The Heart–Mind as the Medium of Transcendence and Virtue: From Post-Confucian Thought to Mencius and Xunzi from a Religious–Ethical Perspective

Abstract

This study interprets early Confucian discourse on xin through a religious–ethical lens, where “religious ethics” denotes the linkage between moral cultivation and a transcendent or cosmic order. Drawing on transmitted texts and recently excavated manuscripts, this study argues that Mencius and Xunzi developed two contrasting yet equally systematic frameworks of ethical cultivation: one that grounds moral agency in the innate unity of xin and xing (性, human nature), and another that emphasizes the functional role of xin as a conscious mediator between nature and ritual. Through a comparative and religious–philosophical perspective, the paper reveals how the evolving discourse on xin enabled early Confucians to construct morally responsive selves embedded in a spiritualized ethical universe. This approach not only illuminates the diversity of early Confucian thought but also offers conceptual resources for rethinking moral subjectivity in contemporary virtue ethics and religious moral anthropology.

1. Introduction: Early Confucian Xin Theory from a Religious–Ethical Perspective

Early Confucian thought placed the xin1 (心, heart–mind) at the center of its reflections on human moral subjectivity. In this paper, “religious ethics”2 is used not in the institutional or doctrinal sense typical of Abrahamic traditions, but as a philosophical category that captures the linkage between ethical cultivation and a transcendent or cosmic order. While early Confucianism did not constitute an organized religion, it operated within a worldview in which Tian (天, Heaven), ancestral spirits, and ritual cosmology provided the moral structure and metaphysical authority for human action. “Religious ethics,” therefore, refers to a moral discourse that links self-cultivation to an order beyond empirical social relations—such as Tian, ming (天命, destiny), or ancestral forces—which shaped the Confucian conception of moral life.

Scholarly debates on the concept of xin in early Confucianism have often focused on its function as either a cognitive organ or a moral faculty. Traditional interpretations (e.g., Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan) contrast Mencius’s “moral heart” with Xunzi’s “cognitive heart.” More recent scholarship examines the embeddedness of xin in broader cosmological and ritual systems, especially in light of excavated texts, such as Xing zi ming chu (《性自命出》), Wu xing （《五行》）, Cheng zhi wen zhi （《成之聞之》）, and Xin shi wei zhong （《心是謂中》） (Cook 2012). From a religious–philosophical perspective, xin may be approached as a symbolic center of moral responsiveness akin to the conscience in Christian theology (Keenan 2005) or the citta in Buddhist ethics (King 1999), facilitating a comparative understanding of Confucian ethics as a form of religious moral anthropology (Taylor 1989; Angle 2009).

Within this framework, Iso Kern’s phenomenological analysis of heart and nature identifies three types of ethical reasoning within Confucianism: one based on social welfare, order, and harmony—exemplified by Xunzi and Mozi; one rooted in the individual’s inherent spiritual essence—represented by Mencius and Wang Yangming; and one predicated on natural or cosmic law as the basis for ethical conduct—represented by Zhu Xi (Kern 2012). In early Confucian discourse, xin developed in conjunction with such key terms as xing3 (性, human nature), qing4 (情, emotion), ming5 (命, destiny), and qi (氣, vital energy), giving rise to two major theoretical frameworks: one that integrates xin and xing ontologically, regarding their unity as the essential basis of human moral nature; and another that maintains a functional distinction between them, emphasizing cultivated consciousness in realizing human ethical potential through conformity with the dao (道the Way). Examining the evolution of xin within the broader xin–xing (心-性) structure reveals a critical transformation—from a descriptive account of natural life to a normative vision of moral life—underscoring both the spiritual orientation and the practical dimension of Confucian life ethics.

Although scholars such as Gu Shikao have recognized the significance of the Guodian Chu bamboo manuscripts and other early Confucian works outside the received canon—arguing that many of their ideas illuminate the formation of theories of human nature between Confucius and Mencius, as well as the origins of later traditions such as Xunzi (Gu 2006)—these excavated texts have yet to be fully integrated into systematic studies of the xin. In other words, the intellectual currents reflected in the excavated manuscripts constitute an important context for understanding early Confucian discussions of major themes such as “self-cultivation and scholarly learning” (qiu ji 求己, zhi xue 治學) and “inner sageliness and outer kingliness” (nei sheng 內聖, wai wang 外王). Nevertheless, with respect to xin as a key philosophical concept, little research has systematically examined the richness of its meanings and their relationship to the construction of moral subjectivity in the thought of Mencius and Xunzi, along with the distinctive features of each. Clarifying this development and transformation allows us to see more clearly how early Confucians understood the possibility of virtue and its transcendent grounds through their engagement with the concept of xin.

Existing scholarship has thus paid relatively little attention to the continuities between Mencius’s and Xunzi’s accounts of the xin (heart–mind) and the discourses on xin developed by Confucius’ later followers as reflected in excavated manuscripts. A close examination of this post-Confucian “discourse on the heart–mind” (yan xin si cao 言心思潮) enables a clearer understanding of the intellectual lineage in which Mencius and Xunzi situated their thought, and illuminates the intellectual-historical value and philosophical significance of their conception of the xin as the locus of human moral subjectivity.

Building on this perspective, this study further contends that Mencius and Xunzi regarded the diverse functions of the xin as the primary locus for attaining both the transcendence of the Way of Heaven (tian dao 天道) and a moral sensibility—a view that developed along the trajectory of post-Confucian thought. From the later disciples of Confucius to Mencius and Xunzi, the xin, as the pivotal faculty in the cultivation of virtue (cheng de 成德), functioned as a subjective medium linking human beings with the Way of Heaven. In another sense, the realization of virtue was seen as an intrinsic necessity of the human being—an immanent necessity that was nonetheless continuous with the transcendence of the Way of Heaven. This continuity reflects the early Confucian affirmation of the value of human life and constitutes an important dimension of their recognition of human transcendence within a broadly defined framework of religious ethics, marking a significant divergence from the Western Christian tradition’s understanding of life’s meaning. Methodologically, the paper first analyzes the conception of xin in post-Confucian sources, especially excavated texts; it then examines the distinct interpretive paths taken by Mencius and Xunzi under the influence of this intellectual heritage; and finally, it offers a comparative synthesis of their respective models of xin theory in light of the Confucian religious–ethical understanding of the Heaven–human relationship.

2. From Physiology to Moral Center: The Evolution of Xin in Early Confucian Thought

Among the core concepts in Chinese philosophical discourse, xin (心, heart–mind) occupies a central position in early Confucian understandings of humanity. The character xin appeared as early as in oracle bone and bronze inscriptions, initially signifying a bodily organ, but gradually evolving to embody a range of meanings, including consciousness, sensation, cognition, volition, and spirit. Through continuous interaction with other philosophical concepts, xin came to express multiple dimensions of human life—physiological, psychological, moral, and spiritual—and became foundational to early Chinese thought. The concepts of xin (心, heart/mind) and xing (性, nature) are fundamental to Confucian reflections on human beings.

In contrast, the character xin emerged and was used much earlier. As the concept of xin developed within intellectual discourse, it gained additional layers of meaning during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Initially denoting a physical organ, xin later came to be understood as the locus of cognitive functions, encompassing consciousness, emotions, desires, cognition, spirit, and mental states. It thus gradually became a central concept in early Chinese thought. If the emergence of xing was driven by an inquiry into the fundamental source of human and cosmic life,6 then the emergence of xin was rooted in an introspective exploration of the embodied self—closely linked to both physiological and psychological functions and exhibiting a unified mind–body characteristic.

Although the term xin was used early on, its conceptualization as a philosophical category did not take shape until the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Even in Confucius’ thought, these notions had not yet received significant attention. Compared to later Confucian discussions on the relationship between the body and consciousness (xin), as well as the connection between the external body (xing, 形) and internal vital energy (qi, 氣), such issues had not yet become central philosophical concerns in Confucius time. As a result, Confucius spoke little about xin and did not address its connection to shen (body). Instead, his primary intellectual concerns lay elsewhere, focusing on relationships among key virtues, such as ren (仁, humaneness) and li (禮, ritual),7 ren and zhi (知, wisdom), and ren and zhongshu (忠恕, loyalty and reciprocity) (Yang 1999).

For Confucius, the fundamental problem of inquiry lay in the restoration of Zhou ritual (fu Zhouli, 复周禮), which served as the foundation for reconstructing social order and human relationships through ren. However, the intrinsic nature of ren and its role in grounding institutional order already implied that ren governed both the internal spiritual life and the externalized behaviors of human beings. From the perspective of the relationship between ren and other virtues, xin began to be associated with moral cultivation; from the perspective of the path to achieving ren as a virtue, the cognitive and spiritual capacities of xin became linked to the distinctiveness of human nature.

Scholars generally regard the mid-to-late Warring States period as the stage during which intellectual discourse on xin (心, heart–mind) became a central focus. Both transmitted texts and excavated bamboo and silk manuscripts from this period provide clear evidence that xin was a key subject of discussion. In Confucian literature, references to xin can be found in transmitted works such as Mencius (Mengzi), Xunzi, and the Liji (Book of Rites), as well as in excavated texts such as Xing zi ming chu (《性自命出》), Xin shi wei Zhong (《心是谓中》) and Cheng zhi wen zhi (《成之聞之》), and Wu xing (《五行》). (Cook 2012) Additionally, discussions on xin are present in texts outside the Confucian tradition, such as the Guanzi and Zhuangzi.

In bamboo manuscripts, early Confucians had already begun to explore human consciousness and cognition—broadly referred to as xin (心, heart–mind)—and to develop this understanding in diverse directions.

Firstly, they proposed that, to understand what it means to be human, one must seek answers within the human being itself. This gave rise to a distinctively Confucian view of the body, in which the various faculties (官, guan) and their functions are used to explain the essential difference between humans and things (or animals). Among these bodily faculties, xin (心, heart–mind), qing (情, emotions), si (思, thinking), xi (習, habituation), and zhi (志, will) stand out most prominently as markers of what differentiates human beings from animals.

Secondly, those faculties are all closely connected with the xin, which implies heart–mind (xin), as the governing faculty of a person’s outward actions and inward states of emotion and desire, is precisely the key that distinguishes humans from animals. At the same time, it indicates that the manifestation and practice of the moral qualities that set humans apart from animals arise from the xin and the practical impetus it embodies. Those bodily faculties are either expressions emanating from the heart–mind or practical activities and concrete behaviors directed and animated by it.

A representative example is the Xing zi ming chu (《性自命出》) from the Guodian bamboo manuscripts. This text presents key propositions. such as “Xing arises from ming (命, destiny), and ming descends from Tian (天, heaven)”,8 “Within the four seas, human xing is the same” and “Although humans possess xing and xin, without active engagement, these faculties do not manifest.” These statements indicate that Tian and ming constitute the origins of xing, with xing emerging as a result of ming being bestowed by Tian.9 However, the text also states: “Although all people possess xing, their xin lacks a fixed will (ding zhi 定志); it responds to external objects before it acts, requires pleasure (yue 悅) before it moves, and depends on habituation (xi 習) before it attains stability.” Furthermore, “Although humans possess both xing and xin, without active engagement, these faculties do not manifest. Every xin has intentions (zhi 志), but without interaction, they cannot function—just as a mouth cannot speak in isolation.” (L. Li 2007).

This passage underscores that, while both xin and xing are inherent in human beings, xing remains latent and potential until activated through xin. It is through xin’s engagement with external objects (wu, 物) that xing is actualized and revealed as qing (情, emotions or affective responses). In other words, the concrete manifestation of xing relies on activities related to xin and corresponding bodily responses.10 The various expressions of xing, such as qing (情, joy, anger, sorrow, and grief), ai (love), wu (aversion), and zhi (wisdom), are all tangible and perceptible manifestations produced by xin. Functionally, xin is both an entity and a dynamic capacity: it engages with external objects (wu 物), generates motivation (yue 悅, pleasure or inclination), and, through repeated habituation (xi 習), may attain a degree of stability. However, xin also possesses an inherent dynamism, characterized by the fluidity of consciousness and thought, which prevents it from being perpetually stable. It may exist in a state of wu ding zhi (无定志), or an unfixed will. The formation of ding zhi (定志, a determined will) in xin requires the reinforcement of xi (習, habit), and variations in the degree of habituation influence the strength or weakness of the will to actualize xing.

In the bamboo manuscript Wu xing, although the graph xin (心, heart–mind) does not appear explicitly, the text discussion of “manifesting inwardly” (xing yu nei 形于內) and “manifesting outwardly” (xing yu wai 形于外) already implies a conceptual distinction and inquiry into the inward heart–mind and outward conduct. By contrast, the “Explanations” (Shuo 說) of the silk manuscript version of Wu xing contains extensive usage and explication of the term xin. As Liang Tao has observed, Wu xing (Jing) (《五行經》) occupies a central transitional and differentiating position in the intellectual history of pre-Qin Confucianism, exerting influence on both Mencius and Xunzi (Liang 2008). It may be said that, from Wu xing to Mencius, there gradually emerged an interpretive trajectory that approached xing (human nature) through the lens of xin—that is, treating the heart–mind as the moral root. The aim of this development was to link the transcendence of the human heart–mind with the transcendence of Tian (天 Heaven), thereby establishing the foundation for understanding the meaning of human life.

In the Cheng zhi wen zhi (《成之聞之》) chapter, the guiding role of the xin (心, heart–mind) is articulated through the phrase “seeking it within oneself” (qiu zhi yu ji 求之于己), which is presented as being in accord with the order of the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道). As Shirley Chan observes, although the text does not explicitly formulate a theory of the xin, it affirms the intimate relationship between human beings and Heaven, indicating that only through inward self-cultivation—via the xin—can one attain unity with the cosmic order (Chan 2012). In this sense, the order of Heaven prescribes the arrangement of the human Way; the necessity of becoming virtuous originates from Heaven, yet the capacity for moral practice is innate to human beings. The imperative to cultivate virtue is thus Heaven-given, while the realization of virtue depends on human agency. Accordingly, the xin may be understood as both the subject and the driving source of moral action.

During the Warring States period, early Confucians came to recognize that the heart–mind possesses tendencies of attraction and aversion—or inclinations that may be intertwined with dispositions toward good and evil. The xin is oriented toward external objects and engages in interaction with them, thereby constituting the basis of human awareness and cognition. At the same time, its interaction with the physical body gives rise to a reflexive awareness of the self. The former orientation is outward-facing, while the latter is inward-facing.

Thus, early Confucians had already identified a form of spiritual consciousness in which the self becomes an object of reflection. This self-reflective consciousness, together with cognitive awareness, is intimately tied to the function of the xin as a central faculty. The xin is both ontologically real and functionally active. It does not manifest in isolation but operates in coordination with the body and other faculties, each serving distinct roles. For instance, the text Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) clearly articulates the dominant guiding role and function of the xin.

In Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》), the primary discussion explicitly centering on the xin (心, heart–mind) is concentrated in its opening section. This portion employs the analogy of the xin as a ruler, and ultimately elevates the discourse to the level of political governance, grounding its argument in the unifying and directive capacity of the heart–mind. Such an account does not directly engage with the ethical constitution of the xin. The expressions “what the heart deems good or bad” and “the small and great that issue from the heart” are general statements concerning the heart–mind’s evaluative and cognitive capacities, illustrating how its volitional orientation governs the faculties and the four physical aspects of the body, rather than explicating human moral nature as such.

Chapter Two of Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) deliberately emphasizes the cognitive functions and capacities of the human heart–mind, namely its abilities to “deliberate(mou zhi 謀之),” “examine (ji zhi 稽之),” “measure (du zhi 度之),” and “discern (jian zhi 鑒之).” Such cognitive capacities are unique and not possessed by other bodily organs. More specifically, this cognition involves the recognition and evaluation of right and wrong, norms, beauty and ugliness, good and bad, as well as length and shortness. Because the “heart” possesses this cognitive function, the bodily faculties of “hearing (wen 聞),” “inquiring (xun 詢),” “seeing (shi 視),” and “listening (ting 聽)” are able to produce appropriate actions. The heart’s powerful cognitive role is even regarded as comparable to “Heaven,” to the extent that it can determine matters of “life and death.” Thus, according to the text, the combined operation of the heart and Heaven together brings about the fulfillment of human affairs (Cao 2019).

Although the doctrines of the xin in the Xunzi (《荀子》) and in Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) are not entirely identical, they are strikingly convergent; moreover, the Xunzi’s insistence on the “division between Heaven and humanity” is also found in Xin shi wei Zhong (《心是謂中》). As Chen Wei observes, the account of the heart–body relation in Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) is most closely aligned with that found in the Guodian Wu xing (《五行》) and in the silk manuscript version of Wu xing, even sharing notable similarities in phrasing. For example, Xin shi wei zhong’s analogy of the heart to a ruler parallels a rhetorical usage in the “Explanations” (Shuo, 《說》) of the Mawangdui silk Wu xing (《五行》) (W. Chen 2018).

Furthermore, whereas the bamboo and silk Wu xing texts confine themselves to the heart–body relation, Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) extends this framework to assert that “those who act as rulers should take this as a model in governing the people,” thereby linking the discourse to political order. Both Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) and the Guodian Wu xing (《五行》) emerge from the broader intellectual current that foregrounded the heart–mind, yet they diverge in orientation: the former lacks an explicit ethical teleology, while the latter moves decisively toward one. Finally, Xin shi wei zhong’s conception of the Heaven–human relation—according to which Heaven and humanity are distinct, yet human agency may stand on equal footing with Heaven—likely exercised substantive influence upon Xunzi’s thought.

Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) inherits the Wu xing (Jing) (《五行·經》) tradition that venerates sagely wisdom, and, in the longer view, it further influenced the Xunzi. By contrast, the Mencius carries forward the Wu xing (Jing) (《五行·經》) lineage that emphasizes the internalization of morality. Although Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》) gives prominence to the “heart–mind,” its central theme is not the moral nature of the heart but rather the “distinction between Heaven and humanity.” These two orientations represent distinct concrete expressions of the thought of Confucius’ later followers.

The various conceptualizations of xin in these texts reflect the deep engagement of early thinkers with this notion, illustrating what scholars have termed the “diversity of mental imagery” in the mid-to-late Warring States period (Wang 2019). Therefore, clarifying the perspectives of Confucian scholars who lived after Confucius but before Mencius and Xunzi is crucial for understanding the broader evolution of the xin concept in early Confucian thought. According to prevailing scholarly perspectives, the approximate dating of excavated bamboo and silk manuscripts falls between the periods of Confucius and Mencius, extending to that of Xunzi (Pang 1998; M. Chen 2019).11 Based on existing research on the thought reflected in these texts, it is possible to outline a logical structure of Tian-Ming-Xing-Xin (天-命-性-心) formulated by Confucius’ later disciples. This framework situates the function and significance of xin (心, heart–mind) within the conceptual domain of xing (性, human nature) and Tian dao (天道, the Way of Heaven), and it served as an intellectual foundation for the subsequent development of xin theories by Mencius and Xunzi, who constructed their respective views of xin based on their differing understandings of xing.

In sum, xin must interact with its objects to fulfill its role in manifesting the reality of xing. Moreover, the functional expression of xin is not unidirectional but structurally complex, encompassing both cognitive and affective dimensions in its dynamic engagement with the world. It is evident that the authors of these bamboo manuscripts had already recognized that, in contrast to the latent and static nature of xing (性, human nature), xin (心, heart–mind) is dynamic and active. It signifies that an individual’s self-awareness and volition undergo a process of growth and formation, shaped by change, choice, and adaptation (Wang 2019). Xin manifests through engagement with external objects (wu 物) and moves in response to them. The objectification of wu gives rise to the cognitive, volitional, and intellectual dimensions of the human mind. Moreover, once xin interacts with wu and generates consciousness, it enables individuals to engage in self-reflection and self-cognition, thereby encompassing both internal and external dimensions.

During this period, xin included both general consciousness and spiritual faculties, as well as moral consciousness and ethical awareness. It remained inseparable from the material and situational contexts in which individuals lived, while also accommodating the human pursuit of self-knowledge and spiritual growth. With the intellectual advancements made by Confucius’ later disciples, the conceptual development of xin extended beyond its original physiological functions to include a self-reflective dimension of thought and a cognitive dimension directed toward experience and practice. Despite this development, xin retained its multifaceted nature: it continued to express sensory and perceptual faculties, maintained the unity of body and mind, and had not yet acquired a distinctly metaphysical connotation. The accumulation of these intellectual insights laid the foundation for Mencius and Xunzi to construct their respective conceptions of xin. As the Warring States period saw increasing engagement with questions concerning human beings and human nature (ren xing 人性), the significance of self-will and self-cognition became even more pronounced, leading to the formation of distinct conceptual frameworks for understanding xin, each with its own particular emphasis.

On the one hand, accompanying the deepening understanding of “human” in early Chinese thought, the concept of the “heart” (xin, 心) underwent continuous evolution. Through its interaction with other philosophical ideas, a series of heart-centered concepts emerged that together form the intellectual foundation for understanding what it means to be human. In the pre-Qin period, the notion of the heart was expansive and multifaceted; its complex, intertwined layers of meaning were encapsulated within the use of an ambiguously defined concept. As it merged with various thematic discourses specific to different periods, the concept further propelled inquiries into human nature. Such inquiries might involve either the quest for the inner spiritual essence and its intentionality or an exploration of the modes and mechanisms by which the heart reflects its objects. On the other hand, within early Confucianism, two distinct developmental trajectories of the concept of the heart eventually emerged—represented by Mencius and Xunzi. Both paths are, in essence, manifestations and outcomes of the accelerated evolution of the heart concept during the mid-to-late Warring States period. They have, in turn, profoundly influenced the subsequent development of Confucian discourse on the heart and human nature, as well as modern efforts to reflect upon and reconstruct Confucian thought.

3. Mencius’ Heaven-Endowed Heart–Mind and Innate Moral Orientation

Building on this historical trajectory of xin as reconstructed from excavated manuscripts, Mencius develops the notion of xin into an innate moral faculty. In particular, the discussion in the Wu Xing (《五行》) concerning the “manifestation inwardly” (xing yu nei 形于内) in the section on the “practice of virtue” (de zhi xing 德之行) is undoubtedly connected with Mencius understanding of the function and attributes of the xin, namely his orientation toward interpreting the heart as an a priori moral faculty of human beings. Furthermore, by linking xin to the spontaneous moral sprouts (duan 端), Mencius transforms earlier explorations of consciousness and volition into a doctrine of moral subjectivity that grounds the possibility of virtue.

Mencius places xin (心, heart–mind)at the center of his moral philosophy. His doctrine of the “four beginnings” (compassion, shame, deference, moral discernment) anchors moral subjectivity in innate tendencies of the heart–mind (Shun 1997). These tendencies reflect not mere instinct but a divinely instilled orientation toward virtue. The Mencian xin is simultaneously descriptive of human potential and normative in its ethical imperative, serving as the basis for the Confucian idea that one must “nurture the heart” to fulfill one’s heavenly nature (Ivanhoe 2000). This inner-directed cultivation evokes comparisons with religious notions of an inward moral calling or the divine image in the soul.

The fundamental distinction between Mencius and his contemporary Confucians in their understanding of ren (人, human beings) lies in Mencius’ assertion that humans cannot be understood solely in terms of their biological attributes. He observes that “all discussions of xing (性, nature) in the world merely follow from what already exists” (天下之言性也，故而已矣) (Mencius, Gaozi I), pointing out that previous discussions of xing have primarily sought to comprehend it by following the natural tendencies of things, grasping their constant nature at the level of surface phenomena. However, he argues that this approach is insufficient for understanding the essence of human nature. He challenges the prevailing perspective by asking,

生之謂性也，犹白之謂白與？……白羽之白也，犹白雪之白；白雪之白，犹白玉之白與？……然则犬之性，犹牛之性；牛之性，犹人之性與？

To say that life (sheng, 生) is xing—is it the same as saying that whiteness is white?… The whiteness of white feathers, is it the same as the whiteness of white snow? The whiteness of white snow, is it the same as the whiteness of white jade?… If so, is the nature of a dog the same as the nature of an ox? And is the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a human? (Mencius, Gaozi I).

(Lau 2003)

In other words, if one follows the reasoning that “xing is simply life,” then it fails to capture what distinguishes human beings from other animals. Biological attributes such as sensory perception and appetitive desires cannot serve as defining characteristics of human nature. Rather, xing should refer to the distinctiveness of humans as a species.

Whereas early Confucians prior to Mencius used xing in a broad and somewhat undefined manner without explicitly specifying its referent, Mencius consciously narrows its meaning to denote essence rather than mere instinct. In this respect, Mencius explicitly regards human nature as the fundamental determination of what it means to be human and articulates human distinctiveness in terms of essence. This essentialist conception of human nature is one that can be cultivated and fulfilled through virtue (de 德) and, in this sense, is inherently good (shan 善). It is this moral essence that constitutes the fundamental distinction between humans and animals (Kuang 2018).

Although Mencius posits the essential nature of human beings and asserts that its content is manifested as the moral goodness (shan 善) of virtue (de 德), xing (性, human nature) itself is not a tangible entity with physical substance. How, then, can the goodness of human nature be demonstrated? Mencius accomplishes the unification of xing and shan through the conceptual construction of the significance of xin (心, heart–mind).

As previously discussed, early Confucians had already recognized that the latent xing must be transformed into a perceptible and tangible reality in order to be grasped, a process that necessitates its manifestation and embodiment through the physical faculties—for instance, the way in which xin gives rise to qing (情, emotions). Following this line of thought, Mencius maintains that the essence of human xing is not separate from nor opposed to the corporeal reality of life; rather, the two are fundamentally unified,

君子所性，仁義禮智根于心。其生色也，睟然见于面，盎于背，施于四體，四體不言而喻。

The nature (xing 性) of the noble person (junzi 君子) consists in ren (仁, benevolence), yi (义, righteousness), li (禮, ritual propriety), and zhi (智, wisdom), which have their roots in the heart–mind (xin). In their vital manifestation, they radiate from the countenance, overflow onto the back, and extend through the four limbs. The four limbs articulate them without the need for words. (Mencius, Jin Xin I).

(Lau 2003)

Without severing the intrinsic connection between body and mind, Mencius emphasizes that xin serves as the medium that links xing to the four limbs (siti 四體), thereby integrating both the spiritual and corporeal dimensions within the essence of human nature. In other words, Mencius attributes the unity of human essence and corporeal existence. Since xin (心, heart–mind) is, like the faculties of the ears, eyes, mouth, and nose, a bodily function, how does it unify the spiritual and the physical dimensions of human existence? Mencius first establishes si (思, thinking) as the unique capacity of xin that integrates body and spirit.

耳目之官不思，而蔽于物，物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。

The faculties of the ears and eyes do not think and are thus obscured by external things. When one thing encounters another, it is simply drawn toward it. The function of xin, however, is to think; if it thinks, it attains, but if it does not think, it fails to attain. (Mencius, Gaozi I).

(Lau 2003)

The guan (官, faculties) of the xin—and, in particular, its distinctive ability to si (think)—is what Heaven (tian 天) has endowed to human beings. As long as one is able to “first establish the greater (xian li fu qi da 先立夫其大),” then “the lesser cannot overpower it (ze qi xiao zhe fu neng duo 則其小者弗能奪)”, and thus one may become a “great person” (da ren大人). Conversely, if one follows the immediate instincts of the bodily faculties—such as the eyes and ears—one remains fixated on the “lesser body” (xiao ti 小體) and becomes a “small person” (xiao ren 小人). If one instead follows the xin, which possesses the capacity to si (思, reflection), one aligns with the “greater body” (da ti 大體) and becomes a noble person (da ren 大人).

The “lesser body” corresponds to the immediate instincts shared by both humans and animals, which are passively influenced by external stimuli and thus fail to exhibit the stable essence of human nature. The “greater body” refers to the xin’s capacity for preference and intentionality, which governs human will and action, serving as the fundamental distinction between humans and animals. In practice, however, people often prioritize the preferences of the sensory faculties over those of the xin, which inclines toward ren, yi, li, and zhi (仁義禮智, benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom). The preferences of the bodily faculties are immediately apparent, whereas the preferences of xin are not self-evident. It is precisely for this reason that Mencius underscores the priority of xin’s greater body as the key to ensuring that humans actualize their true nature essence and significance of xin.

However, there is “will” (zhi 志). “Zhi” is the driving force and executive power that materializes the concept of “acting according to the general principle” based on “thinking” and “seeking”. “Small is related to the mouth and stomach; large is related to the heart and will… To govern the heart and will is the way of the great person.” “The general principle pertains to the mind, thoughts, and the principles of propriety and righteousness. The small principle pertains to indulging in desires and passions.” (Jiao 2017).

“General principle” signifies the importance of the will in the heart. The initiation of will ensures the heart’s inclination toward benevolence and righteousness (moral intentions), providing the foundation for the heart’s preferences for these virtues to be sustained and realized. As the saying goes, expanding and fulfilling the will in the heart leads to the realization of goodness, which is the characteristic of a virtuous life, while not expanding and fulfilling it, and following the base instincts (the desires of the senses) hinders the attainment of goodness. In summary, will ensures that the legitimacy provided by the heart (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) can be attained through “thought” and “obtained”.

Meanwhile, it also facilitates the cultivation of the “four beginnings” through the heart’s cognitive power, allowing one to truly become human. Mr. Tang Junyi shared a similar understanding of Mencius’ concept of “heart and will”: “…In my understanding of the spirit of Mencius’ entire philosophy, I discern a path that ‘awakens the hearts and will of all people, enabling them to rise from below, towards the higher and upright path’… This path can, in brief, be referred to as the ‘way of becoming a true person.’” (Tang 2006). “Heart and will” can be said to be the key to Mencius’ theory of becoming a complete person.

Mencius also emphasized that, just as the aesthetic preferences of the ear, eye, mouth, and stomach are universal, so too are the “preferences” of the heart identical in all individuals.

口之于味也，有同嗜焉；耳之于聲也，有同听焉；目之于色也，有同美焉。至于心，独無所同然乎？心之所同然者何也？謂理也，義也。聖人先得我心之所同然耳。故理義之悦我心，犹芻豢之悅我口。

For the mouth, with respect to taste, there is a common fondness; For the ear, concerning sound, there is a shared auditory pleasure; For the eye, regarding color, there is a universal sense of beauty. But what of the heart? Is there nothing common? What then is it that the heart shares in common? It is reason and righteousness (li yi 理義). The sage is the first to apprehend what is common to the heart. Therefore, the delight that reason and righteousness impart to my heart (xin) is analogous to the delight that nourishing food confers upon my mouth. (Mencius, Gaozi I).

(Lau 2003)

This indicates that, in addition to its capacities for thinking, seeking, and inspiring aspiration, the heart also possesses an affective responsiveness.12 Since the heart is part of the bodily faculties, its capacity for affect is, like the aesthetic inclinations of the ear, eye, mouth, and stomach, both universal and uniform among human beings (Sueyoshi and Sato 2020). The sole distinction being that the object of the heart–mind’s affect (or preference) is reason and righteousness. Such affect is, in essence, the moral intentionality of the heart–mind.

The heart–mind’s delight in reason and righteousness, as opposed to the mouth’s delight in nourishing food, fundamentally marks the distinction between human nature and mere instinct: in addition to the instinct for survival, being human entails the pursuit of one’s essential qualities (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom), and the guarantee for attaining these qualities lies in the heart’s innate intentionality toward reason and righteousness. Mencius repeatedly asserts that the heart–mind’s disposition toward benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (the four beginnings) is “inherent” and “not externally conferred,” with the purpose of being governed by its intrinsic moral intentionality. Under such governance, the will is activated and, with the aid of the bodily faculties, there ensues a natural progression from the heart to action, from the inner self to the external world, from the individual to others—thereby fulfilling what it means to be human.

In light of the preceding discussion on xin and its moral orientation, Schwartz’s comment is particularly apt:

“In fact, the heart is the ultimate locus of that part of human nature which distinguishes human beings from other animals.

If properly understood, ‘human nature’ is merely the innate tendency of the human heart toward the full realization of its moral capacities.

Indeed, in addressing the human condition, Mencius’s central concern is not human nature per se but rather the human heart/spirit.”.

(Schwartz 2007)

4. Xunzi’s Rational Heart–Mind and the Ritual Formation of Virtue

As discussed in Section 2, the excavated bamboo texts already highlight the authoritative role of the heart–mind (xin, 心) as the governing faculty of human conduct and cognition. Building on this trajectory, Xunzi further develops a systematic account of the sovereign and cognitive capacities of the heart.

It is precisely on the basis of emphasizing the central importance of xin (心, heart–mind) that xing (性, human nature, understood as evil) can be transformed under its guidance—what Xunzi terms “what the heart approves” (xin zhi suo ke 心之所可). The object of “what the heart approves” is li (理), whose substantive content is li yi (禮義, ritual and righteousness). In other words, although the human heart is changeable, the cognitive heart (zhishi xin 智识心) possesses a highly authoritative and governing role. The development of this governing status of the heart undoubtedly demonstrates Xunzi’s continuity with the post-Confucian discourse on the heart, as when he says: “The heart dwells in the center, empty yet commanding the five faculties; this is what is called the ruler of Heaven” (Xunzi, Discourse on Heaven 天论).

Moreover, Xunzi’s further elaboration on the discernment and verification of the heart indicates that the cognitive heart must operate only after the sensory faculties have come into contact with external objects—that is, its activity must be grounded in experiential perception. In this respect, Xunzi not only parallels the understanding of the sovereign role of the heart in texts such as Xin shi wei zhong (《心是謂中》, The Heart is the Center) and Cheng zhi wen zhi (《成之聞之》, Accomplishing Awareness through Inquiry), but also makes explicit that humans are innately endowed with cognitive capacities and can further develop what he calls the “cognitive knowledge of the heart” (xin zhi zheng zhi 《成之聞之》). This xin zhi (心知) holds a decisive and governing significance for the development and transformation of human nature, for it directs whether one becomes virtuous through self-cultivation or lapses into contention driven by unrestrained desires.13

Thus, Xunzi emphasis on the authoritative role of the heart—where its aim is never arbitrary but oriented toward li (禮), understood as ritual and righteousness—offers, from the perspective of intellectual history, a deepened interpretation of the relationship between xin (心) and xing (性), and between the heart and external objects, that had already been articulated in the Xing zi ming chu (《性自命出》) manuscript. In this sense, Xunzi extends and transforms the heart-centered discourse of Confucius later disciples, making the capacity of xin for knowledge and discernment (xin zhi 心知) the decisive factor in determining whether human beings move toward virtue and cultivated goodness, or fall into desire and disorder.

In contrast to Mencius’s affirmation of the heart’s innate goodness, Xunzi inherits the same discourse of xin but redefines it in terms of rational order and deliberate cultivation. His theory of xin not only diverges from Mencius but also reflects a different appropriation of the intellectual currents reconstructed in Section 2, emphasizing the necessity of ritual, learning, and conscious self-discipline. Building on this foundation, Xunzi explicitly regards xin as a rational and discriminating faculty tasked with regulating desires and constructing social order through ritual and law.

Xunzi regards xin as a rational and discriminating faculty tasked with regulating desires and constructing social order through ritual and law. While rejecting Mencius’s claim of innate goodness, Xunzi maintains that human beings possess the capacity for moral transformation via conscious effort. His emphasis on xinzhi (心知, heart–mind knowledge) underlines the pedagogical and social dimensions of virtue (Goldin 1999; Hagen 2002; Van Norden 2007). Though devoid of the sacral innateness found in Mencius, Xunzi’s model retains a religious ethical structure by envisioning li (ritual) as a means of harmonizing the human with the cosmic. Xin (心, heart–mind), in this framework, is the faculty through which one learns to conform to the moral order inscribed in tradition.

As Lin Hongxing observes, scholarly interpretations have often positioned Xunzi’s theory of xin primarily within an epistemological framework. Yet, strictly speaking, Xunzi’s thought does not exhibit a fully independent epistemological system.14 Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that, among pre-Qin Confucians, it was Xunzi who undertook the most careful and systematic inquiry into the nature and characteristics of the xin. Indeed, Xunzi’s reflections on the xin are multifaceted, remarkably complex, and arguably among the most challenging aspects of his philosophy to interpret (Lin 2011).

Xunzi holds that what constitutes a human is not entirely manifested by human nature (i.e., the inherent natural endowment for life). Humans are not only capable of embracing their biological nature (their original, unadorned material) but also of demonstrating their distinctiveness from other living beings. This distinction lies in their ability to form communities and, guided by righteousness, to make meaningful distinctions. Xunzi does not define the essence of humanity by its innate nature; rather, he grounds it in the capacity to achieve a life governed by the rites and moral propriety of the human collective—a capacity whose core is the “heart.”

In other words, it is only within the context of a communal life that actualizes the goodness inherent in rites and moral propriety that an individual can realize his own virtue (benevolence, righteousness, moral character) while simultaneously attaining a social nature that reflects his essence. The “heart” thus serves as the principal basis for establishing such an ordered system of rites and morality. Each person, through the “art of cultivating the heart” and the “method of governing the heart,” facilitates a dialogue between the heart and the Way, thereby unifying personal virtue with the collective good. Consequently, the “heart” is the most crucial factor distinguishing humans from animals. In contrast to Mencius, who elevates the heart to a metaphysical substance to secure the progressive fulfillment of human nature through virtue, Xunzi starts from the standpoint of empirical human practice. He more concretely delineates the use of the heart as a faculty of consciousness, thought, and other cognitive capacities, thereby clarifying its function and significance in human moral practice. (Xunzi, Rectification of Names/zhengming 正名) (Knoblock 1988).

In Xunzi’s framework, the essential connotation of the “heart” is its capacity for “knowing” (xinzhi 心知), and the manner in which the heart achieves knowledge is the linchpin of his conceptual system regarding the heart. Xunzi, taking the “way of governance and disorder” as his premise, underscores the pivotal role of the heart in the rise and fall of human society. In his view, “the key to order or chaos lies in knowing,” and the human capacity for knowledge is rooted in the heart. When asked, “How does the heart know?” he answers, “By being empty, unified, and tranquil” (xu yi er jing 虚壹而静); indeed, “the heart cannot fail to know. If the heart does not know, then it cannot be in accord with the Way, but rather, it will deviate from it.” (Xunzi, Dispelling Obsession/Jiebi 解蔽) (Knoblock 1988)

Yet, the realization of the heart’s ability to apprehend the “Way” requires postnatal cultivation and practice, for the heart is in constant interaction with external phenomena and is easily subject to obstruction: “Wherever all things differ, they inevitably obstruct one another” ((Xunzi, Exposition on Obscuration). The heart, engaging with external objects through the ears, eyes, nose, and bodily forms, is influenced by the appearances and motions of things as well as by the fluctuations of its own consciousness. Such “obstruction” refers to the interference with the heart’s capacity for proper discernment and judgment; “removing the obstruction” is the process of eliminating these interferences so that the heart’s orientation can align with the Way and thus serve as the master guide for human affairs.

Rather than eliminating desire, Xunzi envisions the heart–mind as guiding and reorienting it through the rituals (li 禮) and teachings of the sages. Desire is nurtured (yang, 養) rather than negated. Over time, the heart–mind develops refined motivational structures, such as an affection for ritual and a sincere desire for virtue. This transformation is not merely behavioral but also spiritual, forming a new moral will that governs the self in accordance with the dao (Hagen 2011; Hutton 2016; Sung 2017).15 Xunzi emphasizes the principle that “a journey of a thousand li begins with a single step” and that “small streams flow into great rivers and seas,” underscoring the idea that perseverance lies in never ceasing. This highlights the necessity of lifelong accumulation, which must not be abandoned even for a moment, and affirms that teaching exerts a lasting influence on one’s nature, while self-cultivation must never be neglected. The “strength of the heart–mind” (xin 心) required for such constancy finds a parallel in the Cheng zhi wen zhi (《成之聞之》), which employs concepts such as “constancy” (heng 恆), “urgency” (ji 疾), and “completion” (Zhong 終) to convey a similar message. (Gu 2006) In both cases, the enduring commitment of the heart–mind serves as the driving force behind moral formation, ensuring that the individual’s cultivation is not a momentary act but a lifelong endeavor.

The root cause of disorder lies in permitting one’s “sincere heart” to operate without the pursuit of correction, allowing it to become self-directed; in effect, the heart becomes “obstructed by a crooked path” and loses its proper orientation, to the extent that “though black and white lie before the eyes, one sees nothing; though thunder and drums resound nearby, the ears hear nothing.” (Xunzi, Dispelling Obsession/Jiebi 解蔽) (Knoblock 1988). This very obstruction and the failure to seek correction undermine the heart ‘s capacity for proper governance—its ability to differentiate and know—and prevent it from returning to a rational state of intention. The fact that one does not see or hear what is evident is not due to the heart’s inaction but rather to the failure of its discernment and knowledge to emerge; the “obstruction”, which interferes with a rational orientation and blocks the heart’s capacity for differentiation and knowledge (the common affliction of the heart’s method), must be overcome. This is the logical process by which the heart “seeks correction.”

Regarding the basis upon which the heart seeks correction, Xunzi provides an answer that differs from Mencius’s. According to Mencius, the heart’s ability to seek correction derives from its innate nature (with the four hearts being originally good), merely requiring restoration. (Mencius, Gongsun Chou I 孟子公孫丑上) Xunzi, by contrast, ascribes “correctness” to the Way; it is by aligning the heart with the Way that the heart is able to exercise its capacities for differentiation and knowledge—thus, only then can it be said to be in accordance with the Way rather than deviating from it (with the “Way” here referring not to a heavenly path but to human propriety, righteousness, and legal order).

The functions of “differentiation” and “knowledge” are introduced through “learning,” which is the external manifestation of the heart’s capacity for knowing, directing its cognitive faculties toward the moral ends of propriety and righteousness: “learning culminates in propriety” (Xunzi, Encouragement of Learning/quanxue 勸學). This process not only concretizes the practical exercise of cognition but also unifies body and mind so that, through the realization of the heart’s knowing, one’s being is expressed through the integration of one’s entire corporeal existence—both in movement and in stillness—thus perfecting one’s self.

The heart’s cognitive operations—its processes of differentiation, knowing, and learning—not only facilitate the moral cultivation that perfects the self but also further delineate the differences between humans and beasts, as well as between the noble and the base.

君子之学也，以美其身，小人之学也，以为禽犢。

The noble person’s learning aims at refining his self; the mean person’s learning reduces him to a brute. (Xunzi, Encouragement of Learning/quanxue 勸學).

(Knoblock 1988)

In this framework, the essence of learning is prescribed by propriety, while the capacity for learning originates in the heart. Without propriety, a person is reduced to animality; indeed, the study of propriety to clarify righteousness is an essential requirement of human beings as social entities, for righteousness pervades learning so as to be “inseparable from it—commit to it, and one is human; abandon it, and one is no more than a beast.” (Xunzi, Encouragement of Learning/quanxue 勸學).

Thus, regarding what is to be retained or discarded, Mencius regards both the heart and human nature as integral, with the practical approach being the cultivation and expansion of the inborn, a priori “four beginnings of the heart.” In contrast, Xunzi confines such preservation or abandonment solely to the heart, independent of human nature; his concrete method lies in “removing obstructions” and “cultivating oneself.” Propriety and righteousness correspond to the Way; the heart is merely the principle through which the Way (expressed as propriety) is manifested, not its creative source—in other words, propriety and righteousness do not emanate from the heart, yet they cannot be realized without it.

For Xunzi, the heart and propriety (or righteousness) are two distinct entities, as are the heart and human nature. It is precisely this separation that underpins his emphasis on the sovereign role of the heart while simultaneously rejecting the notion of the innate goodness of human nature (Wei 1966).

It is noteworthy that Xunzi also mentions zhi (志, the unity of the heart).

蚓無爪牙之利，筋骨之強，上食埃土，下飲黃泉，用心一也。

An earthworm, though lacking the sharp advantages of claws and fangs and the strength of muscles and bones, nevertheless consumes dust above and drinks from the Yellow Springs below, relying on its unified heart. (Xunzi, Encouragement of Learning/quanxue 勸學).

(Knoblock 1988)

The term “unity” here highlights the significance of the heart’s orientation—or, put differently, its willpower—although its strength is difficult to sustain in practice: “The human heart is precarious; the heart of the Way is slight (ren xin zhi wei dao xin zhi wei 人心之危，道心之微).” (Xunzi, Dispelling Obsession/Jiebi 解蔽)

Thus, in contrast to Mencius—who holds that the intentionality (will) of the heart is what determines the attainment of virtue—Xunzi regards zhi (志 the unity of the heart) merely as a methodological tool for moral cultivation. In Mencius, the “heart” (understood as conscience or the four beginnings of the heart) serves as the foundation for moral intention and will, and is the driving force behind moral practice; whereas in Xunzi, zhi (志, the unity of the heart) is not the basis upon which virtue is established but instead possesses a utilitarian character.

According to Xunzi, although zhi (志, the unity of the heart) resides in the heart, the heart is not identical with its unified state (xin yi 心一). In other words, willpower alone does not guarantee the realization of virtue; rather, its effectiveness depends on a fundamental social prerequisite—the condition of being inherently communal. That is, an individual’s essential nature must be actualized within the common good of communal life (as prescribed by the rites and moral propriety established by the sage). Each person, as a member of the community, must attain true personhood through the realization of the goodness embodied in rites and propriety. This attainment relies on the capacity for “heart-knowledge,” which is expressed through psychological processes such as differentiation, knowing, reflection, and deliberation, as well as through behavioral practices like learning, removing obstructions, self-cultivation, and the rectification of names.

If Mencius’s construction of the concept of the heart is oriented along an a priori–will dimension, then Xunzi’s approach is grounded in an empirical–practical dimension. His delineation of the operative realm of the heart is an experiential or practical description of the complex processes of consciousness and thought: the progression from “knowing” to “wisdom” represents an evolution from mere awareness to moral consciousness—the practical exercise of the heart’s cognitive capacities.

From the perspective of a broad conception of life ethics, situating Xunzi’s account of the xin within the intellectual continuum extending from Confucius’ later disciples allows us to see more clearly how he inherited and developed earlier debates on the heart–mind. This vantage point not only illuminates Xunzi’s understanding of moral cultivation and its relationship to the transcendent Dao, but also reveals an alternative dimension in early Confucian reflections on the meaning of human life.

In sum, Xunzi’s construction of the xin concept, with its emphasis on empirical practice, ritual order, and the removal of obstructions, represents one of the most systematic reflections on the nature and function of the heart–mind in pre-Qin Confucianism. While it diverges sharply from Mencius’s a priori moral idealism, Xunzi’s theory nonetheless inherits and develops the intellectual momentum of Confucius’s later disciples, integrating cognitive, volitional, and ethical dimensions into a unified framework. This dual lineage—one affirming the heart’s innate moral orientation, the other grounding its value in deliberate cultivation—shaped the conceptual horizon for subsequent Confucian thought. It is against this backdrop that the following conclusion will synthesize the main findings of this study, highlighting the religious–ethical significance of xin and its enduring philosophical relevance.

Taken together, the models of Mencius and Xunzi demonstrate how the early Confucian discourse of xin evolved along two distinct trajectories—one highlighting innate moral orientation, the other stressing rational cultivation. These trajectories not only shaped subsequent Confucian traditions but also illuminate broader questions of moral subjectivity and the religious self, which the conclusion will further elaborate.

5. Conclusions: The Religious–Ethical Legacy of Early Confucian Xin Theory

The study of early Confucianism enriches our understanding of it as a sophisticated religious tradition, one that was continually reinterpreted and renewed by its practitioners (Richey 2008). In particular, early Confucian discourse on xin (心, heart–mind) reveals a rich moral anthropology that integrates bodily, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of the human being. Whether as an innate moral compass (Mencius) or a cultivated rational guide (Xunzi), xin serves as the fulcrum of ethical transformation and the site of resonance with a higher moral reality. By interpreting early Confucian heart theory through a religious–ethical framework, this study contributes to broader conversations in religious philosophy and comparative moral theory, illustrating the enduring relevance of Confucianism to questions of virtue, selfhood, and transcendence.

First, building on the early- to mid-Warring States exploration of the “heart,” Mencius and Xunzi integrated the concepts of “nature” (xing 性), “sentiment” (qing 情), and “will” (zhi 志) to articulate the connotations and directed significance of xin. This integration fundamentally established the structural content of the heart–mind. Taking xin as the central axis allows us to retrace the evolution of early Confucian thought—from inquiries into “what it is to be human,” to debates over “human nature,” and finally to the crystallization of the heart–mind concept. This progression not only reflects early thinkers’ investigations into the essence of humanity along both spiritual and mental dimensions, but also reveals the dynamic interplay among key concepts and their philosophical implications. Although different schools placed varying emphasis on the conceptual cluster surrounding the heart, their shared focus already signals a concern with the transformation from the “natural” human to the “moral” human, foreshadowing the expansive possibilities for later Confucian inquiry.

Second, Mencius and Xunzi offer two paradigms of the religious self: one affirming the heart’s innate orientation toward transcendence, the other emphasizing rational formation within a communal and ritual order. In both paradigms, xin operates as the axis of transformation, embodying the Confucian pursuit of moral harmony with the cosmos. This duality also reflects a deeper dialectic common to religious traditions—the tension between moral autonomy and spiritual dependence (Taylor 1989; Kline and Ivanhoe 2000; Ames and Hall 2001). In Xunzi’s model, the heart–mind becomes the locus of moral assent: it evaluates, approves, and regulates action in light of the long-term good. This process shapes not only external conduct but also inner orientation, yielding an ethically integrated personality grounded in ritual propriety. The xin thus functions as the regulative center of the self, enabling human beings to inhabit the moral order prescribed by Heaven and tradition (Street 2010; Hagen 2011). While Xunzi’s heart–mind is not inherently sacred, it acquires sacredness through participation in the ordering power of ritual and the dao. Through the deliberate cultivation of xin, one becomes capable of virtue, aligning human life with a transcendent yet immanent moral order—preserving the integrity of moral agency while locating transformation in intentional spiritual practice (Hagen 2011).

Third, the divergent constructions of xin by Mencius and Xunzi exerted a formative influence on later Confucian intellectual history, especially in the Song–Ming Neo-Confucian synthesis and the modern New Confucian revival. For Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi, the Mencian model of xin as innately good became the doctrinal foundation for their emphasis on li (理, principle) as universally accessible through self-cultivation, while Xunzi’s model was deliberately excluded because it appeared to undermine this metaphysical optimism. By contrast, Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming extended Mencius’s emphasis on the heart as the locus of moral awareness, developing it into the doctrine of “the unity of the heart and principle” (xin ji li 心即理). These two trajectories—one more rationalist, the other more experiential—both traces back to early debates between Mencius and Xunzi over whether the heart is inherently virtuous or must be disciplined into virtue.

In modern times, New Confucians such as Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Li Minghui have reinterpreted this legacy by drawing on Kantian notions of autonomy and moral metaphysics. They often side with the Mencian–Wang Yangming lineage, but at the same time they recognize Xunzi’s contribution in articulating the structural role of education, social institutions, and ritual in shaping moral subjectivity.16 Thus, the comparative study of Mencius and Xunzi not only clarifies the intellectual genealogy of Neo-Confucianism and New Confucianism, but also sheds light on contemporary debates over “self-discipline” versus “other-discipline” (M. Li 1990), the tension between moral autonomy and moral heteronomy, and the philosophical significance of xin as both an inner faculty and a socially embedded practice, thereby expanding the philosophical connotations of xin.17

Finally, in contrast to the dualistic separation of mind and body in much of Western philosophy, the traditional Confucian conception of xin reflects the consistent unity of body and mind in early Chinese thought. Across the various developmental paths pursued by early Confucian thinkers, xin retained its original meaning as a human faculty while gradually acquiring deeper moral and spiritual significance. Its evolution emphasizes the inseparability of bodily participation and mental (or spiritual) practice. Only by situating the heart–mind within the broader framework of “self, mind, and world” can its full philosophical value and historical significance be appreciated. The disaggregation of the xin concept is thus essential to understanding moral subjectivity and the religious self. Nevertheless, any interpretation—whether philosophical, comparative, or historical—must be anchored in the actual historical evolution of the heart–mind, in order to faithfully convey its enduring religious and spiritual value.