Search Results (30)

This article analyses female genital mutilation (FGM) from an interdisciplinary perspective, with particular attention to its identity-related dimension and to the interaction between culture, religion, exclusion, and legal responses to violence against women. The study examines the evolution of its treatment and public perception, from the relative invisibility characteristic of early anthropological approaches within Western public and political agendas to its progressive recognition as an extreme form of gender-based violence. Methodologically, it is based on a documentary and comparative analysis of normative instruments, institutional reports, and specialised academic literature. As a specific contribution, the article develops the category of “absolute or totalising otherness” to explain identity-based exclusion and the particular vulnerability of women and girls simultaneously exposed to forms of exclusion based on sex, culture, race, religion, and migration status. The analysis identifies several barriers to eradication, including the lack of comparable data capable of assessing its actual prevalence, proposals advocating the medicalisation of FGM as a purported lesser evil, and dynamics of exclusion in host countries that may reinforce reactive identities and re-signify the value of identity-based rites of passage. The findings further suggest that the persistence of FGM depends not only on these factors, but also on the narratives that sustain or challenge the practice, within which religious discourse acquires particular significance. However, the position adopted by religious spokespersons, leaders, and institutions remains ambivalent: they may provide an argument or alibi that sacralises the rite or, conversely, serve to challenge the false belief that it constitutes a religious mandate, thereby excluding the practice from the moral and religious order. Full article

This study poses the question of whether certain linguistic features are not subject to dialectal variation, a question that requires thorough examination in the corpus of Ancient Greek dialects. To this end, the semantics and the pragmatic function of the injunctive/existential future is examined in the dialectal inscriptions of Ancient Mytilene, in the framework of cognitive semantics, deontic modality, and STIT, a semantic model of agency and control. The first line of enquiry regards the distribution of the semantic functions of the form: is it the case that all semantic nuances of ‘FUTURE TENSE’ are attested in the entirety of Ancient Greek dialects? A second line of enquiry regards the semantics of the form, and more particularly the fact that it expressed extreme deontic force, as if it were a type of injunctive. The form was detached from a specific deontic source, i.e., it merely represented a moral principle in a rather abstract, general form. Its meaning approximated that of infinitive pro imperativo, in that both types indicated what was morally right as a general legal requirement. Particular attention is given to the semantic/pragmatic distinction of the form from the imperative mood. It is claimed that a scale of an agent’s involvement in the verbal action distinguishes imperatival infinitives, injunctive futures and imperatives and that a shift from an objective to a more subjective expression of deontic necessity affects injunctive futures in the history of Greek. The existential future had no performative, directive force, this pragmatic task was performed by imperatives and imperatival infinitives. The existential future denoted absolute certainty in the realization of a prospective fact and presented a projected reality as if it were real in the present of the utterance, hence the characterization as existential. As such it lends support to the view that temporality is tightly connected to modality. The existential meaning of the future seems to be an innovation within Greek and became more frequent in (post)classical times. It appears as a panhellenic feature, but further verification is needed. Full article

This study offers a critical re-examination of contemporary euthanasia debates through an Islamic legal lens, with particular focus on requests for euthanasia arising from psychological suffering within the context of mental disorders. Within bioethical discourse, advocates of euthanasia predominantly justify their position on the grounds of individual autonomy and the alleviation of unbearable suffering, framing it as consistent with modern medicine’s aspiration to optimize quality of life. Yet, by elevating autonomy and self-determination as supreme moral values, it risks reducing the human condition to its cognitive and volitional dimensions, thereby overlooking the existential, spiritual, and affective aspects of suffering. In contrast, Islamic law regards life as a divine trust bestowed by God. Human beings are understood as stewards—rather than absolute proprietors—of their lives and are thus accountable before God for their preservation. From this perspective, psychological pain—akin to physical pain—may serve as a means of moral refinement, spiritual purification, and divine testing. Methodologically, the study conducts a textual and analytical examination of Islamic legal sources, complemented by practical examples that illustrate how psychological suffering transforms into requests for euthanasia, thereby examining how these sources ought to be understood through concrete cases. Furthermore, the study aims to examine whether appeals to a “right to die,” grounded in experiences of psychological suffering, can find any juridical legitimacy within the framework of Islamic law. Full article

The position presented in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments” published under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus—crystallized in the infamous declaration that truth is subjectivity—has often been interpreted as dramatically upholding the rift between the Christian faith and common-sense reason. Through a comparison with Kant’s approach in philosophy of religion, I explain why such a response naturally arises. I then take a stab at making sense of Climacus’ position by comparing his account of faith in the historical God-man with contemporary analytic accounts of hope. The structural similarity between the two suggests that divine incarnation may not be all that puzzling as an object of hope, as it can be judged as morally useful within the framework of Kant’s practical philosophy. The question, then, is whether Climacus is justified in going beyond demanding hope and calling instead for faith, an absolute yes to Jesus. His crucial move is to frame our proper relationship to this person as a case of unconditional love. I take this move to establish Climacus’ subjective truth as a sensible aspirational ideal within Kant’s bounds of mere reason, although it never comes into full possession of finite humans. Full article

This study examines the human–nature relationship in the thoughts of Yunus Emre (d. ca. 1320) and addresses the Qur’anic positioning of humanity as laden with responsibility through the idea of amanah (entrustment), while focusing on Yunus Emre’s reflections on this concept as both a mystical stance and a moral state. His poems place humanity not as an absolute claim of ownership over the world and other beings, but rather within a relationship based on testimony, decency, and equality. He presents nature not as an object requiring protection or an area needing transformation but as a framework for contemplation and reflection in which the divine order is visible. In this context, humans’ established relationship with the world reflects a stance determined not by domination or interference but by a consciousness of limitation and a sense of moderation. By revealing the aspects of his understanding of humanity and nature that overlap with the concept of amanah in Islamic thought, this study argues that this overlap should be evaluated not as conceptual equivalence but rather in terms of mystical and moral affinity. This approach aims to demonstrate how Yunus Emre’s ideas, while not offering direct solutions to modern environmental debates, provide a historical mystical perspective that allows for a rethinking of the human–nature relationship. Full article

This essay attempts to bring together the philosophies of Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze by developing an ethics of learning that is implicit, and at times explicit, in each of their works. How this comes to be manifest in their works is that for Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze, what is most important about this ethics of learning is that it is irreducible to rigid moral laws and to an understanding of reality that is reducible to forms of representational thinking. Most importantly, this essay shows that Spinoza’s understanding of absolutely infinite substance allows Spinoza to develop the ethical project of his Ethics—namely, his ethics of learning—and it is also what helps us to understand what Wittgenstein believed must be passed over in silence. Although the influence of Spinoza on Deleuze is well known, the focus placed here on learning will highlight, and in large part explain, why Spinoza remains a constant thread throughout Deleuze’s work while the importance of other philosophers, such as Nietzsche, slip to the background. Full article

Centering on the debate over whether Fichte’s philosophy of religion underwent a shift between his early and late periods, existing studies have largely taken changes in terminology and content as their basis, understanding it as a move from an early, practical moral religion to a late, ontological religion; other studies maintain that the late period, with themes such as God, being, and love, transcends and develops the early framework. This paper argues that, once we return to the Jena Wissenschaftslehre’s genetic construction of spiritual freedom, the so-called shift does not hold. Through the logical structure of “absolute I–finite I–feeling,” the Jena Wissenschaftslehre provides a model of how the Absolute manifests itself within finite consciousness and completes its actual manifestation in free action. The early philosophy of religion unfolds the same genetic logic in the structure “God–the finite–faith,” while the structure “being–image–love” in the late philosophy of religion represents not a negation of the early view or a move beyond it, but rather a renewed clarification and interpretation of the same logic of spiritual freedom. Full article

This study examines religion as a potent pre-socialisation factor in modern military socialisation, exploring how sacred roots and transcendent anchors influence the formation of military identity. By synthesising Ecological Systems Theory, the Religion–Military Model, and an Integrative Model, the analysis frames religiosity as a multidimensional construct that shapes integration across macro (societal), meso (organisational), and micro (individual) levels. The research reveals the dualistic nature of religious influence. On the one hand, religious pre-socialisation instils a habitus defined by normative commitment, sacrificial ethics, and ritual familiarity. These elements facilitate Person–Organisation fit and act as catalysts for identity fusion, where personal agency is united with the group’s strength. On the other hand, the study identifies a critical theological and psychological vulnerability: moral injury. When absolute religious commandments—such as the sanctity of life—collide with the lethal demands of combat, an irresolvable normative conflict arises, mirroring historical tensions between the Christian conscience and the sacramentum. By identifying strategic intervention points for chaplaincy and leadership, the study demonstrates that integrating the religious dimension is not only an ethical duty but a prerequisite for maintaining triadic equilibrium, resilience, and institutional stability. Full article

In a certain sense, the experience of beauty is objectless. Obviously, only in a certain sense: for the experience evidently makes some objects manifest—namely, the object found beautiful. Yet to find an object beautiful means finding that it somehow, given the juxtaposition of its material elements, expresses something beyond conception, which thus directs us towards something that could never be given as an object of experience. Kant thus claimed that beauty ultimately expresses the purportedly supersensible basis of all being, accounting for the sense of meaningfulness and repose engendered by the experience of beauty. Levinas, expanding on such ideas, calls this an expression of the sacred. Levinas, however, thus worries about our appreciation of beauty: for if the sacred, as he argues, discloses an ostensibly unmanifestable mystical or metaphysical absolute as if it were at one with the material forces that traverse and underlie beings, then beauty’s repose ultimately represents the moral complacency of a disclosure that all is right on some “deeper level.” By contrast, the holy, which reveals itself in the relation to another and which Levinas opposes to the sacred, represents a different unmanifestability—of the other as such and of the infinite responsibility to which the other’s appeal, by decentering one absolutely, subjects one thereby—but this encounter, instead of inviting complacency, thus incessantly challenges us. In the following, I clarify Levinas’s position by explicating his account of beauty and his claim that beauty manifests an unmanifestable sacred and then discussing Levinas’s distinction between the sacred and holy and explicating his worries about the sacred. I conclude by discussing the caution he believes we should exercise in appreciating beauty, but also the latter’s exigency, a consideration that can help resolve issues in Levinas scholarship as well as current debates on the moral value of art. Full article

Most primitive religions originated from the devout worship of celestial deities, earthly spirits, and ghosts. In oracle bone inscriptions, rituals related to praying for rain, temple worship, river deity worship, and the worship of great deities were referred to as “fang” 方 or “yi fang” 以方. The Supreme God was the paramount deity of the Yin Shang Dynasty people; by the early Zhou Dynasty, the Supreme God and ancestral spirits began to merge. The hexagram of Contemplation 觀卦 (guan gua) establishes instruction through the concept of “contemplation” fully presenting the entire process of shamans, sorcerers, or ritual hosts participating in temple sacrifices, and completing the hand-washing ritual 盥 (guan) and the sacrifice-offering ritual 薦 (jian). It emphasizes the sincere communication between humans and Heaven. When a monarch performs the guan ritual, he embodies inner “sincerity and clarity” 誠明 (chengming); in response, the celestial deities will “show trust” 有孚 (youfu). Thus, it can be verified that deities exist in Heaven, and an interactive, responsive relationship is formed between Heaven and humans. The nine in the fifth place (the dominant line) possesses great inspiring power. The two fundamental dimensions for interpreting the hexagram structure are “the great view is above” 大觀在上 (da guan zai shang) and “[t]hose below look toward him and are transformed” 下觀而化 (xia guan er hua). These dimensions not only highlight the infinite transcendence, charisma, and appeal of the worshipped deities but also underscore humans’ profound reverence and faith in deities and the absolute existence. Sages 聖人 (sheng ren), as intermediaries between humans and deities, established religion for the sake of human life but did not regard themselves as religious leaders. However, from the Shang and Zhou dynasties to the Spring and Autumn period, a transition occurred in the spiritual life of the Chinese people: from shamanism to ritual propriety 禮 (li), and from theistic culture to humanistic culture. This transition laid the fundamental direction for the development and evolution of Chinese culture over the following 2500 years. Confucius attempted to replace or eliminate the shamanistic elements in early Confucians with personalized moral experience and ethical consciousness. Full article

This paper examines a recent shift in Catholic moral teaching, characterized by the emergence of a ‘new moral absolutism’, in which certain acts traditionally subject to prudential judgment—such as the death penalty, ecological harm, and restrictive migration policies—are increasingly portrayed as universally and gravely wrong in our age. Simultaneously, traditional moral absolutes, especially in sexual and life ethics, have experienced cautious relativization. Drawing on the framework of Veritatis Splendor (1993), the paper critiques the approach of this new moral absolutism, arguing that it undermines the proper role of individual conscience and situational discernment while failing to provide coherent guidance on complex moral dilemmas. It links its emergence to proportionalist ethics: when traditional moral absolutes are relativized, new types of wrongs take their place. The paper proposes a return to the principles of Veritatis Splendor, advocating for a nuanced approach that preserves the constant and limited set of absolute negative norms and encourages the formation and use of conscience for all other matters. Full article

The meaning of justice can be defined according to a juridical, human, theological, ethical, biomedical, or social perspective. It should guarantee the protection of life and health, personal, civil, political, economic, and religious rights, as well as non-discrimination, inclusion, protection, and access to care. In this review, we deal with three theoretical concepts that define justice in all its aspects. (1) The utilitarian theory, which justifies moral statements on the basis of the evaluation of the consequences that an action produces, elaborating a pragmatic model of medical science. (2) The libertarian theory, which considers freedom as the highest political aim, thus absolutizing the rights of the individual; here, the principle of self-determination, with respect to which the principle of permission/consent is the fundamental presupposition, plays a central role in the definition of the person. (3) The iusnaturalist theory, in which man’s moral freedom is identified with the ability to act by choosing what the intellect indicates to him as good; the natural moral law that drives every conscience to do good is therefore realized in respect for the person in the fullness of his rights. In conclusion, different forms and conceptions of justice correspond to different organizations of society and different ways of addressing ethical issues in the biomedical domain. Full article

In You Shall Be as Gods, Erich Fromm (1900–1980) defines his position as nontheistic mysticism. This research clarifies the term, considers its importance within Fromm’s humanism, and explores its potential origins. The nontheistic mystical position plays a central role in Fromm’s understanding of the relationship between mysticism and organized religion, religion and religiosity, and it clarifies the relationship between religion, philosophy, and social psychoanalysis, whose combination constitutes his humanistic ethics. Nontheistic mysticism relates, as well, to Fromm’s understanding of human nature; it involves the question of the relationship between language, perception, and experience. The nontheistic mystical position is linked to Fromm’s negative theology, the x experience, and idolatry. Hence, the nontheistic mystical position is relevant to Fromm’s understanding of self-realization and his vision of a sane society. Unlike some scholarly opinion, the conclusions of this paper suggest that Fromm’s humanism is not radical, as long as radical is defined as an absolute atheistic secular feature that eliminates the range of religious language and experience. Rather, it is a broad and cautious humanism that, on the one hand, internalizes the transcendent divinity into the human subject and transforms it into anthropological–ethical phenomena, but, on the other, implies that atheism carries the risk of an idolatrous identification of the human being with God. Consequently, this humanism requires a religious–mystical component to adequately portray the spiritual and ethical potentials of humanity and its challenges. Nontheistic mysticism is a consciousness mechanism aimed at the fine-tuning of the individual’s moral compass, which is affected by the pathologies of normalcy that prevail in all societies. Full article

Acute kidney injury is a common and complex complication that has high morality and the risk for chronic kidney disease among survivors. The accuracy of current AKI biomarkers can be affected by water retention and diuretics. Therefore, we aimed to identify a urinary non-recovery marker of acute kidney injury in patients with acute decompensated heart failure. We used the isobaric tag for relative and absolute quantification technology to find a relevant marker protein that could divide patients into control, acute kidney injury with recovery, and acute kidney injury without recovery groups. An enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay of the endothelial cell protein C receptor (EPCR) was used to verify the results. We found that the EPCR was a usable marker for non-recovery renal failure in our setting with the area under the receiver operating characteristics 0.776 ± 0.065; 95%CI: 0.648–0.905, (p < 0.001). Further validation is needed to explore this possibility in different situations. Full article

Religion is one of the central themes of the young Hegel. This is where intellectual problems arise, the treatment of which led him to discover his speculative way of thinking. Starting in the footsteps of Kant’s ethicotheology, Hegel quickly realized that religion cannot be a vehicle for introducing autonomous morality. Under titles such as love and life, he then develops a kind of Spinozist thinking of unification of everything, including the finite and the infinite. However, it turns out that the quasi-divine performance of unity cannot be thought of as such, since thinking is bound to discursive forms of reflection that are always mediated through differences. As soon as the religious performance of unity is to be thought of, it slips away from the form of reflection. This problem can be solved if, on the one hand, the differential form of thinking is brought into a self-application and, on the other hand, difference itself is put into the performance of unity, even if it is named as absolute. The former becomes the nucleus of the figure of negation characteristic for Hegel’s speculative thinking; the latter leads to an understanding of the absolute as spirit, which, according to its self-being, which encompasses difference, is always for the other and is known by the other. Religion brings this to mind in the form of imagination, according to Hegel’s later concept of religion. Full article