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An Evolutionary Game Study of Clean Heating Promotion Mechanisms under the Policy Regulation in China

1,2,3,*, 1,3,*, 1,3, 1,3 and 1,3
1
School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
2
Department of Mechanical and Traffic Engineering, Ordos Institute of Technology, Ordos 017000, China
3
Beijing Key Laboratory of New Energy and Low-Carbon Development, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2019, 11(14), 3778; https://doi.org/10.3390/su11143778
Received: 5 May 2019 / Revised: 23 June 2019 / Accepted: 25 June 2019 / Published: 10 July 2019
(This article belongs to the Section Energy Sustainability)
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PDF [2425 KB, uploaded 10 July 2019]
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Abstract

Recently, various Chinese provinces have greatly reduced their coal consumption due to new environmental protection policies. Because of these policies, the orderly development of the clean energy heating mode has been effectively promoted. As the problem of air pollution in the northern part of China is particularly prominent, adopting clean heating in winter is an important solution to control air pollution for those regions. However, there is a tricky balance to be struck between the government and the heating companies when it comes to using clean heating during winter. Therefore, it is crucial for the government and heating enterprises to research new strategies. Consequently, this paper carries out a comprehensive study on the multiple factors influencing the game relationship between the government and heating enterprises, and tries to set up a more general model for the theoretical analysis of mechanisms of clean heating promotion, as well as their numerical simulation. The research results show: (1) The initial possibilities available to government and heating enterprises have a significant impact on the final strategy choice for the heating system; (2) due to advantages such as increases in social benefits, subsidies, fines, and clean heating profits, as well as the lessening of traditional heating costs, and regardless of the decrease in traditional heating profits, it is possible for the government to adopt the promotion strategy; and (3) there are more opportunities for heating companies to pursue in order to implement clean heating strategies. In conclusion, this paper proposes valuable suggestions for the government and heating companies concerning clean heating in China. View Full-Text
Keywords: clean heating; policy regulation; promotion mechanism; evolutionary game clean heating; policy regulation; promotion mechanism; evolutionary game
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
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Wang, Q.; Tan, Z.; De, G.; Tan, Q.; Pu, L. An Evolutionary Game Study of Clean Heating Promotion Mechanisms under the Policy Regulation in China. Sustainability 2019, 11, 3778.

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