Search Results (59)

The Turkish Civil Code of 1926, received from Switzerland, established a secular family law resting on numerus clausus and a broadly mandatory structure; yet mahr, an institution of Islamic family law, has persisted in social practice and, since the binding unification-of-case-law decision of the Court of Cassation of 2 December 1959, has been characterized as a donation contract governed by the law of obligations. This article analyzes that characterization doctrinally, distinguishing whether mahr is agreed without a civil marriage, before it, or at or after it, and testing it against Turkish statutory law and reported case law, with comparative reference to German, Swiss, Italian, English, Canadian, United States and New Zealand practice. The analysis keeps three levels of material distinct: classical Ḥanafī doctrine and its Qurʾānic basis, the later positivization of mahr in the codes of Muslim-majority states, and its contemporary reconstruction in scholarship and in Turkish case law. Functional resemblance across these levels is not taken for identity, and the central claim is that Turkish law has taken it for identity. The donation characterization proves internally inconsistent: it misdescribes the parties’ concurring intentions; imposes form requirements unknown to Islamic law; exposes the wife to revocation and restitution; and distorts the concepts of divorce and consummation. In matrimonial property, damages, poverty alimony and subject-matter jurisdiction, the outcomes follow the premise of gratuitousness rather than the structure of mahr, and fall out erratically, sometimes to the wife’s advantage and sometimes against her. So long as the existing secular regime is maintained, mahr is better treated as an imperfect (natural) obligation under Article 78(2) of the Turkish Code of Obligations; the binding force of the 1959 decision, confined to a question of transitional law, does not preclude this reinterpretation. Full article

Over the last century, two highly influential organizations have impacted politics and resistance in the Arab world: the Ba’ath Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood advanced the political dimension of Islam in the sense of a single community (Umma) that revolves around religion. This basic distinction has caused decades of ideological disputes and even, on some occasions, military confrontation. In this study, the media’s construction of the public image of the Muslim Brotherhood is analyzed. Two large outlets, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Al Arabiya, are contrasted. Using a qualitative approach, news stories from 2023 to 2025 are examined to determine how strategic narratives can influence the population’s perception of these groups. The study results reveal a considerable gap in reporting between the two. Al Arabiya presents the Muslim Brotherhood as a collapsed, radical terrorist group manipulating religion to gain power, while the BBC’s reporting is more neutral and subtler, demonstrating how media organizations manipulate certain terms and themes to shape narratives. Full article

This study examines the political discourse and practices of the Greek Cypriot political party ELAM and the Turkish Cypriot political party YDP within the framework of populism. The findings of the study demonstrate that ELAM frames the Greek Cypriot community as part of “Judeo-Christian civilization” and portrays this civilization as being under threat from “Islamic civilization,” including Türkiye, Turkish Cypriots, and “illegal immigrants.” YDP, in turn, conceptualizes the Turkish Cypriot community as part of “Islamic civilization” and claims that “the West”—comprising actors such as Greek Cypriots, Greece, Israel, the EU, and the USA—is waging a comprehensive campaign against “Islamic civilization.” ELAM accuses the Greek Cypriot left of acting against the interests of “Western civilization” and Hellenic Orthodox values, while YDP similarly charges the Turkish Cypriot left with acting contrary to the interests and values of the Turkish-Islamic world. Moreover, while ELAM opposes Turkish Cypriots and “illegal immigrants” benefiting from the resources of the Republic of Cyprus, the right-wing government in which YDP is a coalition partner is frequently criticized for having contributed to the deterioration of the living standards of foreign workers. ELAM adopts a sharply oppositional stance toward the expansion of LGBTIQ+ rights, whereas YDP prefers not to foreground this issue. The study concludes that the discourses of both parties largely correspond to the concept of “civilizational populism.” Full article

The foundational work on civilizational populism by Yilmaz and Morieson has set the stage to explore the complex relationship between civilizational and national identities and how this relationship supports the populist discourse beyond national boundaries. Applying this framework to the case of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a populist party in Pakistan, the paper presents the findings of critical discourse analysis of the public addresses of PTI founder and chairman Imran Khan, delivered in 2022—the year he was removed from his office as Prime Minister of Pakistan through a parliamentary no-confidence motion. Using the Discourse–Historical Analysis (DHA) developed by Reisigl and Wodak and the Discourse Theory (DT) of populism by Laclau, this paper critically examines ten public addresses in 2022, five during his tenure as Prime Minister, and five following his removal from office. The analysis focuses on how Imran Khan constructed Pakistani identity around Islamic civilization and critically evaluates the possible implications of this discourse on religious extremism in Pakistan. The findings contribute to an understanding of how civilizational populism operates in practice, highlighting how populist leaders shift their strategic use of civilizational discourse when moving between positions of power and opposition. Full article

In recent years, Christian language and symbols have played an increasingly prominent role in right-wing populist rhetoric across many western countries. The form of religious expression in right-wing populist rhetoric corresponds to the kind of religiousness that characterizes the contextual factors under which rhetorical communication occurs. In making this case, this article analyzes salient themes found in speeches, interviews, and manifesto content to uncover dynamic similarities and dissimilarities between right-wing populist parties in two religiously different contexts: the Alternative für Deutschland (“Alternative for Germany”) and Fratelli d’Italia (“Brothers of Italy”). First, I discuss how the vertical and horizontal tensions within the populist framework combine with notions of civilizational identity and show the extent to which positive references to Christianity are combined with negative references to Islam. Next, I demonstrate how these parties differ in their treatment of the transcendent and doctrinal qualities of religious commitment. Lastly, I show the ways in which religion is used to help brighten symbolic boundaries, as well as the functions served by the dramatic and emotional elements that are embedded in the process of boundary formation. In light of the respective contextual factors that mediate the nature of religious expression, I discuss how understanding the social logic of this rhetoric can grant valuable insight into what has become such a critical feature of populism’s social character. Full article

This article examines how populist radical right parties (PRR) in three contrasting European contexts—Slovenia, France, and Poland—strategically instrumentalize Christianity within their anti-immigration agendas. Rather than using religion as a matter of faith, these parties recast Christianity as a cornerstone of national and European identity, positioning it in opposition to Islam and non-European migration. The study argues that such instrumentalization serves not only to construct a religiously defined national identity, but also to legitimize exclusionary policies. By analyzing selected political speeches, party manifestos, and media discourse, we explore how far-right actors frame Islam as incompatible with European values, reinforcing the division between “Christian Europe” and “foreign non-Christian migrants.” Drawing on recent scholarship on civilizational populism and religious boundary-making, we further assess how processes of globalization and European integration have been interpreted by populist parties to fuel anti-immigrant sentiment. Methodologically, we employ qualitative content analysis to identify recurring themes and rhetorical strategies, with a focus on the intersection of religion, nationalism, and migration. The findings contribute to debates on religious pluralism in contemporary Europe, shedding light on how far-right populism reframes pluralism and challenges secular principles across different political and cultural settings. Full article

This study explores the role of religion as a state-promoted tool for political assimilation in Pakistan’s border provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. The study is based on five phases of fieldwork (2016–2024) combined with a thematic literature review. The research explores how religious strategies were deployed to forge a unified national identity in these regions. The findings reveal significant disparities in the effectiveness of these strategies. In KP, historical factors, cultural alignment, and geopolitical influences—particularly the Afghan conflict—largely facilitated the integration of Pashtun identity into Pakistan’s broader Islamic-national framework. Tools such as madrassa networks, education reforms, religious slogans, and state-backed Islamist parties effectively promoted religious nationalism. In contrast, religious assimilation efforts in Balochistan largely failed due to entrenched ethnic nationalism, economic exclusion, and political marginalization. Attempts to expand madrassas, delegitimize nationalist leaders as “anti-Islamic,” and support religious movements have been met with resistance, deepening distrust between the Baloch population and the state. The study found that religion alone cannot sustain national cohesion, particularly in regions with longstanding grievances and systemic inequalities. This research emphasizes the limitations of top-down, coercive assimilationist policies and underscores the necessity for more inclusive approaches, such as addressing economic disparities, recognizing regional identities, and promoting political participation as essential components for building a sustainable and unified nation. The study provides critical insights for policymakers, advocating for a shift from religious assimilation to strategies that prioritize justice, equity, and cultural accommodation, particularly in KPK and Balochistan. Full article

While digital religion and digital protest can ideally serve the common good, religious nationalist and fundamentalist movements have exploited these tools to disrupt the social fabric and create dangerous political outcomes. This paper examines how religious communicators within Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) perceive and enact their responsibility within digital spaces, leveraging the power of “networked communities” and the collective identity of the digital “crowd” to advance their agendas of religious fundamentalism and political conservatism. Bypassing traditional media, groups like the AfD and TLP exploit digital religion to build communities, spread propaganda that merges religion with national identity, frame political issues as religious mandates, and mobilize collective action. Campbell’s concept of the “networked community” demonstrates how digital technologies form decentralized, fluid, and global religious communities, distinct from traditional, geographically bound ones. Both the TLP and AfD have tapped into this new digital religious space, shaping and mobilizing political and religious identities across virtual borders. Gerbaudo’s idea of the “digital crowd” complements this by examining how collective action in the digital age reshapes mass mobilization, with social media transforming how political movements operate in the 21st century. Although the AfD’s platform is not overtly religious, the party strategically invokes ethno-Christian identity, framing opposition to Islam and Muslim immigration as a defense of German cultural and Christian values. Similarly, the TLP promotes religious nationalism by advocating for Pakistan’s Islamic identity against secularism and liberalism and calling for strict enforcement of blasphemy laws. Recognizing digital spaces as tools co-opted by religious nationalist movements, this paper explores how communicators in these movements understand their responsibility for the social and long term consequences of their messages. Using Luhmann’s systems theory—where communication is central to social systems—this paper analyzes how the TLP and AfD leverage individuals’ need for purpose and belonging to mobilize them digitally. By crafting emotionally charged experiences, these movements extend their influence beyond virtual spaces and into the broader public sphere. Finally, this paper will reflect on the theological implications of these dynamics both on and offline. How do religious communicators in digital spaces reconcile their theological frameworks with the social impact of their communication? Can digital religious communities be harnessed to foster social cohesion and inclusivity instead of exacerbating social divisions? Through this lens, the paper seeks to deepen our understanding of the intersection between digital religion, political mobilization, and theological responsibility in the digital age. Full article

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey, while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became its leader in 2003, and both have remained in power until today. Initially, Erdoğan had a predominantly Islamist discourse, and in that period, Islam became gradually more visible in public space and foreign relations. However, that Islamist discourse later increasingly gave way to realpolitik due to domestic requirements and international economic and political changes. This article deals with this transition from Islamism to civil religion and secularism during Erdoğan’s power and explores its nature and characteristics as well as the impact on politics. I suggest that while still sometimes making use of an Islamist rhetoric, Erdoğan’s focus in recent years has been more on various secular–sacred items of civil religion, like homeland, nation (as a chosen people), national flag, (sacralized) state, and, additionally, national development. I examine the civil religion Erdoğan advocates by analyzing his official and casual speeches, interviews he gave, and some of the slogans he used. I also suggest that Erdoğan’s transition to civil religion also represents a shift to secularism, as modern civil religions undermine and subordinate established religions to a great extent and also create their own secular sacredness. Full article

Religion has become increasingly important in the discourse and ideology of the ‘fourth wave’ of the populist radical right which began in 2000 in Europe. To achieve its normalization in the political contest, these formations have shifted from openly racist positions to other arguments that, like religion, can be used to present their proposals in terms that are, at least apparently, democratic. This paper analyzes how Fratelli d’Italia and Vox appeal to religion in their efforts to construct national identity and differentiate from the “Other”. To develop our research, we have carried out a qualitative analysis of the programs, founding documents, speeches, parliamentary interventions, interviews, and key messages of the leaders of both parties from their foundation until the European elections of June 2024. Despite the differences, the emergence of religion in a broad sense, as a form of a sacralization of politics, can be observed in both parties. In both cases, there is also a “politicization” of religion, which emerges as a secularized Christianity. Both parties appeal to a “Christian secularity”, which, in their opinion, must be defended against Islam. Full article

The majority of US Black social movement organizations during the second half of the twentieth century had explicit ties to either Christian or Islamic religious institutions. The Black Panther Party (BPP) was a notable outlier in its secularism. Through the lens of radicalization, this paper examines the place of violence in the Party’s ideological platform and political practice relative to the Party’s secularism and experience of state repression. Drawing on newly available archival materials, we examine how Party members conceptualized their own programs, made sense of, and responded to the repressive intervention of state actors and institutions in their attempts to create social change. Full article

The enduring narrative of Islamist victimhood, particularly for those who call for a just governance system on behalf of devout Muslim society, which they claim has been systematically repressed and forced underground by the Kemalists, has been prominently echoed in both Turkish and Western scholarship from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. Scholars argued that loosening the hegemonic Kemalist grip on state institutions would promote democracy and civil rights; however, when Islamists took control of the state apparatus in the 2010s, it became evident that this support contributed to the rise of an autocratic electoral regime with Islamist overtones, worsening democracy, which became more repressive than ever after the Kemalist threat was removed. Despite the prominence of these victimhood narratives, the origin and credibility of these claims have not been critically and systematically examined. Through a detailed analysis of biographies, official texts, and personal memoirs, this study assesses the validity of the foundational Islamist victimhood narratives. The findings challenge the narrative of widespread repression, demonstrating that many religious figures continued to operate openly under the Kemalist regime, using the closure of Sufi lodges as a tool to construct a narrative of collective victimhood for political leverage. This study is significant because it highlights how academia can fall into similar “victimhood traps” elsewhere in the world by amplifying victimhood narratives without fully understanding their dynamics or verifying their factual basis, ultimately worsening the situation. Full article

We introduce the Ising Network Opinion Formation (INOF) model and apply it to the analysis of networks of six Wikipedia language editions. In the model, Ising spins are placed at network nodes/articles and the steady-state opinion polarization of spins is determined from the Monte Carlo iterations in which a given spin orientation is determined by in-going links from other spins. The main consideration was the opinion confrontation between capitalism, imperialism (blue opinion) and socialism, communism (red opinion). These nodes have fixed spin/opinion orientation while other nodes achieve their steady-state opinions in the process of Monte Carlo iterations. We found that the global network opinion favors socialism, communism for all six editions. The model also determined the opinion preferences for world countries and political leaders, showing good agreement with heuristic expectations. We also present results for opinion competition between Christianity and Islam, and USA Democratic and Republican parties. We argue that the INOF approach can find numerous applications for directed complex networks. Full article

The challenge arises from Malaysia’s struggle to foster peaceful connections among its diverse ethnic groups, mainly due to the prevalence of politics centered around religious and ethnic identities. To examine how racialised political sentiments subtly influence power dynamics, this study analyses four digital excerpts using a critical discursive approach. The primary sources are secondary materials such as videos and social media posts in cyberspace related to the 15th General Election political campaigns. This article demonstrates that language is used to create and reinforce religious and racial divisions in pursuing political power by the two most significant political parties, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP). It emphasises the underlying power that drives these discourses, where cyberspace linguistic features and access to digital technologies have the “power” to shape audience reactions. The selected analysed excerpts collectively contribute to the primary discourse that fuels racial sentiments, especially those related to race, religion, and royalty (3R sentiments) in electoral competition. Full article

While there is a large body of literature on different models of secularism and religion and politics, relatively scarce attention has been devoted to the experimentation of the moderate secularism model in authoritarian and Muslim-majority countries. This article brings a novel insight into the literature by unpacking the complex relationship between secularism, politics, and religion in Turkiye. The Turkish Republic was founded on the norm of authoritarian secularism that promulgates the exclusion of religion both from the political and public spheres. After the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power, Turkiye appeared to be moving toward moderate secularism through policies, such as the liberalization of the headscarf and the expansion of non-Muslim rights. By examining the transformed role of the Diyanet (the Presidency of Religious Affairs), Imam Hatip schools, and the conversion of church-turned-museums into mosques, this article illustrates that rather than moving in the direction of moderate secularism, the JDP has rather instrumentalized it and has eventually worked toward infusing Islamic norms into the Turkish state through bureaucratic and political initiatives. By examining and contextualizing the trajectory of secularism in Turkiye, this study contributes to the literature on religion, authoritarianism, and secularism in general, and ongoing debates on Turkish politics in particular. Full article