Transformation of the Energy Market in Poland in the Context of the European Union over the Last 20 Years

Abstract

The transformation of the energy market in Poland over the last 20 years has been a process deeply rooted in European Union policies and initiatives, including emissions trading (EU ETS), climate and energy packages and the European Green Deal. Poland, historically dependent on coal, continues to struggle with systemic problems such as low grid flexibility, ageing infrastructure, high CO₂ emissions and the socio-economic costs of the transition in mining regions. The research methodology is based on analysis of reports, scientific articles, EU documents and statistical data. So far, there is a research gap in the research area, mainly concerning two problems. The first is the lack of a multifaceted, integrated analysis of Poland’s energy transition, taking into account not only technological changes and RES participation, but also systemic problems (infrastructure, policy, social acceptance). The second, in turn, relates to the need to identify the impact of EU regulation as a driving force, not just an obstacle. The objective of the article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Polish energy market in the context of the EU over the past 20 years, covering (1) systemic problems of the Polish power sector, (2) the impact of key EU initiatives and regulations, (3) the development of renewable energy sources, (4) the modernisation and digitalisation of the grid, (5) current and future market trends, and (6) the main challenges of the transition. The analysis shows that Poland’s electricity sector is still dominated by coal, but its share is steadily decreasing, from ~85% in 2015 to about 60% in 2023. At the same time, the share of renewable energy sources (mainly wind and photovoltaics) has increased from ~10% to ~27%. Nevertheless, the gap with the EU average remains significant.

1. Introduction

The transformation of the energy market in Poland over the past 20 years has proceeded in parallel with challenges related to the dominance of coal and the increasing requirements of the European Union’s climate and energy policy. Poland has historically based its power sector on hard coal and lignite, which has made its energy sector one of the most carbon-intensive and least diversified in the EU [1,2,3,4]. Despite ongoing changes in the energy mix, in 2023, CO₂ emissions from the Polish power sector were still the highest in the EU (approximately 666 g CO₂/kWh compared to an EU average of 251 g) [1,3,5,6,7]. Over the past two decades, Poland has been required to gradually adapt its energy system to EU regulations: from the implementation of the 2020 climate package targets, through the implementation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS—EU Emissions Trading—a European cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide emissions aimed at limiting GHG emissions cost-effectively), to commitments under the European Green Deal. As a result, the energy mix and regulatory environment have undergone significant changes—the share of coal in power generation is gradually decreasing, while the role of renewable energy sources (RES—energy sources that naturally replenish on a human timescale, e.g., solar, wind, biomass, Figure 1) is growing rapidly [5,8,9,10,11]. At the same time, the transformation faces systemic barriers (technical, economic and socio-political) that slow down the pace of change.

The area of research discussed in the paper concerns the transformation of the energy market in Poland in the context of integration with the EU energy and climate policy. The rationale for choosing this area is mainly due to the existing three problems. The first concerns Poland’s heavy dependence on coal as an energy source. The second problem is the need for Poland to adapt to the EU climate neutrality targets by 2050. The third involves changing regulatory and technological conditions.

Accordingly, this paper identifies the following stages of research analysis:

• Identification of the main systemic problems: dependence on coal, low system flexibility, obsolete infrastructure, dominance of state-owned concerns.
• Analysis of EU regulations: 2020 and 2030 climate packages, EU ETS, Green Deal, Fit for 55.
• Assessment of RES development in Poland against the EU average.
• Analysis of transmission grid modernization and digitalization of the energy system.
• Description of market trends and future scenarios (electrification, hydrogen, EU market integration).
• Identification of challenges: technological, social, legal and financial.

The direction of the energy market in Poland is significantly influenced by the preferences of energy consumers.

These preferences relate to the behaviour of households, prosumers, social attitudes toward the transition and support mechanisms that influence consumer decisions. For households, there is a dominance of regulated tariffs. More than 80% of households in Poland buy energy at regulated prices from former monopolists. This indicates a low level of consumer involvement in supplier choice and underdeveloped competition in the retail market. The preference for price stability and reluctance to switch suppliers limit market liberalisation and investment in new energy technologies. Poland has one of the lowest supplier-switching rates in Europe, reflecting limited consumer activity and little influence of price competition on consumer decisions.

Recently, there has been a surge in the number of prosumers, i.e., households producing their own energy from RES, mainly photovoltaics. Since 2019, the number of micro-installations has been steadily increasing thanks to the “My Electricity” programme and the drop in panel prices [4,5,6]. In 2023, about 75% of PV power in Poland will have come from prosumer micro-installations, mainly on the roofs of private homes.

This shows a change in the attitude of consumers from passive consumers to active participants in the energy market, driven by economic (savings) and ecological (independence from coal) motivations.

Unfortunately, there is also strong public resistance to windmills and infrastructure. There is currently a so-called 10H rule (prohibiting windmills from being built within 10 times their height of buildings), which was introduced under pressure from public protests. This means that local aesthetic preferences and health or social fears can effectively block RES investments. Therefore, there is a need for community participation in investments (e.g., energy clusters, cooperatives) and offering local benefits (e.g., municipal budget revenues, cheaper energy) to increase project acceptance.

Also very important are preferences for the security of supply and energy prices, manifested in public opposition to price increases. Due to consumer fears of high prices, measures were carried out to freeze energy prices in 2022–2023 and shield subsidies for households. Consumer preferences such as stability and low price affect market regulations, which in turn affects the profitability of investments and competition. New trends such as electromobility and heat pumps, for which there has been an increase in interest, are becoming increasingly interesting.

Thanks to support programmes (e.g., “Clean Air”), the number of households preferring electric heating sources is increasing, which positively changes the profile of energy demand (more electricity, less solid fuels). In the case of electric cars, an increase in their use is expected due to the ban on the sale of internal combustion vehicles after 2035 [7]. Thus, consumer preferences are a market force, as they shape the market through

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Purchasing behaviour (loyalty to suppliers, reluctance to change);

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Investment decisions (PV micro-installations, heat pumps);

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Social attitudes (acceptance or resistance to new technologies);

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Expectations regarding prices and security of supply.

If energy policy is to be effective and socially acceptable, it must take into account the preferences listed above. Prosumer activism and social acceptance of the transition are among the key factors in the success of the energy market today.

The objective of the article was to provide a detailed analysis of the impact of EU regulations on the direction of transformation in Poland, the development of renewable energy sources (RES), the modernisation of transmission and distribution networks, and projected development trends. The main challenges and barriers to the transition were identified, including technological constraints, investment shortfalls and social challenges. This article provides answers to several important gaps found in the literature to date. The most important of these include

• The lack of a comprehensive review of Poland’s energy transition in a long-term context (2005–2025) against the EU;
• The lack of a combination of technical, economic, social and regulatory aspects—analyses to date have often been limited to one of these areas;
• Insufficient examination of the role of EU policy as a catalyst for change—the authors indicate how support mechanisms (e.g., modernization funds, Just Transition Fund) shaped national decisions;
• Neglect of analysis of systemic barriers (e.g., low network flexibility, ownership structure, social resistance) in previous work.

2. Research Methodology

This article is a review paper and is not based on original empirical research, but on analysis of foundational data, academic papers, EU documents, reports of institutions (e.g., Eurostat, ARE, PSE, IEA) and statistical data from the past 20 years. Accordingly, the methodology of this article includes

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Comparative analysis of quantitative data on energy mix, CO₂ emissions, RES share;

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Assessment of the impact of EU regulations (climate and energy packages, EU ETS, Green Deal);

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Analysis of trends and barriers at the technological, social and institutional level;

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Presentation of data in the form of graphs and time structures (e.g., change in the share of coal and RES).

3. Systemic Problems of the Polish Energy Market

3.1. Dependence on Coal

Poland is characterised by its long-term dependence on coal as an energy fuel. In the early 2000s, over 90% of electricity in Poland came from coal, and this share remained the highest among EU countries for years [10,12,13,14,15]. In 2021, 85% of Poland’s total primary energy consumption came from fossil fuels (including ~36% from coal, Figure 2). As a consequence, for years the Polish power sector was distinguished by the highest share of coal in electricity generation in the EU, which translated into huge emissions and negative environmental effects.

Although the role of coal is slowly decreasing—its share in power generation has dropped from about 80–90% in 2005–2010 to ~60% in 2023—in 2022, about 70% of electricity still came from coal [4,6,16,17,18]. This fuel profile causes a number of systemic problems: high CO₂ emissions, the risk of emission allowance costs (EU ETS), and an ageing power plant fleet. Many of Poland’s coal-fired power plants were built in the 1970s and 1980s and are now depleted and operationally inflexible, hindering the integration of new, unstable RESs.

3.2. Insufficient Flexibility of the System and Infrastructure

The Polish energy system has long suffered from a lack of flexibility in balancing energy supply and demand. This is due, among other things, to the dominance of large-scale, inflexible central sources (coal-fired power plants) with a small share of rapidly regulating sources (such as gas-fired power plants or energy storage facilities) [4,10,14,19,20,21]. Poland has limited energy storage resources (several pumped storage power plants with a total capacity of about 1.8 GW). As a result, the integration of growing generation from RES, especially wind and solar, encounters barriers—forced curtailments (disconnections of PV farms) have already occurred during peaks in renewable generation due to the system’s inability to accept energy. The transmission and distribution network is outdated—nearly half of the infrastructure is over 40 years old [12,14] and requires modernisation and expansion to meet new challenges. Integration with the European market is also limited—although Poland is connected to the systems of its neighbours (Germany, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Sweden), a decade ago the level of cross-border capacity was still low. The low level of interconnectors reduced the possibility to import/export energy in the event of shortages or surpluses, making the system less resilient and flexible.

3.3. Ownership Structure and Market Conditions

The Polish electricity market is characterised by high concentration and dominance of state-controlled entities. Four state-owned energy groups (PGE, Enea, Tauron, Energa) control the majority of electricity generation and retail sales [4,10,22]. Despite the formal liberalisation of the energy market, over 80% of households still purchase energy at regulated prices from the former monopolists, and the rate of switching suppliers among individual consumers is among the lowest in Europe [23]. Such a structure limits competition and the inflow of new investors, often resulting in conservative investment decisions (preference for proven technologies, delaying the closure of unprofitable coal assets). In addition, state-owned energy companies have been under political pressure for years to maintain employment in the coal sector and stable energy prices, which has hampered the transition. National regulations have also been unconducive to change: official electricity prices for households were maintained until 2023, and between 2016 and 2022, one of the most stringent restrictions in Europe on onshore wind energy was in force (the so-called 10H rule—a ban on the construction of turbines with <10 times their height from buildings), which effectively blocked the development of new wind farms [24]. As a result, private investors were discouraged from getting involved in the Polish energy market, and the pace of transformation remained slower than in other countries in the region.

In summary, the impact of the dominance of state-owned entities on innovation and private investment is very visible in Poland. This is due to the fact that the energy market is dominated by large, state-owned corporations (PGE, Tauron, Enea, Energa). The effects of this domination include

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Inhibition of competition—private investors have difficult access to transmission infrastructure and the power market.

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Limited flexibility—investment decisions are often dependent on current government policy.

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Slower pace of innovation—state-owned entities are less likely to take technological risks (e.g., new energy storage models, hydrogen, SMR).

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Marginalisation of the role of start-ups and the prosumer (an energy consumer who also generates energy, typically via rooftop photovoltaic systems) sector—despite the potential for growth, there is a lack of market space and regulatory support.

3.4. Energy Security vs. Transformation

Systemic problems have also become apparent at the interface between security of supply and decarbonisation. Due to the slow pace of diversification of sources and shortages of flexible capacity, Poland has experienced tensions in recent years between the need to decommission old units and maintain capacity reserves. In 2021, when demand for energy surged after the pandemic slump, the share of coal in power generation increased again to ~80% [4], indicating that the system was not prepared to replace coal with other sources. Power reserves in the system are low, and the availability rate of old units is declining, creating the risk of power deficits during periods of peak demand [25,26]. This, in turn, has forced the implementation of intervention mechanisms—in 2018, a capacity market (a mechanism for remunerating producers for their capacity readiness) was launched, effectively subsidising the continued operation of coal-fired power plants. While this has improved security of supply in the short term, it has delayed the phase-out of obsolete coal-fired units. The year 2022 marked the fifth lowest level of power reserve in the electricity system, at 1.4 GW (Figure 3). It was also the lowest value in 7 years.

In conclusion, the Polish power sector needs to overcome its structural dependence on coal and the rigidity of the system in order to effectively achieve its energy transition goals.

4. Impact of EU Initiatives and Regulations on the Transition in Poland

Over the past two decades, EU energy and climate policies have had a major impact on the direction of change in Poland. The most important EU initiatives that have defined the transformation framework are [27,28,29,30,31,32]

• The 2020 climate and energy package, adopted in 2008, involved the 3 × 20 target (by 2020, a 20% reduction in CO₂ emissions, a 20% increase in the share of RES, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency). Poland has been assigned national targets that take into account its lower starting point: a 15% share of RES in final energy consumption in 2020 and the possibility of a 14% increase in emissions in non-ETS sectors (relative to 2005) as part of the community’s reduction effort [4]. These targets become the driving force behind the first major transformation efforts in Poland—support for RES was developed, co-firing of biomass in power generation was increased and coal-fired power plants were modernised to improve efficiency. Nonetheless, Poland approached the 15% RES target with some difficulty—ultimately, the RES share in 2020 was around 12.9% (against the target of 15%), which meant failure to meet the commitment [33]. The need to implement the missing RES volume became the subject of negotiations under cooperation mechanisms (transfers of statistical surpluses from other countries). However, the 2020 package initiated an increase in investments in wind power plants in Poland (2008–2016) and projects aimed at improving energy efficiency in industry.
• The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)—launched in 2005—covered power plants and energy-intensive industries, introducing the cost of CO₂ emissions as an economic factor [34,35,36,37,38,39,40]. For Poland, which relies on coal for ~70–90% of its energy production, the ETS has become a key driver of the transition. In the initial stages of the ETS, Poland negotiated important concessions including free allowances for the electricity sector for modernisation (derogation from Article 10c of the ETS Directive) and the establishment of the Modernisation Fund, a mechanism to support low-carbon investments financed by the sale of part of the allowances (Poland is the largest beneficiary of this fund). Nevertheless, since around 2018, the price of ETS allowances began to rise sharply, exceeding 50 EUR/t and, in 2021–2022, even 80–90 EUR/t [4]. This dramatically worsened the economics of coal-fired power plants, as the cost of CO₂ became comparable to or higher than the cost of fuel. In 2022, the Polish power sector incurred some of the highest emission costs in the EU, which translated into higher wholesale energy prices. The government tried to mitigate the effects of the ETS by keeping the national emission fee low (in 2021, only EUR 0.07/t compared to ~89/t in the ETS market) and subsidising companies, among other things, through the aforementioned capacity market. Nevertheless, the pressure of the EU ETS has become a decisive factor forcing the closure of the oldest and least efficient coal-fired units. According to analyses, after 2025, there may be a rapid increase in coal-fired unit shutdowns; i.e., once their capacity contracts expire and in the absence of further subsidies, up to 8 GW may be withdrawn from the market around 2026, and another ~6 GW by 2030. [4]. This is a direct result of stricter EU rules—from July 2025, power plants emitting >550 g CO₂/kWh will not be eligible for support under the capacity market. When negotiating the Commission’s approval for its capacity market, Poland had to accept this mechanism (550 g CO₂/kWh), which effectively set a cut-off date for coal subsidies. In this way, the ETS and related regulations are forcing the accelerated decarbonisation of the Polish power sector.
• The 2030 climate and energy policy framework—agreed in 2014 (and tightened in 2018)—set new targets for 2030: at least a 40% reduction in GHG emissions (later increased to 55%), a 32% share of RES and a 32.5% improvement in efficiency [41]. For Poland, this meant, among other things, the need to update its energy strategy, which took the form of the adoption in 2021 of the Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (PEP2040—a strategic government document outlining Poland’s energy policy goals and directions until 2040). However, the 2021 version of PEP2040 was considered an inadequate document, as it only envisaged a 30% reduction in emissions by 2030 relative to 1990 levels (EU: −55%) and based the transition mainly on replacing part of coal with natural gas and introducing nuclear energy [42]. It assumed, among other things, an increase in the share of gas in power generation from ~4% to 9.3% in 2030 and only moderate development of RES. No specific measures to reduce emissions in non-ETS sectors were specified either, with only rather vague proposals being put forward. Meanwhile, at the EU level, regulatory momentum accelerated, with the European Green Deal announced in 2019 and the “Fit for 55—an EU legislative package aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030” package proposed in 2021, which increases reduction targets and RES. As part of its alignment with the new EU targets, the European Commission proposed a mandatory 17.7% reduction in non-ETS emissions for Poland by 2030 (compared to 2005) [4] and estimated that in order for the EU to reach the 40% RES target, Poland should achieve a 25% share of RES in final energy consumption by 2030. These figures far exceeded the ambitions of PEP2040. As a result, the Polish government was obliged to revise PEP2040 already in 2023. The updated assumptions (published in Q2 2023) announced an acceleration of RES development and efficiency, while extending the operation of some coal-fired units to reduce natural gas consumption (which was a response to the 2022 energy crisis) [43]. The clear impact of EU regulations is easy to see here, as Poland was faced with the need to increase its climate targets in order to meet the EU’s shared ambitions.

The gap between Poland’s targets under PEP2040 and EU ambitions mainly relates to Poland’s Energy Policy to 2040 (PEP2040), which calls for 23% RES in gross final energy consumption by 2030, 11 GW of offshore wind power by 2040, and a 30% reduction in CO₂ emissions by 2040. In contrast, the EU’s ambitions under Fit for 55 are for a 55% reduction in CO₂ emissions by 2030 and at least a 42.5% share of RES in final consumption by 2030. It follows that Poland’s targets are significantly less ambitious than those of the EU, creating a clear political and strategic gap. Poland is adopting a more conservative transition scenario. Thus, adaptations of Poland’s policies to the “Fit for 55” package are necessary. The most important of these include [34]

• Increasing the RES target to 42.5% by 2030, including the development of biomethane, PV and offshore wind energy produced at sea, offering higher efficiency than onshore wind power.
• Reform of ETS 2 (for transportation and buildings)—shielding measures for households will be necessary.
• Expansion of electricity grids to allow connection of new RES.
• Simplification of administrative procedures—currently the waiting time for an environmental decision for RES reaches up to several years.
• Decarbonization of the heating industry—currently more than 70% of system heat in Poland comes from coal.
• Development of green transport and electromobility—Fit for 55 assumes 100% zero-emission vehicles after 2035.

• The European Green Deal (EGL) and Climate Neutrality Policy 2050—The EGL, announced at the end of 2019, set a target of achieving EU climate neutrality by 2050 [44,45,46,47,48,49,50]. Initially, Poland was the only country that did not support this target at the EU summit (December 2019), arguing in favour of greater financial support and a longer timeframe for its transition. In response, the EU proposed a Just Transition Fund, from which Poland (especially mining regions such as Silesia) was to receive significant funding to mitigate the social impact of the transition away from coal. Ultimately, Poland committed to the neutrality target, which is binding for the entire EU. The EGL also introduced support mechanisms: in addition to the aforementioned Just Transformation Fund, it also increased the Modernisation Fund, provided preferential financing from the EIB or launched programmes such as REPowerEU (after 2022) to reduce the dependence on fuels from Russia. These initiatives mean that Poland will have access to billions of euros for the transition, provided that projects are implemented in line with climate targets. The EGL also resulted in a number of directives and regulations (the “Clean Energy for All Europeans” package of 2019) that Poland had to implement, including the amendment to the RES Directive (raising the requirements for the share of green energy), the Market Directive (integration of day-ahead and balancing markets at the EU level), and regulations introducing the requirement to gradually phase out regulated prices for end users. All these legal acts are gradually changing the operating environment of the Polish energy sector, forcing greater competition, innovation and market openness.

In conclusion, the European Union acts as the main catalyst for energy transition in Poland. Polish authorities have often defined their goals and policies in response to EU commitments—whether by implementing minimum requirements (such as the 2020 RES target), negotiating derogations (such as free ETS allowances), or finally modifying their own strategy (PEP2040) under pressure from the EU’s increased ambitions [14]. In 2021, the Polish government concluded a social agreement with mining trade unions, announcing the closure of the last hard coal mines by 2049 with protective measures for employees. Poland is currently actively using EU instruments (funds, EIB loans, regional cooperation) to support the transition, although it is still balancing between ensuring energy security and meeting climate goals.

5. Development of Renewable Energy Sources in Poland Compared to the EU

One of the main drivers of transformation is the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy sources (RES). In Poland, the start of this process was delayed—in the early 2000s, the share of RES in electricity production was only a few per cent (mainly thanks to hydroelectric power plants and biomass in heating). However, under the influence of EU policy and the changing economics of technology, the development of RES has accelerated, especially in the last decade.

5.1. Dynamics of RES Growth in Poland

Initially, wind energy grew the fastest. The installed capacity of wind power plants increased from symbolic values at the beginning of the century to approximately 5 GW in 2015 and 8.25 GW in 2023. [26,45]. This translated into increased wind power production, which accounted for ~10% of electricity in 2020 and approximately 15% in 2023. Poland became one of the largest wind markets in the EU by 2016, but onshore development was hampered by the aforementioned siting restrictions (the 2016 Distance Law). As a result, 2017–2019 saw stagnation in new wind investments. At the same time, biomass was also developing—through co-firing with coal and the construction of several biomass power and heating plants. Biomass has become an important component of RES in Poland (especially in district heating and CHP plants). The development of photovoltaics (PV) proved to be a breakthrough (Figure 4).

In 2015, PV capacity in Poland was negligible (around 0.1 GW), but thanks to a drop in panel prices and the introduction of favourable regulations (including the “My Electricity” subsidy programme from 2019), there has been a real increase in prosumer photovoltaics. In just five years, PV capacity increased from 0.2 GW in 2016 to 7.7 GW in 2021, making Poland one of the fastest growing PV markets in the EU [4]. A significant portion of this capacity (about 75% in 2021) was generated by small prosumer installations <50 kW, distributed on the roofs of households and businesses. In 2023, PV covered more than 10% of the country’s electricity generation [4,14,51].

5.2. Share of RES in the Energy Mix and the EU Average

Despite accelerated investment, Poland still ranks below the EU average in terms of the share of renewable energy. In final energy consumption (all sectors) in Poland, the share of RES increased from about 7% in 2004 to 16.9% in 2022 (Figure 5). For comparison, the EU27 average reached ~22% in 2020 and 24.5% in 2023 [52].

Poland performs particularly poorly in the transport sector (biofuels and electromobility—in 2022, the share of RES in transport was only 5.8%) [17]. The share of green energy in power generation increased from ~10% in 2015 to 27% in 2023. However, the EU average for the electricity sector is much higher—around 38% in 2020 and over 40% in 2023. Poland therefore has a lot of catching up to do. The PEP2040 target was 32% RES in the electricity sector by 2030, but updates to the plans may raise this ambition (“Fit for 55” suggests a need for ~40% RES in electricity by 2030) [53]. The RES structure in Poland also diverges from many EU countries: biomass plays a significant role (especially in individual heating—firewood is the most important RES carrier in Poland’s final energy balance) [4,54]. According to the Energy Forum, wood is still the main renewable fuel in domestic RES consumption, with all other RESs (wind, solar, biogas, hydro) accounting for <5% of final energy consumption. Wind and biomass dominate the electricity mix, but the share of photovoltaics is growing rapidly—in 2023, production from PV (approx. 11% of energy) approached the combined production of hydroelectric and biomass power plants. In many EU countries, the RES mix is more diverse (e.g., large-scale hydropower in southern and northern Europe or geothermal in Iceland). Poland, with its limited hydro resources and lack of large-scale geothermal resources, relies mainly on wind and solar power for its RES transformation [14,22,55]. However, despite this, the gap between Poland and the EU average remains significant.

5.3. Comparison with Other EU Countries

Compared to other EU countries, Poland is a case of a late start but fast catching up in some areas. In 2020, Poland was among the three countries with the lowest share of RES in final energy consumption (12.9%, alongside Malta and Luxembourg) [14]. However, thanks to the growth of photovoltaics and the return of wind investment, the rate of RES capacity growth in Poland between 2019 and 2023 was one of the highest in Europe (in 2021, Poland ranked fourth in the EU in terms of PV capacity growth, behind Germany, Spain and the Netherlands). The share of wind and solar power in electricity production reached 23% in 2022, which is even above the global average (15%) [14,53,55], although still below the EU average. Some EU countries (Denmark, Ireland) already generate more than half of their electricity from wind and solar power, which shows the potential direction for Poland. Offshore wind energy is a great opportunity for Poland, as it has some of the best wind conditions in the Baltic Sea and plans to install at least 11 GW of offshore capacity by 2040 [4,53], with the first ~5.9 GW farms by 2027 already contracted. This could make Poland one of the offshore leaders in the region and significantly increase the share of RES after 2025 (

Table 1. Comparison between installations of RES power plants in Poland and installations in European Union countries in 2024.

Category	Poland	UE-27
New PV (photovoltaic) capacity	~4 GW	65.5 GW
Total PV capacity	~21 GW	~338 GW
New wind (onshore) capacity	~0.5 GW	12.9 GW
Total RES capacity	27.2 GW (PV + wind + biomass + hydro)	EU to expand its RES capacity by ~78 GW in 2024.
RES share of energy production	28.8% (of which: PV 11%, wind 15%)	~45% from electricity generation

Source: own compilation based on CSO and Eurostat data.

).

Poland is a good example in terms of green distributed energy, with more than 1.2 million prosumers with PV micro-installations, which has revolutionised the ownership structure of energy sources. However, this requires grid and market adaptation (aggregation, storage) [56].

In summary, the development of RES in Poland has gone from a slow start to acceleration in recent years, although the share of clean energy is still below the EU average. The greatest progress has been made in the electricity sector (wind, solar), while district heating and transport remain a challenge (dominated by coal and gas in district heating plants, oil in transport). Further expansion of RES requires not only investment in capacity, but also grid reconfiguration and the introduction of flexible solutions.

5.4. Situation of Poland Against the Background of the Baltic Countries

In performing various analyses, it is also worth noting the situation of Poland against the background of the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) in the context of investments in energy (especially offshore). A comparative analysis with regard to energy transition, including investments in renewable energy sources, is presented in the chart in Figure 6 and in

Table 2. Comparison of various aspects affecting the energy transition of Poland and the Baltic countries.

Aspect	Poland	Baltics
Offshore potential	Very large (11 GW planned)	Moderate
M&A market	Large, integration-oriented	Small, dispersed
Dominant sector	Coal + RES development	Imports + modernization of sources
Regional leader	Yes—PKN Orlen, large projects	No—no large energy companies
Public support	Intensive but variable	Stable but financially constrained

Source: own elaboration based on the literature [57,58].

and

Table 3. SWOT analysis of offshore development in the Baltics.

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Access to the Baltic Sea and favourable wind	Limited grid transmission	EU energy transition and European Green Deal	Public opposition and locality
Growing technological experience (partnerships with Ørsted, Equinor)	Complex administrative	Rising demand for green	Regulatory and policy
Political support and EU	Lack of local turbine and offshore technology manufacturers	Development of ports and maritime	High investment costs and inflation

[57,58].

In the geo-strategic context, both Poland and the Baltics have maritime potential. However, in the case of the Baltic countries, the scale of planned investments is much smaller. These countries are focused on diversification of energy sources and are developing offshore to a lesser extent. In contrast, in the case of Poland, access to the Baltic Sea is used in planning offshore wind power investments, which is a key element of its energy transition strategy. Poland is building port and connection infrastructure for offshore wind farms and developing partnerships with foreign companies. It is planned to achieve 11 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2040 (PEP2040 strategy).

There are also structural differences between the countries. Poland has the largest energy market in the CEE region. It forms integrated multi-energy concerns (Orlen-Lotos-PGNiG). Such a model is not available in the Baltics. There are also differences in sustainability strategy and climate goals. The transformation in Poland is motivated by EU pressure and slowed by coal dependence. Programmes supporting prosumers and RES (e.g., “My Electricity,” “Clean Air”) are of great importance. Renewable energy sources are developing dynamically, but the support system (auctions, feed-in tariffs) is unstable. In contrast, the Baltic countries are actively supporting EU climate policy. They are introducing energy strategies with a strong emphasis on energy security and local energy sources. However, the limited number of large energy investors limits the scale of M&A in the RES sector.

It is also worth noting the investment gap and barriers that exist. The main challenges in Poland include limited transmission grid capacity, public opposition to energy infrastructure (e.g., onshore windmills), and the dominance of state-owned giants, which limits private market dynamics. In the Baltics, on the other hand, constraints are due to the small size of domestic markets, dependence on foreign support (e.g., EU funds), and the lack of large domestic players capable of offshore investment on their own. A common challenge for the region is the need to expand network infrastructure.

6. Transformation of Energy Networks—Modernisation, Digitalisation, Smart Grids

The expansion and modernisation of the grid infrastructure is the foundation for a successful energy transition. In recent years, Poland has faced an urgent need to upgrade its transmission and distribution networks to cope with the connection of distributed RESs, handle bidirectional energy flows and meet the growing demand (e.g., as a result of the electrification of heating and transport).

6.1. Transmission Network (400/220 kV)

For years, the national transmission operator, Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne S.A. (PSE), has struggled with underinvestment in infrastructure—many of the main 220 kV and 400 kV lines in central and northern Poland date back to the 1960s and the 1980s and require upgrade or replacement. Since around 2010, the transmission investment programme, partly supported by EU funds, has accelerated. Between 2014 and 2020, key projects were implemented to increase integration with neighbouring countries: the Poland–Lithuania power bridge was launched (700 MW), connections with Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were strengthened, and a new 400 kV line was built in Pomerania (laying the groundwork for receiving power from offshore wind farms). The transmission grid development plan for Poland until 2030 assumes, among other things, the construction of 4850 km of new 400 kV lines and 28 substations [20]. The scale of the needs is enormous, as the Polish power system requires at least EUR 25 billion of grid investment by 2030, of which ~EUR 18 billion is for distribution networks and ~EUR 7 billion is for transmission [21]. Accelerating transmission investments is essential, as also emphasised by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its recommendations for Poland [1].

6.2. Distribution Networks and Smart Solutions

The energy distribution sector in Poland faces the greatest challenges related to the growth of RES. Local grids are often old and were not designed to handle the generation connected to low voltages. For several years, electricity distribution companies have been reporting problems with voltage maintenance and overloading in areas with a very large number of PV panels. It is therefore necessary to significantly increase expenditure on infrastructure modernisation (including the upgrading of power lines), automation and energy storage. Another key element is the implementation of the smart grid concept—the digitisation of the grid and the integration of remote control, monitoring and storage systems [22]. In parallel, a central energy market information system (CSIRE) is being developed, which will enable efficient access to data and service provision by consumers [23]. Smart grids are expected to increase efficiency and reliability, i.e., locate and isolate faults faster, manage load, and integrate home energy storage or EV chargers so as not to overload local infrastructure. In addition, DSOs are investing in digital dispatch centres and substation automation, which facilitates the connection of new RESs.

6.3. Market Integration and Cross-Border Infrastructure

An important aspect of grid transformation is Poland’s integration into the EU’s single energy market. In recent years, Poland has launched market coupling with its neighbours. Since 2015, day-ahead market couplings with Sweden and Lithuania have been in operation, and in 2021 Poland joined the multi-area SIDC (Single Intraday Coupling) trading in Europe [59]. This has resulted in more efficient use of interconnection capacity and convergence of energy prices with EU markets. There are plans to build new interconnectors, such as another line with Lithuania as part of the synchronisation of the Baltic states with the European system. Synchronisation of the Baltic countries’ networks with the continental system requires Poland to ensure stable connections with Lithuania, among other things. Poland participates in EU initiatives on regional cooperation between operators (RCC platforms) and implements network code guidelines (concerning, among other things, flow management, reserve exchange mechanisms, etc.) [60]. All this makes the Polish network more interoperable and resilient.

6.4. Modernisation Challenges

Despite progress, network modernisation in Poland faces barriers, mainly the lengthy process of obtaining permits, the limited capacity of contractors and a shortage of specialists. Funding is partially supported by EU funds. In accordance with the IEA’s recommendations, Poland should accelerate the expansion of the transmission and distribution network to integrate planned RES and nuclear power plants, as well as to accommodate increasing electrification [4,61]. Otherwise, the grid will undergo a slow transformation, as already in some regions (e.g., northern Mazovia, Greater Poland) DSOs are refusing to connect new PV/wind farms due to lack of connection capacity. Simplification of procedures and regulatory incentives for DSOs investing in the grid are currently planned, which is expected to accelerate the modernisation and transformation process [62].

6.5. Digitisation and New Technologies

Grid transformation involves both hardware (wires and transformers) and software. The Polish power sector is implementing grid automation solutions (smart grid)—SCADA systems, advanced distribution management systems (ADMS) and automatic grid reconfiguration—to minimise the effects of failures. The first grid-level energy storage facilities have also been built, such as PSE’s pilot large container batteries (+50 MW project near Żarnowiec) and smaller storage facilities at DSOs’ PPE (point of electricity supply) stations with a capacity of 1–2 MW [63]. These are intended to support voltage stability and local balance during large PV generation. The infrastructure for charging electric vehicles is also developing (it is still low in Poland compared to the western EU, Figure 7), but plans call for thousands of new charging points by 2030. This generates new loads on the low-voltage grid, which must be managed intelligently (e.g., nighttime charging, dynamic tariffs) [64].

In summary, modernisation of power grids is a prerequisite for transformation. In recent years, Poland has made significant progress in planning and financing the expansion of transmission and distribution infrastructure. The key areas for modernisation include increasing transmission capacity for new RES capacity (offshore/onshore farms, PV), market integration with the EU (interconnectors), digitisation and smart metering (80% smart metering by 2028) [65], and the implementation of storage and demand management systems for increased flexibility. The IEA recommends that Poland dramatically accelerate these measures, as without a strong, smart grid, it will be impossible to achieve the RES and decarbonisation goals [1].

7. Current and Future Trends in the Energy Market in Poland and the EU

The energy market transformation is a dynamic process, and the coming decades will bring new trends for both Poland and the entire European Union [66,67,68,69,70,71]. The most important current and future changes include decarbonisation of the energy mix, electrification of energy consumption, integration of markets and sectors, development of storage and hydrogen technologies, and changes in the energy market model.

7.1. Accelerated Decarbonisation and Transition Away from Coal

Both the EU and Poland are moving towards a zero-carbon economy by mid-century [69,72,73]. For Poland, this means that coal must be almost completely eliminated from the electric power industry by 2050. A downward trend was already observed in the 1920s [1]. Current forecasts indicate that between 2025 and 2035, there will be a large-scale decommissioning of old coal-fired units for economic and environmental reasons [24]. The role of coal will steadily decline, continuing to be replaced by RES, gas (as a transition fuel) and, from the 2030s, nuclear energy. The EU target of a 55% reduction by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050 implies rapid emission reductions for Poland. To meet these targets, Poland would have to close most of its coal-fired power plants by 2040 [1]. Decarbonisation also applies to buildings, transportation and agriculture, where Poland is significantly behind. It is expected that programmes for replacing coal-fired boilers and geothermal and biomass heating plants will be developed, and investments in biogas plants (especially in rural areas) will increase.

7.2. Nuclear Energy as a New Element in the Mix

One of the trends in Poland is the construction and integration of nuclear power into the energy mix. After years of planning, a decision was made in 2022 to build the first nuclear reactors. According to PEP2040, the first unit of ~1–1.6 GW is to be launched in 2033, with a total of 6–9 GW of nuclear capacity planned by 2043 [74]. Nuclear power is expected to replace coal as a stable base for the system, complementary to renewable sources. However, its development will be challenging: it requires significant investment (the nuclear programme will cost about EUR 30 billion over 20 years) and effective project management. If implemented, however, nuclear power will significantly change the structure of the market after 2035, and Poland will join the group of EU countries with a significant share of nuclear power (such as France, the Czech Republic, Finland), which will help to achieve climate targets and stabilise supplies.

7.3. Electrification of Heating and Transport

A pan-European trend is to replace fossil fuels with direct use of electricity, provided, of course, that the electricity itself is low-carbon. The beginning of this process is visible in Poland. Heat pumps have become increasingly popular over the past two years. Poland has recorded one of the highest increases in sales of heat pumps in the EU [75], thanks in part to the “Clean Air” subsidy programme. Hundreds of thousands of new heat pumps are expected to be installed by 2030, which will increase electricity consumption but also reduce emissions from buildings.

Electric transport is also growing, although the share of electric vehicles (EVs) in Poland is currently low, accounting for about 3% of new registrations. EU regulations such as the ban on the sale of internal combustion cars from 2035 are likely to force a transition to EVs [76]. By 2030, hundreds of thousands of electric cars may be driving on Polish roads. This creates challenges and opportunities: on the one hand, it will increase the demand for energy and the load on local grids, but on the other hand, EV batteries may provide a source of flexibility in the future, i.e., feeding energy back into the grid. Electrification will also cover other areas: railway development (Polish railways are currently ~75% electrified), city buses (Poland is one of the largest manufacturers of electric buses) or industrial processes (resistance furnaces instead of gas furnaces). These forecasts indicate that demand for electricity will grow. The transformation of the market will involve not only a change in supply (RES instead of coal), but also a change in the structure of demand (more energy consumed in the form of electricity at the expense of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels).

7.4. Integration of the Energy Market at the EU Level

The future lies in an increasingly integrated, unified European energy market. For Poland, this means full participation in European trading and balancing mechanisms. In practice, this trend manifests itself in further expansion of cross-border transmission capacity and harmonisation of market regulations. The Polish power exchange is already connected to European exchanges under the market coupling mechanism, and prices in the region are converging. In the future, it may be possible to develop joint strategic reserves or cross-border peaking power projects, which Poland could also benefit from. The integration of markets will increase security (possibility of importing in the event of a power deficit, exporting of RES surpluses) and promote cost-effective transformation across the EU (Figure 8) [77,78,79].

The EU also emphasises the importance of integration between sectors, e.g., the integration of the electricity, gas and district heating systems. In the Polish context, this means, for example, the potential use of surplus RES to produce green hydrogen or green gas (biomethane), which could power the existing gas infrastructure or be used in industry. By 2040, hydrogen could become an important part of the system as a long-term energy storage medium and fuel for hard-to-electrify sectors (heavy transport, steel industry). In 2021, Poland adopted a hydrogen strategy that aims to install approximately about 2 GW of electrolysers by 2030, which is in line with the EU’s hydrogen strategy [77].

7.5. New Energy Market Models

A trend being discussed in the EU, which will also affect Poland, is the evolution of the electricity market model. The current wholesale market based on marginal prices (where the price is determined by the cost of the most expensive unit deployed, usually gas) revealed its shortcomings during the 2021–2022 crisis, i.e., extremely high prices for countries with a cheap RES mix if coupled with an expensive gas market (Figure 9) [4].

A concept for reforming the EU energy market has emerged, involving the decoupling of RES and gas energy prices, increasing the role of long-term contracts and mechanisms ensuring stable prices for consumers. Poland, facing massive investments in zero-carbon sources, can benefit from these changes. The digitisation of the market also allows new players and services to emerge: aggregators managing distributed resources, energy storage operators, energy communities or peer-to-peer models. These innovations may change market relationships over time, as prosumers become important players and demand flexibility becomes a market commodity. Poland has already begun to develop a legal framework for energy clusters and energy cooperatives, albeit on a small scale for now [14].

A new element of the trends since 2022 is the re-evaluation of the EU’s approach to energy security. The response to the crisis caused by the cutoff of gas and coal from Russia (which Poland, with its LNG terminal and own coal reserves, managed to weather relatively well) was the REPowerEU programme, which aims to drastically accelerate the transition to RES and energy savings as a way of decoupling from fossil fuel imports [80]. This factor further stimulates the transition, as the EU has raised its RES target to 42.5% by 2030. Poland is also increasing its diversification efforts. In the long term, security is to be provided by local energy production from RES and nuclear power. The trend towards decarbonisation therefore coincides with the trend towards energy sovereignty, and both ideas support each other.

In the coming years, Poland’s energy market will undergo profound changes. Various forecasts indicate a declining role for fossil fuels (first coal, then gradually gas after 2035), dynamic development of RES (including offshore wind and prosumer PV), the introduction of nuclear power around 2033+, the widespread electrification of transport and heating, and full integration with the European market through infrastructure and market mechanisms [77]. These changes will also require new tools—from smart grids to energy storage to regulatory changes that promote flexibility and stability. There is also a growing trend towards ensuring social acceptance and fairness in the transition, as without this it will be difficult to maintain the pace of change.

8. Major Challenges and Barriers to the Transformation in Poland

The Polish energy sector continues to face numerous challenges, both internal (domestic) and external. These can be divided into four groups: socio-political, technological, regulatory and economic.

8.1. Socio-Political Challenges

The energy transition is not only about replacing technologies, but also about social change. In Poland, the key issue is that of mining regions and coal sector workers. The coal industry (mining + coal power) still employs tens of thousands of people—about 80,000 workers in mining alone in 2020 [4]. The Silesian region, where hard coal mining is concentrated, has legitimate concerns about job losses and the decline of traditional industries. Although coal mining and employment is declining (employment has been reduced by 75% since the 1990s [14,77]), mining still has political and social influence. Protests and resistance from trade unions have slowed down decisions to close mines. It was not until 2021 that the government reached an agreement that sets 2049 as the deadline for phasing out coal, providing miners with employment guarantees or social protection [74]. This, however, means that coal may remain in use longer than climate neutrality would require, which is controversial in the EU. Another social dimension is the acceptance of new investments. RES and infrastructure projects sometimes face resistance from local communities. An example is the aforementioned 10H law, whose introduction in 2016 reflected residents’ concerns about wind farms near their homes. The amendment to this regulation in 2023 (liberalisation to 700 m) also stirred emotions and was a political compromise [16]. The construction of transmission lines or photovoltaic farms is also sometimes blocked by local protests. It is therefore crucial to engage in social dialogue and establish participation mechanisms (e.g., local community involvement in RES investments, benefits for municipalities) and education to increase acceptance. Political conditions at the national level are also important; transformation requires stable, long-term policies that transcend electoral divisions. Meanwhile, in Poland, the government’s approach to the transition has varied. In 2015–2019, the government focused on defending the mining industry and curbing the EU’s climate ambitions, which delayed certain measures (such as the development of wind farms) [14]. In contrast, after the 2023 elections, a shift towards more pro-climate policies was announced, but continuity and consistency in the implementation of the strategy (PEP2040 and beyond) remain a challenge.

8.2. Technological and Infrastructure Barriers

The transformation requires mastering new technologies and expanding infrastructure in a short period of time. In Poland, the limited flexibility and stability of the system constitutes a significant barrier—the aforementioned shortage of storage facilities, peaking sources and interconnectors makes the integration of very large volumes of unstable RES (wind, solar) increasingly difficult without risking the stability of supply. Investments in stable low-carbon sources are necessary, hence the plans for nuclear and gas energy. However, these projects carry implementation risks; e.g., possible delays in the construction of nuclear power plants could create a gap in demand coverage if old coal-fired plants are shut down in the meantime. The grid infrastructure, in turn, may not be expanded quickly enough. Storage technologies are still expensive and large battery storage facilities and electrolysers for hydrogen generation are only in the pilot phase. Poland does not yet have a developed domestic production of these technologies and will be dependent on imports [81]. Similarly, the development of offshore wind farms requires building an entire supply chain from scratch (installation port, specialised vessels, factories for foundations, cables, turbines), which is a huge engineering and logistical challenge. The increasingly complex (distributed, bidirectional) power system requires advanced control and cybersecurity systems—and thus investment in IT, where new risks (cyberattacks, system failures) are emerging. In summary, while transformation technologies are available, the scale and pace of their implementation in Poland pose a huge challenge.

8.3. Regulatory and Legal Challenges

Stable and favourable regulations are a prerequisite for successful investments. In Poland, despite the general direction set by the EU, retail regulations have often changed, creating uncertainty. The RES support system is a case in point—from green certificates (whose price collapse in 2016 affected the profitability of many farms), through delays in the introduction of RES auctions, to the change in the prosumer discount system in 2022, which temporarily destabilised the PV market. Investors need predictability, but the years of delay in liberalising 10H have caused some foreign capital to leave the wind sector. On the other hand, administrative procedures (issuing environmental, connection and planning permits) can be lengthy and complicated. Although Poland is gradually improving them, obtaining a permit for a large wind farm or line can still take many years. Energy market regulations also require adjustments, e.g., the full implementation of the flexibility market (demand-side response) requires changes to the energy law. There is also constant tension between the desire to protect consumers from the effects of price increases and the market signals necessary for investment. An example of this is the energy price freeze for households in 2022–2023 in response to the crisis—socially understandable, but economically distorting the market and burdening the state budget [16]. The challenge will therefore be to return to market normality while protecting vulnerable groups (which requires the development of social safety nets, such as energy allowances for the poor). At the EU level, Poland must implement new regulatory packages (e.g., upcoming capacity market regulations, new RES targets associated with the update of the National Energy and Climate Plan) [17]. The pace and quality of the transposition of these provisions into national law will affect the success of the transition.

8.4. Economic and Financial Challenges

The energy transition requires gigantic investments. Financing is therefore a key challenge. Polish energy companies burdened with coal assets have limited credit capacity [4]. It is necessary to attract private capital (domestic and foreign) to RES projects and infrastructure. However, foreign investors are looking at regulatory stability and political risks. In addition, high interest rates and recent inflation are increasing the cost of capital. Public and European funds will play a major role. Poland is the largest beneficiary of EU funds, with approximately one-third of the 2021–2027 Cohesion Policy budget and the Reconstruction Fund (RFC) earmarked for the green transition. However, even huge EU funds will not cover all the needs and must be supplemented by commercial investments. Energy costs may remain high during the transition period and investment costs may translate into prices for consumers, raising the risk of public opposition [10]. The challenge will therefore be to distribute transition costs fairly so that they do not disproportionately affect the poorest. The concept of a just transition assumes that no one is left behind—in practice, this requires, among other things, retraining miners, creating alternative jobs in Silesia (e.g., in the RES sector, electromobility), and investing in technical education and innovation.

8.5. External and Global Risks

While the EU has been fairly consistent in its pursuit of climate neutrality, there is a risk of external factors, such as further commodity shocks, global economic instability or delays in global technology development [7]. If, for example, energy commodity prices rise sharply again or supplies of key components (e.g., rare earth metals, PV panels) are disrupted, this could cause fluctuations in the pace of the transition (

Table 4. Energy prices for industry (PLN/MWh) in Poland from 2013 to 2022.

Year	Semi-Annual Average 1st Half	Semi-Annual Average 2nd Half
2013	~250	~260
2014	~255	~265
2015	~260	~270
2016	~270	~275
2017	~275	~280
2018	~280	~285
2019	~285	~290
2020	~295	~300
2021	~310	~325
2022	~470	~590

Source: own compilation based on ERO and POLPX data.

). Another factor is a potential change in EU policy (e.g., under the influence of social crises), although the current direction seems to be firmly established across the political divide. Maintaining a high rate of emission reductions after 2030 is also a major challenge, as the most costly technological innovations will be those related to CO₂ capture, which are not yet being developed in Poland.

In conclusion, the barriers to transformation in Poland are significant but still require a coordinated strategy. It is necessary to take care of the social aspect (equitable transformation of coal regions, acceptance of RES), accelerate investments in infrastructure and new technologies (by solving technical problems), streamline and stabilise the legal framework (to build investor confidence), and mobilise capital with the support of EU funds. Examples from other EU countries show that the transition is feasible. For example, despite challenges, Germany is moving away from coal by 2038 at the latest, and more ambitiously by 2030. Spain, on the other hand, has increased the share of RES in its electricity sector to ~50% in a decade, and the mining regions of Asturias have undergone restructuring. For Poland, it will be crucial to manage the change appropriately and ensure that the transition is socially acceptable, safe for the system and economically competitive.

9. Summary and Conclusions

The transformation of the energy market in Poland relative to the rest of the European Union between 2005 and 2025 is a story of gradual transition from a high-emission, coal-based system to a more balanced mix with a growing share of RES, while struggling with the legacy of structural problems. EU regulations and initiatives, ranging from climate packages and the ETS to the Green Deal, have been the main drivers of change, forcing Poland to take concrete action. Over the past 20 years, the share of renewable energy in Poland has increased significantly (although it is still below the EU average). There has been partial liberalisation and market integration, and awareness of the need for decarbonisation has become widespread. At the same time, the transition has highlighted systemic weaknesses: grid inflexibility, investment delays and social tensions in coal-mining regions [25].

Poland remains a special case within the EU, as the country most dependent on coal, with a longer road ahead than many of its European partners. However, trends in recent years (the development of photovoltaics, a decline in the share of coal to ~60%, plans for the development of nuclear power) indicate an acceleration of Poland’s transition. The next decade will be critical for Poland, as it requires tripling efforts (in line with the new EU target of 42.5% RES by 2030), building new pillars of the system (RES + nuclear power instead of coal), and ensuring stability and security of supply during this transition [25].

Whether Poland will be able to catch up with the EU leaders in the energy transition depends on the effective removal of barriers and the use of available support. An analysis of the past 20 years indicates that a clear strategy (the goal of carbon neutrality by 2050), consistent policy (across divisions), investment in infrastructure and human capital, and close cooperation with the EU (technical and financial) are prerequisites for success. This also requires constant monitoring of progress and adjustment of measures so that Poland not only meets its minimum commitments but also takes advantage of the opportunities offered by the transition (new sectors of the economy, improved air quality, independence from fuel imports).

At the same time, it should be pointed out that there are potential data limitations and uncertainty factors that affect the forecasts presented in the article. Among the most important of these are

• Heterogeneity of data sources, as the data considered and the article come from different institutions (CSO, ARE, Eurostat, PSE), which may use different methodologies. In addition, there is a lack of standardised time series—which hinders comparability and modelling of long-term trends.
• Unpredictability of political conditions—frequent changes in national and EU law (e.g., changes in the RES support system, feed-in tariff policy). Disputes around EU climate targets and their national implementation can disrupt the stability of the system.
• The impact of geopolitical factors—the war in Ukraine has changed the directions of raw material imports and accelerated the process of moving away from gas from Russia. In turn, the increase in energy and raw material prices significantly distorted the investment cost assumptions.
• Limitations of technological modelling are due to the fact that the conclusions drawn in the work are based on trend analysis, not mathematical predictions.

In summary, the transformation of the Polish energy market against the backdrop of the EU is a difficult but feasible process. The last two decades have brought significant changes, and the next two will determine the shape of the Polish energy sector in 2050 in terms of whether it will be modern, zero-emission, secure and competitive, contributing to the European green energy system. Based on experience to date, we can say with cautious optimism that, despite the initial delays, Poland is embarking on a path of profound transformation, in line with the EU-wide trend towards a sustainable energy future.