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Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

1
Oslo Business School, Oslo Metropolitan University, 0166 Oslo, Norway
2
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(3), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030029
Received: 30 April 2019 / Revised: 27 June 2019 / Accepted: 28 June 2019 / Published: 6 July 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning)
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising. View Full-Text
Keywords: electoral competition; multidimensional policy space; microtargeting; office-motivated candidates; negative campaigning; strategic disclosure electoral competition; multidimensional policy space; microtargeting; office-motivated candidates; negative campaigning; strategic disclosure
MDPI and ACS Style

Bizzotto, J.; Solow, B. Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure. Games 2019, 10, 29.

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