Search Results (103)

Unchecked artificial intelligence strengthened by large language models poses a crisis that reaches past ethics into ontology, and it demands that we reconfigure the basic categories of anthropological theology. Working by a hermeneutical–constructive method that places biblical exegesis in dialogue with philosophical thinking, this article advances three interconnected theses. The first is that contemporary AI is reminiscent of the theological hubris of the Tower of Babel narrative (Genesis 11:1–9); both instantiate a closed system of signification that forecloses transcendence by collapsing the distinction between naming and being named. The second concerns what algorithmic governance produces—what Giorgio Agamben calls bare life, a condition the biblical theology of nakedness in Genesis 2–3 can inversely illuminate, and which Simone Weil’s analysis of attention as decreative receptivity sharpens by exposing algorithmic distractedness as the spiritual antipode of contemplative openness. The third is christological: Agamben’s potentiality–impotentiality and Weil’s attention and décréation converge with the kenosis of Philippians 2:5–11 to ground an anthropology of voluntary self-emptying instead of replicable capacity. Reading imago Dei with Paul Ricœur as a dynamic process and drawing on Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of alterity, I argue that authentic existence in the algorithmic age requires a “second nakedness”, a deliberate refusal of egotistical self-assertion that reopens creaturely dependence, so that God’s grace becomes operative in the common life of humanity. Full article

This article explores the ecological crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon that engages humanity at an existential and therefore philosophical level. Starting from the recognition of the authentic human condition, as that of a being deeply rooted in an ecosystem whose balance sustains its well-being, it argues for moving beyond the anthropocentric fallacy that has driven humankind to pursue its dream of Promethean domination. Rather, the complex nature of the human being, at once biological and cultural, carries a message of universal solidarity. In ignoring this message, humanity has betrayed its true identity: that of a steward of life understood in its universal dimension. As a conscious part of nature, humanity is entrusted with caring for it, adopting a more-than-human ethics grounded in respect and love for the relationships that connect all things within the web of life. This calls for revisiting the anthropological question through a systemic lens, opening onto an alternative epistemological and ontological perspective, one that allows us to rethink humanity’s relationship with the entire ecosphere and imagine a different way of co-dwelling on Earth. Full article

The development of artificial intelligence has proceeded within a disciplinary culture whose positivist epistemological foundations generate a constitutive blind spot: the systematic exclusion of tacit, embodied, relational and contextually situated knowledge from what counts as knowledge at all. This article argues that this exclusion is not a technical limitation, but a structural condition of AI systems as currently built, with serious consequences for individuals, institutions and the social order. The method is interdisciplinary and critically synthetic, integrating the anthropology of science and technology, the philosophy of language and the literary-philosophical tradition of techno-critique. Three original contributions are advanced. First, the Faustian framework is reformulated as a collective rather than individual pact: the AI contract implicates a civilisation. Second, the prevalent reductionist critique is refined: the error is not quantification of incommensurable goods but the enforcement of total orderings upon value landscapes that admit only partial orderings. Third, the stochastic parrot objection is reconciled with the Faustian analysis through the concept of institutional amplification: AI’s danger resides not in its intelligence but in the authority conferred upon its incomprehension. The article concludes that Mephistopheles, not Faustus, is the more precise figure for AI itself, and asks whether the defunding of humanities disciplines, those best placed to navigate the moral challenges AI presents, constitutes the most consequential characteristic deletion of all. Full article

This paper develops an original philosophical anthropological account of hope, arguing that hope is the essence of freedom—the inner propulsive principle without which freedom cannot move or sustain itself. Three levels of hope are distinguished. Ontological hope is the invariable, pre-reflective orientation of the human being toward the possibility of adequate response to the demand of ontological emptiness—the raison d’être of freedom itself, and the central contribution of this paper. Fundamental hope is its variable existential actualisation—the dispositional, non-object-directed orientation that emerges from the human being’s encounter with the totality of reality and is carried by the spiritual unconscious. Fragmental hope is the most variable and most familiar mode—the hope directed at particular, temporary needs and solutions. It is ontological hope—invariable, constitutive, and prior to every conscious act of hoping—that is the essence of freedom: the phenomenon that opens the space of ontological emptiness and gives freedom access to the demand of the latter, making its exercise possible at all. The paper further introduces and analyses three original concepts: certainty-mania—the obsessive quest for certainty that severs consciousness from the unconscious and from the fundamental hope it carries—showing that the loss of hope is always rooted in fear and the compulsive need for predictability; the distinction between anticipating joy (Freude-auf) and existential joy (erlebte Freude), arguing that pre-emptive certainty eliminates the tension that genuine hoping requires and thereby empties the present of its capacity to fulfil; and an original etymological and phenomenological analysis of disappointment as Enttäuschung—disillusionment, the medicinal return from illusion to reality. The paper situates its account in relation to Marcel’s ontological hope and Moltmann’s eschatological hope, and engages Frankl, Marcel, Moltmann, Fromm, Heidegger, Camus, Kierkegaard, Tillich, and Blondel as principal interlocutors. Full article

This work expands upon Leonardo Polo’s anthropological proposal regarding human work as a distinctive entrustment from Creator to each created person. Situated within philosophical anthropology as a branch of knowledge devoted to a deeper understanding of the human being, it delves into the highest human dimension—the personal act of being—as the heart of this dedication, and breaks down the appeal to destiny. The goals to which human beings aspire are innumerable, but they all ultimately depend on the first, the ultimate one. In light of the manifestative dimension—which in Polo’s framework corresponds to the order of human essence, distinct from yet intrinsically related to the personal act of being, and encompasses the sphere of human actions, possessions, and material, intellectual, and virtuous gains—this study, according to the view of work as an entrustment, offers a philosophical inquiry surrounding the ultimate destiny of work and the roles that other persons and the divine Person play in this search. Full article

Despite a century of learning research, why human beings desire to learn remains theoretically unresolved. Behaviorist, cognitivist, and constructivist paradigms explain the mechanisms of learning but presuppose rather than account for its motivational genesis—a gap this paper terms motivational minimalism. Drawing on René Girard’s mimetic anthropology, this paper develops Mimetic Learning Theory (MLT), grounded in philosophical anthropology (Plessner, Gehlen), hermeneutics (Rosa, Gadamer), and normative theory (Biesta, Honneth, Arendt). MLT reconceives learning as the reflective transformation of mediated desire. Humans do not merely copy actions but appropriate the desires of models who render knowledge, identity, and recognition worth striving for. Eight dominant learning paradigms are reread as partial articulations of this mimetic dynamic. Two novel constructs are introduced: mimetic load (the affective–cognitive tension from competing models of desire, complementing cognitive load theory) and zones of desire (a reformulation of Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development). MLT does not displace existing frameworks but re-grounds them in a shared anthropological logic—that learning begins not in the mind, but in the field of mediated desire. Full article

Visual learning is not merely a form of visual memory—the ability to associate an object of learning with its spatial and temporal context—or simply an explanatory aid or instrumental support, as is often assumed. The kind of visual learning addressed here aligns, more broadly, with the notion of visual thinking as conceived in the 1960s by Rudolf Arnheim, the German psychologist and art historian, for whom art and expressive forms help us understand the world, generate active and creative comprehension, and organize one’s interpretative universe. The aim, therefore, is not to describe didactic practices that employ images, maps, videos, or simulations, but to go beyond the apparent familiarity of the topic and ask: When and how does the visual dimension foster learning? And, above all, what role does the image play within the educational process? Historically, the visual has been assigned an instrumental function—or so it was believed. Yet one might doubt that this fully captures the experiences of Leonardo, Giotto, or Michelangelo. Can we truly think that sketches or elaborated images have ever been mere mnemonic aids? In both art and education, images do far more than illustrate or serve as tools for remembering, orienting, or recognizing. Especially today, in the presence of technological interference, the visual covers broader horizons: it is used to generate information, explain complex concepts, and produce new experiences—and possibly even new forms of knowledge. In a world saturated with images, there emerges a growing risk of simplification and trivialization: images abound, yet meaning often escapes us. We distrust images, and perhaps we have never truly learned how to read them. Here lies a crucial anthropological fracture: between the mnemonic and the constructive functions of the visual, genuine visual literacy is often missing. A broad methodological approach is therefore needed—one that, through theoretical, historical, and pedagogical analyses, can problematize the educational use of images beyond their mere instrumental dimension. Such reflection must draw from aesthetic and philosophical traditions while acknowledging technological influences and maintaining a clear focus on the specific contexts of contemporary teaching and learning. Full article

This study offers a comparative analysis of the symbolism of the soul’s ascent in Gregory of Nyssa’s De vita Moysis and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio. Rather than attempting to establish a linear or exclusive dependence, it focuses on a series of Mosaic themes that articulate a dynamic conception of perfection in both authors. Beginning with Moses as a paradigm of virtuous life, the paper examines the shared anthropology of desire underlying Nyssen’s notion of unending progress and Pico’s sacra ambitio. It then traces the ordered sequence of symbols as it develops in Gregory’s treatise: light and darkness, the mountain of the knowledge of God, Jacob’s ladder, the tabernacle, the eagle, death as consummation, and divine friendship. Through the interplay of these symbols both thinkers configure spiritual growth as an ever-deepening participation in divine unity and truth. Particular attention is given to integration of the classical disciplines of the ancient philosophical curriculum within the Mosaic itinerary, as well as to the conception of truth as gradually apprehensible but ultimately inexhaustible. The paper concludes by pondering the results of the comparative study and reflecting on Pico’s way of assimilating the wide variety of sources in his project of philosophical concord. Full article

The following paper, starting from the centrality of the question of truth in the terms understood by J. Ratzinger (truth as the original—das Ursprüngliche—and not as the archaic– das Uralte), addresses the importance of Thomas Aquinas’s thought in the philosophy of Edith Stein (1891–1942) and Karol Wojtyła (1920–2005). Thus, the relevance of the metaphysical and anthropological aspect of truth in both of them is highlighted, especially in order to establish a realist epistemology (Stein) and ethics (Wojtyła). In Stein’s case, Aquinas’s influence is reflected particularly in two key aspects: her response to Husserl’s idealistic phenomenology and her dialogue with Max Scheler’s theory of values. Regarding Woytyła, the connections with the Dominican centre on four points: the inseparable relationship between ethical acts and ethical experience; perfectionism as a defining feature of any ethics in its proper sense; the characterisation of humans as beings, not merely as consciousness; and the relationship between truth and goodness. These four aspects will form Wojtyła’s response to Scheler’s philosophy of values and to the question of the authenticity of the individual. The article ends with a modest but clear conclusion: it is possible to be modern in philosophy without breaking with philosophical tradition. Full article

This essay offers a philosophical and bioethical upholding of Dignitas Personae §27, which cautions against the use of human gene editing (HGE) for non-therapeutic purposes. After situating the debate within the historical development of gene-editing technologies, the essay classifies enhancement-oriented interventions—physical, behavioral, and cognitive—and argues that such practices risk violating human dignity, diminishing authentic freedom, and promoting a deterministic anthropology. Drawing on a personalist framework, the analysis incorporates insights from neuroscience, genetics, and natural law. In the second part, the essay examines Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics, integrating Ernest Mayr’s notion of teleonomy to explain how the rational soul actualizes its perfect operations. It is argued that non-therapeutic HGE, especially germline modifications, may disrupt the ontological structure of the human person by impairing the soul’s expression through properly disposed prime matter. Ultimately, Dignitas Personae stands as a coherent and prescient response to emerging biotechnologies, defending the human person against technocratic reductionism and the ideological drive to transcend our embodied finitude. Full article

The scientific activity and outputs of the neurosciences are fascinating and, for the most part, uncontroversial. However, there have been sustained claims that neuroscientific findings represent a powerful challenge to historic, orthodox Christian teaching concerning human ontology. While philosophers had long debated the “mind/brain” problem, the rise of “eliminative materialism” (in the specific form of “neurophilosophy”) in the last quarter of the 20th century evoked various responses to the proposition that a mature neuroscience would forever banish familiar “folk science” entities like beliefs and desires as well as immaterial souls or minds. These would all be shown to play no role in a thoroughly materialistic, mature, neuroscientific understanding of ourselves. One aspect of the response to such claims within Christian scholarship was a turn to non-reductive physicalism and theological monism prompting a reassessment of biblical teaching concerning human ontology, seeking a position that would be consistent both with neuroscience (or its alleged implications) and Christian teaching. The aim of this paper is to review neuroscientific, philosophical and theological developments in order to establish where theological anthropology currently stands. In part this requires an assessment of contemporary neuroscience (including the subfield of “consciousness studies”) because while the science continues to generate intriguing hypotheses and data, it has fallen some way short of the eliminative materialists’ hopes of forty years ago. Additionally, important methodological criticisms of the science have emerged concerning such issues as reproducibility and participant selection. This may have contributed to the twenty-first century resurgence of interest in the sort of dualism long a key component of theological orthodoxy, as well as highlighting the need for a reassertion of theological values, methods and perspectives. The apparent non-elimination of theology indicates a need to rebalance theological and neuroscientific perspectives in developing our understanding of the person. Full article

This article develops a phenomenological foundation of mystical anthropology through a dialogue between contemporary Spanish philosophy and the sixteenth-century Castilian mystical tradition. Taking Juan Martín Velasco, Miguel García-Baró, and Teresa of Ávila as its main interlocutors, it explores the anthropological structure of the encounter with Mystery as an essential possibility of human existence. The study identifies the human being as a subject in exposure to Mystery—an existence that receives itself through a transcendent call to truth and goodness. The analysis shows that the mystical attitude converges with the philosophical one in their shared openness to the real and their ethical orientation toward truth and the Good. Both reveal that the human being is constituted by relation, receptivity, and responsibility. This synthesis redefines mystical experience not as an exceptional event, but as the most lucid manifestation of the human condition, offering a renewed anthropology capable of addressing contemporary nihilism and spiritual disorientation, understood as the loss of ultimate meaning and the weakening of desire that characterize many contemporary forms of human experience. Full article

The scholastic tradition is often criticized for starting from abstract principles or philosophical definitions. In this way, scholastic theology is frequently contrasted with post-conciliar theology, which is developed on the basis of the Paschal event, understood as the hermeneutical criterion for the whole of theology. Karl Rahner accuses Thomas Aquinas of “isolating” the Trinity from other areas of theology, such as soteriology, anthropology, moral theology, and spirituality. He also criticizes Aquinas for separating Christology from the Trinity, arguing that in the Thomistic account of the Incarnation it is not essential that the Son becomes incarnate, since any divine Person could, in principle, have done so. Rahner contends that this doctrine weakens the connection between God’s inner Trinitarian life and the missions. Consequently, our adoption as children of God would no longer be grounded in the Son’s own sonship, and what God reveals of himself in history would not truly express who he is as the Triune God. The purpose of this article is to show that such criticisms do not accurately represent Thomistic teaching and to present the doctrine of our divine filiation within a Trinitarian Christological framework. It will first examine the relationship between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, then present the Thomistic doctrine of the divine missions and processions. Finally, it will address the role of the Holy Spirit and our adoptive divine filiation, all considered from a Thomistic perspective. Alongside the Summa theologiae, particular attention will be paid to Aquinas’s biblical commentaries, where he focuses on the Trinitarian economy and its implications for salvation, drawn directly from his reading of Scripture. Full article

This article explores the foundations and scope of theological discourse on sustainability by drawing upon transcendental–philosophical and existential–phenomenological perspectives. This study addresses the ongoing debate regarding the unique contribution and place of theological appeals to sustainability, especially in relation to secular arguments and audiences. Building on the structures of human cognition, freedom, and meaning, as well as the phenomenological concepts of givenness and promise, this paper critically examines how these structures can both motivate sustainable behavior and serve as interfaces to theological creation and eschatology. The methodological approach combines systematic philosophical analysis with affirmative theology, especially reflecting on the interrelation between the cognitive and experiential dimensions of human existence. The findings suggest that sustainability is not merely a moral option promoted by extrinsic or intrinsic motivators but is deeply rooted in the anthropological groundings of the human being. This study argues that a philosophically and anthropologically grounded discourse on sustainability serves as a vital interface between religious conviction and secular reasoning, extending the reach and impact of sustainability ethics. Full article

Contemporary philosophers and epistemologists as well as scholars of Islamic studies have not failed to notice some striking similarities between aspects of the Islamic notion of the “fiṭra” (humanity’s archetypal nature) articulated by the medieval Hanbalī traditionalist jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328) and the account of the sensus divinitatis (an innate, direct perception of God) espoused by the reformed philosopher Alvin Plantinga (1932–present). This article systematically compares both these notions and more by first situating them within the antecedent historical factors and developments leading up to their emergence in their respective intellectual milieu, the theological anthropology espoused by both thinkers and the religious epistemology of each respective thinker. The article will also discuss salient differences between each doctrine and their broader parent epistemologies and will examine major objections raised against them. The comparative study reveals not only a rich source of Islamic religious epistemology to be mined by diligent researchers but the exciting application of philosophical analysis to the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. Finally, the article argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s account of the fiṭra faces some problematic epistemological conundrums, one of which will be explored in detail. Full article