory intuition (Anschauung) and conceptual thinking (begreifendes Denken). This phenomenon is characterised by a synthetic connection of the sensuously immediate and thought, signifying a merging of “universality and singularity”. In essence, it can be regarded as a depiction of the universal or the generalization of intuition. Religion communicates its truth through the medium of “mytho-logical language”, employing narratives (Erzählungen), images (Bilder), metaphors, and parables (Gleichnisse)—a “logo-mythical biography” of the divine. This mode is characterised by its reliance on the productive power of imagination to combine elements into a composite or amalgam of the logical and the pictorial. This inherently hybrid form is susceptible to equivocation. Concepts such as “God,” “hell,” “devil,” and “creation” are representations that synthesise thought and image. While not entirely devoid of reason, this synthesis lacks the rigorous, internal necessity of the concept. The connections within its divine history appear contingent, governed by mere conjunctions (and or also) rather than logical deduction. Its components exist side-by-side (Nebeneinander) or sequentially (Nacheinander), as a “happening” or “appearances following one another”, not as moments organically developing from and necessitating one another—the immanent, necessary self-unfolding of the Concept.

Furthermore, representation is inherently tied to immediacy–the immediate certainty of faith and objecthood (Gegenständlichkeit). The absolute, even as spirit, is still presented as an “other,” an object over against consciousness, a transcendent “Beyond” (Jenseits), lacking the full form of free actuality (Wirklichkeit) and free otherness (Anderssein) that conceptual thought affords. Hegel sharply critiques approaches, like Schleiermacher’s theology of feeling or doctrines of immediate Knowing, which perpetuate this limitation by severing religious content from the mediations of thought, thereby rendering religion vulnerable to arbitrariness (Willkür) and subjectivism, or conversely, to passive acceptance of external authority. As Hegel critically observes, even within the absolute religion, spirit “does not have itself as this object, or does not open itself up to consciousness of itself” (Hegel 1980, GW 9, S. 420). The content, despite its profundity, is shrouded in the garment of pictorial form, preventing its full realization as an independent, free being. Key religious doctrines, such as divine creation or providence, often remain trapped in the realm of presupposed immediacy or unfathomable mystery, fostering a sense of givenness (Gegebensein) that impedes full rational comprehension and risks reducing the divine to an empty abstraction.

Consequently, the absolute truth grasped by religion necessitates a crucial translation or sublation into the form of the concept. Hegel explicitly states that the final task is solely the sublation of this mere form. This transition is not an arbitrary leap, but the logical culmination of the truth already implicitly contained within religion, especially its consummate form. The mediating force enabling this crucial ascent is the very structure and content of revealed religion itself. While expressed representationally, its core articulations—particularly the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity—implicitly point towards the conceptual truths philosophy must explicitly grasp. Doctrinally, the conceptual truth implicit in religion, particularly in the consummate religion, Christianity, demands philosophical articulation. The representational figures of the Trinity, namely the substantial unity of the Father (universality), the self-particularization in the Son (particularity), and the reconciling return as Spirit (singularity), prefigure the logical movement of the Concept itself (universality, particularity, singularity). Furthermore, the core Christian notion of the incarnation (Menschwerdung Gottes) and the death of God signifies, philosophically, the overcoming of abstract transcendence and the realization that the divine essence achieves actuality only in and through finite spirit and its historical development. The narrative of divine action, creation, alienation (symbolized by the Fall), and ultimate reconciliation (Versöhnung) through the death and resurrection of the God-man embodies, in pictorial form, the logical movement of the absolute. The central event of Good Friday, the “death of God”, is pivotal. Representationally, it signifies profound sacrifice. Conceptually, however, it embodies absolute negativity, namely the necessary self-mediation and self-sacrifice inherent within the absolute itself. The death of the immediate, the sensuous representation of the divine (Tod der Vorstellung), on the speculative Good Friday clears the way for its resurrection as a concept on what can be called the “Sunday of thinking” or “Easter Sunday of thought”. The reconciliation portrayed in the religious narrative, though often deferred representationally to the past (Christ’s act) or the future (Last Judgment), conceptually signifies the present overcoming of alienation within the thinking subject. The mediating role of religion is thus intrinsic. It presents the absolute content in a form accessible to consciousness immersed in finitude and pictorial thinking. However, its internal dynamic—specifically the struggle within its representations and the profound truths they imperfectly convey—compels the transition towards the pure self-mediation of the concept. Religion functions as the essential “prelude to science”, the necessary forecourt through which spirit must pass to enter the temple of absolute knowing.

The transition from religious representation to philosophical concept marks the passage from religious consciousness to absolute Knowing (absolutes Wissen) and pure philosophy. This transition represents neither a simple negation nor a mere summary, but rather the essential sublation (understood as simultaneous preservation, negation, and elevation) of religious content into its proper conceptual form. This fulfills the necessity inherent within that content within its proper element. In religion, spirit possesses the true content but in an inadequate form. In philosophy, specifically in the Science of Logic, spirit gives this same content its true form, namely the self-determining, self-mediating movement of the concept. Philosophy, particularly in its highest discipline, the philosophy of religion, takes the content of religion—the absolute idea of God as spirit—and liberates it from the constraints of the representational form. It comprehends conceptually what religion grasps through imagery and feeling. Hegel emphasizes that the concrete idea is necessarily the last, meaning that the full, developed concept emerges only through the explication and mediation inherent in the system (Hegel 1986c, TWA 6, S. 461–62). Philosophy demonstrates the necessity of the religious moments, such as God’s self-manifestation, the overcoming of evil, and the immortality of the soul, not as contingent dogmas but as essential stages in the absolute’s self-unfolding. It replaces the picture-thinking of incarnation with the logical comprehension of the unity of universal and particular, and replaces the feeling of reconciliation with the systematic understanding of negation and sublation. The “gray in gray” of the concept does not negate the vibrant colors of religious representation; rather, it provides their ultimate foundation and justification. The moments that were once independent shapes of consciousness or static representations become fluid “determinate concepts” (bestimmte Begriffe), moments within the self-determination of the absolute idea. This translation involves comprehending the necessary logical relationships implicit in religious doctrines and practices, demonstrating how they articulate, albeit inadequately, the self-mediation of Absolute Spirit.

Absolute Knowing emerges as the result of this translation, signifying the final overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy constitutive of consciousness. It is the point where spirit, having traversed its phenomenal appearances, achieves complete self-transparency in the element of the concept. This Knowing is “absolute” not primarily in an ontological sense of a detached entity, but because it is self-comprehending spirit (der sich als Geist wissende Geist). It remains in its concept, characterized by the unrestricted self-determination of thought where the object is no longer alien but the very manifestation of thought’s own activity. The movement of consciousness culminates in the “I that is We, and the We that is I” (Hegel 1980, GW 9, S. 108), now grasped not figuratively but conceptually. The historical and experiential journey of consciousness, including the rich content of religion, is preserved (aufbewahrt) within absolute Knowing as moments comprehended within the self-mediating structure of the concept. This Knowing is the standpoint of Science proper– ”Science of Logic” and the encyclopedic system–where thought thinks itself in its necessary, autonomous development, freed from the representational veil. This conceptual comprehension (begreifendes Wissen) is where the self finally achieves its true “being-within-itself” (Bei-sich-selbst-Sein) and freedom, recognizing itself not merely in relation to the absolute, but as the active site of the absolute’s self-Knowing. The faith in the one Spirit and the inwardness cultivated in devotion become the experiential bridge that the Concept rationally validates and fulfills. Hegel’s rejection of any form of finitism of spirit, such as Habermas’s reduction of the Absolute to intersubjective foundations, is predicated on the assertion that it denies the necessity of this movement beyond the objective spirit’s inherent relativity to nature and finite presuppositions. This movement, according to Hegel, is initiated within religion and completed in philosophy.

The concept of art (Kunst) offers an immediate, sensuous intuition of the Absolute through the beautiful form, while philosophy achieves conceptual comprehension (begreifendes Denken) in the pure element of the Concept. However, religion occupies the indispensable mediating position. The Absolute Spirit is apprehended through representation (Vorstellung), a form that utilises images, narratives, feelings (Gefühl), and symbolic practices. This representational mode, which exists precariously between sensory immediacy and conceptual thought, is characterised by inherent tension. The Absolute content is presented as the unity of consciousness and object, divine and human, infinite and finite, substance and subject, yet veiled within a pictorial and often sequentially narrated form, thereby maintaining a vestigial sense of objecthood (Gegenständlichkeit) and a transcendent “Beyond” (Jenseits). As Hegel critically observes, even within absolute religion, spirit “does not have itself as this object, or does not open itself up to consciousness of itself” (Hegel 1980, GW 9, S. 420). Nevertheless, this very form makes the profound truths of Spirit accessible to communal consciousness, which is immersed in finitude and pictorial thinking.

It is apparent that religion serves as an indispensable intermediary between the objective spirit of ethical life and the pure self-knowing concept of philosophy, as well as between sensuous consciousness and absolute knowing. Its significance is twofold: it is important both for its content and its structural position within the system of spirit. The concept of the absolute spirit, as delineated in the aforementioned work, is intricately interwoven with the realms of art, religion, and philosophy. It is within this domain that the truth is pursued, leading to the full attainment of self-Knowing by the spirit (Hegel 1968, GW 4, S. 76). The presentation of the absolute through art and the representation of the absolute through religion are two discrete forms of expression. Philosophy, however, grasps the absolute in the pure, self-transparent form of the concept. Religion provides the crucial stage where the substantial truths of spirit, developed through history and the earlier stages of subjective and objective spirit, attain concrete representation for the communal self-consciousness in an accessible, pictorial or representational form. The text under scrutiny elevates the substantial ethical content—the determinations of freedom, justice, and the infinite worth of the person developed in Objective Spirit—to the level of the Absolute. However, it does so within a form that remains pictorial and narrative. Philosophy is the discipline that provides complete conceptual clarity and justification, an immanent demand within religion.

Philosophy does not discard religion’s content, but elevates it into the form of the concept, thereby demonstrating its rational necessity and integrating it into the systematic whole of comprehended truth. This progression, therefore, does not constitute a rejection of the truth of religion; rather, it is an elevation and justification of it. Philosophy acknowledges that the fundamental tenets inherent in all religions, despite their manifestation as “natural flowers and formations sprung up accidentally” (Hegel 1994, TWA 17, S. 156–57), constitute indispensable elements of the absolute concept. It is only through philosophical comprehension of religion that the absolute spirit finally attains self-conscious freedom, whereby it knows itself completely. This is not achieved through images or feelings of devotion, but rather through the self-movement of the speculative-logical concept itself. The role of religious consciousness as the indispensable mediator is to provide the substantial content and the experiential pathway that makes this final, purely conceptual self-appropriation of spirit possible. It is evident that the process of attaining an absolute truth on the concept is contingent upon the journey through the realm of religious representation. Hegel’s system thus affirms religion’s vital role not as the end, but as the essential, culminating bridge that spirit builds from the pictorial consciousness of the absolute to its fully realised conceptual self-Knowing. This mediating ascent constitutes the vital progression within Hegel’s system, demonstrating how religion, far from being superseded in a negative sense, finds its truth and culmination in philosophical science. The transition does not signify the termination of religion’s significance; rather, it denotes its conceptual sublation into the self-comprehending logical science of absolute spirit, thereby completing spirit’s journey to absolute truth in the element of pure concept.

While Hegel’s system undoubtedly contains rational elements that seem to predispose religion to a diminished role in modernity—particularly through its emphasis on the historical character of religious consciousness and the sublation of representation into conceptual truth—it would be reductive to interpret this as a straightforward “enlightenment dismissal” of religion. This present study seeks not to defend a fully successful reconciliation, but rather to reconstruct Hegel’s own systematic effort to mediate between religion and philosophy. Even during his Berlin period, Hegel still believed that God is the speculative concept and the community is the idea, which affirmed the value of Christianity by strengthening the intrinsic connection between Christianity and his philosophy (Hegel 1994, TWA 17, S. 451). His critique of the Romantic “new mythology” underscores his attitude to religion’s historicity rather than its abolition; he rejects Romantic abistorical, aestheticized resurrection of religion, insisting instead on its developmental and mediated nature within the life of Spirit. However, precisely because Hegel’s system is monistic and teleological, religion appears as a necessary but transitional moment. 5 This very framework implies an inescapable modern fate for the religion: once translated into conceptual form, religion risks losing its independent vitality, a trajectory dramatically realized in the Left-Hegelian turn of Strauss and Feuerbach, who radicalized Hegel’s historicizing impulse into explicit secularization. Thus, although Hegel sought to preserve the truth of religion within philosophy, his logical and historically informed approach ultimately presents religion as a weakened and preserved moment within Spirit’s self-development—not rejected in the manner of Enlightenment critique, but sublated through the self-negativity of the Spirit. Nevertheless, Hegel’s enduring contribution lies in his rigorous effort to affirm both the truth-content of religion and the necessity of its philosophical comprehension, without simply reducing one to the other—a nuanced mediation that continues to offer resources for thinking religion’s role in a modern world, even as his system contains the seeds of its decline.

5. Concluding Reflections: Hegel’s Representation and Concept in the Interdisciplinary Pursuit of Truth and Meaning

In concluding this examination of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, it is essential to reflect on how his dialectic of Vorstellung (representation) and Begriff (concept) contributes to contemporary interdisciplinary dialogues concerning truth and meaning—particularly within the context of religion and philosophy. Hegel’s system offers a monistic framework for understanding the relationship between these two domains, avoiding both naïve identification and rigid opposition. Instead, he posits that they are best understood as reciprocal, mediating moments in Spirit’s (Geist) journey towards self-determining and self-conscious freedom.

Hegel’s conception of religious Vorstellung offers a rich, communal, and affectively potent mode of apprehending truth—one inextricably tied to meaning in both existential and historical senses. Religious narratives, symbols, and rituals are not merely allegories or primitive precursors to philosophical truth; they are necessary, sensuous–imaginative forms through which communities have historically articulated and experienced the deepest truths of their existence. In this way, religion serves as a primary site where truth becomes meaningful—where abstract universality is embodied in particular histories, cultures, and practices. The Incarnation, the Trinity, and the “death of God” are not just doctrinal content; they are profound representational expressions of the unity of subject and object, infinite and finite, lending the meaning of existence to the speculative truths they signify.

In contrast to religion, Hegel’s concept (Begriff) represents the movement toward logical clarity and self-mediation, in which truth is freed from the limitations of narrative sequentiality, sensory imagery, and emotional immediacy. Philosophy does not simply dismiss the meaning-laden content of religion, but elevates it into a form adequate to its truth—a form that is universal, self-grounding, and fully transparent to reason. Through this transition, Hegel provides a nuanced response to the question of how truth and meaning are integrated within a dialectical framework: truth, in its fullest sense, requires meaningful embodiment, while meaning, to be truly true, must ultimately be comprehended conceptually. Truth without meaning remains abstract and empty; meaning without truth remains subjective and contingent.

This Hegelian perspective also sheds light on the conjunction ‘and’ in the context—seeking truth and meaning—interpreted neither as a simple addition, nor an irreducible dichotomy, but as a speculative relation. Similarly, the ‘and’ between religion and philosophy signifies a dynamic, non-identical repetition: both share the same content—the Absolute—but differ in form. Philosophy does not invalidate religion; rather, it serves to more accurately realise the inherent truth of religion. This perspective finds resonance with John D. Caputo’s interpretation of the conjunction ‘and’. Both caution against reducing the conjunction to an abstract concept of identity or a simple semantic glue. In a manner similar to Caputo, Hegel acknowledges both the kinship and the tension between these concepts, which are linked by conjunctions. However, while the majority of contemporary thinkers accentuate uncertainty and the openness of meaning, Hegel emphasises the self-determination of negativity and a final sublation (Aufhebung) into absolute knowing.

From a hermeneutic viewpoint, Hegel’s system posits that all understanding progresses from the meaningfulness of representational forms towards conceptual truth—a movement that is simultaneously historical and logical. This has profound implications for how we conceive of interpretation, truth and the dialectical relationship of philosophy and theology. It also invites us to consider whether absolute spirit, the culmination of Hegel’s system, truly transcends the need for narrative, image, and existential meaning, or whether, as is contended by most contemporary thinkers, Derrida included, the movement of meaning is endless and truth remains always ‘to come’. In this light, Hegel’s philosophy emerges as a significant resource for those who seek to conceptualise truth and meaning in unison, without conflating them, and without relinquishing the demand of reason. It offers a way to honour the depth of religious meaning while embracing the rigour of philosophical-conceptual truth.