National Populism and Religion: The Case of Fratelli d’Italia and Vox

Abstract

Religion has become increasingly important in the discourse and ideology of the ‘fourth wave’ of the populist radical right which began in 2000 in Europe. To achieve its normalization in the political contest, these formations have shifted from openly racist positions to other arguments that, like religion, can be used to present their proposals in terms that are, at least apparently, democratic. This paper analyzes how Fratelli d’Italia and Vox appeal to religion in their efforts to construct national identity and differentiate from the “Other”. To develop our research, we have carried out a qualitative analysis of the programs, founding documents, speeches, parliamentary interventions, interviews, and key messages of the leaders of both parties from their foundation until the European elections of June 2024. Despite the differences, the emergence of religion in a broad sense, as a form of a sacralization of politics, can be observed in both parties. In both cases, there is also a “politicization” of religion, which emerges as a secularized Christianity. Both parties appeal to a “Christian secularity”, which, in their opinion, must be defended against Islam.

1. Introduction

Religion has become increasingly relevant in the discourse and ideology of the “fourth wave” (von Beyme 1988; Mudde 2007) of the populist radical right, which emerged in Europe in 2000. In their effort to achieve “normalization” and to be perceived as legitimate parties in the political contest, these formations have abandoned openly racist positions, adopting instead arguments centered on issues such as religion, secularism, or gender equality. These strategies seek to present their migration proposals as democratic and acceptable. Is it here where religion appears both in the broadest sense as a sacralization of politics, but above all as a politicization of religion, a feature of identity that must be defended, along with secularism, against Islam. However, this process has not been attended to until recent times. The work of Marzouki et al. (2016) stands as a key reference to understand how populists “hijack” religion for the benefit of their ideological interests. According to this perspective, religion is instrumentalized; that is, it is used as a resource outside its original ideological core to support nativist and populist agendas (Marzouki et al. 2016; Wodak 2015)1.

Studies on this subject show how the question of religion in these parties responds—without being a part of it—to what constitutes their ideological core according to Mudde’s (2007) definition: authoritarianism and, above all, populism and nativism (Betz 2003; Zúquete 2017; DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Peker 2022; Beuter et al. 2023). The work of Brubaker (2017a) is particularly relevant in explaining how religion emerges in the context of its confrontation with Islam in a civilizational framework that is defined by identitarian Christianity, liberalism, and secularism. More recently, an interest has emerged in analyzing the compatibility between this apparent religious resurgence and the secularized European context (Morieson 2021; Peker 2021; Innerarity 2023; Cremer 2023). These analyzes coincide in pointing to a “growing standardization” (Marzouki et al. 2016) of the populist radical right’s discourse in relation to religion, especially in Western European countries, despite the differences between the various national contexts2. Such standardization derives, fundamentally, from two nuclear elements of its ideology, populism and nativism, as is described below.

1.1. Religion and the Ideological Core of the Populist Radical Right: The Sacralization of Politics and the Politicization of (Secularized) Religion

In the discourse and ideology of the populist radical right, religion appears in the two ways pointed out by Linz (2006), as a religious use of politics and as a political use of religion. On the one hand, the religious use of politics arises from the populist character of these formations (Zúquete 2017; Brubaker 2017b; DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Pérez-Agote and Aleman 2023). According to Mudde, populism is “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté genérale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, p. 543). From this binary, Manichean and simplistic division of society, between a homogeneous “good” and a homogeneous “evil” (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2017, p. 7; Zúquete 2017, p. 9; Brubaker 2017a), a “national populism” (Taguieff 1995, pp. 32–35) unfolds in which religion emerges as a sacralization of the people and of politics.

The sacralization of the people associated with populism refers to the process by which populist leaders grant a kind of ‘sacredness’ or ‘inviolability’ to the people, often understood as a homogenous and pure unity that is above political, social, and economic divisions. This idea is used strategically to mobilize and unite people around a collective sense of identity and legitimacy. This process of sacralization has several aspects (Zúquete 2017; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021). Firstly, the portrayal of the people as a pure entity, “a moral community that sees itself with the collective mission of fighting conspiratorial enemies, redeeming the nation from its alleged crisis” (Zúquete 2017, p. 453). A second aspect of this sacralization is the consideration of the people as an indivisible whole, a monolithic unity, in which differences are minimized or ignored for the sake of a collective identity. Populism tends to present an ‘us versus them’ vision, simplifying social complexity into a struggle between the people and the elites, who are accused of corrupting or betraying them. In the case of the populist radical right, this binary relationship between the people and the elites is complemented by a third element derived from its nativism, the external ‘Other’, represented in cultural–religious terms: Islam. Thirdly, the leader is often presented as the ‘legitimate representative’ of the people, someone who does not belong to the elites or established interests. This leader takes on the task of defending and representing the interests of the people, and his discourse is based on the idea that he is in direct contact with the ‘real’ needs and desires of the population. Schmitt’s theory of political representation echoes here (Schmitt 1922). According to Carl Schmitt, political representation is the ability to make political unity visible. The leader is not just an individual endowed with power, but rather an embodiment of the collective identity of the political community; therefore, the leader’s presence and actions become a symbol that represents political unity and creates a bond between himself and the people. The leader represents the state and the people, symbolizing the indivisibility of the political community, and fostering a bond that transcends mere legal or institutional frameworks. Closely linked to the role of the leader, the sacralization of the people also translates into a symbolic construction of the community. Through constant rhetoric and symbolism such as speeches, images, and public performances, populist leaders reinforce the idea that the people are a special entity that deserves to be defended at all costs (Pérez-Agote and Aleman 2023). This helps to create a strong sense of belonging and solidarity among supporters, while at the same time fostering a sense of exclusion of those who are not part of the people. In short, the sacralization of the people in populism is not just a matter of rhetoric, but a strategy for uniting society around a simplified and polarized idea of ‘us’ (the people) versus ‘them’ (the elites, Islam). Populism thus “promises a believing community ‘salvation’ if they follow a particular leader” (Yilmaz and Morieson 2021). This has the potential to result in a strengthening of the figure of the leader, who is seen—or who presents himself—as the sole individual capable of interpreting and defending the will of this sacred people.

In this context, politics acquires a salvific character, with its own myths, rites, and symbols, that becomes a “surrogate of religion” (Linz 2006). The populist leader assumes the role of savior, confronting conspiratorial enemies who embody evil (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, p. 179). A good example of such populist political messianism is Marine Le Pen’s video for the 2017 presidential election. In this video, the leader presents herself, not only as just another one of the people—woman, mother, lawyer—but, above all, as she herself emphasizes, French: the leader embodies the people and the attacks on France are attacks on her person. Something similar occurs when the attacks on the Church and its representants are perceived as attacks on God. “It is a matter”, she asserts, “of choosing a model of civilization” that she, the savior, will lead from the Presidency against the enemies of France “in the name of the people” (Le Pen 2017). All this is framed in grandiose landscapes, some of them located in Normandy, evoking, thus, a sense of patriotism linked to the national heritage.

Along with this sacralization of politics and in clear relation to the opposition between the people and their enemies, the politicization of religion in a strict sense, the political use of religion, is closely linked to another of the nuclear ideological elements of these parties: nativism. This is defined as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007, p. 19). In this framework, religion is used to construct the identity of the people in homogeneous terms, marking a distinction between the good ‘us’ and the bad ‘them’” (Roy 2016, p. 186). Thus, parties appeal to the ‘Christian Identity of Europe’ (Marzouki et al. 2016; Zúquete 2017; Giorgi 2022) to emphasize cultural and civilizational differences with outside groups, particularly Islam. ‘We’ (i.e., the Occident or Christian Europe) must defend ‘Ourselves’ against ‘Them’ (i.e., the ‘Orient’: Rome, Jews, Muslims) (Wodak 2015, p. 20).

1.2. Religion and Secularity: Secularized Christianity and Christian Secularism

The return of religion in the contemporary political discourse of the populist radical right seems paradoxical in a largely secularized European context. This is particularly salient when these formations not only deploy their action in a liberal environment, but precisely consider that liberal values, including the differentiation between politics and religion, that is, secularization, are aspects of our identity that distinguish us from Islam. Marine Le Pen refers to this combination of Christianity and secularity as a feature of national identity in the context of the 2012 presidential elections: “France is France. It has Christian roots, that is, this is what makes its identity. It is secular (laïque); we hold on to this identity and we will not allow it to be changed” (Le Parisien 2011)3. Furthermore, both arguments must be compatible, otherwise we could not explain the growing electoral success of these formations, given the decline in religious belief and practice in Europe4. There are several arguments that allow us to understand this apparent paradox. We explain them below.

In the first place, the compatibility between the defense of religion and secularity is explained by the fact that references to religion do not seem to contain a transcendent meaning, a call to faith or observance, but religion is understood in a merely cultural sense. Europe is a Christian continent because the people who inhabit it is Christian. But it is what some authors call a “culturalized religion” (Astor and Mayrl 2020), “religion as heritage, not religion as belief” (Joppke 2018); “religion recast as culture and as vital to the heritage of some countries” (Beaman 2020). Religion here becomes an identity marker of the European “leading culture” (Roy 2019), rather than a defense of Christianity as a creed or as a religious practice. That is why they do not speak of faith, but always of Christian “identity”, of Christian “values”, “traditions”, of the “Christian roots of Europe” (Eatwell and Goodwin 2019, p. 173). It is a question of belonging, not of believing (Roy 2016), but a question of belonging to a people, not to an institution. For this reason, these parties refer to Christendom—the set of countries with a Christian tradition—rather than to Christianity—the Christian religion itself, with its doctrines and practices. It is an awareness of our own identity that is activated in the face of the growing visibility of Islam. Populist radical right parties “have emphasized Christianity as a cultural and civilization identity” only in response to the perceived “civilizational threat from Islam” (Brubaker 2017a). We define the immigrant by (Muslim) religion and ourselves by an “identitarian Christianism” (ibid.), but that does not mean that we are religious. It is only a set of traditions, symbols, and values, not beliefs and precepts.

This reference to a “secular Christianism” (Joppke 2013) and its symbols converted into culture, is what allows its deployment in secularized societies. In this sense, Roy argues that “even if the identity of Europe is Christian, it is no longer a religious identity because the faith has left” (Roy 2013, p. 11). Therefore, “staunch secularists can now defend a Christian identity” (Roy 2013, p. 11) in a “Godless crusade” (Cremer 2023). Indeed, the more secularized Europe becomes, the more easily it can integrate religious tradition into the definition of its identity (Brubaker 2017a, p. 9). The fact is that these parties are not, properly speaking, religious parties, but religion obeys the purpose of defining a civilizational identity (Brubaker 2017a) and excluding Islam as alien to Europe. Howevers, while they underline that liberal values are at the core of European civilization, in opposition to cultures perceived as “retrograde” such as Islam, these parties tend to maintain, at the same time, clearly conservative views, for example, regarding gender issues.

The cultural use of religion allows these formations to avoid certain contradictions in their discourse. Firstly, since it is not a cult, these parties can demand privileges for Christian traditions, such as the celebration of Easter, without challenging state neutrality and secularity proper to the West. Moreover, it allows restricting Muslim religious practices without contradicting the liberal commitment to religious freedom (Joppke 2013, p. 606; Brubaker 2017a, p. 10). Thus, for example, Marine Le Pen can propose to ban Muslim prayer in the streets—compared to the Nazi occupation—while admitting, at the same time, religious manifestations “having a traditional character, deeply rooted in the local or national culture” (Rassemblement National 2021), in a clear allusion to Christian traditions.

On the other hand, although references to Christianity in the speeches of these parties always allude to values, it is not a general commitment to Christian moral precepts, but rather a reference to “our traditions and customs”. This allows for a selective use of arguments, leaving aside those Christian values that may contravene their proposals on issues such as immigration or social justice. This selectivity explains the frequent confrontations with the Catholic Church and the questioning of the authority of its hierarchy, without conflicting with the party’s discourse on this topic. This “dissent” is due to the fact that the party does not aim to defend the Church as an institution, but instead promotes an individualized, non-institutional form of Christianity, a “believing without belonging” approach (Davie 1990). This phenomenon is coherent with the process of de-institutionalization and disintermediation that religions have undergone in contemporary societies (Casanova 2000).

The fact that Christianity, in their discourse, is neither a creed, nor a cult, nor a system of moral precepts, nor an institution, is what allows them to defend the Judeo-Christian identity and, at the same time, secularity as an achievement of European civilization. Together with this culturalized Christianity, secularity is another key identity marker in their strategy of differentiation from Islam. In the perspective of right-wing populist parties, Islam is a religion alien to the West, not only because of the ‘strangeness’ of its practices, but above all because it has not experienced—nor can it experience—the process of secularization that defines the West. Moreover, the concern of these parties about Islam is not so much about Muslim religious practices per se, rather it is chiefly focused on the visibility of Islam in the public space. The mere presence of Islam in Europe and, particularly, its increasing visibility (for example, by the use of the veil or the construction of mosques), not only blurs the panorama of our cities, but also, fundamentally, threatens the secularity that defines us. In this way, a “sacralization of secularism” is produced, as an absolute value to be defended against the threat of Islam. However, this is a “Christian secularism” (Brubaker 2017a), what Joppke has described as “moderate secularism” (Joppke 2015), which exclude Islam allowing at the same time the vindication of a Christian identity without sacrificing the commitment to secularism.

Together with the allusions to Muslim religious practices in the public space, Islam often appears not as a religious creed, but as a political ideology that aims to conquer Europe. This ambivalence when referring to Islam makes it possible to overcome another possible contradiction: defending the religious freedom of the native population while questioning or restricting that of those who practice Islam. This is one more rhetorical strategy with which to circumvent its discursive contradictions (Wodak 2015).

In short, Christianity in the discourse and ideology of the populist radical right is not a faith, nor a religious practice, nor a cult, nor an institution—that is why it is compatible with secularization. Nor is it a moral system—that is why it is compatible with other aspects of its discourse. It is a matter of culture, used to define the identity of the people—of the nation—and to legitimize the exclusion of Islam. Precisely for this reason it is possible to appeal to (secularized) Christianity and at the same time defend (Christian) secularism as something that defines us, Europeans, in the face of Islam.

If Christianity has undergone a fundamental transformation that has allowed it to become a culture, secularism has also experienced substantial changes in the domain of political competition. If, traditionally, it had been an issue proper to the left in the face of the power of the Church in different areas of social life, now it is the right of the political spectrum that has made this issue its own in its combat against Islam (Brubaker 2017a; Innerarity 2023). This is yet another example of the instrumentalization of issues by the populist radical right, like the use of the argument of defending gender equality against Islam (Innerarity et al. 2024), which reveals a profoundly illiberal liberalism.

1.3. Vox and Fratelli d’Italia

Vox in Spain and Fratelli d’Italia in Italy represent paradigmatic cases of young parties that have managed to consolidate themselves in the space of the radical right in Europe (Rama et al. 2021; Jaráiz et al. 2020; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020). Although they emerge in different national and political contexts, they share ideological and strategic connections, especially in the use of Christianity as a central element of their identity narratives.

Vox was born in 2013 as a split from the Partido Popular, presenting itself as an ultra-conservative and nationalist response to the decline of traditional values in Spain and the alleged dismemberment of national unity because of the separatist process in Catalonia (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). Fratelli d’Italia emerged in 2012 from the reorganization of the Italian right after the collapse of Alleanza Nazionale and the leadership crisis in the center-right (Vassallo and Vignati 2023; Canzano Giansante 2023). Although both share an emphasis on nationalism and the defense of Christian values, the differences in their trajectories reflect the different degrees of secularization in their national contexts.

At the institutional level, both countries declare the non-denominational nature of the state in their constitutions. At the same time, they have concordats with the Catholic Church that protect certain privileges and its influence in cultural matters. In short, they are non-confessional states, but Catholicism continues to have a symbolic weight in both countries, in line with what has been called “moderate secularism” (Joppke 2015).

In Spain, secularization has advanced significantly, leaving Catholicism with less institutional influence, but retaining a symbolic weight in cultural identity (Ruiz Andrés 2022; Díaz de Rada and Gil-Gimeno 2023). In Italy, although there has also been a process of secularization, the Catholic Church maintains a more visible presence in the public and political sphere. These differences condition how Vox and Fratelli d’Italia position their religious discourses in relation to their electorates.

2. Methodology

To develop our research, we have carried out a qualitative analysis of the programs, speeches, official documents, parliamentary interventions, interviews, and key messages of the leaders of both parties from their foundation until the European elections of June 2024.

The main source of analysis has been the founding documents of both parties, as well as the programs drawn up for the general and European elections held since their formation until the present day. We chose the programs as the basic material, as they are the most visible face of the party at a given moment in time in ideological terms (Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2013). In them, we looked for all references to religion, Christianity, Catholicism, the Catholic Church, Islam, and secularity to see, through discursive analysis, how they reflected the main discursive topics identified by the academic literature on this issue. To illustrate and complement the programs in a more dynamic way, particularly significant speeches by Santiago Abascal (Vox) and Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d’Italia) have also been selected, such as those at the opening of the campaign in the case of Vox or at the closing of the Fratelli d’Italia meeting in Trieste in 2017. Without carrying out exhaustive research, we also draw on parliamentary interventions at the national level and in the European Parliament, especially in debates on immigration, education, and family issues, which confirm our findings. In the case of Italy, we have conducted interviews with party leaders. This approach allows us to identify how Vox and Fratelli d’Italia integrate religion into their political proposals and how they articulate their narrative around issues of identity, culture, and values, aligning themselves with the radical right-wing formations in their immediate surroundings.

3. Results

3.1. Vox

3.1.1. Populism: Salvific Politics

The sacralization of politics linked to populism in the sense we have pointed out above is particularly evident in some of the videos prepared by Vox in the context of electoral campaigns. Symbols, music, images, and landscapes serve to evoke the image of the people as a ‘pure’ unit and the leader as their savior. Already in the video set up for the 2016 general elections (Vox 2016), images of Santiago Abascal climbing a steep mountain, facing the storm, are shown. These images, accompanied by epic music and a speech loaded with terms such as “courage” and “honor” project a heroic vision of politics. A politics of a distinctly moral and Manichean character, as reflected in the recurrent contraposition between concepts such as courage/fear, virtue/vice, and honor/cowardice. “If you choose beauty, goodness and truth”, Abascal affirms, “you will be making Spain great again”, an expression that recalls Trump’s motto “Make America great again”. The leader is invested here with an epic character, presenting himself as the defender of the people and their cultural integrity.

A similar representation of politics appears in the video produced a few months before the 2018 Andalusian elections (Vox 2018a). In this video, with scenes that evoke the film The Lord of the Rings and its soundtrack, reference is made to the “Reconquest of Spain”5, a recurring topic in Vox, which is posited as a process that must begin in Andalusia. In fact, it is common for Abascal to start the electoral campaign in Covadonga, a place in the north of Spain mythologized as the cradle of the Reconquest against the Muslims and, therefore, the origin of the Spanish nation6. This reference to the Reconquest, to the #espíritudeCovadonga, includes a clear exaltation of history and of the nation, which owes its origins to the confrontation with Islam. In addition to populism’s epic vision of politics, the allusion to the Reconquista also reflects the politicization of religion derived from its nativism, as we will explain below.

3.1.2. Nativism: The Politicization of Religion

The mythification of the Reconquista establishes a discursive framework in which religion appears linked to the identity and nativist discourse of Vox. “Here it all began”, Abascal recently declared in Asturias (Vox 2024a), “here began the reconquest against the enemies of the cross”, he pointed out, alluding at the same time to the “Islamist migratory invasion that we are suffering”. The roots of Spain—and of Europe, in general—are eminently Christian, and that is why it is necessary to defend Christianity inside and outside our borders. This perspective is reflected in different initiatives, such as the request for diplomatic actions to protect Christians in the world or the proposal to officially support the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland to establish an “International Day for Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief”. In addition, Vox promotes the establishment in Spain of a “Day of Solidarity with Persecuted Christians” (Vox 2022). The justification for these actions lies in the fact that “Spain is a country of Christian culture and, consequently, its basic legal institutions are inspired by the Christian tradition, as are those of the West as a whole” (Vox 2023).

This identity based on Christian traditions is presented in a monolithic way, without admitting any division within it. Pluralism, then, becomes the first enemy to fight. That is why Vox urges the Government to suppress the Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia7, arguing that it facilitates “other religious confessions to acquire a greater influence in our society, perpetrating the call effect of illegal immigration and boosting the so-called multiculturalism” (Vox 2023), one of the “globalist dogmas” that, according to the party, threaten Spanish identity. Christianity is used, therefore, to justify its rejection of immigration. Moreover, as it is usual in this type of formations, trying to avoid been accused of racism, its discourse is “dressed up” with apparently democratic arguments, such as the statement that the Foundation “has limited itself to disseminating and promoting confessions that are, in some cases, hostile to democracy and that attack the dignity of women” (Vox 2023). The rejection of Islam appears frequently in a civilizational frame. In this respect, Vox argues that “Western civilization cannot be understood without the three pillars on which it was built: Christian tradition, Greek philosophy and Roman law. Christianity is an essential part of the Spanish historical identity” (Vox 2023). Therefore, “Islam should not be taught in schools because it is incompatible with our democracy” (Vox 2021b). It is a religion that teaches inequality between men and women or condemns homosexuality. With this same approach, Vox proposes “to reject any attempt to integrate into the Union those States that do not accept the above principles and values and particularly those States that directly or indirectly assume the political postulates of Islam and the imposition of religious ways of life on European citizens” (Vox 2024b). Islam is an adversary that demands a robust defense, particularly considering its repudiation of liberal values, most notably the denial of religious freedom and secularity.

It is an Islam, on the other hand, that is associated in its discourse with Islamic fundamentalism (Vox 2015). Hence the reiteration of the proposal for the “closure of fundamentalist mosques and prohibition of their financing by States or foreign organizations” (Vox 2021c). “Zero tolerance with all forms of Islamic fundamentalism. We will close mosques or centers of worship that propagate ideas that are contrary to our culture and identity such as Islamic radicalism, jihad or contempt for women and our customs” (Vox 2023).

The Christian identity of Europe is thus perceived to be under threat by the process of ‘Islamization’, which is seen as a growing challenge. The elites are the main culprits of this process, they point out, within their populist discourse. “Endophobia as hatred and contempt for one’s own culture has been a constant of the left in this country and continues to be so in our democracy. It is that rejection of the identity and inherent characteristics of the social group that they even dare to mock. It is an attack on the roots and traditions of the people whom they confuse by inoculating their ideological hatred” (Vox 2021a).

In this context, the reproduction of one’s own culture and the rejection of mixing should be an objective of the state. “Many of the secular symbols... come from religious traditions and customs... They are part of our identity and culture and as such must be protected by the public authorities, both nationally and internationally” (Vox 2022). That is why the party proposes, right from its first founding documents: “Quotas of origin will be established, privileging nationalities that share language and important ties of friendship and culture with Spain” (Vox 2018b). Christianity is one of them. For this very reason, the State must assume the commitment to promote its presence in the public space. This is the purpose behind the proposal to declare Easter Week in Madrid as an event of regional tourist interest, “a preliminary step towards its declaration as an ‘event of national tourist interest’” (Vox 2024c), or the defense of the teaching of the Catholic religion in schools, a subject that should receive the same treatment as any other in the educational curriculum (Vox 2020).

Linked to this identitarian conception of Christianity, secularism is also a key characteristic of Western societies according to Vox. However, the party defends a particular version of secularism. It is not the ‘aggressive secularism’ that the party attributes to elites, claiming that this is a strategy designed to eliminate the presence of Catholicism from the public sphere. “That left that makes absolute contempt for Christianity and advocates the imposition of a false secularism; and that, in our culture, Catholic by definition because it is universal, defends Islamism that treats women as an inferior being or condemns homosexuality, contradictions that ride frequently and brazenly. It is the left that aims at cultural and thought hegemony” (Vox 2021a)8. Against this ‘aggressive secularism’, hostile to religion, which the Government intends to impose, neutrality and the principle of positive secularism prevail in the Spanish State, as they point out in the argumentation against the Organic Law of Education of 2020 (Vox 2020), whereas at the same time, Vox rejects any form of accommodation for Islam in public spaces.

This positive secularism implies guaranteeing religious freedom and respect for all confessions, ensuring that none is discriminated against. “End the censorship and persecution of freedom of thought, conscience and religion imposed by the von der Leyen government (...), we will defend religious freedom” (Vox 2024b). Protection of religious freedom also outside our borders is implied. “Promote all necessary actions in the EU, following the Hungarian model, for the defense of religious freedom and persecuted Christians” (Vox 2024b).

This freedom has a special application in the field of education, as reflected, for example, in their criticism of the reform of the Organic Law of Education of 2020 mentioned above. This is a law that, they point out, “strips the subject of Religion of all academic value and does not even program an alternative subject, violating the Concordat9 with the Holy See that provides that the Catholic religion be taught in conditions comparable to the other fundamental disciplines” (Vox 2020). For this reason, they urge the government to guarantee the right of parents to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education that is in accordance with their own convictions. However, this right only corresponds, it seems, to those who want to educate their children in the Catholic religion, not Islam, whose teaching the party intends to exclude from schools. Regarding Islam, “the Spanish State has no other duty than to guarantee the freedom of religion and worship of its faithful with no other limitation, in its manifestations, than that necessary for the maintenance of public order protected by law. It has no obligation to incorporate its teachings into the school curriculum” (Vox 2021b). The argument is based on religious freedom and the right of parents to choose their children’s education. However, as a consequence of the nativist character of this formation, this liberal argument does not apply to individuals who adhere to other religions or identify with different cultures. The protection of Catholicism and rejection of Islam is in clear contradiction with the commitment of the party to a positive secularism that respects all religions and ensures that none is discriminated against.

In any case, the defense of Christianity does not preclude Vox’s confrontation with the ecclesiastical institution. The first confrontation derives from the fact that, as we have pointed out, populists do not refer to Christianity as a system of beliefs, values, and practices, but only as an identity. For this reason, while the party considers the involvement of the State in its reproduction to be essential, they select only those values that are most in line with their ideology; everything that has to do with charity or hospitality clashes head-on with their creed. This has caused numerous disagreements with Pope Francis, whom Santiago Abascal refers to as “citizen Bergoglio”, to delegitimize his authority. The fundamental clash derives from the Pope’s statements in favor of the opening of Europe’s borders and his “excessive hospitality” towards immigration. Thus, for example, Ivan Espinosa (former general secretary of Vox) notes, ironically, that he respects that the Pope wants to welcome in the Vatican as many migrants as he wishes but urges him to respect the sovereignty of each country to manage its borders as it sees fit.

In short, the Catholic religion appears in the context of their nativist discourse as an argument to build Spanish/European identity and mark the difference with Islam. It is an argument that allows the party to justify its proposals in matters of migration, thereby circumventing potential allegations of racism.

3.2. Fratelli d’Italia: A Philosophy of Identity

In the discourse of Fratelli d’Italia, religion appears in an identity key, linked to its conservatism and as a way of dealing with the crisis of values and identity affecting Europe, and particularly, Italy. In the document drafted during the party’s second national congress in 2017, held in Trieste—a city rich in patriotic symbolism10—it is explicitly stated that this crisis is largely attributed to attacks stemming from “the same ideological scheme inaugurated by the Enlightenment in its crusade in the name of reason against the authority of tradition” (Fratelli d’Italia 2017). The text denounces that the “mystification” of the Enlightenment led to the “delegitimization of authority”, especially religious authority. Therefore, the defense and, at the same time, the political vindication of the recovery of tradition, must be regarded as nothing other than the reaffirmation of a religious tradition, given that this has historically prevailed in Italy in the absence of a civil tradition of national scope.

Religion not only gives content to identity, but also, and not least, contributes to the unity and sanctification of the people (Urbinati 2014). Thus, in this discursive construction of a collective political identity, the party stresses the centrality of “Christian roots” to restore community ties in a context of disintegration and cultural weakness (Fratelli d’Italia 2017). This position is reaffirmed in the program for the 2024 European elections:

“Fratelli d’Italia wants to defend the identity of European peoples and nations. For us, Europe represents the foundational core of the West, the space where, throughout history, the values and principles on which our civilization is based have been forged: freedom, equality, democracy, law, and the encounter between faith and reason embodied in our classical and Judeo-Christian roots”.

(Fratelli d’Italia 2024)

In a largely secularized and desacralized context, religion manifests itself mainly in its symbolic dimension. In Italy, a political discourse incorporating religious elements is particularly effective, since, despite the predominant secularization, most of the population identifies itself as Catholic, even if it does not actively practice religion. This discrepancy between affiliation and practice is evidence that symbolic identification prevails over faith as a personal choice.

In support of the reduction of religion to a cultural component and, therefore, to a sort of religious substitute, Giorgia Meloni affirmed in the interview she gave us in 2022: “Politics for me is a form of civil religion”, understanding by civil religion, Meloni continues, “that culture capable of defending the pillars of identity” (Meloni personal interview 21 May 2022), of which religion is an element of support. In the same vein, Giovan Battista Fazzolari, program director and chief ideologist of the party, pointed out in the interview we conducted in 2022: “civil religion expresses for us a conservative identity that is also a religious identity” (Fazzolari personal interview 21 May 2022). Giovanni Donzelli, the party’s organizational director, further emphasized the following: “Our conservatism is a political culture of identity in defense of Christian roots and an anthropocentric vision of man” (Donzelli personal interview 21 May 2022).

Meloni reinforces in her autobiography this secularized view of religion on which she intends to rebuild the social bond by stating that her struggles against “progressivism” do not derive, despite being a believer, from a confessional approach to politics. Rather, she asserts that her motivations are rooted in the need to save society from those who undermine the foundations of an orderly and “healthy” coexistence through regulations such as euthanasia, surrogate motherhood, free abortion, or gender self-determination (Meloni 2021a, p. 33). According to her perspective, such regulations break community ties based on Christian values. Politics thus acquires a salvific character, centered on the defense of the traditional family, seen as a religious bond and symbol of the social bond par excellence, indispensable for the political and identity narrative of the party. Fazzolari reinforces this idea in the same interview: “The feature that best defines the party ideologically is, without a doubt, identity. The great conflict of values is around identity: conservatives value preserving that of the individual, the family, the national context, civilization and religion. This contrasts with those who believe that all these identities must be overcome” (Fazzolari personal interview 21 May 2022).

The political use of religion in the identity narrative of Fratelli d’Italia is characterized, as might be expected, by the identification of enemies that threaten both traditional religion and collective identity, weakening community ties. The most prominent of these enemies is immigration, especially illegal immigration, and the Islamization of Italian society, which is considered its direct consequence. In this context, the defense of Christian roots is seen as a matter of survival, particularly in the face of the cultural weakness of European nations, which exposes them to the aggression of anti-identity forces such as radical Islam.

The defense of Christian identity therefore helps to justify the rejection of immigration, without being accused of racism. In their view, immigration cannot be considered a right, but rather a concession based on the needs of the State. According to Fratelli d’Italia, protecting the homeland implies, above all, defending its borders, especially against illegal immigration and immigration associated with cultures and beliefs considered difficult to integrate into Europe. The document of the Trieste conference points this out along these lines:

Regulating immigration through flow control means favoring the entry of those who come from nationalities that have been able to integrate easily without creating security problems, and blocking, instead, immigration from those nationalities that have shown themselves less willing to accept our laws and our culture, as is the case of Islamic immigration.

(Fratelli d’Italia 2017)

In line with this view, Giorgia Meloni stated in our 2022 interview, developing an anti-elitism and nativist discourse to identify her political target: “Europe is currently an instrument of technocratic overreach, and it is no coincidence that it makes decisions, such as those related to immigration, without considering the identity of the peoples” (Meloni personal interview 21 May 2022). From this quote, immigration is not a problem in itself, considering also that millions of Italians have historically emigrated abroad, but is a problem insofar as it represents a real or supposed threat to the national culture, defined mainly by its Christian roots. In our 2022 interview, Giorgia Meloni argued the following:

Globalist homogenization is clearly a tool in the hands of great economic concentration and financial speculation. That is to say those who use themes and arguments that, although they seem understandable and attractive, actually seek something quite different. An example is the issue of mass immigration. These are mechanisms that, in our opinion, are used to dismantle the pillars of identity. The family is attacked but also gender identity and religion. Everything that defines people at their core and their roots is under constant threat. Their goal is a world à la John Lennon of the song ‘Imagine’, which for me was a nightmare.

(Meloni 2022)

The religious element thus acquires a central role in the public discourse of Fratelli d’Italia, where the enemy is, above all, who threatens the common faith and, by extension, the sacred unity of the people. This was expressed by Giorgia Meloni in a Facebook post during the 2018 general election campaign:

No to the Islamization of Italy. Defense of our identity against the process of Islamization of Italy and Europe. A battle of Fratelli d’Italia. On March 4 choose which side to be on.

#VoteGiorgiaMeloni. (23 February 2018)

More elaborately, the Trieste Theses argue the following:

A Europe that, by denying its Judeo-Christian and classical roots, subordinates the needs of identity and autonomy of peoples to a radical universalism in harmony with an abstract multiculturalism, gives rise to the indiscriminate access of people from other continents in a number that prefigures a real ethnic replacement.

(Fratelli d’Italia 2017)

According to Fratelli d’Italia, a kind of “soft invasion” would be taking place, facilitated by the financial support for Islamic institutions and organizations in Europe, leading “to the strengthening of Islamic influence in the West” (Fratelli d’Italia 2017). This phenomenon, the document warns, “not only endangers the Greco-Roman and Christian identity of Europe, but also calls into question the principles of equality, freedom, democracy, and secularity of the State on which Western culture is based” (Fratelli d’Italia 2017).

From this perspective, Fratelli d’Italia unfolds a holistic vision of society or, rather, “of the community that is the repository of positive values forged along historical traditions.” According to Colaianni (2019), this community generates strong bonds and a shared sense of identity and belonging, integrating differences “in a natural and prodigious way into an organic whole”11.

To reinforce its stance against the Muslim religion, Fratelli d’Italia’s discourse does not distinguish between moderate Islam, integrated into Western societies, and radical and fundamentalist Islam. This is clearly reflected in the Trieste document:

We are not even afraid to say that the fundamentalist Salafist theories openly spread in our country by fundamentalist Islamic states are the humus in which the terrorism that bloodies our cities is born and grows. This is why we want to prevent fundamentalist propaganda in Italy, limit Islamic immigration to Europe, and reiterate that those who want to live in Italy must accept our culture and identity.

(Fratelli d’Italia 2017)

This positioning translates into specific measures included in the 2018 election program, such as the following:

Prohibition of the financing of places of worship by fundamentalist states. Fight against fundamentalist proselytism that fuels terrorism and the introduction of the crime of Islamic fundamentalism. Registration of imams and obligation of sermons in Italian.

(Fratelli d’Italia 2018)

The rejection of Islam is combined, as usual in these parties, with the defense of Christian symbols against the “aggressive” and “distorted” secularism that, according to Fratelli d’Italia, predominates in Europe (Fratelli d’Italia 2017). Along these lines, the party proposes “not to give in to those who want to eliminate the symbols of our Christian tradition, ban the nativity scene or remove crucifixes from public places” (Fratelli d’Italia 2018).

Thus, religious identity, specifically Christian identity, redefined as culture, is presented as the fundamental pillar of national and Western civilization. This enables the clear delineation of a dividing line between ‘us’ and ‘others’ and the establishment of a cultural hierarchy (Colaianni 2019, p. 15). However, the party’s religious narrative conflicts with the Magisterium and social doctrine of the Catholic Church, which not only avoids imposing barriers between different cultures and religions but explicitly promotes the principle of universal fraternity. More specifically, the Church advocates interreligious dialogue, particularly with Islam, without instigating a “war of civilizations.” Similarly, on key issues such as immigration, welcoming, and social solidarity, which are essential to the Church, the Church aligns itself more with the left than with the party’s positions.

The relationship of the party with the official religion is, therefore, complex, considering that the Church does not recognize Catholic parties, as happened with the Christian Democrats12 in the second half of the twentieth century, nor does it grant patents of religious fidelity to any political party. In other words, the ecclesiastical hierarchy does not establish exclusive alliances with the parties13. Instead, the parties tend to express a cultural rather than a confessional Catholicism, which does not require an authentic profession of faith (Guolo 2011). In this approach, the figure of Christ is relegated to the background or even disappears, while elements of his doctrine are incorporated and identity symbols are prioritized, such as crucifixes, nativity scenes, and religious celebrations in public spaces. The Catholic Church is rather involved in the promotion of values that generate both support and opposition. This is evident in its instance on bioethical issues, the defense of life, and the opposition to gender theories. These positions are adopted by conservative parties, with Fratelli d’Italia being a notable example. This party has also distinguished itself by aligning itself with the Church in its defense of the teaching of religion in schools, turning this issue into yet another factor of symbolic identity. This is evidenced by the statement of Deputy Bucalo, published on the party’s website:

Lay parliamentarians from different parties to the rescue, together, united as rarely happens in politics, for the abolition of religious teaching in Italian schools have presented a motion for the revision of the State-Church concordat. Among the four points listed in the motion I will dwell on what I consider fundamental for the maintenance of the identity of our nation: the teaching of religion to pupils, to students; education in the values of Catholicism..... This is a motion that must not pass.

(Fratelli d’Italia 2021)

Similarly, we see the party positioning itself in favor of the defense of persecuted Christian minorities around the world, in the name of religious freedom. This is expressed in the 2018 general election program, which includes “attention and support for discriminated and persecuted Christian communities around the world” (Fratelli d’Italia 2018) or in the following statement on the party’s website:

A great victory for Fratelli d’Italia: the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies has approved the resolution presented by our group leader, Delmastro, which commits the Government to include respect for religious freedom and Christian minorities among the criteria to be taken into account by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when providing aid and funds for international cooperation. The persecution of Christians is the greatest ongoing genocide in the world, there are millions of believers who risk their lives every day for their faith, and in some States, it is a real emergency. Thanks to Fratelli d’Italia, our nation can be at the forefront in Europe in the defense of religious freedom. An achievement of which we are proud.

(Meloni 2021b)

We may conclude by saying that, in the case of Fratelli d’Italia, religious homogeneity is intertwined with the demand for political unity, which inevitably passes through the political use of religious symbols. The party’s objective is to rebuild Italian identity, as articulated in the program devised for the 2013 general elections, “so that Italy may be the land of those who love it, know it and respect its Constitution and its cultural and religious traditions” (Fratelli d’Italia 2013). Precisely so ended one of the most important public speeches of Giorgia Meloni, on October 19, 2019, in Rome, declaring that “we will defend God, the homeland and the family, so assume it”.

4. Conclusions

Despite the disparities between them, religion remains a salient issue for both parties. In both cases, religion manifests in the two senses to which we referred at the beginning of this study, as the sacralization of politics and as the politicization of religion. While religion is not an integral component of the defining features of this family of parties, it does manifest in these two senses as a consequence of the ideological core established by Mudde, particularly populism and nativism.

Firstly, the populist character of these movements is reflected in the sacralization of the people, considered the depositary of the values that the populist leader is called upon to protect. Politics is redefined as a salvific endeavor, framed in a binary struggle between good and evil, pure and corrupt, traditions and progressivism.

The two formations also coincide, according with their nativism, in emphasizing the Christian roots of Europe, specifically of Italy and Spain. This commitment manifests in concrete political proposals, such as the defense of religious festivities or symbols, including processions. It is a defense of Christianity mostly in cultural terms. However, in the case of Fratelli d’Italia, the reference to Christianism is occasionally made, in contrast to Vox, in properly “religious” terms, as exemplified by Melloni’s self-identification as a Christian believer and her commitment to defend God. The explicit reference to a Christian faith or to God in Italy corresponds with the lower level of secularization in this country previously mentioned. However, in both parties, this appeal to religious tradition is intertwined with an explicit rejection of immigration, particularly from countries with a Muslim tradition. The use of issues such as religion, secularism, and gender equality serves to construct a discourse that positions their stance on Islam within the ambit of ‘democratic’ arguments, thereby circumventing the potential accusation of racism. This discursive strategy mirrors those employed by analogous parties in our closest European environment, such as Rassemblement National (RN) in France or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), thereby serving to reinforce a shared narrative among the European populist radical right.

Along with Christianity, the protection of secularity is also a prominent issue in the discourse of both parties, although it is more pronounced in the case of Vox, again, according with the level of secularization in Spain compared with Italy. Their understanding of the neutrality of the State diverges from the position adopted by the French Rassemblement National (RN), which defends a more republican and strict vision of secularism (laïcitè). On the contrary, it approaches a “moderate secularism” along the lines described by Joppke, similar to the position espoused by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The discourse on secularism exhibited by the parties analyzed here seems to fluctuate between non-confessionalism and positive secularism. A fundamental tenet of positive secularism is the protection of religious freedom, a principle that does not prevent the presence or even the protection of symbols in public spaces. However, this positive secularism shows a clear bias as its application is restricted exclusively to Christianity, which is regarded as an integral component of the majority culture. Conversely, when it comes to Islam, the secularism adopted assumes a more stringent and exclusionary character, recalling the most radical version of French laïcitè. This discursive duality enables these parties to justify a state neutrality that privileges the cultural reproduction of majority traditions, while at the same time adopting a restrictive stance towards the religious manifestations of minorities, most notably Muslims. In sum, the secularism promoted by these formations combines the advocacy of neutrality and religious freedom with a clearly nativist approach, congruent with their objective of safeguarding the cultural and civilizational identity of the majority, wherein Christianity assumes a pivotal role. Consequently, the confluence of national populism and religion—encompassing both secularized Christianity and Chistian secularism—emerges as discursive frameworks within their ideological confrontation with Islam.

In any case, as the then editor of La civiltà catolica, the Jesuit magazine and one of the most authoritative voices in the Catholic field, wrote, the crucifix “is used as a sign with political value, but in an inverted way compared to the past: if before what would have been good to keep in the hands of Caesar was given to God, now it is Caesar who holds and brandishes what is God’s, sometimes even with the complicity of the clerics” (Spadaro 2019, p. 41). It clearly consists of an attempt at “cultural appropriation of religious doctrines and symbols that usually resolves in an expropriation of the authentic meaning given to them by religious organizations to the extent that ‘what is God’s’ is ideologized. Thus, populism adopts the appearance of a new secular faith, but structured like religions: an infallible leadership, which holds the monopoly of the correct political line and, therefore, is endowed with an exclusive disciplinary power to the point of ‘excommunicating’ the dissident. A religious vision, equally secularized, is, after all, that of a unitary people, not traversed by divisions, with individuals in direct, and submissive, relationship with the sovereign or leadership without the intermediation of a plurality of social formations” (Colaianni 2019, p. 15).

Religion thus seems to be clearly linked to national populism in the two parties analyzed here, similar to what is happening in other European parties of the same family. We have analyzed here two parties that occupy the space of the radical right in two countries that, despite the differences we have pointed out, share similar contexts in terms of secularization. To follow up this research, it would be interesting to develop a comparison with other central and northern European countries with higher levels of secularization or with parties of Eastern Europe where politics and religion are not so clearly differentiated as they are in Western Europe. The study of the ideological evolution of both parties, which could not be done here given the youth of the two cases analyzed, could also contribute to our better understanding of the relationship between national populism and religion in the ideology and discourse of the radical right.