Search Results (15)

In the context of carbon trading policy, carbon emissions in the supply chain of new energy vehicles have received much attention in academic research and practice. Consumer preference for environmental friendliness is also growing in new energy vehicle supply chain operations, which has prompted new energy vehicle manufacturers to invest in carbon abatement technologies to improve the environmental friendliness of new energy vehicles. At the same time, the increased demand for new energy vehicles will also increase the green promotion of third-party power battery recycling companies to facilitate the recycling of power batteries. Considering these special features in the new energy vehicle supply chain, we applied a differential game model to examine the carbon emission reduction behaviors and green promotion technologies of the new energy vehicle supply chain members from a long-term and dynamic perspective. Supply chain equilibrium strategies under four different scenarios were analyzed and compared, numerical experiments were conducted to validate the theoretical results, and sensitivity analyses were performed to identify further insights. The results of the study show that a unit carbon trading price reaching a critical threshold is a prerequisite for technical cooperation between the new energy vehicle manufacturer and the third-party power battery recycling company. It provides a theoretical basis for the government to set the carbon price, and it effectively stimulates the cooperation and emission reduction drive of new energy vehicle companies. The study breaks through the traditional cost–benefit framework, internalizes the carbon price as a supply chain cooperation drive, and opens up a new paradigm for new energy vehicle industry research. Full article

The rapid development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry has led to concerns about battery quality and the transparency of green recycling, causing uncertainty among consumers. Many firms adopt blockchain technology to solve this problem, but blockchain adoption will bring privacy leakage risk to consumers. A Stackelberg game model of a three stage NEV supply chain is constructed to examine the impact of adapting blockchain on strategic decisions of supply chain participants. We consider a setting in which a battery supplier provides batteries to a NEV manufacturer, and a third-party recycler recovers retired batteries for a NEV manufacturer. We explore the influence of consumers’ green recycling preferences on the decisions of NEV supply chain members in three scenarios: not adopting blockchain traceability (NB), adopting blockchain with forward traceability (FB), and adopting blockchain with forward–reverse traceability (DB). We find that NEV supply chain members are more likely to adopt forward–reverse traceability under certain conditions. Moreover, the adoption of blockchain drives the battery supplier and NEV manufacture to increase wholesale price and retail price, especially under forward–reverse traceability. In addition, when consumers exhibit strong preferences for green recycling, third-party recyclers are more willing to invest in blockchain-based recycling due to its ability to enhance the accuracy and credibility of recycling data. Full article

This paper focuses on the carbon emission problem of new energy vehicle (NEV) battery recycling, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of battery manufactures, new energy vehicle original equipment manufacturers (NEV OEMs) and certified recyclers, analyzes the stability of each party’s strategy selection and the relationship between the influence of the elements, and simulates to verify the validity of the conclusions, and arrives at the conditions for the occurrence of the lowest carbon emission stabilizing strategy combinations, and puts forward countermeasure suggestions accordingly, and analyzes the effects of the changes of the key parameters on the equilibrium results, and the study shows that (1) Carbon emission cost, battery decomposition cost, recycling channel construction cost and R&D cost are the main factors affecting the equilibrium results. (2) Under the carbon emission reduction policy, the battery manufacturer’s investment in low-carbon production can help other actors in the supply chain to reduce the negative impact of the policy so that they can reduce their costs. (3) The cooperative recycling model based on the recycling network constructed by vehicle manufacturers can maximize the interests of all parties in the supply chain. The findings of the study provide management insights for governments, battery manufacturers, NEV OEMs, and certified recyclers. Full article

With the booming development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry, the issue of power battery recycling has increasingly attracted attention. Standardized recycling of power batteries can reduce environmental pollution and promote sustainable resource utilization. This paper employs evolutionary game theory to construct two models of deposit systems for the recycling of new energy vehicle power batteries: one under market mechanisms and the other with government participation. The evolutionary stable strategies among vehicle manufacturers, consumers, and the government are examined, and the stable equilibrium points of the models are analyzed. Finally, Matlab is used to conduct a simulation analysis of the deposit system with government participation. The results indicate that the deposit system under market mechanisms is difficult to constrain consumer behavior, while the deposit system with government participation is conducive to promoting the achievement of long-term environmental protection goals. These findings provide valuable insights for policymakers in designing deposit–refund systems and contribute to advancing the sustainable development of the NEV industry. Full article

The sales of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) have experienced substantial growth, resulting in a significant increase in the number of used NEV batteries. Improper disposal of these used batteries can lead to pollution and resource wastage. In line with the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) principles, this research designs a three-level hybrid recycling closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, retailer, and third-party recycler. Furthermore, Stackelberg game theory is applied to develop distinct game models for analyzing the interactions among the supply chain participants. To research the interaction among multiple policies on the hybrid recycling system, it explores the optimal pricing and the CLSC’s recycling performance under the policy mix. In addition, a coordination mechanism is devised and validated to solve the decline in members’ individual profits caused by the policy mix. The findings indicate that battery tax policy may reduce total profits, and subsidy policies could result in enterprise dependency, but the policy mix can lead to increase in both recycling price and amount. This research demonstrates the policy mix can overcome the limitations of single policy, implement a long-term and dynamically adjustable incentive mechanism and provide a crucial reference for the government’s role as the “visible hand” in recycling. Full article

Under the low carbon goal, recycling power batteries (PBs) from new energy vehicles (NEVs) is a crucial measure to address resource shortages and reduce carbon emissions. This study examined the insufficient collaboration among the responsible entities and the imperfections in market mechanisms within the PB recycling system. We overcome the limitations of traditional tripartite evolutionary game models by developing a four-party evolutionary game model that incorporates the government, manufacturers, recyclers, and consumers to investigate the strategic interactions within the extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework. Using MATLAB 2023a numerical simulations and Lyapunov stability analysis, we found that the system’s stability and efficiency depend on stakeholder collaboration and effective government policy guidance. The system evolves toward a Pareto optimal state when all parties adopt proactive recycling strategies. Meanwhile, ensuring substantial profits for manufacturers and recyclers is critical for the feasibility and stable operation of compliant recycling channels. While manufacturers and recyclers are more sensitive to subsidies than consumers, consumer decision-making is key to market stability. Long-term excessive subsidies may lead to diminishing marginal benefits. Strategic recommendations are provided for policymakers and stakeholders to enhance the efficiency and sustainability of the PB recycling system. Full article

As the global new energy vehicle (NEV) industry rapidly expands, the disposal and recycling of end-of-life (EOL) power batteries have become imperative. Efficient closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management, supported by well-designed regulations and strategic investments, plays a crucial role in sustainable waste power battery recycling. In this study, an evolutionary game theory (EGT) methodology is used to construct a tripartite game model to investigate the interactions among manufacturers, recyclers, and the government to study the decision-making dynamics of green investments. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to evaluate the sensitivity of the relevant parameters on the stability of the evolution of the system. The results reveal that government green subsidies can stimulate early period investments in advanced recycling technologies. However, as the battery recycling industry matures, a ‘free-rider’ behavior emerges among enterprises, which can be mitigated through the imposition of a carbon tax. Eventually, as the industry reaches maturity, manufacturers and recyclers autonomously invest for enhanced profitability. This research provides valuable insights for government policy formulation, facilitating the formal recycling of retired batteries and fostering sustainability in the NEV sector. Full article

Developing new energy vehicles (NEVs) is necessary to grow the low-carbon vehicle industry. Many concentrated end-of-life (EoL) power batteries will cause large-scale environmental pollution and safety accidents when the time comes to replace the first generation of batteries if improper recycling and disposal methods are utilized. Significant negative externalities will result for the environment and other economic entities. When recycling EoL power batteries, some countries need to solve problems about lower recycling rates, unclear division of echelon utilization scenarios, and incomplete recycling systems. Therefore, this paper first analyzes representative countries’ power battery recycling policies and finds out the reasons for the low recycling rate in some countries. It is also found that echelon utilization is the critical link to EoL power battery recycling. Secondly, this paper summarizes the existing recycling models and systems to form a complete closed-loop recycling process from the two stages of consumer recycling and corporate disposal of batteries. The policies and recycling technologies are highly concerned with echelon utilization, but few studies focus on analyzing application scenarios of echelon utilization. Therefore, this paper combines cases to delineate the echelon utilization scenarios clearly. Based on this, the 4R EoL power battery recycling system is proposed, which improves the existing recycling system and can recycle EoL power batteries efficiently. Finally, this paper analyzes the existing policy problems and existing technical challenges. Based on the actual situation and future development trends, we propose development suggestions from the government, enterprises, and consumers to achieve the maximum reused of EoL power batteries. Full article

Due to the popularization and development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) worldwide, power batteries that have been used are being retired and replaced. In China’s battery recycling industry, the legal NEV battery recycling enterprises are at a negative financial performance. Based on theory of organizational adaptation, the key to innovation performance and sustainable development is recognition of the environment and strengthening organizational flexibility. This study empirically explores the bidirectional dynamic relationships among heterogeneous environmental uncertainties, innovation activities, firm growth and strategic flexibility in Chinese NEV battery recycling firms. A total of 1040 sample data were collected from 2015 to 2021. The research results demonstrate that environmental uncertainty (EU), strategic flexibility (SF) and innovation activities (INNO) all had impacts on firm growth (FG). Specifically, INNO had strongly negative effects in the short term, and in the long term, it will bring a positive effect to FG; the impact of EPU was more important than market uncertainty (MU) to FG and innovation activities. This could be due to the dependence of the Chinese NEV battery recycling industry on government policy. However, MU has a strong impact on SF. Moreover, the levels of SF should be reasonable, otherwise it could be a burden to enterprises. There also exists the bidirectional dynamic relationships between FG and INNO. This study contributes a non-core perspective to strategic flexibility research by revealing the complex environmental mechanism, and to the Chinese NEV battery recycling industry we provide a theoretical basis and practical guidance for government and firms on how to apply SF to promote innovation and realize growth in the present business environment. Full article

As a strategic emerging mineral resource, lithium is widely used in new energy, new materials and other emerging industries. There exists a changing trend of the material flow, consumption and evolution of lithium resources in the market. Thus, this research constructed a material flow analysis system for lithium resources based on the trade correlation of the whole life cycle. The study used the material flow analysis method to analyze the supply, flow and stock of lithium resources in China from 2007 to 2020. The research shows that during that timeframe, China’s cumulative consumption of lithium resources equivalent to lithium carbonate reached 309.9348 kiloton (kt). The consumption of lithium in traditional and lithium electric fields increased from 14.3653 kt and 8.08228 kt in 2007 to 49.53125 kt and 90.75866 kt in 2020, respectively. From 2007 to 2011, the consumption of lithium in the traditional sector was greater than that in the lithium electric sector. From 2012 to 2020, with the innovation of network technology and the boom in the New energy vehicles (NEV) market, the market for consumer lithium and power lithium grew rapidly, and the field of lithium with power batteries as the main driving force gradually became the major contributor to the consumption of lithium resources. With the rapid increase in the consumption demand for lithium resources, the supply structure of lithium resources in China has changed from domestic supply to international import. The external dependence of lithium resources has increased from 29.74% in 2007 to 70.75% in 2020. With increasing lithium consumption, the storage of lithium batteries increased from 20.69721 kt in 2007 to 341.6322 kt in 2020. At the same time, the scrap volume of lithium batteries increased rapidly, but the recycling volume of lithium resources was far lower than the scrap volume. The resource recycling potential is huge, and there is still a lot of room for the development of the sequential utilization of waste lithium-ion batteries. Full article

With the increasing popularity of new energy vehicles (NEVs), a large number of automotive batteries are intensively reaching their end-of-life, which brings enormous challenges to environmental protection and sustainable development. This paper establishes a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model composed of a power battery manufacturer and a NEV retailer. The benchmark scenario of CLSC members without blockchain technology is analyzed, and the optimal recycling strategy of the manufacturer and retailer using traceability information based on blockchain technology is discussed. We generate our findings from three aspects, as follows: the manufacturer or retailer is more willing to take the responsibility of recycling when the proportion of retired batteries that can be used in echelons is relatively high. Meanwhile, when the recycling cost is large, both manufacturers and retailers should adopt blockchain technology to obtain greater profits. Furthermore, with the improvement of traceability information transmission efficiency, a higher profit growth rate will be achieved. Full article

As a valuable reuse resource, the efficient recycling of retired power batteries is of great significance to the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry. With the arrival of the NEV power battery decommissioning tide in China, how the government promotes the relevant responsible subject to improve the recovery rate is becoming urgent. Current studies have not considered the policy role of a government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) in power battery recycling. Therefore, based on the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system, this paper constructs three models under the government RPM: the government implements the RPM only for vehicle enterprises; the government implements the RPM only for power battery manufacturers, and the government implements the RPM for both vehicle enterprises and power battery manufacturers. The results of the study show that: on the one hand, when the government implements the RPM only for vehicle enterprises, the recovery rate is the highest, and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain is also the highest. Therefore, it is suggested that the government should set a target recycling rate according to the actual situation of each region and implement the RPM only for vehicle enterprises. On the other hand: when the government implements the RPM only for vehicle enterprises, they can implement the strategy of small profit and quick turnover to improve the recovery rate and their own profits. When the government implements the RPM only for power battery manufacturers, they should adopt the strategy of reducing the wholesale price of power battery to increase their profits by increasing sales. When the government implements the RPM for both vehicle enterprises and power battery manufacturers, if the vehicle enterprises share a large responsibility, all members of the closed-loop supply chain can benefit from the RPM. Full article

Due to the limited service life of new energy vehicle power batteries, a large number of waste power batteries are facing “retirement”, so it will soon be important to effectively improve the recycling and reprocessing of waste power batteries. Consumer environmental protection responsibility awareness affects the recycling of waste power batteries directly. Therefore, under the two recycling modes of new energy vehicle manufacturers and third-party recycling enterprises, this study analyzes the impact of consumer environmental protection responsibility awareness on the recycling price of waste power batteries and profit in the supply chain. The influence of factors such as recycling income, recycling input cost, and black-market recycling prices on consumer awareness of responsibility is also analyzed. Through theoretical research, it was found that: Under the model that third-party recycling enterprises are responsible for recycling, it can obtain better overall supply chain benefits; consumer environmental protection responsibility awareness and recycling benefits are positively correlated with supply chain benefits overall; and recycling benefits have a certain role in promoting consumer awareness of responsibility, while the increase in informal recycling prices inhibits consumer awareness of responsibility. Full article

Recycling and gradient utilization (GU) of new energy vehicle (NEV) power batteries plays a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of the economy, society and environment in the context of China’s NEV power battery retirement tide. In this paper, the battery recycling subjects and GU subjects were regarded as members in an alliance, and an evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation between the two types of subjects was established. Evolution conditions and paths of the stable cooperation modes between these two were explored. Suggestions were proposed to avoid entering a state of deadlock and promote the alliance to achieve the “win-win” cooperation mode of effective resource recovery and environmental sustainability. The results revealed four types of certain situations, two types of uncertain situations, and one type of deadlock situation for the evolution of alliance cooperation. The factors of the market environment are evident in not only changing the evolution paths and steady-states of the alliance but also in breaking the evolution deadlock. However, the sensitivity of the members in the alliance to different types of parameters varies greatly. It is difficult for the government to guide the formation of an ideal steady-state of cooperation or break the deadlock of evolution by a single strategy, such as subsidies or supervision. The combination of subsidy-and-supervision or phased regulation should be adopted. Only increasing subsidies is likely to weaken the function of the market and have a counterproductive effect. Full article

With the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) industry in China, the reusing of retired power batteries is becoming increasingly urgent. In this paper, the critical issues for power batteries reusing in China are systematically studied. First, the strategic value of power batteries reusing, and the main modes of battery reusing are analyzed. Second, the economic benefit models of power batteries echelon utilization and recycling are constructed. Finally, the economic benefits of lithium iron phosphate (LIP) battery and ternary lithium (TL) battery under different reusing modes are analyzed based on the economic benefit models. The results show that when the industrial chain is fully coordinated, LIP battery echelon utilization is profitable based on a reasonable scenario scheme. However, the multi-level echelon utilization is only practical under an ideal scenario, and more attention should be paid to the first level echelon utilization. Besides, the performance matching of different types of batteries has a great impact on the echelon utilization income. Thus, considering the huge potentials of China’s energy storage market, the design of automobile power batteries in the future should give due consideration to the performance requirements of energy storage batteries. Moreover, the TL battery could only be recycled directly, while the LIP has the feasibility of echelon utilization at present. At the same time, it will strengthen the cost advantage of the LIP battery, which deserves special attention. Full article