The Place and Face of the Stranger in Levinas†
AbstractThis essay addresses the topic of place, more specifically it raises the question how and why place is essential for defining the strangeness of the other person. In Levinas’ philosophy the Other as stranger is the one whom I welcome to my home and country, i.e., to my place. This essay takes up three interrelated topics: (1) the general notion of place; (2) the ethical notion of place in Levinas’ philosophy, contrasted with an ontological notion of place. The deepest significance and virtue of place appears not in my dwelling or my compatibility with being but at the site from which the I is able to welcome the Other. Furthermore, the “ownness” of my place is always contested by the stranger as I have no necessity, no ultimate right to be; (3) the strangeness of the Other in Levinas’ philosophy defined not by topology but by vulnerability. To welcome the stranger and give up my place comes from my infinite responsibility for the Other. On the ethical level, the vulnerable face of the Other cannot be objectified and classified. View Full-Text
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Saldukaitytė, J. The Place and Face of the Stranger in Levinas. Religions 2019, 10, 67.
Saldukaitytė J. The Place and Face of the Stranger in Levinas. Religions. 2019; 10(2):67.Chicago/Turabian Style
Saldukaitytė, Jolanta. 2019. "The Place and Face of the Stranger in Levinas." Religions 10, no. 2: 67.
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