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Article

Regional Marketization and Corporate Wastewater Treatment Activities: From the Perspective of Government Intervention

by
Zhengrui Li
1,
Xueting Du
2 and
Weihua Zhong
3,*
1
Business School, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266061, China
2
Economics School, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266061, China
3
Economics School, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 102206, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2023, 15(18), 13879; https://doi.org/10.3390/su151813879
Submission received: 22 February 2023 / Revised: 4 April 2023 / Accepted: 18 April 2023 / Published: 18 September 2023
Browse Figure
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Abstract

:
The government affects the sewage discharge behavior of enterprises through intervention behavior, which reflects the viewpoint of institutional theory. However, at the same time, whether regional marketization can also motivate enterprises’ sewage treatment behavior poses a challenge to this view. Therefore, theoretical models are established, objective data are collected, and empirical studies are conducted to explore the relationship between regional marketization and the sewage treatment behavior of enterprises. The results show that the higher the marketization level, the lower the wastewater treatment rate of the firm. Further research shows that the government’s attention to the local environment can significantly weaken the relationship between the marketization level and the corporate wastewater treatment behavior. This study provides experience and analysis for policy makers and firms to better control wastewater pollution.

1. Introduction

In the process of industrialization and urbanization, how China handles the relationship between development and environmental protection has attracted the attention of scholars around the world. Wastewater, waste gas, and solid waste are the three main wastes produced in the production process, which have a direct negative impact on the living environment of citizens [1,2]. Among them, wastewater is the largest kind of waste and has a direct and rapid impact on the ecological environment. The massive discharge of wastewater not only hinders the development of the local cultural environment but, more importantly, affects the health of residents [3]. Based on official reports and other documents, enterprises accounted for the highest proportion of wastewater discharge. Therefore, it has become one of the contents of government governance to regulate enterprises and restrict their wastewater discharge behavior [4,5]. However, in fact, there are many factors that affect enterprises’ wastewater discharge behavior [6,7], and it is difficult for the government to respond to and deal with all possible factors [8,9]. Therefore, how to effectively limit the wastewater discharge of enterprises and encourage their wastewater treatment behavior has become a difficult problem in academia.
According to institutional theory, the government is the maker of public policy while assuming the function of providing public service. It is these policies that shape government behavior and enterprise behavior, and affect the relationship between government and enterprise. Wastewater treatment also falls under the scope of public policy. Therefore, it has both positive externalities and negative internalities, which cannot be solved by market forces alone. In this case, government intervention becomes the key to solve the problem of wastewater treatment. Therefore, institutional theory provides a way to solve the above practical problems.
Government intervention is an institutional mechanism that ensures the supply of public services and products when the market regulation mechanism fails. Therefore, clarifying the relationship between government intervention and enterprise behavior is the key to solving the dilemma of wastewater treatment. Due to its popularity and practical significance, previous studies have discussed the relationship between government intervention and enterprise behavior, mostly focusing on the research field of environmental protection. According to resource-based theory, government behavior can affect the allocation of key resources in the market, and key resources are one of the sources of the competitive advantage of enterprises [10]. Therefore, the government can realize the intervention of enterprise behavior by controlling key resources and influencing the path of enterprise financial performance [11]. Because of the importance of critical resources, companies have to comply with relevant regulations to demonstrate legitimate behavior, and government intervention works [12]. In addition, relying on administrative force to ensure the implementation of supervision and punishment measures is also an effective way for the government to intervene in the behavior of enterprises. Boosting green investment is a cheaper and more robust strategy than imposing fines and other penalties on companies that violate environmental targets. As a result, enterprises will increase investment in green innovation under government supervision to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions while government needs are met [13].
However, based on China’s actual situation, government intervention is not the best choice. In other words, government intervention is not the best way to reconcile development and environmental protection. Since China implemented its market-oriented reform in 1978, the efficiency of the country’s resource allocation has improved significantly [14], and the country’s economic system has changed from a government-regulated economy to a market economy [15]. As a result, the market has also become an effective means of energy conservation and emission reduction [16], which means that local governments have gradually reduced their roles and, in some cases, withdrawn from administrative intervention in enterprise operations. In other words, marketization in China has become an important factor in reducing local government intervention in corporate operations [15]. As an external mechanism, government intervention exerts pressure on the production and operation of firms and affects their environmental impact [17]. To sum up, it can be seen that the marketization level has become a new uncertain factor in the relationship between government intervention and enterprise behavior. For this reason, it is important to ask: will different marketization levels in China force firms to accept different degrees of government intervention, and, if so, will companies change their environmental behaviors as a result?
In addition, when analyzing the relationship between government intervention and enterprise behavior under the issue of wastewater treatment, the impact of government attention cannot be ignored [18]. While government intervention can influence the behavior of enterprises compulsorily, government attitude will also be actively captured by enterprises and become a factor affecting their behavior [19].
Based on the above analysis and a review of the existing literature, this paper finds that the marketization level and government attention have not been paid much attention in the research field of the relationship between government intervention and firm behavior. This is not only a flaw in the existing research system, but also the starting point and destination of this research. Therefore, this paper will establish an empirical test model on marketization level and enterprise wastewater treatment and consider the influence of government attention to clarify the influence of government behavior on enterprise behavior, so as to contribute to the solution of wastewater problems.
Based on this perspective, the innovations of this paper are as follows: First of all, this paper expands the existing research system, especially putting forward a new theoretical model for the problem of government constraint on enterprise behavior. Secondly, the proposal of the above model promotes improvement in the research level in the field of government regulation, and the research can obtain more realistic and operable suggestions, which can truly contribute to the solution of practical problems. Finally, the conclusions obtained by the research can not only provide help for the government but also provide guidance for the operation and management of enterprises, which is universal. In areas with high marketization levels, the government has less ability to regulate firms, and these companies realize the optimal efficiency allocation of resources through free competition [14]. In other words, firms will be less likely to be subject to strict environmental regulation. As a result of less government intervention, companies will use more resources for the production of products related to economic expansion, ignoring their negative environmental effects, resulting in a run-on investment in environmental protection [20,21,22]. Clearly, this behavior is not conducive to pollution control or emission efficiency [23]. Therefore, when the degree of marketization is high, the efforts of firms to improve their environmental performance, such as developing greener wastewater treatment practices, will be reduced.

2. Theories and Assumptions

Since its marketization reform in 1978, China’s industrial economy has developed rapidly, becoming the second-largest economy in the world after the United States. It is known as the “growth miracle of the world economy.” As an important part of China’s economic development, the industrial economy has become the mainstay of economic growth [24]. However, economic prosperity is accompanied by the intensification of pollution and the deterioration of the environment [19]. The wastewater discharge per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) in China is about four times that of other developed countries. In recent years, respecting the environment has gradually become an important part of national modernization. In April 2015, the State Council adopted a water pollution prevention and control action plan, requiring increased governmental supervision of industrial wastewater to promote water pollution prevention and control comprehensively and systematically. In “made in China 2025”, it is proposed that China should comprehensively implement a green transformation of the manufacturing industry, which will create the dual-value effect of economy and environment [25]. The Asian nation should realize the harmonious development of enterprise economy and ecological environment [26] and achieve its goal of becoming a manufacturing power. Corporate wastewater treatment planning is an important part of green transformation. Different regions have varying levels of marketization and government regulation, the existence of which results in different amounts of regulatory pressure for developing wastewater treatment activities.
Li et al. (2013) proposed that the government and the market are two important driving sources of legitimacy pressure [27]. Government legitimacy refers to the evaluation of the appropriateness of enterprise behavior by the government and relevant departments. The government imposes coercive pressure on the operation of firms by formulating and implementing rules [28]. Only by following these rules and reaching agreements with the government can firms obtain the key resources needed to increase enterprise development (such as land, bank credit, tax relief, subsidies, etc.) [29] and obtain political legitimacy (such as political access and preferential treatment) [30]. These resources will affect the market and financial performance of firms [11].
Marketization is a comprehensive index to measure the external environment of firms. It is a series of large-scale institutional changes, which reflects the resource allocation of a region [31]. Therefore, a high level of marketization means local resources are efficiently allocated. For the purpose of profit maximization, firms will allocate resources to product departments for production and operation activities. For the purpose of economic development, local governments will reduce intervention and guidance to firms through free competition [32], that is, high marketization inhibits local government intervention in local firms [15]. Due to less administrative intervention, the pressure of environmental regulation faced by firms is reduced, which, in turn, reduces corporate wastewater treatment plans. Therefore, because there will be fewer national laws and regulations, firms will invest more resources in production to improve their production capacity and profitability rather than actively develop plans to reduce their negative environmental impacts. This will lead to an increase in wastewater discharge and a decrease in the wastewater treatment rate.
Based on the above, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1. 
The higher the local marketization level, the less the enterprise’s wastewater treatment activities.
While promoting economic growth, the development of a market economy may also make firms driven by interests and aggravate the phenomenon of wastewater discharge. Therefore, the government needs to intervene and guide the market economy. When the government conveys its environmental views and attitudes through work reports and other administrative forms, firms will feel the attention. When the enterprise realizes that the government attaches great importance to the local environment, the firm will implement a positive environmental strategy in order to maintain its legitimacy and access to resources [33]. The goal is that with increased government attention paid to the local environment, industrial firms will change their environmental behavior, e.g., improve the wastewater treatment rate to give them more leverage in reaching an agreement with the government [34].
Based on the above, we propose the follow hypothesis:
H2. 
The more the government attaches importance to the local environment, the more an enterprise will invest in wastewater treatment activities, thereby reducing the overall marketization rate in China.
Based on the above research assumptions, the following theoretical models can be summarized in Figure 1:

3. Methodology

3.1. Sample and Data Collection

To study the impact of the marketization rate on the wastewater discharge behavior of firms, the research sample was based on 2000–2010 data from China’s large- and medium-sized manufacturing firms with sales volume of 72 thousand USD. The reasons for choosing these companies are as follows: based on the data released by relevant Chinese yearbooks and government announcements, manufacturing enterprises are the key groups in pollution control because they account for the major position of pollutants emitted by their production activities; secondly, the reason for choosing large- and medium-sized enterprises with an annual gross product of more than 72 thousand USD is that such enterprises account for more than 60% of the gross product of the manufacturing industry, and the management of such enterprises can improve governance efficiency. As a matter of fact, there are so many manufacturing enterprises in China that it is difficult for the government and managers of relevant departments to intervene in each enterprise, and only a “key few” can be captured, which is the basis for sample screening in this paper.
Industrial data were obtained from China’s industrial enterprise database, while the regional characteristic data were obtained from China Statistical Yearbook and China Urban Statistical Yearbook. The data on enterprise wastewater discharge were derived from the environmental survey and reporting (ESR) database, compiled by China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment. The local marketization index was derived from the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) report. The data needed to measure government attitude came from the government work report of each province (GWR).

3.2. Variables

(1) Wastewater Treatment:
In this paper, the dependent variable is wastewater treatment, which is an enterprise behavior affected by government intervention. The ratio of wastewater treatment capacity to wastewater discharge is used to measure the wastewater treatment rate. The calculation formula of this variable is as follows:
Wastewater Treatment = wastewater treatment capacity/wastewater discharge
(2) Regional Marketization:
The degree of regional marketization is an independent variable in the theoretical model constructed in this paper, which has an impact on enterprise behavior. The marketization index is a recognized and reliable index to describe the marketization degree of Chinese provinces. Inspired by the mature literature, the marketization index of each province in China is used to measure the degree of marketization. This index is a composite index, which is obtained by using the entropy weight method to comprehensively measure the relationship between government and enterprises in various provinces and the development of a non-state-owned economy.
(3) Government Attitude:
The essence of government attitude is government environmental protection attention. When local governments want to vigorously promote environmental protection, it will be expressed in official documents such as government work reports. Therefore, we use the number of times the government’s annual work report mentions keywords such as “environmental protection”, “waste water”, and “sewage” to represent the government’s attitude. This is also the general practice of the mature literature.
(4) Control Variables:
The control variables for this study are as follows:
  • Firm size: the enterprise scale, measured by the natural logarithm of the total assets of the enterprise second bullet.
  • Firm age: the years of establishment of the enterprise, expressed in the length of company registration.
  • Debt ratio: asset structure, measured by the asset–liability ratio.
  • Financial performance: the enterprise’s return on assets.
  • Government jurisdiction: the direct management of an enterprise uses the orderly variable to measure, which is marked as 1 by the town government, 2 by the national government, 3 by the prefecture-level city government, 4 by the provincial government, and 5 by the central government.
  • Regional corruption level: the total number of corruption cases per 10,000 civil servants in a province.
  • Regional environmental investments: provincial government pollution investment—the ratio of provincial government investment in environmental protection to provincial GDP.
  • Regional wastewater pollution: provincial wastewater discharge divided by provincial GDP.
  • Regional economic development: provincial economic development, expressed by the natural logarithm of provincial GDP.
Table 1 lists the specific meanings, measurement methods, and data sources of key variables in this paper.

3.3. Estimation Method

Wastewater treatment                         
                       =β0 +β1 Regional marketization
                                              +β2 Regional government environmental attitude
                  +β3 Regional marketization
                                                                  ×Regional government environmental attitude + β4 Controls + ε
where β refers to the coefficient to be estimated, that is, the degree to which the variable affects the dependent variable; ε is the error term; and Controls is a set of variables formed by control variables.

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive Analysis and Correlation

Table 2 reports the results of the descriptive statistics of the sample. The average value of wastewater treatment of the enterprise is 1.463, and the standard deviation is 2.4; the mean value of the regional marketization level is 8.904, and the standard deviation is 2.024; and the average environmental attitude of local governments is 0.055, and the standard deviation is 0.025. The VIF mean of each variable is 1.4, which is significantly less than 10, so there is no serious multicollinearity.

4.2. Hypothesis Test

Column 2 of Table 3 shows the regression results between local marketization levels and enterprise wastewater discharge behavior. Among them, the regression coefficient of the local marketization level is −0.106 (0.1%), which is significant and indicates that the local marketization level has a negative effect on the enterprise’s wastewater discharge behaviors. Conversely, the higher the local marketization level, the more serious the enterprise’s wastewater discharge behavior, which is consistent with H1.
Column 3 of Table 3 introduces the interaction term between the local marketization level and the local government’s attention to the environment to test the regulatory effect of the local government’s attention to the environment on the marketization level and the enterprise’s wastewater discharge behavior. The regression results show that the regression coefficient of the adjustment term is 0.872, which is significant at the level of 5%. This shows that when the local government pays more attention to the environment, it weakens the impact of the marketization level and the attention paid by the local government to the environment, which is consistent with the prediction result of H2.

4.3. Robustness Check

4.3.1. Alternative Variables

When Chinese manufacturing enterprises respond to government regulations on wastewater, in addition to wastewater treatment, they can also reuse wastewater to reduce emissions. This is also one of the ways to solve the problem of enterprise wastewater discharge. In a considerable number of documents, the wastewater reuse rate can also be used to express the wastewater treatment behavior of enterprises. Therefore, we use the wastewater reuse rate of the enterprise to replace the wastewater treatment rate for regression estimation. The empirical results show that after replacing the variables, the previous empirical results do not change substantially. The detailed inspection results are shown in Table 4.

4.3.2. Tobit Estimation

Because there are a large number of firms in the sample, the wastewater treatment rate is 0. To avoid the impact of this part of the sample on the estimation results, the Tobit model is used to truncate the dependent variable at 0 for the robustness test. These results are shown in Table 5. The empirical results show that the previous empirical results did not change substantially after the truncation of the dependent variable at 0.

5. Discussion

As an inevitable result of economic development, the improvement in regional marketization degree is not conducive to encouraging enterprises to show environmentally friendly sewage treatment behavior. On the one hand, this makes the government fail to coordinate the relationship between enterprises and the environment through the market mechanism. On the other hand, it also warns that the government’s forced intervention is still the most effective way to ensure the intensity of environmental protection. The past practice of economic development has proved that the pursuit of profit is far more than the sense of social responsibility, and enterprises always prefer the former between the pursuit of profit growth and environmental protection. Thus, in the past, when the government also pursued economic performance, the extensive business model caused damage to the environment [40,41,42]. With the improvement in the economic development level and prominent environmental problems, the government has realized that the phenomenon of enterprises making profits at the cost of environment has become the biggest obstacle to the sustainable development of human beings. As a result, the government is trying to strike a balance between intervention and market involvement. The dual nature of the government’s management goal begins to appear, that is, economic attributes and environmental attributes. However, there is a lack of theoretical research and guidance on how to choose. The research results of this paper confirm that regional marketization is contrary to the government’s demand for wastewater treatment. This provides evidence and support for the solution of the above problems. Therefore, this paper suggests that the government should continue to adhere to the policy of strong administrative intervention for enterprises in environmental protection affairs, such as wastewater treatment, so as to ensure the intensity of their environmental protection behaviors and make contributions to environmental protection.
Secondly, in addition to specific intervention measures, the government can also have a deterrent effect on enterprises by transmitting environmental energy and inclination to enterprises, forcing them to carry out sewage treatment. This is essentially government attention at work. In modern enterprise management, the business owner should not only pay attention to the market competition caused by competitors but also pay attention to the loss of survival power due to their own legitimacy. The reason is that if the government imposes punitive measures such as rectification within a time limit or closure of a company that violates the regulations on sewage treatment, the company loses its right to compete in the market and its operating profit will be significantly reduced [43]. Therefore, in order to avoid such serious consequences, when the government’s determination of environmental governance is enhanced, enterprises will have more incentive to increase environmental protection investment. Based on this principle, the government can declare its determination on sewage treatment in some public places or show its determination on sewage treatment through public materials, so as to enhance the sensitivity of relevant enterprises to environmental protection policies and encourage more sewage treatment behaviors. The study of this paper confirms the regulating effect of government attention and provides a new understanding and suggestion for government sewage treatment.

6. Conclusions

The conclusions of this paper are as follows: there is a negative correlation between the degree of regional marketization and enterprises’ wastewater treatment behavior, that is, the improvement in the degree of regional marketization is not conducive to encouraging enterprises to make wastewater treatment behavior; government attention has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between regional marketization and enterprises’ wastewater treatment behavior, that is, when the government pays more attention to environmental protection issues, enterprises will pay more attention to wastewater treatment at the same marketization level. The above research conclusions confirm the viewpoint of institutional theory, that is, the realization of public affairs needs the guarantee of government public power, and relying only on market mechanisms is ineffective or inefficient.
In addition, due to the impact of data integrity, the theoretical model test was only conducted for medium and large manufacturing enterprises, which means that the research conclusions in this paper are valid only under certain conditions. Therefore, in order to improve the research applicability, it is valuable to conduct industry-wide research when the data are complete. At the same time, static data were used to test the hypothesis, which failed to reflect the dynamic characteristics. The authors believe that with the evolution of time, when the economic development situation changes, the conclusions obtained by the research will also show new characteristics. Therefore, this is one of the future research directions of the authors.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, Z.L. and W.Z.; methodology, Z.L.; writing—original draft preparation, W.Z.; writing—review and editing, Z.L. and X.D.; supervision, Z.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Sustainability 15 13879 g001
Figure 1. Theoretical model.
Figure 1. Theoretical model.
Sustainability 15 13879 g001
Table 1. Key variable definitions and data sources.
Table 1. Key variable definitions and data sources.
Key VariablesMeasure MethodUnitData and Sources
Wastewater treatmentWastewater treatment capacity/wastewater dischargePercentageThe environmental survey and reporting (ESR) database, compiled by China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment [35]
Regional marketizationMarketization indexDimensionlessThe National Economic Research Institute (NERI) report [36,37,38]
Government attitudeFrequency of keyword mentionsTimesThe government work report of each province (GWR) [39]
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix.
VariablesMeanS.D.(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
(1) Wastewater treatment1.4632.91.000
(2) Firm size5.4721.2260.0661.000
(3) Firm age13.71714.23−0.0020.2821.000
(4) Debt ratio1.1752.2060.0500.001−0.0111.000
(5) Financial performance0.2181.3460.016−0.024−0.0290.1961.000
(6) Government jurisdiction1.5221.0280.0150.3310.4230.019−0.0281.000
(7) Regional corruption26.6766.907−0.008−0.0160.058−0.137−0.0610.1241.000
(8) Regional environmental investments14.89611.2250.0320.0880.080−0.113−0.0590.2280.3441.000
(9) Regional wastewater pollution8.9624.292−0.022−0.045−0.010−0.172−0.0730.0250.5310.2421.000
(10) Regional economic development16.6640.993−0.0560.0510.0980.024−0.0210.006−0.186−0.274−0.3181.000
(11) Regional government environmental attitude0.0550.0250.000−0.074−0.083−0.048−0.013−0.194−0.138−0.133−0.0940.0711.000
(12) Regional marketization8.9042.024−0.077−0.142−0.117−0.053−0.020−0.362−0.345−0.554−0.2670.4290.3641.000
Table 3. Regression results.
Table 3. Regression results.
VariablesDV: Wastewater Treatment
Model 1Model 2Model 3
Firm size0.201 ***0.188 ***0.189 ***
(0.015)(0.015)(0.015)
Firm age−0.001−0.001−0.001
(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)
Debt ratio0.045 ***0.035 ***0.035 ***
Financial performance(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)
−0.013−0.016−0.016
(0.014)(0.014)(0.014)
Government jurisdiction0.014−0.022−0.022
(0.019)(0.02)(0.02)
Regional corruption0.008 *0.0060.005
(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)
Regional environmental investments0.008 ***0.0020.002
(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)
Regional wastewater−0.01−0.011−0.013 *
pollution(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)
Regional economic−0 09 ***−0 031−0 029
development(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)
Regional government0.5382. 179 **0.775
environmental attitude(0.7)(0.719)(1.182)
Regional marketization −0.106 ***−0.112 ***
(0.012)(0.012)
Regional marketization × regional government 0.872 *
environmental attitude (0 413)
Constant1.547 ***1.691 ***1.788 ***
(0.312)(0.315)(0.323)
Year dummiesYesYesYes
Industry dummiesYesYesYes
F-value24.27 ***29.38 ***27.99 ***
Adjust R-squared0.0790.0810.081
Observations38,09938,09938,099
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4. Regression results after replacing the variables.
Table 4. Regression results after replacing the variables.
VariablesDV: Recycle Water
Model 1Model 2Model 3
Firm size1.342 ***1.331 ***1.331 ***
(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)
Firm age−0.005 ***−0.005 ***−0.005 ***
(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)
Debt ratio0.036 ***0.023 *0.024 *
(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)
Financial performance−0.004−0.006−0.005
(0.015)(0.015)(0.015)
Government jurisdiction0.605 ***0.568 ***0.569 ***
(0.019)(0.02)(0.02)
Regional corruption−0.002−0.003−0.004
(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)
Regional environmental0.003 *−0.002−0.001
investments(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)
Regional wastewater0.035 ***0.032 ***0.032 ***
pollution(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)
Regional economic−0.15 ***−0.072 ***−0.066 **
development(0.019)(0.02)(0.02)
Regional government1. 1132. 129 **1.97 *
environmental attitude(0.766)(0.776)(0.779)
Regional marketization −0.125 ***−0.126 ***
(0.012)(0.012)
Regional marketization × regional government environmental attitude 0.976 **
(0.296)
Constant1.12 **1.062 **0.981 **
(0.337)(0.337)(0.337)
Year dummiesYesYesYes
Industry dummiesYesYesYes
F-value1069.87 ***987.36 ***905.53 ***
Adjust R-squared0.3120.3130.313
Observations75,69975,69975,699
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 5. Regression results after the truncation of the dependent variable at 0.
Table 5. Regression results after the truncation of the dependent variable at 0.
VariablesDV: Wastewater Treatment
Model 1Model 2Model 3
Firm size0.263 ***0.249 ***0.25 ***
(0.014)(0.014)(0.014)
Firm age−0.003 *−0.002 *−0.002 *
(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)
Debt ratio0.053 ***0.042 ***0.042 ***
(0.008)(0.008)(0.008)
Financial performance−0.013−0.017−0.017
(0.012)(0.012)(0.012)
Government jurisdiction−0.003−0.042 *−0.042 *
(0.018)(0.019)(0.019)
Regional corruption0.008 **0.006 *0.006
(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)
Regional environmental0.008 ***0.0010.002
investments(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)
Regional wastewater0.001−0.001−0.003
pollution(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)
Regional economic−0.0270.039 *0.042 *
development(0.017)(0.019)(0.019)
Regional government0.612.432 **0.855
environmental attitude(0.731)(0.753)(0.941)
Regional marketization −0.116 ***−0.123 ***
(0.012)(0.012)
Regional marketization × regional government environmental attitude 0.979 **
(0.35)
Constant−0.411−0.45−0.416
(0.387)(0.387)(0.387)
Year dummiesYesYesYes
Industry dummiesYesYesYes
LR chi23423.43 ***3520.87 ***3528.69 ***
Log likelihood−89,785.12−89,736.399−89,732.49
Pseudo R20.0190.0190.019
Observations38, 10138, 10138, 101
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors are in parentheses.
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Li, Z.; Du, X.; Zhong, W. Regional Marketization and Corporate Wastewater Treatment Activities: From the Perspective of Government Intervention. Sustainability 2023, 15, 13879. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151813879

AMA Style

Li Z, Du X, Zhong W. Regional Marketization and Corporate Wastewater Treatment Activities: From the Perspective of Government Intervention. Sustainability. 2023; 15(18):13879. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151813879

Chicago/Turabian Style

Li, Zhengrui, Xueting Du, and Weihua Zhong. 2023. "Regional Marketization and Corporate Wastewater Treatment Activities: From the Perspective of Government Intervention" Sustainability 15, no. 18: 13879. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151813879

APA Style

Li, Z., Du, X., & Zhong, W. (2023). Regional Marketization and Corporate Wastewater Treatment Activities: From the Perspective of Government Intervention. Sustainability, 15(18), 13879. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151813879

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