Security for the Internet of Vehicles with Integration of Sensing, Communication, Computing, and Intelligence: A Comprehensive Survey
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Basic Connotation of the ISCCI
2.1. The Basic Architecture of the ISCCI
2.2. Multi-Node Collaborative Sensing
2.3. Auxiliary Communication Network Optimization
2.4. Computation and Offloading of Complex Tasks
2.5. Edge Intelligent Integration Decision
3. Internet of Vehicles Security Challenges
3.1. Physical-Layer Security
- (1)
- Interference and blocking of wireless signals: Attackers may disrupt communication by transmitting signals of the same or similar frequency as the IoV communication, resulting in the receiver being unable to parse the signal correctly, thus affecting the normal operation of the IoV. This interference can be caused by unintentional electromagnetic radiation from other nearby electronic devices or by a malicious attacker intentionally using a jammer. Signal blocking involves launching an attack by either covering the wireless signal with high-power signals or physically obstructing its propagation path, preventing the vehicle from sending or receiving signals. For instance, an attacker might leverage terrain features or buildings to block signals or employ specialized jamming devices to disrupt communication in a targeted area.
- (2)
- Electromagnetic attacks refer to attackers using electromagnetic waves to attack IoV devices, which may cause device damage or data leakage. Specifically, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, performed by releasing high-intensity electromagnetic energy, can cause hardware failures or unexpected restarts in onboard electronic control systems. These kinds of attacks can originate from natural electromagnetic phenomena, and can also be carried out by artificially designed electromagnetic pulse generators. In addition, radio frequency interference (RFI) attacks can significantly reduce the signal-to-noise ratio of vehicle networking communication by directionally transmitting interference signals in a specific frequency band, thus leading to communication link interruptions or data packet transmission errors. Their implementation methods mainly include malicious deployment of radio transmission equipment, hijacking of wireless communication terminals, and other attack media.
3.2. Network-Layer Security
- (1)
- Data tampering attacks refer to an attacker illegally modifying data during data transmission to mislead the recipient or destroy the normal operation of the system. In an IoV environment, the attack may have serious consequences, such as tampering with navigation instructions or traffic signals, which may lead to traffic accidents.
- (2)
- DoS attacks are designed to make services inaccessible to legitimate users by depleting network or system resources. In the IoV, the attacks can manifest as blocking communication channels, depleting server processing power, or interfering with communication between vehicles.
- (3)
- A MiTM attack refers to behavior in which malicious entities intercept and possibly tamper with the communication between two parties without being detected or authorized. The attacker secretly inserts itself between the two communicating parties, acting as a middleman, hence the name “middleman”. Attackers intercept, alter, or retransmit data within the transmission process for eavesdropping, tampering, or impersonation. In the IoV environment, such attacks may lead to two types of serious consequences: one is the unauthorized leakage of users’ sensitive information, and the other is the malicious tampering with or incorrect input of vehicle control instructions, thereby endangering driving safety.
3.3. Application-Layer Security
- (1)
- Authentication is a procedure to confirm the identity of users, and its purpose is to ensure that only verified users can obtain the services and resources provided by the Internet of Vehicles. The identity authentication mechanism of the IoV system is a key link to ensure system security and system security is guaranteed through multi-dimensional verification methods. The current authentication system combines multifactor authentication with various verification means such as cryptographic methods, biometric features, and hardware security modules, effectively enhancing the reliability of authentication. Secondly, digital certificate authentication based on public key infrastructure provides a trusted identity verification method for vehicles and users. In addition, dynamic authentication technology utilizes mechanisms such as one-time passwords and temporary tokens, further enhancing the security and real-time performance of authentication. The comprehensive application of these authentication technologies constructs the security protection system of IoV systems.
- (2)
- After completing identity authentication, the authorization management mechanism of the IoV realizes access control of system resources through refined permission allocation. This mechanism adopts role-based access control (RBAC) technology. By predefining role types and their corresponding permissions, it realizes efficient permission allocation and management. Meanwhile, attribute-based access control (ABAC) technology implements fine-grained access control based on user attribute characteristics (including dynamic attributes such as vehicle parameters and spatial locations). To cope with changes in the security environment, the system has established a dynamic policy update mechanism. Regularly evaluating and adjusting access control policies ensures continuous security protection capabilities. These technologies jointly build a multi-level authorization management system for the IoV, effectively ensuring the security of system resources and user data.
- (3)
- The purpose of the data privacy protection mechanism in IoV is to prevent users’ sensitive information from being subject to unauthorized access, disclosure, or abuse. This system mainly implements three protection measures: High-strength encryption algorithms are adopted in the data transmission and storage processes. Data de-identification processing is achieved through technologies such as differential privacy and K-anonymization. The principle of minimizing data collection is strictly followed, and only the basic data necessary for business is obtained. The systematic integration of these technical solutions has effectively constructed a multi-layer data privacy protection architecture in the IoV environment.
3.4. System-Layer Security
- (1)
- Security of in-vehicle operating systems: Since in-vehicle operating systems are derived from traditional information technology operating systems, they may inherit the security defects in traditional systems, such as kernel permissions and buffer overflow. The operating system may be installed by attackers with malicious applications that affect system functions or steal user data. In addition, the components and applications of the vehicle operating system may have security flaws, which may lead to cooperative attacks on the operating system.
- (2)
- Update mechanism: OTA has become a necessary function for the IoV to improve security protection capabilities, but OTA has also become a potential attack channel. The control system for the upgrade package could be tampered with during the upgrade operation. Alternatively, the upgrade package may be hijacked during the upgrade transmission and attacked by a MiTM attack. Additionally, the cloud server might be targeted, potentially turning the OTA process into a vector for malware distribution. OTA update packages may also bring security risks, such as being removed from the control system or gaining advanced management rights for equipment.
- (3)
- Fault recovery: The challenges faced by the IoV enterprises in the dimension of fault management include the uncertainty of fault recovery time and the lack of a definite quick recovery plan. Furthermore, the detection rate of issues before user awareness is suboptimal, exacerbated by an insufficient early-warning system and inadequate monitoring capabilities, which hinders proactive fault detection and pre-emptive issue identification. Additionally, the mechanism is deficient for post-incident analysis and subsequent improvement; the execution of corrective actions following a review is inconsistent, leading to recurrent and systemic issues within the network.
3.5. Security Enhancement Mechanisms for Full-Duplex Integrated Sensing and Communication
- (1)
- Sensing dimension: Artificial noise is modulated into radar detection waveforms. Through orthogonal design between noise and useful signals, legitimate receivers (e.g., roadside units) can suppress noise via beamforming, while eavesdroppers cannot effectively parse target parameters due to the lack of channel prior information.
- (2)
- Communication dimension: Noise is injected into the null space of communication signals, which not only does not affect the demodulation performance of legitimate users but also reduces the SINR of eavesdroppers by 15–20 dB, significantly increasing the difficulty of information interception.
4. Internet of Vehicles Safety Countermeasures
4.1. Physical-Layer Countermeasures
- (1)
- Physical-layer security assurance mainly involves protecting transmission media, including the integrity and security maintenance of physical channels such as optical fibers and wireless channels. The protection mechanism at this level mainly includes three key aspects: encryption processing of transmitted data, implementation of physical isolation measures, and application of anti-interference communication technology. These measures jointly ensure that data is protected from the threats of eavesdropping and tampering during physical transmission.
- (2)
- In physical-layer security protection, adopting advanced encryption technology to protect the transmitted data is a key technical means to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the data. These encryption algorithms are designed based on rigorous mathematical principles and combined with strict key management mechanisms, which can effectively prevent data decryption and illegal tampering by unauthorized parties.
4.2. Network-Layer Countermeasures
- (1)
- The access control mechanism in the network-layer security protection ensures authorized access to the vehicle network through multi-level technical solutions. The key technical means include the following: The deployment of firewall systems, and the interlocking protection of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), which jointly constitute the network access control system. In terms of academic research, Habib et al. developed the SPBAC model, which effectively balances the communication security and system efficiency of the IoV through the purity-role hierarchical architecture [74]. Gupta et al. proposed the ABAC framework, which utilizes a dynamic attribute grouping mechanism to implement refined access rights management based on multi-dimensional parameters such as location and speed, providing an enhanced security protection scheme for industrial intelligent vehicle systems [75].
- (2)
- In the security protection of the network layer, the application of end-to-end encryption technology can effectively guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the entire data transmission process. This encryption method is applied from the data’s transmitting end to the receiving end, ensuring that no intermediate link can decrypt the data, thereby effectively preventing data leakage and tampering during transmission. In the context of connected vehicles, end-to-end encryption is critical when dealing with sensitive data, meaning that data collected and transmitted by vehicles (such as location information, speed, direction of travel, etc.) needs to be protected against unauthorized access and tampering [76]. Raja et al. dealt with end-to-end security targets at two levels: first, group authentication within the scope of RSUs; and second, collaborative learning using private collaborative intrusion detection systems to detect potential intrusions [77]. Such solutions are designed to ensure that communication in the IoV is both secure and efficient while protecting the privacy of vehicle users and supporting the development of the green industrial IoV by reducing network load.
- (3)
- Identity authentication and authorization: The network layer also needs to deploy authentication and authorization mechanisms to ensure that all devices and users go through strict authentication and authorization processes before accessing the IoV. This can be achieved through the use of digital certificates, biometric identification technologies, and other means. As for the countermeasures of identity authentication and authorization, Bojjagani et al. mentioned intrusion detection systems, honeypots, secure routing protocols, routing privacy protection mechanisms, and key management strategies to ensure their effective and secure operation in the face of various attacks and threats [78]. Ahmed et al. focused on identity authentication and privacy protection in vehicle networking environments and proposed a three-layer architecture, including an RSU, RSU gateway, and trusted authority, to reduce authentication overhead and improve application-layer packet throughput [79]. Luo et al. mainly focused on secure identity authentication in the IoV and proposed an improved authentication protocol to enhance the safety performance of the IoV. Their work summarized the advantages of the proposed protocol in protecting user anonymity, resisting internal attacks, and preventing smart card theft attacks [80].
4.3. Application-Layer Countermeasures
- (1)
- The core of application-layer security management in the IoV lies in building a multi-dimensional protection system, with a focus on three major areas: source code security guarantee, malicious software defense, and refined permission control. The security management solution developed by Zeng et al. integrates five key technologies: end-to-end data encryption, a two-way authentication mechanism, secure communication protocol stack, hardware security module (HSM) integration, and trusted boot verification. The integrated application of these technologies has significantly improved the overall effectiveness of the IoV system in defending against internal and external security threats [81].
- (2)
- In the application-layer security mechanism, the data hierarchical protection system conducts a sensitivity assessment and classification of IoV data and implements differentiated encryption strategies. This system adopts corresponding encryption algorithms based on the data confidentiality level and is combined with a strict access control mechanism to ensure that only authorized entities can obtain sensitive data. Xu et al. proposed that the IoV has accumulated a wealth of vehicle and driving information through V2V, V2P, V2I, and V2N communication, which may be used to infer personal daily activities and preferences. Without advanced data encryption technology and strict access control measures, users’ privacy and security will encounter multiple threats. In order to meet this challenge, their work proposed a blockchain-driven privacy protection strategy for sensitive information, which uses the distributed storage and tamper-proof properties of blockchain to enhance the security of vehicle networking data. They used association rules to mine the big data of the IoV, establish a data security aggregation protocol, and finally establish an end-to-end encryption mechanism. Through static and dynamic strategies, the privacy safeguarding of big data in the IoV was realized. The experimental results show that this method can effectively improve the concealment of sensitive data. Moreover, compared with traditional technology, the duration of the key generation and encryption process shows higher efficiency and stronger encryption efficiency [82].
- (3)
- Security audit and monitoring: At the application level, it is also necessary to implement a security audit and monitoring mechanism to carry out regular security checks and monitoring of applications and data on the IoV. This helps to quickly identify and deal with potential security threats, ensuring the stable operation of the connected vehicle system. Tian et al. mentioned that the IoV can offer a wide range of robust application services through cloud computing, and through sharing and analyzing diverse vehicle networking data. However, guaranteeing the wholeness of multi-source and diverse connected vehicle data when stored in the cloud remains a significant challenge. To solve this problem, they constructed a public audit framework of IoV data cloud storage based on identity authentication, which can fully realize the key functions and security requirements such as classified audit, multi-source audit, and privacy protection [83]. Liang et al. described the necessity and urgency for information security monitoring in the context of big data and proposed an information security monitoring mechanism consisting of three key components, network monitoring personnel, the monitoring environment, and the monitoring technology, and established an information security monitoring mechanism based on this. An information security control evaluation index system covering multiple levels and dimensions was constructed and implemented, aiming at systematically evaluating the information security situation in the IoV environment and providing a theoretical basis and operational guidance for information security practice in this environment [84].
4.4. System-Layer Countermeasures
- (1)
- System architecture design: The system level is necessary to design a reasonable system architecture to guarantee the security and stability of the vehicle networking system. This encompasses adopting a distributed system architecture, using technologies such as redundant backup and load balancing to enhance system reliability and fault tolerance. Kaiwartya et al. constructed a five-layer architecture of vehicle networking systems, which covers the perception layer, the coordination layer, the artificial intelligence layer, the application layer, and the business layer, and each layer has specific functions and functions [85]. Luo et al. depicted the design of the information collection layer, data layer, platform layer, business support layer, and application layer, improving the scalability and maintainability of the system through a hierarchical architecture [86]. On this basis, a design and implementation scheme of an environmental quality comprehensive monitoring management platform was put forward, which involved the application of service-oriented architecture, J2EE technology, multi-layer system architecture, a real-time database, and practical project experience.
- (2)
- Safe policy and management mechanism: The system layer also needs to develop a sound security policy and management system to safeguard the safe operation of the networked vehicle system. This includes the development of safety operating procedures, the implementation of regular safety training and drills, and the establishment of emergency response mechanisms. Some crucial security policies and frameworks include encryption technologies (such as public key infrastructure, symmetric encryption, hybrid encryption, and identity-based encryption), digital certificates, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, trust models, behavioral analysis techniques, heuristic detection methods, and cloud infrastructure services [87]. These offer valuable insights and guidance for comprehending and executing an approach to information security monitoring and governance within IoV environments. Wang et al. proposed a systematic automotive network security risk assessment framework, including an evaluation process and system assessment method. The framework considers changes in the threat environment, assessment objectives, and accessible information over the life cycle of the vehicle. This work demonstrates the feasibility and practicability of the proposed risk assessment framework through specific use cases [88].
- (3)
- AI-driven offensive and defensive countermeasure technology: As artificial intelligence technology advances, AI-driven offensive and defensive countermeasure technology has become an important means of security protection at the system level. Through the use of machine learning algorithms to continuously monitor network traffic and perceived signals, AI can swiftly identify abnormal behavior and automatically generate defense strategies to guarantee the safety and stability of connected vehicle systems. Magdy explored the growing dependence of autonomous vehicles on complex AI systems to carry out tasks such as advanced driver assistance, autonomous operation, and fleet management, as artificial intelligence (AI) technology progresses. The study specifically emphasized cyber-defense technologies that could be integrated into AI-based software frameworks to reduce security vulnerabilities and strengthen the cybersecurity of AI-driven autonomous driving technologies [89].
4.5. Sustainability in IoV Security
5. Future Development Trends
5.1. B5G/6G Network
5.2. Blockchain
5.3. Digital Twins
5.4. Post-Quantum Cryptography for IoV
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
IoV | Internet of Vehicles |
IoT | Internet of Things |
ISCCI | Integration of Sensing, Communication, Computing, and Intelligence |
DSRC | Dedicated Short Range Communication |
C-V2X | Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything |
RSU | Roadside unit |
V2V | Vehicle-to-vehicle |
V2I | Vehicle-to-infrastructure |
V2P | Vehicle-to-pedestrians |
V2N | Vehicle-to-network |
6G | 6th Generation Mobile Communication System |
OBU | Onboard unit |
RFI | Radio frequency interference |
EMP | Electromagnetic pulse |
DoS | Denial of service |
MiTM | Man in the middle |
OTA | Over the air |
IDS | Intrusion detection system |
IPS | Intrusion prevention system |
HSM | Hardware security module |
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Method | Technical Implementation | Operational Scenario | Key Advantages | Major Limitations |
---|---|---|---|---|
OFDM-based ISAC | Adaptive CP-OFDM with radar processing | Urban multi-vehicle networks |
|
|
Tunable PAPR ISAC | Adaptive OFDM with peak suppression | High-mobility urban scenarios |
|
|
PMCW Radar-Comm | Phase-modulated CW with Gold sequence spreading | Highway platooning |
|
|
Hybrid Beamforming | 64-element mmWave phased array with dual-function RFIC | V2I infrastructure nodes |
|
|
Neural-Enhanced ISAC | CNN-LSTM hybrid processing (5.8 TOPS required) | Urban canyon environments |
|
|
LEO-Enhanced ISAC | Quantum key distribution (QKD) over Ka-band (26.5–40 GHz) | Cross-regional logistics |
|
|
Model | CPU Cores | AI Accelerator | Power (W) | Memory (GB) | Latency (ms) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
NVIDIA DRIVE AGX Orin | 12× ARM Cortex | 2048-core GPU | 15–40 | 32–64 | 2.1 (YOLOv8) |
Qualcomm Snapdragon Ride | 8× Kryo | Hexagon DSP | 10–30 | 16–32 | 3.8 (ResNet50) |
Texas Instruments TDA4VM | 8× RISC-V | 2× C7× DSP | 5–20 | 8–16 | 5.2 (MobileNetV3) |
Security Level | Major Threats | Threat Level | IoV-Specific Impact | Safety Countermeasures | Effectiveness Evaluation | Refs. |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Physical Layer |
|
|
|
|
| [51,52,53,54,55,56,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77] |
Network Layer |
|
|
|
|
| [57,58,59,60,71,72,73,74,75,76,77] |
Application Layer |
|
|
|
|
| [61,62,63,78,79,80,81] |
System Layer |
|
|
|
|
| [64,65,66,82,83,84,85,86] |
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He, C.; Wang, W.; Jiang, W.; He, Z.; Wang, J.; Xie, X. Security for the Internet of Vehicles with Integration of Sensing, Communication, Computing, and Intelligence: A Comprehensive Survey. Sensors 2025, 25, 5119. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25165119
He C, Wang W, Jiang W, He Z, Wang J, Xie X. Security for the Internet of Vehicles with Integration of Sensing, Communication, Computing, and Intelligence: A Comprehensive Survey. Sensors. 2025; 25(16):5119. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25165119
Chicago/Turabian StyleHe, Chao, Wanting Wang, Wenhui Jiang, Zijian He, Jiacheng Wang, and Xin Xie. 2025. "Security for the Internet of Vehicles with Integration of Sensing, Communication, Computing, and Intelligence: A Comprehensive Survey" Sensors 25, no. 16: 5119. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25165119
APA StyleHe, C., Wang, W., Jiang, W., He, Z., Wang, J., & Xie, X. (2025). Security for the Internet of Vehicles with Integration of Sensing, Communication, Computing, and Intelligence: A Comprehensive Survey. Sensors, 25(16), 5119. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25165119