Search Results (40)

Mine water is both wastewater and a valuable unconventional water resource, and its recycling is crucial for the sustainable development of coal-resource-based cities. In response to the complex interactions among multiple stakeholders in the process of mine water recycling, this study innovatively develops a four-party evolutionary game model involving local government, coal mining enterprises, mine water operators, and water users. For the first time, key variables—mine water pricing, water volume, water rights trading, water resource taxation, and objective utility of water resources—are systematically integrated into a multi-agent game framework, extending the analysis beyond conventional policies, such as penalties and subsidies, to explore their impact on recycling behavior. The results show the following: (1) There are 10 possible evolutionary stabilization strategies in the system. The current optimal strategy includes supply, input, use, active support, while the ideal strategy under the market mechanism includes supply, input, use, passive support. (2) Local governments play a leading role in collaborative governance. The decisions of coal mining enterprises and mine water operators are highly interdependent, and these upstream actors significantly influence the water users’ strategies. (3) Government subsidies exhibit an inverted U-shaped effect, while punitive measures are more effective than incentives. The tax differential between recycled and discharged mine water incentivizes coal enterprises to adopt proactive measures, and water rights trading significantly enhances the users’ willingness. (4) Mine water should be priced significantly lower than fresh water and reasonably balanced between stakeholders. Industries with lower objective utility of water tend to prioritize its use. This study provides theoretical support for policy optimization and a market-based resource utilization of mine water. Full article

Effective and sustainable water reserve management faces increasing challenges due to climate-induced variability, data fragmentation, and the limitations of traditional, static modeling systems. This study introduces a conceptual framework designed to address these challenges by integrating digital twins, IoT-driven real-time monitoring, game engine simulations, and AI-driven decision support systems (AI-DSS). The methodology involves constructing a digital twin ecosystem using IoT sensors, GIS layers, remote-sensing imagery, and game engines. This ecosystem simulates water dynamics and assesses policy interventions in real time. AI components, including machine-learning models and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) chatbots, are embedded to synthesize real-time data into actionable insights. The framework enables the continuous assessment of hydrological dynamics, predictive risk analysis, and immersive, scenario-based decision-making to support long-term water sustainability. Simulated scenarios demonstrate accurate flood forecasting under variable rainfall intensities, early drought detection based on soil moisture and flow data, and real-time water-quality alerts. Digital elevation models from UAV photogrammetry enhance terrain realism, and AI models support dynamic predictions. Results show how the framework supports proactive mitigation planning, climate adaptation, and stakeholder communication in pursuit of resilient and sustainable water governance. By enabling early intervention, efficient resource allocation, and participatory decision-making, the proposed system fosters long-term, sustainable water security and environmental resilience. This conceptual framework suggests a pathway toward more transparent, data-informed, and resilient decision-making processes in water reserves management, particularly in regions facing climatic uncertainty and infrastructure limitations, aligning with global sustainability goals and adaptive water governance strategies. Full article

In its broadest sense, the mountain environment represents a setting useful for promoting health. This Italian project, conceived and applied in the Dolomites, aims to encourage multi-sector preventive public health policies; improve refuge hygiene; strengthen safety requirements; and implement projects aimed at promoting health. With the support of healthcare workers (HCWs) of the Prevention Department and other professionals in this field, 27 establishments in the Alpine territory have joined the project, benefiting from being recognized as a “Healthy and Safe Refuge” at the end of the quality improvement process. This process consisted of a documentary assessment, an on-site evaluation, and an assessment of analytical evidence relating to parameters investigated by both HCWs and refuge managers according to specific protocols. Data were collected from a specific database via an application to join the project and from sampling reports of parameters investigated for evaluating the quality of water intended for human consumption. The outdoor Alpine environment has recently witnessed extraordinary development and must continue to meet all health and safety requirements, especially in view of a global event—the Olympic Games—that will be hosted in the Dolomites area in 2026. Full article

Clean energy serves as a crucial means to alleviate water resource shortages and ensure power production safety. This study delves into clean energy diffusion and development within the confines of the Yellow River Basin, considering water resource constraints. It examines the dynamic evolution of the strategic choices made by local governments and the expansion of clean energy businesses among power generation groups using an evolutionary game model. Additionally, the study employs the L-V model to elucidate the diffusion and competition dynamics between fossil fuel power generation technology (FFGT) and clean energy generation technology (CEGT). To provide a more scientific elucidation of this process, actual values are utilized for simulation. The findings indicate that: (1) The strategic decisions of power generation groups are influenced not only by local government guidance but also by advancement in clean energy technology and cost reduction efforts; (2) the implementation of water resource tax guidance strategies yields noticeable effects, with higher taxes correlating to increased willingness among power generation groups to expand clean energy businesses; (3) in contrast to diffusion speed, the final state of equilibrium attained by the two technologies is more closely tied to the competition coefficient. A higher competition coefficient leads clean energy generation technology to gain a competitive advantage in the market, potentially dominating it entirely. Based on these conclusions, pertinent policy suggestions are proposed to drive the advancement of clean energy and facilitate energy structure transformation in the Yellow River Basin. Full article

This paper, based on differential game theory, examines governance models and cooperative strategies for managing cross-border water pollution in regions with uneven economic development. To address cross-regional water pollution, three differential game models are constructed under different scenarios: the Nash noncooperative mechanism, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism, and the collaborative cooperation mechanism. This study analyzes the dynamic changes in pollution emissions, governance investments, and economic returns within each model. The results indicate that the collaborative cooperation mechanism is the most effective, as it significantly reduces pollution emissions, maximizes overall regional benefits, and achieves Pareto optimality. In comparison, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism is suboptimal under certain conditions, while the Nash noncooperative mechanism is the least efficient, resulting in the highest pollution emissions. Furthermore, the research explores the influence of cooperation costs on the selection of governance models. It finds that high cooperation costs reduce local governments’ willingness to engage in collaborative cooperation. However, an appropriate compensation mechanism can effectively encourage less-developed regions to participate. Numerical analysis confirms the dynamic evolution of pollution stocks and economic returns under different models, and provides corresponding policy recommendations. This paper offers theoretical insights and practical guidance for cross-regional water pollution management, highlighting the importance of regional cooperation and cost-sharing in environmental governance. Full article

At present, global water resource security is facing serious threats, and the construction of a cooperative, open, and mutually beneficial water resource community is a potential solution to the global water resource crisis and water resource hegemony. Previous studies on the formation and beneficial distribution of water resources in cooperative alliances have more often focused on the idea that participants take all of their water resources when they join a cooperative alliance (i.e., a crisp cooperative alliance), while fewer studies have focused on participants including different proportions of their water resources and joining multiple cooperative alliances (i.e., fuzzy cooperative alliances), and even fewer comparative studies concern the use of different benefit-sharing mechanisms. In this paper, in order to improve the efficiency of water use, allocate water resources more optimally, and generate higher returns for water users in a given basin, we propose the establishment of a traditional crisp and improved fuzzy cooperative alliance for water resources in the basin from the perspective of cooperative game theory; we examine the water resource allocation mechanism within the alliance based on the principle of priority; we construct a benefit allocation mechanism for the cooperative alliance based on the core, least core, weak least core, and Shapley value method; and we carry out empirical research using the example of the Tarim River Basin. Our findings are as follows: (1) A cooperative alliance based on the perspective of cooperative game theory can effectively improve overall benefits and individual benefits, and a fuzzy cooperative alliance is more effective than a crisp cooperative alliance in improving the overall water benefits of the region. (2) The participants in the fuzzy cooperative alliance can obtain more benefits than in the crisp cooperative alliance, and the benefit distribution mechanism of the cooperative alliance helps the participants to determine the object of cooperation while maintaining the sustainable existence of the alliance. (3) The different methods of benefit distribution within the cooperative alliance directly affect the overall water benefits of the region. (4) The different methods of benefit distribution directly affect the stability of the alliance, and the players in the game have heterogeneous preferences for different distribution schemes. The resource-sharing mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism of a water resource cooperative alliance have good applicability as solutions to the problem of water resource optimization and allocation in river basins, and they may provide policy references for the efficient use of water resources and optimization of water resource allocation and management in areas with a shortage of water resources, such as arid and semi-arid zones. Full article

The year 2023 will mark the tenth year of China’s pilot water rights program, with China’s overall water use efficiency improving and the water-related industry continuing to grow. Due to the uneven spatial and temporal distribution of water resources in China, there still exists the real problem of resource-type water shortage and structural water shortage, in which the problem of water poverty is particularly prominent. In order to alleviate water poverty, this paper constructs a water poverty indicator system and measures it, uses a double difference model to study whether the water trading policy is effective in alleviating water poverty, and establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model to simulate the behavioral strategies of the relevant stakeholders in water trading. The main findings of this study are as follows: (1) the degree of water poverty in China’s 31 provinces and municipalities from 2008 to 2022 shows a decreasing trend in general, but there are still regional differences; (2) the pilot policy of water rights trading effectively alleviates the situation of water poverty in China, and the alleviation effect is especially obvious for the western region; (3) The degree of government subsidy, the price of water rights trading, the degree of government punishment for non-trading behavior, and the extra income gained from water rights trading all affect the degree of water poverty of both parties to the water rights trading. Therefore, we should continue to improve the water rights trading platform, promote the construction of a diversified water use market, and strengthen the monitoring, measurement and supervision of water rights trading. Full article

China has been facing a contradiction between its water supply and demand for a long time, and it is urgent that it builds a “water-saving society”. Previous research on water pricing mainly focused on the policy level, only considering the supply and demand sides and ignoring the participation of local governments. Due to the inconsistent approval mechanisms, different times of cost formation, and lack of a scientific pricing relationship between multiple water sources and multiple users, with the current water pricing in China, it is difficult to solve the complex problem of water resource allocation. This study aimed to promote the qualitative supply of water and the reuse of reclaimed water, achieve a high-quality and low-cost water supply, and explore the role of water-pricing mechanisms in the regulation of multi-source water supply configurations. The mechanism of regulation is constructed for the complex, multi-source, multi-user water resource system, and a three-party game model is established among local governments, water supply enterprises, and water users. A reasonable pricing system with a rational price relationship is obtained, and Pinghu City in Zhejiang Province is taken as the research area. The prices of the external water supply to residential users, non-resident users, and special users are 4.48 CNY/m³, 6.28 CNY/m³, and 7.12 CNY/m³. The external supply prices for resident users, non-resident users, and special users are 3.81 CNY/m³, 5.25 CNY/m³, and 6.05 CNY/m³. The external supply price for non-resident users is 2.62 CNY/m³ for reclaimed water. The results of the study showed that when the government’s contribution did not exceed the amount that it would have been without the inclusion of recycled water and the annual payment of water users did not exceed their ability to pay, the income of water suppliers increased by 69%. The three balanced objectives of rational water resource configuration by the local government, reasonable profit for the water supply enterprise, and reasonable payment by water users have been achieved. This study provides theoretical and methodological support for the implementation of water pricing for multi-source and multi-user water supplies in water-scarce areas. Full article

Multi-stakeholder participation processes in watershed management face challenges due to limited monitoring and baseline data, resulting in a lack of awareness among stakeholders about the current state of the watershed. This knowledge gap often leads to conflicts of interest, wherein the broader impacts of individual decisions are overlooked. To overcome these limitations, this paper explores the design and implementation of a Serious Game (SG) aimed at coproducing a watershed management plan at the basin scale within the specific context of the Campoalegre River basin in Colombia. By providing an interactive platform, the SG facilitates collaboration between local actors, who may be unfamiliar with existing watershed plans, and decision-makers. The goal is to create a participatory space where stakeholders can comprehend the watershed management plan structure and prioritize actions based on various climatic, social, and economic conditions. Following the application of the SG, stakeholders demonstrated an improved understanding of the basin, fostering increased participation, open debate, and the proposal of actions. These outcomes serve as valuable inputs for the implementation of water management planning policies, showcasing the potential of SGs in bridging knowledge gaps, and fostering effective multi-stakeholder engagement. Full article

Brazilian quilombos are rural semi-isolated remnant communities of former black slaves and their descendants who traditionally maintained themselves through archaic subsistence livestock and agriculture practices and historically lacked specific public health policies. Although such individuals and their dogs may be exposed to zoonotic pathogens such as Toxoplasma gondii, no study to date has assessed these human-animal populations together. Populations in four different Brazilian quilombos in southern Brazil were evaluated. Overall, 93/208 people (44.7%) and 63/100 dogs (63.0%) were seropositive for IgG anti-T. gondii antibodies by indirect immunofluorescent antibody test (IFAT), 4/208 (1.9%) human samples seropositive for IgM anti-T. gondii antibodies, with a human-dog seropositivity ratio for IgG of 0.71. Quilombola individuals ingesting game meat were 2.43-fold more likely (95% CI: 1.05–5.9) to be seropositive. No risk factors were associated with seropositivity among dogs, thus suggesting that their exposure to T. gondii was random. Surprisingly, our research group had previously found an inverted human-dog ratio for T. gondii seropositivity of 2.54 in the urban area of a nearby major city. Because consumption of raw/undercooked game meat by quilombola individuals may have contributed to higher exposure, higher overall seroprevalence among dogs may have also indicated interaction with wildlife. Although these dogs may hunt wildlife without their owners’ awareness, the higher dog seropositivity may also be related to feeding from discarded food in the community or backyard livestock animals and drinking surface water contaminated with oocysts. Thus, wildlife cannot be singled out as the reason, and future studies should consider sampling water, soil, wildlife, and livestock tissues, to fully establish the source of infection in dogs herein. Full article

This study aims to analyze the impact of “overseeing the government” on corporate pollution control and emission reduction behavior and the choice of corporate emission reduction paths. The central government in China persistently reinforces its environmental oversight of local governments. The effectiveness of environmental protection is closely tied to the performance of local officials and the implementation of the “one vote veto” system in the realm of environmental conservation. In this study, we use the evolutionary game model theory and the DID model to test the impact of “overseeing the government” on the environmental behavior of enterprises. Specifically, this study establishes an evolutionary game model between local government and enterprises, exploring how the local government and the enterprise make decisions. The theoretical findings are validated using pollution data from industrial enterprises in China. The study reveals that enterprises are influenced by local governments primarily when the costs of environmental abatement are relatively low, and the costs of noncompliance are high. Strengthening government oversight leads to a reduction in the intensity and overall emissions of both water and air pollutants. Enterprises respond by increasing their utilization of clean energy sources, reducing their reliance on fossil fuels, and enhancing their pollution control infrastructure to mitigate emissions. Notably, there is no evidence suggesting that enterprises curtail production levels to reduce emissions. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a rational understanding of the relationship between environmental protection and economic performance. In addition, tailored policies should be formulated to enable precise pollution control measures and facilitate the pursuit of high-quality development. Full article

To accomplish IMO’s emission reduction targets, the Chinese government has established emission control areas and implemented strict sulfur limitation policies. Faced with a downturn in the shipping industry and the challenge of an insufficient supply of compliant fuel, Hong Kong and Shenzhen in China have implemented different low-sulfur fuel oil subsidy policies. It is particularly important to study non-cooperative games between two ports considering low-sulfur fuel oil subsidies. In this paper, first, non-cooperative game models considering low-sulfur fuel oil subsidies are constructed. Second, the mechanisms of various factors affecting port pricing, throughput and profit are analyzed. Then, a case study is conducted using AIS data of container ships in Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan ports. The study reveals that in both sequential and simultaneous games, the gross tonnage of a ship has an impact on the optimal service price, throughput and profit of the port. The subsidy rate has a positive impact on the profitability of the port itself, to the detriment of competitor ports. In conclusion, a low-sulfur fuel oil subsidy policy has a significant positive impact on the step-by-step implementation of more stringent air pollution reduction policies in port waters. Full article

In grassroots water environment governance, political–community dialog is an unavoidable issue. Traditional policy analysis tools emphasize top-down stages and sequences, often ignoring the essential role of social factors (organizations, resources, or individuals)—outside the policy subsystem—in policy advocacy. The Advocacy Alliance Framework (ACF) provides a perspective on the role of social factors in policy changes and the interaction mechanism driving the relevant stages and alliances. In this study, we re-examine the key elements of the ACF and extract the grassroots logic of policy advocacy by discussing how actors act from policy divergence to policy learning, constructing an action framework to explain grassroots social policy advocacy in China. We find that policy advocacy depends on the joint influence of multiple elements such as the alliance members, alliance belief system and alliance resources. Therefore, social forces can better intervene in the policy agenda and achieve effective political–community dialog by identifying the relevant elements. Full article

With the acceleration of Chinese industrialization, industrial wastewater is discharged in large quantities, leading to a groundwater environment with high ammonia nitrogen characteristics in many places, which seriously endangers people’s health and makes the treatment of ammonia nitrogen by enterprises an urgent issue. Therefore, based on the principle of “no-fault responsibility”, this paper combines China’s pollution trading rights policy and the reward and punishment distribution mechanism to provide a three-party governance model for groundwater ammonia nitrogen treatment under the benefit sharing of emissions trading. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of groundwater ammonia nitrogen pollution treatment among sewage discharge enterprises, third-party governance enterprises and local governments, the role mechanisms of the strategic choices of different participating actors are analyzed. Finally, the validity of the model is verified via simulation, and the influence of key variables on the evolutionary stability of the system and the strategic choices of the participating parties under different situations are discussed. The research results show that setting reasonable reward and punishment allocation coefficients is the basis for promoting active pollution treatment among sewage discharge enterprises and third-party governance enterprises; a change in pollution rights trading revenue is a key factor affecting the strategic choices of the three parties; sewage discharge enterprises show stronger revenue sensitivity than third-party governance enterprises; and an environmental treatment credit system built by the government can effectively enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises to control pollution. Based on the research results of this paper, the participation of third-party governance enterprises in pollution rights trading is explored, which effectively promotes enterprises to actively carry out groundwater ammonia nitrogen treatment and provides a reference for the government to improve the construction of a sustainable development system for the water environment. Full article

This paper is a synthetic overview of some of the threats, risks, and integrated water management elements in freshwater ecosystems. The paper provides some discussion of human needs and water conservation issues related to freshwater systems: (1) introduction and background; (2) water basics and natural cycles; (3) freshwater roles in human cultures and civilizations; (4) water as a biosphere cornerstone; (5) climate as a hydrospheric ‘game changer’ from the perspective of freshwater; (6) human-induced stressors’ effects on freshwater ecosystem changes (pollution, habitat fragmentation, etc.); (7) freshwater ecosystems’ biological resources in the context of unsustainable exploitation/overexploitation; (8) invasive species, parasites, and diseases in freshwater systems; (9) freshwater ecosystems’ vegetation; (10) the relationship between human warfare and water. All of these issues and more create an extremely complex matrix of stressors that plays a driving role in changing freshwater ecosystems both qualitatively and quantitatively, as well as their capacity to offer sustainable products and services to human societies. Only internationally integrated policies, strategies, assessment, monitoring, management, protection, and conservation initiatives can diminish and hopefully stop the long-term deterioration of Earth’s freshwater resources and their associated secondary resources. Full article